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SOCIOLOGY

An Introduction to the Science of Society

Formerly published under the title MAN AND SOCIETY



by Samuel Koenig

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by Samuel Koenig, Ph.D.
Professor of Sociology and Anthropology, Brooklyn College of the City University of New York

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To Miriam and Paul

Preface

The primary purpose in writing this book has been to present to the reader systematically, succinctly but comprehensively, the contributions of sociology to our understanding of human society. The attempt has been made throughout to explain clearly the *basic* ideas and teachings of sociology. At the same time, the social scientists who developed these ideas appear as the protagonists of the drama of man's search for knowledge about the infinitely complex problems of human relationships. The reader is thus afforded an introduction not only to sociology but also to the personalities who formed, shaped, and advanced it. This approach is bound to be more meaningful to him than one that would guide him around a field full of plants but devoid of the workers who sowed and nurtured them.

The selection of theories and authors to be included in a book of this kind depends on what one considers fundamental or most important in the discipline. Probably no two sociologists agree fully on that question. The guiding principle here has been to emphasize, first, writers who have left a definite mark on sociological thought by work that has proved a permanent contribution; and, second, scholars who by their analyses and interpretations of sociological data have deepened or extended our understanding of social phenomena.

Much of the fruitful thought in sociology rests upon the work of the pioneers or recognized masters. A good deal of recent writing in the field consists of little more than restatements (often not as clear as the original versions) of their findings. Even advanced sociology students are frequently ignorant of these early teachings and are thus deprived of the background necessary for a full understanding of the subject or for significant research in it. The masters, therefore, occupy a prominent place in this book.

In presenting the wide range of data covered by the book, the aim has been to give the reader a sense of historical perspective. Hence, each institution or process discussed is traced to the first stirrings of scientific investigation. Explanations of the origins of

human institutions have been included for a similar reason. In orde to understand an institution, the reader must know what has bee discovered about its beginnings, even though these are often difficul to determine and, therefore, remain hypothetical.

Sociology: An Introduction to the Science of Society is intende for both the student and the general intelligent layman. The boo will be found equally suitable as a basic or as a supplementary te in introductory courses or undergraduate courses in sociologic theory. On the other hand, the general reader who wishes to acquai himself with the fundamentals of sociology will be able to do so b reading the book, as no effort has been spared to avoid the use c technical language and to make the exposition as clear as possibl

The author herewith acknowledges his indebtedness to the man social scientists and thinkers upon whom a work of this natu depends. Their names and works are noted throughout the bool He also wishes to thank Prentice-Hall for permission to quote e cerpts from *Social Institutions* by Harry Elmer Barnes (copyrigh 1952); the University of Chicago Press for permission to quo excerpts from *An Introduction to the History of Sociology* edite by Harry Elmer Barnes (copyright, 1948); and Yale Universi Press for permission to quote excerpts from *The Science of Socie* by William Graham Sumner and Albert Galloway Keller (cop right, 1927). Among a number of persons who have extende counsel for which he is most grateful, he wishes to mention partic larly Albert Galloway Keller, Professor Emeritus of Yale Universit whom he was privileged to have as a teacher; Dr. Harry Elm Barnes; and Professor Charles H. Page of Smith College. All thr have read all or a large part of the manuscript and have made helpf comments. He is also obliged to his colleagues at Brooklyn Colle for suggestions and help cheerfully offered. To his wife and s he wishes to express deep-felt gratitude for their forbearance ar encouragement during the extended period of time he was at wo on the book. Last, but not least, he desires to acknowledge h indebtedness to Dr. Samuel Smith and Miss Nancy Cone, of t Barnes and Noble editorial department, for their able assistance preparing the manuscript for publication. Needless to say, the auth assumes the entire responsibility for any shortcomings of the boo

SAMUEL KOENIG

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1

The Meaning and Scope of Sociology

Sociology is the study of man's behavior in groups, or of interaction among human beings. It seeks to understand the nature and purpose of human association; the manner in which the various kinds of association arise, develop, and change; and the beliefs and practices that characterize them.

Although sociology is concerned primarily with the study of social relationships and the processes by which human group activity takes place, nevertheless, in order to analyze the associational life of man, it must also study the individual in his physical and psychological make-up, his animal nature as well as his acquired nature.

The principal task of sociology is to obtain and interpret the facts regarding human association, not to solve social problems. Its ultimate aim, however, is to improve man's adjustment to life by developing objective knowledge concerning social phenomena which can be used to deal effectively with social problems. In this respect sociology bears the same relation to the solution of social problems as, say, biology and bacteriology bear to medicine, or mathematics and physics to engineering. Without the research done in the theoretical and experimental sciences, modern techniques for curing disease or those for bridge-building would be impossible. Similarly, without the investigations carried on by sociology and the other social sciences, no really effective social planning or lasting solutions to social problems would be possible. In this sense, theory can be the most practical thing in the world.

DEFINITION OF SOCIOLOGY

Sociology has been defined in a number of ways by different sociologists. Lester Frank Ward and William Graham Sumner defined it simply as "the science of society," and Franklin Henry Giddings as "the science of social phenomena." Sociology has also

been defined as "the science of institutions" (Durkheim) and as "the science of social organization and social change" (Kovalevsky). Others have conceived of sociology as the science that studies human relationships (Simmel), as the study of "social action" (Weber) or of "social processes" (Small), or as "the science of collective behavior" (Park).

The subject matter of sociology is society itself rather than the individual. "The individual," as the American sociologists William Graham Sumner and Albert Galloway Keller stated in *The Science of Society,* "cannot be left utterly out of the account any more than can the molecular composition of an ivory ball; but if the object of the study is the ball, or society, it is just and proper to deal with it as an entity, not as a sum of its constituent elements." Most sociologists, however, regard the study of the individual as essential to an understanding of society.

Although sociology deals with problems involving values, sentiments, and interests very close to man's heart, it endeavors to keep aloof, to refrain from passing judgment as to the goodness or badness of a thing, its propriety or impropriety, its desirability or undesirability. It is ethically neutral. Sociology takes this attitude because of the conviction, long accepted in all science, that the true nature of any phenomenon cannot be discovered or cannot be adequately understood (and, hence, that the problems connected with it cannot be effectively solved) if the investigator makes up his mind in advance about the subject being investigated. In other words, if the investigator has predilections, he will tend to see the phenomenon or problem not as it actually is, but rather as he wishes it to be. Only an objective study can reveal the real nature and purpose of the phenomenon. Because of the lack of an objective approach many erroneous conclusions regarding social phenomena have been made. Of course, it is impossible to achieve complete objectivity in anything, particularly when dealing with human values, but a large measure of it can be attained with the proper effort and training.

In order to arrive at a complete, rounded picture of man, the sociologist is often obliged to draw upon findings of biology, psychology, anthropology, geography, and history. Furthermore, since man's social life cannot be divorced from his economic and political activities, the sociologist has to utilize the data made available by economics and political science.

This dependence upon other disciplines might give one the im-

pression that sociology is a kind of parasite, living off the efforts of other sciences. As a matter of fact, these contributing sciences (particularly psychology, economics, and political science) are just as dependent, if not more so, upon the data and conclusions of sociology, for their special problems cannot be fully or satisfactorily understood apart from the more general social aspects of life with which sociology is chiefly concerned.

THE FIELDS OF SOCIOLOGY

Sociology includes within its scope all of man's behavior which may be called social. Since many different phases of social life have to be studied, the science of sociology can be subdivided into specialized areas of inquiry, each of which may employ techniques of its own. This subdivision was inevitable since no individual could possibly become expert in every phase of this ramified subject. The specialized areas of inquiry include such problems, phases of social life, and institutional forms as the origin and nature of human group life; the pattern of man's spatial distribution and the factors determining it; institutions, such as the family, school, and church; the nature of group behavior; the community; and social problems, such as poverty, crime and delinquency, vice, and physical and mental disease. Then, too, since no science can exist and develop without cultivating a philosophy and methodology of its own, some sociologists devote their main attention to the philosophical and methodological aspects of the science.

Sociology is divided into several major fields. *Sociological Theory* analyzes principles, concepts, and generalizations of the science. *Historical Sociology* studies societies of the remote as well as of the recent past to discover origins of, and find explanations for, our present ways of life. *The Family* considers the origin, evolution, and function of this institution, the forms it has assumed in various periods of history and in different societies, as well as the contemporary problems connected with it. *Human Ecology and Demography* investigate the spatial distribution of human groupings (primarily communities and neighborhoods), their relationship to one another, and the forces determining their distribution and relationship, and also analyze population changes and movements. *The Community* (a field closely allied with and dependent upon ecology and demography) analyzes the organization and problems

of both rural and urban types of communities. Since the problems of city and country are in many respects quite distinct, this field of study is subdivided into *Rural* and *Urban Sociology*. *Sociology of Religion* studies the church as a social institution, inquiring into its origin, development, and forms, as well as into changes in its structure and function. *Educational Sociology* studies the objectives of the school as a social institution, its curricular and extracurricular activities, and its relationship to the community and its other institutions. *Political Sociology* studies the social implications of various types of political movements and ideologies and the origin, development, and functions of the government and the state. *Sociology of Law* concerns itself with formalized social control, or with the processes whereby members of a group achieve uniformity in their behavior through the rules and regulations imposed upon them by society. It inquires into the factors that bring about the formation of regulatory systems, as well as into the reasons for their adequacies and inadequacies as a means of control. *Social Psychology* seeks to understand human motivation and behavior as they are determined by society and its values. It studies the socialization process of the individual, i.e., how he becomes a member of society; it also studies the public, the crowd, the mob, and various other social groupings and movements. Analysis of mass persuasion, or propaganda, and of public opinion has been one of its major interests. *Social Psychiatry* deals with the relationships between social and personal disorganization, its general hypothesis being that society, through its excessive and conflicting demands upon the individual, is to a large extent responsible for personal maladjustments, such as various types of mental disorder and antisocial behavior. In its applied aspects it is concerned with remedying this situation. *Social Disorganization* deals with the problems of maladjustment and malfunctioning, including problems of crime and delinquency, poverty and dependency, population movements, physical and mental disease, and vice and prostitution. Of these subdivisions, crime and delinquency have received perhaps the greatest attention and have developed into the distinct field of *Criminology*. *Group Relations* is concerned with studying the problems arising out of the coexistence in a community of diverse racial and ethnic groups.

Although the foregoing are the main divisions of sociology, new areas and subareas are evolved as the problems coming within the

scope of this science are explored more thoroughly and systematically, and as new techniques are devised and developed for dealing with them. Thus, in addition to the areas listed above, there are a number of others such as *Cultural Sociology, Folk Sociology, The Sociology of Art, Industrial Sociology, Medical Sociology, Military Sociology, The Sociology of Small Groups,* and such special topics as social stratification, mass media of communication, public opinion, and bureaucracy.

THE METHODS OF SOCIOLOGY

It has been often stated that sociology cannot be considered a science because it cannot experiment and, hence, cannot predict. It is true that because of the materials with which sociology deals—human behavior and relationships—experimentation in the laboratory sense is difficult and often impossible. But, within limits, sociology can, and does, employ techniques which apply quantitative measurements to social phenomena and are therefore comparable to the method of experimentation. Moreover, two other basic methods of scientific investigation—observation and comparison—are readily available to the sociologist as they are to the physical scientist, and the sociologist uses them all the time. Besides, not all physical sciences employ laboratory experimentation. Astronomy, one of the oldest sciences, cannot experiment with its materials. The heavenly bodies obviously could not be induced to put in an appearance in the laboratory. As to prediction, it may be said, firstly, that no science is capable of making infallible predictions, and, secondly, that sociology does attempt to predict. In some areas of social life, prediction, to a limited extent, is possible. As sociology matures and comes to understand more fully the principles underlying human behavior, it will be in a better position to make accurate predictions.

Moreover, science may be, and indeed has been, defined in such a way as to invalidate these objections to sociology. Thus, one definition states that science is simply "organized common sense." Authorities have long maintained that the approach, rather than any particular set of methods or techniques, determines whether or not a discipline is a science and that scientific procedure consists primarily of objective observation followed by cautious interpretation

of the observed facts. Insofar as sociology does this, it is a science

Sociology employs several methods of inquiry which it shares with other social sciences.

The *historical method* calls for a study of events, processes, and institutions of past civilizations. for the purpose of finding the origins or antecedents of contemporary social life and thus of understanding its nature and workings. The underlying idea is that our present forms of social life. our customs or ways of living, have their roots in the past and that one can best explain them by tracing them back to their sources.

The *comparative method* involves comparisons of various kinds of groups or peoples in order to disclose the differences as well as the similarities in their ways of life. The assumption here is that these divergences and likenesses furnish important clues to man's social behavior. The method may be used in the study of existing groups or of those of the past, and of groups on the same or different levels of civilization.

The *statistical method* is used to measure social phenomena mathematically in order to disclose relationships and thus arrive at generalizations regarding their nature, occurrence, and meaning. Most of the data dealt with in sociology are qualitative and hence do not lend themselves to statistical treatment. However, sociologists have been able to reduce more and more of such data to quantitative terms and thus to deal with them statistically. The sampling and control-group techniques are very important parts of this method. In recent years a technique has been developed that came to be known as *Sociometry,* which attempts to measure social phenomena quantitatively. Sociometry uses scales and values to study interpersonal relations and patterns of informal leadership in varying social contexts; for example, it studies housing projects. health conditions, work situations, and the social and economic status of population groups.

The *case-study method* may be employed in studying a condition, group, community, institution, or individual. Underlying it is the contention that any case being studied is representative of many, if not all, similar cases, and, hence, will make generalization possible. The method involves an investigation and an analysis of all the factors entering into the case and an examination from as many points of view as possible. Interviews, questionnaires, schedules, life histories, pertinent documents of all kinds,

and so-called "participant observation," in which the observer becomes a member of the group, are some of the techniques used in this method.

Aside from the strictly scientific, or empirical approach which has been noted above, some sociologists, of whom Max Weber is perhaps the most notable, advocate the *verstehen* approach to the study of social phenomena. (The German word *verstehen* means understanding or comprehension.) The advocates of this approach maintain that observed facts, no matter how cautious the procedure for gathering them may be, are of little significance unless evaluated and that this evaluation must be accomplished through discovery of their inner meaning. The observer must try to understand what the behavior of individuals or of groups means to them. The American sociologist Charles Horton Cooley maintained, in his *Sociological Theory and Social Research,* that in order to grasp the significance of the noted behavior of individuals, the observer must penetrate to their thought processes and sentiments and share their states of mind. Only in this manner can he *understand* their actions. Although the two approaches, the empirical and the *verstehen,* are distinct in their nature, sociologists do not advocate the exclusive use of one or the other; most of them utilize both approaches in their studies.

Another approach to the study of social phenomena which is being given ever greater emphasis in sociology is *functionalism.* Briefly, functionalism refers to the study of social phenomena from the point of view of the functions that particular institutions or social structures, such as class, serve in a society. Functionalism assumes that the total social system of a society is made up of parts which are interrelated and interdependent, each performing a function necessary to the life of the group. These parts can best be understood in terms of the needs they meet. Again, since they are interdependent, one can understand them only by investigating their relationship to other parts as well as to the whole social system.

This approach is by no means a recent innovation, as its germs are found in the works of Comte, Spencer, and other pioneers. However, it was not until it gained currency among the anthropologists, primarily through Bronislaw Malinowski and A. R. Radcliffe-Brown, that it became established as a method in sociology. In the field of sociology the functional approach has been crystallized by the American sociologists Talcott Parsons and Robert K. Merton,

who, because of their emphasis on social structures, or institutions, refer to it as the *structural-functional method*.

The various methods, or approaches, utilized by sociology are not mutually exclusive. Some are complementary, and sociologists often employ more than one in their investigations.

2

Development of Sociology

In carrying on his life activities, man encounters two types of phenomena which he seeks to understand and to control—the physical and the social. On the one hand, there are the remote, impersonal forces of nature, and, on the other, the more personal, closer, but nonetheless baffling, social forces which rule and determine human behavior.

PRESCIENTIFIC VIEWS OF PHYSICAL AND SOCIAL PHENOMENA

Throughout history man has made attempts to comprehend these forces, realizing that his successful struggle for existence and his welfare are dependent upon his understanding of them. The manner, however, in which he at first sought to learn about them could hardly have resulted in a real understanding, for he relied mostly upon fantasy, imagination, and speculation, rather than upon the investigation of facts. In the course of time, however, man learned to observe carefully and systematically the forces shaping his life, until he reached a point at which he was able to make scientific analyses and generalizations and thus to gain a better understanding of what was going on about him.

Comparing man's approaches to these two major types of phenomena, we find that progress in his understanding occurred much earlier and more completely in the case of the physical aspects of his environment. As far as comprehension of social forces is concerned. there was little headway until very recent times, when notable strides began to be made in the development of sciences dealing with human relationships—the social sciences.

As in the case of the physical sciences, the antecedents of the social sciences were speculation and spurious observation, resulting often in fantastic notions about the nature of phenomena. Whereas, how-

ever, the sciences dealing with physical phenomena have largely liberated themselves from speculation, those concerned with social phenomena are still in the process of doing so.

Why this discrepancy in the development of man's understanding of the two distinct environments—the physical and the social—in which he lives? The answer is probably to be found in the greater observability and control of physical phenomena, as well as in the impersonal approach that they afford. Physical phenomena are usually more concrete than social phenomena and hence are more observable. In his attempt to observe physical phenomena man was able quite early to develop a measure of detachment, but he found it very difficult to do so regarding social phenomena. In the latter case he found himself too close to the object of investigation, too involved in it, to achieve the objectivity which is indispensable to all science.

Nevertheless, in a rudimentary way, man began in ancient times to take stock of his social environment and to attempt to understand the problems created by it. During the medieval and early modern periods, his observations and analyses of social phenomena were almost wholly of a speculative character, and the ideas held regarding them were mostly erroneous and even absurd when considered in the light of our present-day knowledge of the nature of human society.

The earliest results of observations by man, civilized man, regarding human relationships have come down to us by means of oral and written records, proverbs, sacred writings, and the surviving books of ancient sages. All these betray the speculative nature of man's efforts to understand his social environment and the forces shaping it. They were at best profound reflections, wise observations. While some of these contained a good deal of truth, they were on the whole untrustworthy as guides to living. We now know that in order to attain a real understanding of the laws and principles underlying human association, which alone can enable us to solve effectively the problems arising from it, we must employ methods similar to those used by the natural sciences.

THE EMERGENCE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE

Man's efforts to make use of scientific observation and analysis have resulted in the rise of the social sciences. At first and for a

considerable time, a single social science dealt with all of man's activities, whether they touched the economic, the political, or the more specifically social phase. In due course, however, this single "science of society" was subdivided into several social sciences, each specializing in a particular phase of social life. These include, among others, economics, political science, cultural anthropology, and sociology. While, broadly speaking, all deal with social phenomena and are therefore interrelated and quite interdependent, each, at present, concentrates upon a particular phase of human conduct and specializes in studying it. Thus, economics is concerned chiefly with analyzing those activities relating to man's quest for the material things necessary to sustain life, and political science centers on the activities whereby man provides himself with the protections and regulations that are afforded by the government or state. Sociology, on the other hand, focuses its attention on relationships which are definitely *social;* but, in its larger sense, sociology concerns itself with the entire domain of the social sciences, bringing its own methods and approaches to the study of all group phenomena.

THE BEGINNINGS OF SOCIOLOGY

Sociology as a science, and particularly as a separate field of study, did not make its appearance until about the middle of the nineteenth century. Emerging like other sciences, however, it was preceded by a series of attempts to explain human relations and behavior, few, if any, of which could be strictly called scientific. "Social thought" existed, of course, in ancient times and thereafter, consisting now and then of systematic thinking and analysis, but based primarily upon speculation. In fact, this effort to understand the nature of social life may be regarded as having prepared the ground for the development of sociology as the scientific study of society.

Perhaps the earliest attempts at systematic thought regarding social life, at least as far as Western civilization is concerned, may be said to have begun with the ancient Greek philosophers, particularly the great masters of human thought, Plato (427-347 B.C.) and Aristotle (384-322 B.C.). But their efforts were little more than profound reflections. This was inevitable, as their method of investigation consisted primarily of logical deduction. Now, logic is an indispensable tool, to be sure, in all orderly thinking, but in itself it is not a means of arriving at scientific truth, at an understanding of reality. Con-

sequently, the laborious investigations of many of the ancient sages resulted in blueprints, so to speak, of an ideal state, a Utopia where unruffled peace and justice prevail. Aristotle showed a more realistic approach to social phenomena than did Plato, who was his teacher, but, in the main, he succeeded only in drawing up the prerequisites, arrived at mainly through the syllogistic process, of the ideal social order. Moreover, the ideal social order which these two thinkers described was mainly an idealization of the society in which they lived.

Social thought of this prescientific kind, with few exceptions, advanced very little between the time of Plato and Aristotle and early modern times. The works that could lay claim to any systematic social thought at all during and immediately preceding the Middle Ages reflected the teachings of the Church and were for the most part metaphysical speculations regarding the place of man on earth.

It was not until the sixteenth century that there appeared writers who treated life's problems on a more realistic level. Perhaps the most notable among these was the Italian Niccolò Machiavelli, in whose work, *The Prince,* published in 1513, we find an attempt at an objective discussion of the state and statecraft. This book, unlike his other works, was devoted chiefly to an exposition of the principles governing the successful state, or rather the successful ruler of a state. It is a practical guide for the ruler who would maintain his power. Insofar as Machiavelli sought to base his theories of the state upon historical data, he may be considered in a sense an objective writer. Another author in this period worth noting was Sir Thomas More. Although his book *Utopia,* published in 1515, represented an approach virtually the opposite of that found in Machiavelli's writings, it was nevertheless a step in the direction of dealing with everyday social problems, albeit by means of depicting an ideal social order which presumably was presented for emulation. More's *Utopia* pictured a perfect state where all the problems with which society, or rather the England of his day, was beset, have been solved and where complete justice reigns. This perfect society is made possible by putting into practice the rules of natural law. More's technique of presenting a picture of the ideal life as a way of pointing out what real life ought to be was utilized by several other writers, among them Thomasso Campanella, in his *City of the Sun,* Sir Francis Bacon, in his *New Atlantis,* and James Harrington, in his *Commonwealth of Oceana.*

Considerable strides toward the objective analysis of social forces

were made in the writings of the Italian Vico and the Frenchman Montesquieu, who, while primarily political philosophers, had considerable influence upon the consequent rise of a science of society. Giovanni Battista Vico, in his book *The New Science,* contended that society was subject to definite laws which can be discovered through objective observation and study. Charles Louis de Secondat Montesquieu exerted an even greater influence than Vico in the direction of scientific investigation of social phenomena through his brilliant works, particularly his *Esprit des lois (The Spirit of Laws),* which presents a keen analysis of the role certain external factors, especially climate, play in the life of human societies. To these two writers may be added two more, Condorcet and Saint-Simon, whose contributions toward the development of a science of society were even more direct. In his *Historical Sketch of the Progress of the Human Mind,* Marie Jean Antoine Condorcet formulated a theory of social change which had a far-reaching influence upon later sociological theories. Claude Henri Comte de Saint-Simon, though primarily a utopian reformer, insisted that social reform can be achieved only when scientific or "positive" data have been collected. These four writers, although their contributions were primarily in the field of political thought and philosophy, may be considered among the forerunners of sociology.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SOCIOLOGY AS A SCIENCE

Auguste Comte, a Frenchman, is traditionally considered to be the father of sociology. He is regarded as such not because of any significant contributions to the science, but rather because of the stimulating effect he had upon it. Comte is credited with the coining of the term "sociology" (in 1839) and with having defined the scope of this social science and the methods which it should employ. Judging him by his extensive work, we must regard him as a philosopher of science rather than as a sociologist. Comte devoted his main efforts to an inquiry into the nature of human knowledge, a gigantic task which he performed with singular brilliance, seeking to classify all knowledge and to analyze the methods of achieving it. His major labors were directed toward determining the nature of human society and the laws and principles underlying its growth and development, as well as the methods to be employed in studying social phenomena. He saw the need for the creation of a distinct science of

society, which he at first called "social physics" and, later, "sociology," that should concern itself with an analysis and explanation of social phenomena.

Comte's chief work is his *Cours de philosophie positive (Positive Philosophy),* published, in six volumes, during 1830-1842. It formulated his theory of the three stages through which human knowledge develops, namely, the Theological, the Metaphysical, and the Positive, or empirical. Comte maintained that only when this last stage has been reached is real science possible. In the Positive stage, objective observation is substituted for speculation and there is a concentration upon the discovery of causal relationships rather than first causes. Social phenomena, like physical phenomena, he asserted, can be studied objectively by employing the positive method. He thus blazed the trail for a science of society—for sociology.

Sociology came into its own as an autonomous discipline with the appearance of the sociological works of the Englishman Herbert Spencer, who is considered one of the most brilliant intellects of modern times. He undertook to create what Comte had merely indicated as desirable—an all-encompassing science of society. This resulted in a multivolume work, called *Synthetic Philosophy,* the chief sociological part of which is the *Principles of Sociology.* Spencer employed the inductive method in his study of social phenomena; he arrived at his conclusions after an examination and analysis of data based mainly upon what was then known of the life of primitive man. One of his most noteworthy theories was that social phenomena, or the "superorganic," as he termed them, like the organic, undergo an evolutionary process of growth from the simple and homogeneous to the complex and heterogeneous. Primitive man to him represented the simple human type from which civilized man evolved. Another significant contribution of his is the so-called *organic analogy,* in which society is compared with the human organism. Spencer was influenced by the theory of evolution of his contemporary Charles Darwin, although to an extent he also anticipated it.

Many of Spencer's theories had to be greatly modified or even abandoned in the course of the development of sociology, but the contributions of this pioneer can hardly be exaggerated. Among those who were influenced by his organismic theory, which they elaborated upon, were the Continental sociologists Paul von Lilien-

feld, Albert Schäffle, and Jacques Novicow, and the Americans Ward, Sumner, and Giddings.

THE TRADITIONAL SCHOOLS OF SOCIOLOGY

Looking back at the historical development of sociology, we find, on the one hand, a tendency to interpret the social on the basis of the nonsocial, namely, the biological, geographic, and psychological, and, on the other, a tendency to explain social phenomena on the basis of the social or cultural as such. Consequently, we may distinguish four major schools of sociological thought. While none of them is too well defined at present, and the biological and geographical schools are no longer an important part of the field, each has played a significant role in the shaping of sociology as we know it today.

The *biological school* may be traced back to Spencer's comparison of society to a biological organism. Some of the early sociologists accepted this view and tended to explain society in terms of biological laws and evolutionary processes. Sociology to them was mainly a science which is based on biology. Under the further influence and stimulation of Darwin's theory of natural selection, some sociologists sought to interpret social phenomena in terms of group conflict and competition, alleging that society evolves and progresses through struggle. At present few sociologists would accept these theories unqualifiedly, but they have been widely accepted in a modified form. Some of the present-day sociological researches into the various aspects of population, particularly those concerning the quality of populations, may, in a sense, be viewed as a biological approach to the study of society.

The adherents of the *geographical school* of thought emphasize the determining influence of geographical factors upon human society. They hold that the particular forms taken on by such institutions as religion, the family, and economic systems are largely the result of geographic conditions. Even the extent of human progress and achievement is regarded as primarily due to the natural environment. This school has exerted a considerable influence upon some of the demographers and ecologists, who are concerned with the nature of population distribution and movement and with the interaction of man and his environment.

The followers of the *psychological school* conceive of social phenomena in terms of psychological motivations of individuals or groups. Social interaction, in other words, is based on processes which are primarily psychological. The influence of these men has been very wide. Many outstanding European and American sociologists, past and present, have drawn upon their theories for interpreting sociological phenomena.

The greatest array of prominent sociologists is found in the *sociologistic school,* which attempts to explain human behavior in terms of the social environment, or social forces. The ways in which an individual acts or reacts, according to this school, depend largely upon the influences exerted by the group or the society in which he lives. Sumner and Keller conceived of these forces as "due to the operation of impersonal, automatically acting forces which transcend altogether the range of individual powers and control and produce effects characteristic of themselves alone." This view does not necessarily negate all the theories of other schools; in fact, much that has been propounded by the other schools is acceptable, with modifications, to this school.

3

Origin and Development of Society

An inquiry into human history, no matter how far back it reaches, will disclose that man has always lived in groups. Living in a group is so essential to him that his existence is unthinkable apart from it. Perhaps the best indication that it is primarily life in a human group that makes the animal we call *man* human may be obtained from cases of feral children, or so-called "wolf children," and from instances of children left in extreme isolation. The former are children who have been abandoned and forced to live among animals, outside of human society; the best-known account of them is given in *Wolf Children and Feral Man* by J. A. L. Singh and R. M. Zingg. The latter are children kept almost completely out of social contact; they are described by Kingsley Davis in the *American Journal of Sociology*. The behavior of the "wolf children," Kamala and Amala, when they were discovered in India, was found to resemble that of animals rather than of human beings. They could not speak, nor show human emotions; they walked in an animal-like manner on all four limbs, ate raw meat, and in general displayed habits characteristic of jungle animals. Two isolated American children, Anna and Isabelle, were also found by Davis to be lacking in some of the skills associated with human beings, such as the ability to talk, walk, feed themselves, or follow simple directions. Even if, as some suspect, these children, and a number of others in similar circumstances, were subnormal in mentality, their behavior was such as to leave little doubt that without contact within a human group man can hardly develop those characteristics which we call human, and that life in a group is indispensable for the human being. It is thus possible to state, as did the French sociologist Émile Durkheim and others, that the social group, society, precedes the individual, in the sense that the human being is a product of social interaction.

SOCIAL LIFE AMONG THE LOWER ANIMALS

Social life must not be thought of as limited to man or as starting with him. We encounter social life, indeed highly organized forms of it, among many animal species. Thus, a number of insect species have been termed "social insects" because of their highly organized social life. Outstanding examples are the ants, bees, and wasps, which live in communities having a well-defined caste system, division of labor, cooperation, an awareness of belonging, intercommunication, and even mutual aid. Among birds, too, definite features of social life are discernible. These include cooperative endeavors, division of labor, dominance and subordination, communication, and other social characteristics. When we reach the mammals, particularly the higher types, group life not infrequently takes on a form strongly suggestive of human social life. The points of similarity between the social life of the higher apes—the gorilla, orangutan, and chimpanzee—and that of human beings are so striking that the apes have been subjected to painstaking study in the hope that their behavior will shed light upon the origins and foundations of human behavior.

The best-known of such studies is *The Mentality of Apes* by the German-American psychologist Wolfgang Köhler. He found that the group life of apes displays almost all the characteristics of human societies, albeit in a rudimentary form: love and hatred, sympathy and antipathy, friendship and animosity, genuine attachment, mourning over the loss of a friend, happiness and despair, a developed sense of belonging, and group solidarity. To be sure, apes do not employ language comparable to that of human beings, but they have developed a system of intercommunication which makes it possible for them to indicate their feelings to one another. In short, the apes come very close to behaving like human beings.

DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ANIMAL AND HUMAN SOCIETIES

In spite of these similarities, however, there are essential differences between animal and human social life. Even though these differences are quantitative rather than qualitative, differences in degree

rather than in kind, they are sufficiently great to set human society definitely apart from that of animals.

Although, as we have seen, animals lower than man have developed means of communication, they cannot be said to possess true language, and although they are capable of learning, their abilities in this respect are so limited as to be incomparable to those of man. This is true even of the highest among them, the apes. The social life of animals lower than man is based almost entirely upon instinct, or reflex behavior, which shows practically no variation from generation to generation. Petrified anthills which are estimated to be millions of years old indicate that ants of that remote past did not differ in their behavior from that of their present-day counterparts. Not so in the case of human association. Human beings cannot depend upon inherent, or instinctive, patterns of behavior as a guide to their social life and activities; they have to adapt themselves to new and varying conditions and situations in life, to devise means of solving problems as they arise. As a result, human society shows a great variety of forms, even though the fundamental needs of human beings may be said to be the same. Thus, all human beings have need for protection from the elements, but the types of shelters constructed by them vary greatly. Man builds his dwellings in various shapes, of a variety of materials, and in a variety of localities; or, in many cases, he does not build at all, resorting to places of protection provided by nature, such as caves. In seeking to satisfy his other needs, whether material or nonmaterial, a similar variability is to be discerned. Human society, moreover, does not go about meeting its needs in exactly the same manner generation after generation; sometimes as in our own rapidly changing age, the changes occur in a single generation. Man is never satisfied, for any extended period of time at any rate, in merely maintaining himself, in merely existing; he always seeks to improve his lot. He thinks of new, sometimes better, ways of satisfying his ever increasing needs.

THE MEANING OF HUMAN SOCIETY

What is human society? More precisely, what is *a* human society? We have seen that to Spencer human society is comparable to a living organism with functions similar to those found in an organic being. In his *Principles of Sociology,* Spencer went to considerable

length in elaborating on this analogy. Thus, he maintained that both a biological organism and society are subject to the process of growth and decline, that both consist of interdependent parts, and that both possess a regulative system—in the animal, the nervous system, and, in society, the governmental system—and even a distributive system, constituting the circulatory system in one and the communications system in the other. Although Spencer insisted that this analogy should be looked upon as a mere illustration and also pointed out important differences between the biological and social organisms, he, nevertheless, utilized the analogy for the purpose of analyzing many social phenomena.

Several of Spencer's contemporaries, notably the Russo-German sociologist and philosopher, Paul von Lilienfeld, went much further in this attempt to compare society with a living organism. To Lilienfeld, society is a living organism possessing all the characteristics of such, including multiplication, growth, metabolism, disease, and death. Society, according to him, is only the most advanced and complex of organisms. Others who accepted the view of society as an organic being include the German sociologist and statesman Albert G. F. Schäffle, the French sociologist René Worms, and the Russo-French sociologist Jacques Novicow, each of whom developed the idea in his own way. All these writers belong to the so-called bio-organismic school.

Spencer's organic analogy found a number of critics among his contemporaries. Among those rejecting the view that society is comparable to an organism was the eminent Russian sociologist Nikolai K. Mikhailovsky. He contended that society, instead of being an organism, is a "coordination of indivisible organisms," all of which have organs and hence perform a totality of functions. Whereas, he wrote, in the case of an organism, the whole, and not its component parts, suffers or experiences pleasure, in that of society only its constituent members can be conscious of pain or pleasure. The two, therefore, can hardly be considered analogous, even though some similarity, particularly regarding the processes of change, exists between them.

The claim that society is an organism is now completely discredited. The fact that society is composed of individuals who are biological entities does not make it an entity endowed with the characteristics of its components. One might as well claim that a

business organization is a biological organism because it is composed of individuals who are biological entities.

Society has been defined in a number of other ways. Thus, Sumner and Keller, in their *The Science of Society,* conceived of society as "a group of human beings living in a cooperative effort to win subsistence and to perpetuate the species," while the Finno-English sociologist, Edward Westermarck, viewed it simply, but more vaguely, as a group of individuals living a cooperative life. On the other hand, Giddings, in his *Readings in Descriptive and Historical Sociology,* defined a society as a "group of individuals cooperating for the achievement of any object of common interest or utility." Robert M. MacIver, in his *Society,* described society as "the system of social relationships in and through which we live," while the Italian sociologist Vilfredo Pareto regarded it as an aggregation of human molecules living in mutual relationship.

Perhaps, in further clarification of these various views, it may be said that society is a group of people held together by common traditions, customs, and ways of life, or a common culture, and in which there exists among the members constituting it an awareness of belonging to it. This latter characteristic, a sense of belonging, is emphasized by both Giddings and MacIver. It should be added that the term society is used by the sociologist in both a wide and a narrow sense. In the wider sense it includes the human race as a whole, but in the narrower sense—the one used most frequently—it refers to groups ranging in size from a few scores of families constituting a primitive tribe to modern nations with hundreds of millions of people. Thus, the sociologist speaks of human society and at the same time of Zulu, Carib, Eskimo, Albanian, Hindu, Mexican, or American society. A society in this latter sense, furthermore, includes a great variety of smaller groupings, such as age and sex groups, social and economic classes, occupational groups, and communities.

THEORIES OF THE ORIGIN OF HUMAN SOCIETY

It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to discover origins in human affairs, in the sense of finding out just exactly what happened in the beginning. Science has given up the quest for ultimate origins, leaving this problem to speculative philosophers, and being satisfied

with causal relationships. The social scientist hopes to arrive at more or less well-founded inferences, not certainties, as to the origin of various aspects or phases of social life or of social life itself. The beginnings are nebulous and the chain has numerous missing links that may never be found. As a result, explanations regarding the origins of society are bound to be varied and conflicting.

Views of Ancient and Modern Philosophers

Going back to antiquity, we can discern in the thinking of Greek philosophers a vague conception of some sort of evolutionary process. In the writings of Plato and Aristotle one finds the idea of social change as well as the concept of progress. Hundreds of years later, the Roman poet Lucretius, writing in the first century A.D., gave expression, in his *De rerum natura,* to the idea of evolution not only in material things but also in social affairs. For a further development of this concept, however, one has to skip many centuries. In the seventeenth century, one finds again, in the interpretations of the philosophers of the period, the notion of social evolution. The theories of these men were, of course, based almost entirely on speculation. Thus, the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes, one of the first of a succession of thinkers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries preoccupied with the origin of phenomena, including human society, concluded that man was at first little more than a brute, leading an isolated, selfish life, intent upon satisfying only his own desires and impulses. Primitive man was in constant warfare with his fellow men and lived in perpetual fear of being attacked and murdered by his neighbors. In time, however, he realized that by banding together and agreeing to live in peace with his neighbors he would be able to get rid of the unbearable condition in which he found himself. In that period of man's existence orderly society emerged.

Hobbes's younger contemporary, John Locke, differed from him in picturing the original state of man as being peaceful rather than warlike. But he, too, insisted that in order to advance himself man had to unite into larger groups instead of living in isolated families and small bands, which, he maintained, was the original form of group life. A somewhat similar view was held by the eighteenth-century French philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau. Regarding the original state of man as neither good nor bad but merely "natural," he, nevertheless, thought of it as fundamentally savage and cruel

until man entered into an agreement with his fellows to live in peace and order and thus learned to control himself. Since these writers, and a number of others of lesser importance, conceived of human society as the result of a kind of agreement, or "contract", into which men entered, they are known as the exponents of the *social contract theory* of human society.

Views of Early Social Thinkers and Sociologists

Also basing his theory of the origin of human society largely upon speculation, the great Italian thinker Vico arrived at rather far-fetched conclusions concerning the beginnings of human association. To be sure, he held that man from the beginning lived in groups. However, during a certain period, social relationships degenerated, forcing men to live in an unsocial, barbarous, and cruel state from which he emerged through becoming aware of a divine presence and his consequent sense of shame. Montesquieu, on the other hand, believed that man was led to associative life through his fear of the overwhelming natural forces against which he felt helpless and alone. Implicit in the interpretations of these men, as well as in those of the social contract school, is the idea of evolution and progress.

The Frenchman Condorcet was more specific in his formulation of a theory of evolution and progress. In his *Historical Sketch of the Progress of the Human Mind* he propounded a stage theory of social evolution, according to which civilization passed through ten developmental stages, each higher than the preceding one, the highest still to be attained in the future. In this Condorcet anticipated the "first" sociologist, Comte, whom he greatly influenced, though the latter denied it.

Views of Comte and Spencer

Mention has been made of Comte's theory of the three stages through which mankind presumably passes. Comte supplemented this theory, which applied chiefly to intellectual development, with another, according to which human history passes from a Military to a Legalistic to an Industrial era, corresponding to the Theological, Metaphysical, and Positive stages. In his view, society came into existence as a result of a need for association, a felt need of human beings which evolved in accordance with definite laws. Comte believed that existing societies find themselves on different stages

of development, from the most primitive to the most advanced, and, moreover, that the various aspects of life in any society may be on different levels. Progress, he implied, is inevitable, although it is necessarily gradual, slow, and uneven, and a highly desirable state of existence may be achieved by means of certain far-reaching reforms.

The theory of social evolution reached perhaps its highest development and greatest elaboration with Herbert Spencer, who is considered the father of the classical evolutionists. It will be recalled that Spencer conceived of society as being similar to a biological organism. Another major theory of his, which was much more fruitful and more influential, asserted that society is subject to the same laws of evolution as all matter, organic as well as inorganic. In other words, the same evolutionary process is to be observed in all phenomena, including the social, which he significantly termed "superorganic." His general theory of evolution, as it pertains to all phenomena, is discussed in his *First Principles,* while his theory of the superorganic, or social, is treated in detail in his sociological works, *The Study of Sociology* and *The Principles of Sociology.*

Briefly, Spencer held that human society, like other phenomena, developed from a simple to a complex stage; evolution was slow and gradual, in well-defined stages. To him evolution meant, on the whole, progress. Human society advanced from a savage state to a civilized state, passing through various intermediate steps. Contemporary primitive societies, to him, represented man in a young and undeveloped social stage. Moreover, he held that backward societies tend to be militant; then, as they advance, they become more peaceful so that industry tends to replace militarism. He further contended that primitive warfare brought about the integration necessary for the formation of social groups. Nevertheless, Spencer did not view evolution as endless progress but insisted that there is a limit to it, after which disintegration and death take place. Moreover, disintegration is also gradual and involves a process of evolution in reverse. Evolution is thus cyclical in nature.

According to Spencer, the process involved in evolution is one of equilibration, by which, in the case of society, he meant that there is a tendency toward the attainment of an equilibrium, or balance, between a society and its environment, between one society and another, and between the various groups and social forces within a society. Equilibrium occurs through a struggle for exis-

tence. When equilibrium is attained, the society enjoys peace, freedom, and liberty. Since society and its institutions are subject to an automatic process of evolution, Spencer thought that there is little use in trying to change conditions and that individuals should adjust to the existing state of affairs. He was an ardent exponent of *laissez faire,* even though he did allow for the possibility of limited reforms.

Among those supporting the theory of unilinear and progressive evolution was Maksim M. Kovalevsky. According to this great Russian sociologist, human society has passed through several well-defined stages, finally reaching the democratic social order, which is the highest known. In his view, the most primitive stage of social organization was the loosely organized horde with a matrilineal family, or clan, system (a system in which affiliation is reckoned only through the mother's female line). This system was succeeded by a patrilineal, or gens, system. The gens system evolved into a kind of feudal type of organization which prevailed for a long time in many societies, ancient as well as modern. The feudal system finally gave way to a democratic order marked by equality and freedom.

Few, if any, sociologists accept the theory of social evolution expounded by Spencer. The evidence gathered in the past few decades regarding human societies shows no such evolutionary pattern. As in the case of the organic analogy, the comparison between the development of human societies and that of the organic and inorganic matter is held to be invalid. Even such eminent biological Darwinists as Thomas Huxley and Alfred Russel Wallace disagreed with Spencer's comparison. Identification of evolution with progress is also rejected by most sociologists, since it is difficult to determine what progress is, particularly in the nonmaterial aspects of human life. All one can perceive is change—no society is completely static—but change does not necessarily imply progress. Sociologists prefer to use the term "change" instead of "evolution."

A modified version of the idea of social evolution, which may be referred to as "neo-evolutionism," has recently been proposed. Perhaps the chief exponents of this new version are the anthropologists Leslie A. White and V. Gordon Childe. White, in *The Science of Culture,* distinguished among what he called the technological, the sociological, and the ideological phases of culture. (The latter two depend upon the first.) A culture with an efficient technological sys-

tem is an advanced culture, whereas one with a poor system of utilization of power is bound to be primitive. Childe, in his *Social Evolution,* maintained that cultures go through three well-defined stages—savagery, barbarism, and civilization—and that they are subject to processes similar to those operating in organic evolution, i.e., heredity, adaptation, and selection.

Views of the Social Darwinists

Darwin's theory of natural selection through the struggle for existence found strong repercussions in the thinking of a number of sociologists in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Among those deeply influenced by Darwin's epoch-making conclusions were the Englishman Walter Bagehot and the Austrians Ludwig Gumplowicz and Gustav Ratzenhofer.

Bagehot, in his *Physics and Politics* (words which, in his usage, correspond to physical and social science) maintained that societies evolved through struggle and a process of selection. This struggle, however, was primarily social in nature. Bagehot meant that the human group is held together by common customs and practices; in time these become solidified into what he termed a "cake of custom," which makes the members of the group behave and react alike. When this occurs, the group is easily subordinated to its leaders and achieves unity of purpose and solidarity. Equipped in this manner, one group conquers others that are less unified, subordinating them and imposing its customs upon them. Thus a process of selection takes place; the strongest among the struggling groups survive.

In the forefront of the sociologists who found in struggle the basis for the formation and maintenance of human societies was Gumplowicz. According to him, human societies are characterized by *syngenism,* a primordial feeling of the members that they belong together. Without it, no group life is possible. Syngenism is responsible for bringing human beings together and for keeping them united. The human race, Gumplowicz held, consisted originally of small, distinct groups, or hordes, each possessing its own peculiar customs, beliefs, and practices. Their development was marked by a ceaseless struggle, during which the fittest survived. Conflict, therefore, is the process whereby social evolution takes place.

Ratzenhofer, like his associate Gumplowicz, explained human association in terms of struggle, but he held that struggle takes the

form of a conflict in *interests*. Social groups, he maintained, originally were formed because of the existence of a blood bond. Individuals having common blood, were drawn together, and this community of origin kept their naturally conflicting interests in check as long as the group was very small and simple in structure. With an increase in membership and in wants of members, however, conflict arose. Moreover, the increase in numbers inevitably led to geographic dispersion and consequent differentiation into a number of separate groups, each having substantially the same wants. The clash in interests among individuals within the various groups was checked by the community of feeling, and the conflict became an intergroup struggle in which the fittest survived.

The exponents of the struggle theory of social evolution have been criticized mainly for their insistence on conflict as the key explanation of social evolution and progress. Although most sociologists believe group conflict plays an important part in the life and development of human societies, few, if any, are willing to subscribe to such an extreme view. Even the younger contemporaries of Gumplowicz who were adherents of the conflict theory proposed modified versions of it. Ward, who saw the origin of societies in the rapidly propagating family and the eventual organization of hordes or clans, followed Gumplowicz' conflict theory closely but held that upon reaching "higher" levels of development societies can and should avoid conflict by means of intelligent planning or, as he called it, "telesis." Novicow, while maintaining that the world is an "arena of endless combats," believed that conflict goes through definite stages from the physical, which is the most primitive, to the economic, to the political, and, finally, to the intellectual, which is the highest stage. When it reaches this last stage, it becomes merely intellectual competition, which is desirable as a means whereby mankind attains its highest level of development.

4

Biological, Psychological, and Geographic Factors in Society

Before proceeding with our inquiry into human society, we must pause to consider the origin and nature, both physical and psychological, of the human being. This, obviously, is necessary for an adequate understanding of human society, which, after all, is composed of individuals. Similarly, attention will have to be given to the physical environment, for it is, of course, a most significant factor in man's social activities. Since, however, these subjects fall within the scope of inquiry of anthropology, biology, psychology, and geography, we shall have to call upon the findings of these fields rather than upon those of sociology. This is one of the instances in which the sociologist generally relies on specialists outside of his own field to supply him with information, even as these may have to rely upon him to fill in gaps in their inquiries.

ANTIQUITY AND RACIAL DIVERSITY OF MAN

It is only in comparatively recent times that the view has been accepted that man belongs to the animal kingdom, even though he is a special, or "superior," kind of animal. It has been demonstrated that man shares the characteristics of other animals, that he has a common origin with them, and that he differs from them in degree rather than in kind. In former times, man was commonly considered to be the result of a special creation and to be endowed with qualities unique to him. He is still regarded, and rightly so, as the "king of creation," but scientific inquiry assigns him a "lowly" origin and is reluctant to draw a definite line separating him from other species of the higher animals.

The existence of human forms on earth is estimated to go back at least several hundred thousand years. This is attested by the various archeological discoveries of fossil man in different parts of the Old World. These fossils, with the exception of one type, the

Cro-Magnon, however, are not considered the direct ancestors of modern man, but merely indicate that man has gone through evolutionary stages, for they represent intermediate types between ape and man. As to the origin of man, it is at present universally accepted that he is descended from an ancestor common to him and the apes, which makes him a cousin, rather than a son, of the simians. In other words, at one period in the very remote past man became differentiated from the apes, and each evolved independently. Man as we know him at present made his appearance with the Cro-Magnons, who, it is estimated, lived about 25,000 years ago. The Cro-Magnon man, so called because of his having been discovered in a cave by that name in France, is therefore generally considered by anthropologists to be the ancestor of modern man. The Czech-American anthropologist Aleš Hrdlička, however, held that a more primitive and earlier type, Neanderthal man, named after the Neanderthal valley in Germany where his remains were discovered, should be regarded as an earlier direct predecessor of present man. According to Hrdlička, the Neanderthal type evolved into *Homo sapiens*. However that may be, the consensus of authorities is that man, regardless of physical characteristics, now belongs to a single species.

How did man become differentiated from his relatives, the apes? The differentiation occurred through the process known as mutation, or variation in the genes, a process occurring at intervals in all forms of life which causes the appearance of individuals with characteristics differing from those of their parents. Through the process known as natural selection, the ones with less ability to adapt themselves are gradually eliminated and are replaced by the more successful types until a certain type predominates.

These processes, operating in conjunction with climatic conditions, isolation, and inbreeding, are also considered responsible for the appearance of different races of mankind. Racial differentiation took place in the dim past of human existence and over an extended period of time.

The Meaning of Race

Properly speaking, race refers to a subdivision of the human species, the members of which possess in common certain hereditary physical characteristics which distinguish them from those of other subdivisions.

The use of the term "race" in the sense of nation or nationality, language, or religious group is unscientific. Since nations, language groups, and religious groups are as a rule composed of individuals who show no uniform physical characteristics, but who display different racial strains in varying degrees, the term is not applicable to them. There is no such thing as a German race, French race, or Jewish race; the Germans and French are nations, and the Jews are a cultural group, except for the Israelis, who became a nation when they gained their independence.

Superficially viewed, races may seem to be easily distinguishable, but scientific observers have had to devise elaborate techniques and instruments to identify and classify them. Even with these devices, the concept of "race" as employed by anthropologists suffers from confusion and lack of clarity. Ralph Linton, an American anthropologist, in *The Study of Man,* made a threefold classification which contributes to the clarification of the problem. According to Linton, the subdivisions of *Homo sapiens* are breeds, races, and stocks. A breed is a human group similar to a breed of domestic animals, such as horses or cows, tending to possess a good many traits in common, although variants exist even in such a group. At present breeds are encountered rather infrequently in some small primitive tribes or in some isolated mountainous regions. (Isolation and extreme inbreeding probably account for this phenomenon.) A race, on the other hand, consists, according to Linton, of a number of breeds which share certain physical characteristics. Since the breeds vary among themselves, the individuals constituting a race will have fewer characteristics in common than those making up a breed. A stock includes a number of races, and, for obvious reasons, its members will share even fewer characteristics.

The Races of Mankind

It is customary to divide mankind into three major racial stocks: the Caucasoids, or white; the Mongoloid, or yellow; and the Negroid, or black. Although there are no clear-cut lines separating them, there being considerable overlapping, each stock is marked by certain characteristics which are more or less common to all its members. Thus, individuals in the Caucasoid stock have a white skin, a hairy body, wavy hair, a leptorrhine (thin) nose, thin lips, and an orthognathus (perpendicular) facial profile. The Mongoloids have a yellow skin, prominent cheekbones, olive-shaped eyes, and straight

black hair. The Negroids are characterized by a black skin, kinky or wooly hair, a projecting jaw, a platyrrhine (broad) nose, and scanty body hair. In each of these stocks, however, there are great variations, so that the supposedly unique characteristics of one will be found in another. Thus, there are relatively dark-skinned whites with almost kinky hair, thick nose, scanty body hair, etc., or with characteristics approaching those of the Mongoloids, and there are Negroids and Mongoloids possessing characteristics associated with whites. Moreover, many of these characteristics are not constant but change with environmental conditions, as shown by the great American anthropologist Franz Boas, who found that the head form of children of European immigrants in America deviates markedly from that of their parents.

When he attempts to classify races, which, as we have seen, are subdivisions of stocks, the anthropologist finds himself in a real quandary. There is a great deal of disagreement among authorities as to subdivisions. This is particularly true with reference to the white races, which are considered the most difficult to classify because they are the most mixed. In classifying the various races, it is customary to distinguish subdivisions within the Caucasoids (the Nordic, Alpine, Mediterranean, and Hindu subdivisions); within the Mongoloids (the Asiatic Mongoloids, Oceanic Mongoloids, and American Indians, as well as the Polynesians, who are considered to be on the border line between the Mongoloids and Caucasoids); and within the Negroids (the African Negroes, Oceanic Negroes, and Negritos). In addition, there are three groups which have defied inclusion in any of the three major stocks and are therefore classified separately. These are the Australian aborigines, the Indo-Australians, and the Ainu of Japan.

The Problem of Racial Superiority

Despite disagreement among authorities regarding the classification of races, there is little disagreement as to the lack of connection between race and abilities or achievement. To be sure, all the evidence is not in, but whatever is known points to other factors than race as accountable for the uneven score in cultural attainments. The claims of the racists of all kinds, the most erudite of whom were the Frenchman Arthur de Gobineau and the Englishman Houston Stewart Chamberlain in Europe, and Madison Grant and T. Lothrop Stoddard in the United States, are not only unsub-

stantiated but appear to be myths invented by these "scholars" to reassure their own national groups about their feelings of superiority. Differences, whether physical or mental, which have been observed among various racial groups do not necessarily indicate inferiorities or superiorities. Research along these lines in recent years shows that the average lower intelligence of certain racial groups is due primarily to a poor environment rather than to lack of native capacities. The Columbia University social psychologist Otto Klineberg, in a careful study, brought out the fact that the I.Q. (measured intelligence) of children of Negroes who migrated from the South to New York improved in proportion to the length of their stay in the more advantageous environment of the North. He concluded that differences in intelligence among groups are explicable primarily in terms of environment. Moreover, racial groups are found to display abilities along different lines and have distinguished themselves at different times in their history. As pointed out by the eminent American anthropologist Alfred Louis Kroeber, when the Egyptian civilization was flourishing, the Greeks were little more than barbarians; when the Greek civilization reached great heights of development, the Romans were still devoid of any important attainments; and when the Romans achieved a high stage of civilization, the Teutons, who in the recent past claimed a monopoly of superior achievements, were living in a state of semisavagery.

THE BIOLOGICAL NATURE OF MAN

Man, we have seen, is closely related to the higher animals; indeed, he is of one kind with them. In the course of evolution he became differentiated from his closest relatives, the apes, so that he acquired characteristics which definitely set him apart from them. These characteristics, it must be repeated, are quantitative rather than qualitative; i.e., in a rudimentary way they are to be found among other species of higher animals, particularly the simians.

Among the traits distinguishing man from his anthropoid relatives is his erect posture, which, in turn, necessitated changes throughout his bodily structure. The human hand and possibly the brain and the speech organs, to mention just a few of the more important modifications, were the results. These modifications, together with numerous others, enabled man vastly to surpass his relatives, the

apes, in achieving things which the latter are incapable of or capable of only on a very rudimentary level—in short, to become human.

The most remarkable feature of human development is the nervous system, particularly the brain. Man's nervous system is more highly organized than that of any other animal, and his brain is not only larger, in proportion to his body, but also more complex in structure. This makes possible a great variety of behavior reactions and the abilities to think abstractly, to transmit ideas through speech, and to see relationships which animals less endowed cannot perceive. Man's upright posture permitted use of his forelimbs for tasks other than walking, thus enabling him to develop his remarkable hand. Next to the nervous system and brain, the human hand is perhaps his most significant attribute. Without this marvelously versatile and dexterous organ, man would never have been able to construct the tools and machines which were necessary for the development of human culture.

Nevertheless, man is anatomically as well as physiologically like other species of higher animals, being especially similar to the anthropoid apes. In comparing the structure of their bones, muscles, nerves, and organs, we find only minor differences. Even the fingerprints of the chimpanzee are quite similar to those of human beings. Man has also been found to be similar in bodily functions to the apes. The latter are susceptible to many of the same diseases; their blood is almost indistinguishable from that of man; their ductless glands show similarity in function; and in general they go through a similar life cycle. In short, man is physically an animal and shares many of the characteristics of other living creatures, but mostly those of his closest relations, the anthropoid apes.

THE PSYCHOLOGICAL NATURE OF MAN

Psychologically, too, man is similar in his reactions to other animals, showing particular closeness to the apes. In the words of the American anthropologist Alexander Goldenweiser, man is not more than a "talented animal." There is no psychic quality in man which cannot be found in the apes, albeit on a rudimentary level. This is true whether one considers motor, or intellectual, or emotional activities. In his *The Mentality of Apes,* Köhler stated that apes generally react like human beings, giving expression to such emo-

tional states as affection, joy, anger, hate, love, and even coquetry. He also discovered that they manifest some of the higher mental processes, such as curiosity and concentration, learning by imitation and instruction, sustained attention, and even foresight—all, to be sure, to a much lesser degree than normal human beings. Moreover, Köhler found that apes are capable of solving problems and even of recalling visual images on a very limited scale. Comparable results were obtained by other experimenters, notably R. M. Yerkes and W. N. Kellogg. The main reasons for the inability of the apes, despite all these qualities, to rise above their animal state is to be found, it is thought, in their limited capacity for abstract thought and in their inability to produce and use human-like speech. They seem to be unable to go beyond a certain point in their mental activities.

The reason that man has gone as far as he has in his achievements may be said to lie primarily in the higher development of his mental capacities, which, in turn, as we have seen, are attributable to certain modifications in his physical make-up. Of great importance, too, is the fact pointed out by Linton that man from the moment of birth finds himself in an environment with superior opportunities for learning and for acquiring the knowledge accumulated during many generations. Were he to be brought up in complete isolation, he would be closer to an ape in behavior than to his own father.

Instincts and Drives

In common with the other species of higher animals, man possesses a nervous system capable of receiving and responding to stimuli. These stimuli may be internal, i.e., arising within the organism itself (from the stomach, for instance, when the individual is hungry) or external, such as sensations of light and sound. The internal impulses are often referred to as primary drives, the most important being those concerned with the need for oxygen, hunger, thirst, pain, elimination, temperature adjustment, fatigue, sleep, and sex. These are impulses that will arise by themselves in case of prolonged deprivation, although they may also be aroused externally. They are called primary because they are elementary, automatic organic needs which must be satisfied somehow if the individual is to survive. These basic drives of the individual are modified and controlled by society through conditioning (learning), and as a result they will find expression in many different ways, determined by the particular group (and its culture) of which the

individual is a member. Thus, while hunger is an elemental drive which must be satisfied, the type of food and the time and manner of eating are matters of conditioning.

For this reason one can hardly speak of human behavior as instinctive, in the sense of following a set and rigid pattern, as among the lower animals. There was a time, not so long ago, when psychologists regarded much of human conduct as due to inborn tendencies or instincts. A leading exponent of the instinct theory of human behavior was the English psychologist William McDougall. This theory was subscribed to by most psychologists for some time until research forced them to modify it radically or even to abandon it entirely for the more plausible theory of conditioning or learning. At present the behavior of even the lower animals is thought by some psychologists to be at least partly due to learning.

One of the first to question the theory that human conduct is determined by instinct was the dean of American psychologists, Robert S. Woodworth, who applied the term "drive" to most of the impulses or activities formerly attributed to innate tendencies or instincts. The instinct theory of human behavior was most effectively attacked by the American sociologist Luther L. Bernard in his book *Instinct*. Bernard limited human instincts to such activities (also termed *reflexes*) as swallowing, breathing, heart action, digestion, circulation of the blood, intestinal action, sneezing and yawning.

Among the lower animals, behavior is almost entirely determined by innate tendencies or instincts. However, as we ascend the scale in the animal kingdom, we find the importance of instincts decreasing until we reach the great apes, little of whose behavior is instinctive, and, finally, man, whose conduct is almost entirely a matter of learning. Thus, birds inherit a nest-building instinct and build their nests automatically and in a certain manner, deviating little, if at all, from the way their parents built theirs; the apes inherit no such definite propensity, and hence can do no more than build a crude shelter for themselves; but man inherits only an urge for bodily comfort, for protection from the inclemencies of nature, and he will erect a shelter only at a time and in a manner taught to him. With man, building a house is a learned activity, an invention, an art handed down to him from past generations. If left to himself from infancy, he certainly could not build a structure that was anything like the customary shelter of his group. This dependence on

learning explains why the houses in which men have lived vary widely in types, materials, and usefulness.

The lower animals possess instincts which direct them toward activities designed to protect them and to perpetuate their species. Indeed, it might be claimed that many such animals are better adapted to their particular mode of life than man is to his. Nevertheless, man adapts himself through learning, and this is the source of his superiority. Once man has hit upon an idea, has made a discovery, there is almost no limit to the extent to which he can go in improving upon it, thus achieving greater comfort. This kind of continuous progress has enabled him to build elaborate civilizations.

Man's Basic Desires

Other factors besides learning contribute to the growth of human personality. Basic factors include the person's emotions, temperament, innate capacities, and natural aptitudes. We can only touch upon certain human desires or goals which are of particular importance to an understanding of the individual in his social setting.

Psychologists and sociologists have found that certain desires are common to human beings the world over and that these desires dominate the individual's behavior. Ratzenhofer maintained that man everywhere is motivated by certain *interests* which are an outgrowth and expression of fundamental needs *(Bedürfnisse)* of his nature. These are: (1) the procreative interest; (2) the physiological interest; (3) the individual, or egoistic, interest; (4) the social interest, or interest to associate; and (5) the transcendental interest, i.e., interest in the infinite, the supernatural. The fulfillment of these interests makes possible the rise and development of human societies and accounts for the various social institutions such as the family, economic systems, and religion. Each of these and many other societal phenomena can be traced to the existence of those interests. Albion W. Small, an admirer of Ratzenhofer's teachings, offers a list of fundamental human interests of his own, but which are based on those of his master. These are: health, wealth, sociability, knowledge, beauty, and rightness.

Perhaps the most widely known of the theories of the universality of desires is that of the "four wishes" propounded by the American sociologist W. I. Thomas in his work *The Unadjusted Girl*. These might be called basic egocentric desires which are present

in all individuals, regardless of the group or civilization in which they live, and are presumably based on, or anchored in, deep-seated biological and psychological needs of human beings. The intensity with which these wishes express themselves will, however, vary with the individual, and the form they take will be determined by the group in which he lives. Much of the individual's happiness or unhappiness, adjustment or maladjustment, will depend upon the satisfaction of these wishes.

Thomas classified the four elemental desires as follows:

(1) The wish for new experience, which is a desire to avoid monotony and a craving for excitement. This expresses itself in a multitude of ways, depending both upon the temperamental make-up of the individual and upon the type of society in which he lives. Thus, while one will seek to satisfy this craving by hunting game in the jungles of Africa, another will meet it by reading detective stories, and still another by performing scientific experiments. The ways of satisfying this desire are indeed infinite. In our society, visiting night clubs, going to the theater, attending sports events, speeding along the highways on Sunday afternoons—sometimes without any definite destination in mind—are common ways of seeking a break in monotony, while in other societies there may be radically different ways.

(2) The wish for security, which, in a sense, is the opposite of that for adventure, but which is, nevertheless, present at the same time. One desires to travel but also wishes to have a place to which to return, to have an anchor somewhere. Security, too, is sought with varying degrees of intensity by different individuals and is found in many diverse ways. In our individualistic society, one seeks security in the accumulation of money, whereas, in a collectivist society, cooperation is the way to security. Familiar things make us feel secure, and we tend to be conservative, avoiding what is new and strange to us. The security we seek is both physical and psychological.

(3) The wish for response, which is the desire to obtain affection, sympathy, and appreciation from one's fellow men. Individuals everywhere display this craving for response, and they find it in friendship, and in filial, paternal, and conjugal love. Failure to satisfy this basic desire may destroy the morale and efficiency of the individual.

(4) The wish for recognition, which is the desire for the approval

of one's fellow men. The individual wishes his associates to approve of him and look up to him. This wish is thought to be rooted in our desire for self-esteem; in achieving recognition from others, we satisfy this desire. Again, the individual seeks to realize this wish in many ways: through accumulation of wealth, ostentatiousness, membership in societies or criminal gangs and aspirations to be a leader in them, superior scholarship, or success in a business or profession.

Although recognized as an important contribution to the understanding of human motivation, Thomas' formulation of the four wishes has been criticized on a number of grounds, but primarily because of the vagueness of the concept. Although he maintained these wishes are not inborn or instinctive, he made them appear as if they were based upon man's physical make-up. This implication is inconsistent with his view that it is the social and the cultural environment, rather than biological factors, that have a determining influence on personality. The theory of the four wishes remains, nevertheless, one of the best attempts in the search for a common denominator in human motivation.

GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS IN SOCIAL LIFE

We have sketched briefly the origins and the salient biological and psychological traits of man. It remains for us to consider the physical environment in which every human being must wage his struggle for existence. Man lives in both a physical, or natural, environment and a social environment. Here we shall point out the major problems presented by the physical environment; in the following chapter we shall analyze those of the social environment.

The physical environment of man has several well-defined aspects. There is the physico-chemical aspect, including air, light, heat, and gravitation, to which he adjusts more or less automatically. Another aspect is the biological, including the animal and plant worlds. Man has ever been in competition with animals and plants. The area and food supply on the earth are necessarily limited, while living organisms, if allowed to survive, have an unlimited power of reproduction. There ensues, as a result, a life-and-death struggle among them.

This situation involves man in a struggle with animal and plant life which keeps him on the alert lest the other side win. He must

destroy insect pests that threaten his crops and himself. Curiously enough, the tiniest animals, the microorganisms, now constitute the greatest threat to him, and the struggle against them is very far from won. All kinds of vegetation, too, threaten him by invading his gardens and fields, and he must constantly wage war on them.

Then there are the influences of the geographical environment, such as climate, topography, and natural resources. To these man must adjust if he is to survive. But, unlike the lower animals, man does not merely conform to natural phenomena; he modifies them or exercises control over them, to make life more livable. The extent of modifications effected will depend upon the stage of development of a particular society, but on all levels of human civilization, even on the most primitive, man exercises some control over the forces of nature. This is one of the outstanding differences between man and the lower animals. Man does something about his environment; the animal does nothing but adjust to it.

Let it not, however, be imagined that man has succeeded in making himself the master of nature. More often than not, he has learned to dodge rather than control it. He cannot prevent an oncoming storm or flood, but he has learned to forecast its approach and course, and he can try to keep out of its path or minimize its danger.

This, of course, is not to deny the truly remarkable achievements of man, particularly during the past century. But it is well to keep in mind that man by and large has to adjust himself to natural conditions. He has to adjust himself to the climate by building suitable types of houses and wearing appropriate clothing. He has to cultivate the type of crops suited for a particular soil, even though marvelous advances have been made by him in forcing nature to yield to his wishes, or in circumventing it by various means. Man is the most widely dispersed of all animals, living almost everywhere excepting regions subject to extremely adverse conditions. He congregates, however, in the temperate zones.

Although authorities agree that the physical environment exerts an influence upon culture, few now hold that this influence is decisive. Goldenweiser, in his *Anthropology,* cited examples which disprove the theory of extreme geographic determinism. The California Indians, he pointed out, lived in an area offering excellent opportunities for utilizing wood as material for all kinds of objects. Indeed, one would have expected them to become masters in the art

of woodwork. The fact is that these Indians never developed a wood industry, but instead developed the art of basketry. Again, although clay is found in practically every region of North America, pottery was made only by certain tribes.

The idea that the natural environment has a determining effect upon man and his culture goes back at least to Aristotle, who believed that the greatness of the Greeks was due primarily to the favorable physical environment in which they lived. In modern times, Montesquieu was one of the first to expound the theory that geography determines both the physical and the psychological qualities of man. Montesquieu maintained that inhabitants of cold countries tend to be phlegmatic in temperament, relatively insensitive to pain, lacking in sex passion, but strong in physique, vigorous, and brave; and that those living in warm lands are usually hot-tempered, sensitive, sex-indulgent, lacking in ambition, weak, and timid. The English historian Thomas Buckle, in his *History of Civilization in England,* likewise viewed culture as determined to a very large extent by the particular physical environment in which it arises and develops. Similarly, Friedrich Ratzel, in his *Der Staat und sein Boden (The State and Its Territory),* maintained that there is a definite correlation between the physical environment and the political organization of a country.

The American geographer Ellsworth Huntington, in *Civilization and Climate,* stated that climate is a determining factor in the activity of individuals. Extremes and frequent changes in temperature, he held, result in lowered efficiency. He further maintained that the great civilizations have flourished only in temperate zones. If this were so, however, why is it, for example, that in America the highest pre-Columbian civilization, a civilization comparable in many respects to that of ancient Egypt, developed in the tropical climate of Central America among the Maya Indians rather than among the Indians farther north? And why were the California Indians, living in the "ideal" climate, among the least advanced of the American Indians?

Another illustration of how the same environment will produce different adjustments to it and will result in quite different modes of life is provided by the Eskimo, the Chukchee, and the Koryak. Surrounded as he is by eternal snow, what, one might ask, could be more natural for the Eskimo than to build his house out of snow? Indeed, the Eskimo does just that, and he erects it within a very

short time wherever he happens to be, finding in it complete protection from storm and cold. But across the Bering Strait, among the Chukchee and Koryak, who live in an identical climate, the snow house is unknown. These peoples build clumsy tents out of hides attached to wooden supports. They persist in doing this despite the fact that they migrate frequently and must carry their tents with them. Another instance of the difference between these peoples is the way the reindeer, common to their environments, is used. The Eskimos, who have never domesticated these animals, use them for food, depending on dogs for transportation, but the Chukchee and Koryak have domesticated the reindeer and use them for transportation, for which they are manifestly much better suited than dogs.

What the natural environment does seem to do, as Goldenweiser pointed out, is to set limits to the type of civilization man will build, even though it does not determine its form and course. In the absence of clay, for example, man will not use this material for building his home, although he could import it for the purpose. But the mere presence of this material does not assure its being used for this or for any other purpose unless its properties have become known and appreciated. In other words, what is done with the material will depend upon the type of civilization in a society.

Thus, we see that the nonsocial factors, namely, the biological, psychological, and geographical, play an important role in the behavior of man. These factors, are, however, more of a limiting than of a determining nature. The forces having a decisive influence on the conduct of man are social. Hence, to comprehend that conduct, to explain its nature and purposes, one must understand those forces. We, therefore, turn now to a consideration of the social factors in society.

5

Social Factors in Society

We have observed that man is always found living in groups, in association with his fellow men. This phenomenon necessitates rules and regulations governing the relationships among people. These the individual must learn and obey. In other words, man, by virtue of his living in groups, has "artificially" created an environment into which the individual is born and to which he has to adapt himself. The process of adaptation, which starts at birth and continues for a considerable period in the life of an individual, is called socialization.

To the above-mentioned rules and regulations must be added other elements—the accumulated knowledge and techniques of doing things, as well as the creations, both material and nonmaterial, that have been passed on and stored up by the group. Taken together, all these things make up the social environment or what has come to be known as *culture*. The meaning of culture is so vital to an understanding of the nature of society that it must be considered in some detail here.

CULTURE AS MAN'S SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT

Culture has been defined in a number of ways. Spencer, in his *Principles of Sociology,* referred to it as the *superorganic* environment as distinguished from the inorganic, or physical, and from the organic, the world of plants and animals. The superorganic, Spencer thought, is an environment peculiar to man alone, whereas the other two he shares with lower animals. Similarly, the pioneer Russian sociologist E. V. de Roberty regarded culture as the body of thought and knowledge, both theoretical and practical, which only man can possess. On the other hand, the English sociologist Graham Wallas conceived of culture as an accumulation of thoughts, values, and

objects; it is the social heritage acquired by us from preceding generations through learning, as distinguished from the biological heritage which is passed on to us automatically through the genes. Malinowski defined culture as the "cumulative creation of man," as the uniquely human way. Perhaps the most widely quoted definition is that of the famous English anthropologist Edward B. Tylor, according to whom culture is "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." Since man, unlike other animals, is always seeking to improve his lot and is forced to adapt himself to changing conditions by inventing new ways of meeting his needs, culture may be defined as *the sum total of man's efforts to adjust himself to his environment and to improve his modes of living.*

From these brief definitions, it is clear that what the anthropologists and sociologists mean by culture is something quite different from the meaning popularly attached to it, that of intellectual or artistic achievements. People often speak of culture as synonymous with education, as when they apply the term "cultured" to an educated person or group and "uncultured" to one lacking in or devoid of education. To the student of society, a group or person lacking in culture is an impossibility, for to him culture comprises the entire accumulated body of ways of thinking and acting among human groups. Individuals of necessity share in the culture of their group.

The Material and Nonmaterial Aspects of Culture

Culture consists of two phases—the *material* and *nonmaterial.* By material is meant concrete objects—dwellings, articles of clothing, utensils, tools and devices (such as the axe and lever), and concrete presentations of ideas, such as books and paintings; by nonmaterial is meant the ideas, concepts, and techniques behind these objects, as well as modes of thinking and acting, values and emotional reactions, and, in general, the abstract creations of man, such as language and literature, science, law, and religion. The sociologists John Lewis Gillin and John Philip Gillin employed the term "culture" to designate the ideas and techniques behind the concrete objects, and "cultural equipment" to describe the objects themselves. On the other hand, MacIver, the German anthropologist Richard Thurnwald, and a number of other authorities used these two phases to distinguish between culture and civilization, referring to the utilitarian aspects,

including the concrete objects and the techniques involved, as culture, and to the abstract achievements as civilization.

Sumner's Concept of the Folkways and Mores

Sumner contributed one of the most fruitful and clarifying analyses of culture and its implications. He taught for many years at Yale, where he became one of the best-loved and most inspiring teachers. He entered the field of sociology via political economy, having taught that subject in the college for some time. Even after he had changed his interest, he preferred to call the subject "the science of society," rather than "sociology." In his sociological classic, *Folkways,* he made an epochal contribution to the understanding of social behavior. Linked inseparably with the name of Sumner is that of his pupil and disciple, Keller, who succeeded Sumner at Yale. Keller extended the teachings of his master and made important contributions of his own. The lifetime efforts of Sumner and Keller were given shape in *The Science of Society,* a monumental four-volume work published in 1927.

Sumner conceived of culture in terms of *folkways, mores, and institutions.*

Folkways are customary ways of behaving and acting which arise automatically within a group to meet the problems of living. They are the customs, conventions, and usages which have been passed down from previous generations and to which new elements are added as need arises. Sumner further conceived of the folkways as representing man's unique means of adapting himself to his environment. Plants and animals adapt themselves, he stated, primarily by means of structural modifications, but man does so by means of devices which he invents in order to solve his problems. As a result his social life consists almost entirely of a mass of folkways, and he usually thinks and acts in accordance with what they decree to be proper or right. This is particularly so in the case of preliterate man, who conforms almost completely to custom; but civilized man has only a little more choice, and, on the whole, is guided in his behavior by the folkways of the group. Folkways range from the most trifling acts and behavior patterns to the most serious. Their number is infinite. Typical folkways in our society are: shaking hands; eating three meals a day; driving on the right; dividing responsibilities so that the husband is the supporter of a household and the wife is a dependent; and adopting the eight-hour working day.

How do folkways arise? Sumner held that they arise automatically and unconsciously and are not unlike natural forces. They are not, as a rule, the result of any advance planning, although later generations may consider them to have been planned. Someone in the group starts a new way, but by the time the way becomes universally accepted, that is, becomes a folkway, neither the originator nor the time of origin can be traced. As in the case of a folk song or folk tale, the original form of the folkway undergoes changes in the course of time, elements having been added, subtracted, or modified, so that it is almost impossible to credit any single individual with its origination. This is known to be true of primitive groups, but Sumner stated that it is almost equally true of modern, civilized societies, even though in these some folkways may be traced to their origins.

Folkways change with changing social conditions, although there is always resistance to change. Folkways connected with beliefs and practices regarding the family, property, etc., resist change more than those connected with the economic functions of a people, such as techniques of production. Some folkways undergo comparatively rapid and continuous change, and Sumner called them fashions. For example, fashion includes the changing styles of women's dresses, whereas folkways include the custom of wearing a dress.

How does an innovation started by an individual become a folkway? If the new way proves to be better than the old one, or if, for any reason, it appeals to the members of the group, it is accepted, spreads, and becomes a custom, exerting pressure on every individual within the group to adopt or conform to it. This the individual does by forming habits; what is customary to the group becomes habitual to the individual. He behaves, under ordinary conditions, almost entirely by force of habit, i.e., nonrationally. He merely follows the ways of the group. Primitive man, when asked why he acts as he does, will reply that he is following his ancestors' ways. And civilized man, when asked a similar question, say, why he salutes his country's flag, will reply in a similar manner, namely, that his forebears also saluted the flag, or that this is the accepted way of showing respect for one's country.

Not all folkways, of course, are considered of equal importance by the group. Sumner applied the term *mores* (singular *mos)* to those folkways which are thought by the group to be indispensable to its welfare and the violation of which is believed to endanger its

existence. As explained by Sumner and Keller, the mores "are the popular habits and traditions, when they include a judgment that they are conducive to societal welfare, and when they exert a coercion on the individual, to conform to them, although they are not coordinated by any authority." While an individual may disobey the ordinary folkways more or less with impunity, he cannot violate the mores without incurring severe punishment. Thus, monogamy and democracy or, for that matter, the right to collective bargaining, would, in our society, be within the mores, as would nearly all our ideas, beliefs, and practices concerned with moral values. The Ten Commandments may be considered the basic mores of our society. Mores usually receive the sanction of religion, and when this occurs their force is even more binding. Although the line dividing folkways from mores appears to be clear and definite, it is sometimes difficult to differentiate between them, there being quite a few borderline cases. Excessive drinking is one example of a borderline case because some people regard it merely as something to be avoided, whereas others strongly condemn it as immoral. Nevertheless, in most cases it is possible to distinguish folkways from mores.

From the above analysis it is clear that our conceptions of what is proper or improper, right or wrong, are determined entirely by the folkways and mores. The folkways and mores, Sumner held, can make anything right. What is right at one time may be wrong at another, and vice versa, and what is right in one society may be wrong in another. One has but to recall that not so long ago slavery was considered right and was sanctioned by church and state. Or one may compare the present attire worn on our bathing beaches with bathing costumes of only a few decades ago. It follows that all our moral or ethical ideas and values are relative to time and place, that there is no absolute, universal system of moral values or ethical code.

Edward Westermarck reached the same conclusions in his *Ethical Relativity*. Citing an immense accumulation of data on the moral standards of different societies, he showed that morals are relative and vary with the group. They vary because of the differences in experience among groups and in the degree of empirical knowledge possessed by them. Studies of different cultures by anthropologists point to the same conclusions. The idea that morals are not absolute is difficult for many people to subscribe to and is repulsive to some,

but the weight of evidence is indeed overwhelmingly in its favor.

Since the folkways and mores are adaptations to life conditions, can they ever be harmful? The answer is that they can be, and often are, harmful, since they may be retained by a group after having outlived their usefulness; because of changed conditions they may have become distinct maladjustments, or they may not have been the proper adjustments in the first place. They may be out of tune with the prevailing social conditions or state of knowledge, or they may even be contrary to the biological nature of man. Examples of such folkways or mores are legion. One might mention at random such practices as the consumption of harmful foods, on the one hand, and taboos on healthful foods, on the other; the undue postponement of marriage and child-bearing; various modes of beautification such as the "wasp waist" and the high heel; or even the contemporary insistence upon unhampered "free enterprise."

According to Sumner, a vital activity or interest surrounded by a cluster of folkways and mores is an *institution*. Institutions are so important an aspect of sociology that a large part of this book will be devoted to an analysis of them.

Sumner also maintained that laws are actually codified mores. They are mores which have been given rational and practical character. L. T. Hobhouse expressed a similar opinion, namely, that law "arises out of custom." Laws are usually found in more advanced societies; in primitive groups, the folkways and mores suffice to control the individual, since there is almost unquestioned compliance with them. It may be said that in civilized societies mores tend to be translated into laws. Consequently, to be effective, laws must be in conformity with the prevailing mores; otherwise, they are doomed to failure. An excellent example of what happens when laws are enacted in opposition to the mores is the Eighteenth Amendment, popularly known as prohibition. There is little doubt that in a narrow-minded or bigoted society a similar fate would overtake an attempt to eradicate anti-Negro bias or anti-Semitism by merely passing a law. A lot of preparation, of conditioning, would have to be done prior to their being effectively outlawed.

The passing of laws against certain practices can be effective, however, when the mores underlying those practices are in the process of disintegration and a considerable number of people no longer hold to them, or are ambivalent about them. Then it is mostly a matter of forcing the "reluctant" ones to accept the new, "legal" way,

which in time they do. A good case in point is the recent decision of the United States Supreme Court outlawing racially segregated schools in this country.

Durkheim's Concept of Collective Representations

Émile Durkheim arrived at a concept of the folkways very much like that of Sumner, but from an entirely different approach and drawing quite different conclusions. Durkheim maintained that the individual's thought and behavior are determined by "collective representations." By collective representations he meant the body of experiences, ideas, and ideals of a group upon which the individual unconsciously depends for his ideas, attitudes, and behavior. This accumulated group experience is a kind of reservoir supplying individuals with ideas and attitudes which they accept as their own. Up to this point it is possible to compare collective representations with the body of folkways and mores as conceived by Sumner. Durkheim, however, went further, ascribing to collective representations an autonomous existence, altogether independent of individuals. Accordingly, he advocated a theory of "collective consciousness" and a "group mind," which are supposed to exist apart from the consciousness of individuals. This part of Durkheim's doctrine has been severely criticized, particularly by American sociologists, and is, at present, overwhelmingly rejected.

Almost identical views were expounded by another leading French sociologist, Maurice Halbwachs, a disciple of Durkheim, who postulated the existence of a collective memory apart from that of the individual and upon which the latter depends. Other European sociologists who held similar views included the German anthropologist-sociologist Alfred Vierkandt, who espoused the doctrine of the "social whole," similar to Durkheim's "collective representations." This was conceived as an entity which exists independently of individuals in a society. On the other hand, the eminent German sociologist Georg Simmel and the Russo-French social scientist Dimitrie Draghicesco insisted that the individual is merely a microscopic reflection of the society in which he lives.

Pareto's Theory of Residues and Derivations

One more theory relating to the nature of social behavior deserves to be considered. It was propounded by the Italian engineer-econo-

mist-sociologist Vilfredo Pareto, who wrote one of the most painstaking and thought-provoking, though obtuse and cumbersome, works in sociology, *Trattato di soziologia generale*. He was almost unknown in this country until his work was published here in 1934, under the title, *The Mind and Society: A General Sociology*, and American sociologists turned their attention to his theories.

In his work, in which he aimed at what he called a "logico-experimental science," that is, a strictly objective study of society, he postulated that underlying man's behavior and social organization are certain elemental factors, among which the following are perhaps the most significant: (1) residues, (2) derivations, (3) individual and social heterogeneity, and (4) circulation of the elites.

By "residues" Pareto meant the elemental drives present in all societies and expressed by their individual members. These residues are not unlike instincts, but they are less rigid and uniform in their expression. Among them—Pareto classified them into six categories—are the drives of the individual for association with others, resulting in interaction; drives for the preservation of his personality; and sexual drives. By "derivations" Pareto meant the ideologies, theories, and overt actions of individuals, which are based upon the residues. Since the residues often contradict and are in conflict with one another, man's ideologies and theories are seldom rational, and his reasoning, more often than not, is illogical. Our thinking and reactions to what we hear and see are usually based upon our residues. It is because of this that we so easily become victims of propaganda and emotional appeals. He further concluded that most of our ideals and concepts, such as democracy, freedom, equality, and justice, are only derivations, little more than superstitions. To study man's ideas and beliefs scientifically, therefore, Pareto held, it is necessary to go back and analyze the residues.

Since individuals differ in their physical, intellectual, and other qualities, i.e., are heterogeneous, Pareto asserted that stratification is inevitable, and democracy, or real political, social, and economic equality, cannot exist. These are little more than myths, mere derivations. Furthermore, stratification divides society into two major divisions: the upper classes, which consist of the aristocracy or elite; and the lower classes. Many individuals in the lower classes, however, possess superior qualities and constantly infiltrate into the upper division, while some in the upper classes are subject to enerva-

tion and deterioration, and descend into the ranks of the lower division. This process creates what Pareto called "circulation of the elites." Aristocracies often become enfeebled and die out. During the process of disintegration, vigorous members of the lower classes climb up to form new classes. Preservation of the ruling classes, Pareto held, depends upon vigor and strength, even though these be accompanied by cruelty and relentlessness. Pareto concluded, therefore, that states, such as the democracies, which practice humanitarian methods are doomed to failure, while those which utilize force and coercion will succeed. This theory caused many to assign Pareto a place among the foremost theorists of Fascism. Condemnation of his conclusions, does not, however, invalidate his important contribution to the scientific analysis of society.

CULTURAL ACCUMULATION AND VARIABILITY

The social heritage of man, culture, is cumulative in character. The amount of accumulated elements in any particular culture and the rate of accumulation depend upon many factors, but principally upon the existing state of knowledge and contact with outsiders. As a rule, the greater the cultural accumulation in a society, the greater the acceleration. William F. Ogburn compared the curve of accumulation with the compound interest curve, in the sense that it grows at an ever increasing rate. Similarly, contact with other cultures is essential, for many of the elements of a culture are "borrowed" or are a combination of "native" and "foreign" elements. To be sure, not all items accumulated are kept, some being discarded, changed beyond recognition, or, for one reason or another, forgotten; but, on the whole, growth takes place. While all this is particularly true of the material aspects of culture, its nonmaterial phases, too, register growth, being marked by the appearance of new customs, laws, and institutions.

Increase, diversification, and complexity, however, must not, as implied by Spencer and other early sociologists, be confused with progress. It is only in the material items of culture that, as shown by Ogburn, Hornell Hart, and many others, one can speak of progress at all, for improved techniques, tools, and utensils, and even an increase in them—up to a certain point—clearly mark advance. But it is highly doubtful whether changes in the realm of the nonmaterial can be automatically considered progress. Such changes

might be more appropriately called evolution, which, according to Hobhouse, is merely change in a given direction.

The term culture is used both in a generic and a specific sense, i.e., as the social heritage of mankind as a whole and as that of a particular society. In the latter instance we speak of the culture, say, of the Blackfoot Indians, the Maoris of New Zealand, or the Kazaks of Central Asia, or of the Germans, Italians, or Albanians. Man has been found, on the whole, to have the same basic needs and desires—Linton classified them as biological, social, and psychic—and hence will everywhere tend to possess certain cultural items, which another American anthropologist, Clark Wissler, called the "universal pattern of culture." Nevertheless, the way different societies go about meeting those needs and the results of their endeavors may differ radically. The consequence is *cultural variability*. Sometimes the differences in culture among human societies are so great that little or no mutual understanding and appreciation of one another's ways will be found among them. This is especially true of diverse, preliterate societies; but civilized man is subject to similar cultural differentiation and reciprocal misunderstandings, although, of course, to a lesser extent because of constant intercourse and the resulting possession of similar codes of mores. This cultural variability is certainly a most significant factor in preventing understanding among the nations of the world.

In the course of time the cultures of groups living in a certain locality will assume characteristics which differentiate them from other cultures. Anthropologists have therefore introduced the term "culture area" for such a locality, each having a central, or core, culture and subcultures. Wissler, in his *The American Indian,* divided pre-Columbian North America into nine such areas. At present, it is held that the world may be divided into two major culture areas—the Euro-American and the Oriental. It is obvious, though, that we can still speak of many cultural areas, or subareas, separated, to be sure, by less definite barriers. Indeed, American sociologists, notably Howard W. Odum and Harry E. Moore, in their *American Regionalism,* have referred to more or less culturally distinct regions in the United States. There are some very slight indications of a tendency toward a lowering of barriers separating the present-day cultures of nations; mankind may be moving toward what Sumner called an extended "peace group" or what Graham Wallas referred to as the "Great Society" and Wendell Willkie as

"One World." But the road is, indeed, rough and the going very slow. Many are skeptical as to whether any progress at all is being made in that direction.

Bearing in mind the facts presented in this and the previous chapters, we can now consider the place and role of the individual in society.

6

The Individual in Society

At birth the infant possesses merely the potentialities of becoming human. Gradually, through a variety of experiences, he becomes what the sociologist calls *socialized*. By socialization is meant the process whereby an individual becomes a functioning member of the society into which he is born, that is, behaves and acts in accordance with its folkways and mores.

THE SOCIALIZATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL


How does the individual become socialized? Through contact with persons and things. Although the physical environment plays a part, it is the social environment, the presence and actions of the people around the infant, that is really the determining factor. At first the child is unaware of his surroundings, but soon he begins to take an interest in things and, above all, in persons about him, particularly the one closest to him—his mother, who is, in most cultures, the most important person he will ever meet. Next to her in importance are his father and the other members of his immediate family. Within this close circle the individual receives his first—and lasting—impressions; there he is introduced into the world in which he is to spend his life. Small wonder, then, that psychologists, psychiatrists, psychoanalysts, and sociologists consider the initial years of the child and the environment in which he spends them so crucial.

The Looking-Glass Self

This narrow circle of the family members is later enlarged to include playmates; still later, schoolmates, the teacher, and friends; and, finally, many "outsiders." All these play a part in conditioning the individual, but the intimate group of the family and close associates are of greatest significance in his socialization. Charles Horton

Cooley introduced the term *primary group* to designate the intimate, face-to-face group, particularly the family and playmates, as distinguished from the *secondary group,* i.e., the larger group with which the individual's relationships are more or less impersonal.

THE INDIVIDUAL'S EXPANDING WORLD



Through contact with the primary group, particularly with the members of the family (as Cooley stated in his *Human Nature and the Social Order)* the individual develops the idea of self. This he does by becoming conscious of their attitudes toward him. In other words, the child gets his conception of his self, and later of the kind of person he is, by means of what he imagines others take him to be, through a reflection of how he appears in the minds of others, as revealed in their attitudes toward him. Cooley therefore called the child's idea of himself the "looking-glass self."

Since the child pictures himself in this roundabout, indirect way, he practically never gets a portrait of himself as he actually is. He conceives of himself as better or worse, in varying degrees, depending upon the attitudes of others toward him. The American psychologist G. Stanley Hall thought that the child's view of himself may be affected by the kind of appellation given him by his family or friends. Thus, a child called "angel" by his mother gets a notion of himself which differs from that of a child called "rascal."

The Definition of the Situation

W. I. Thomas introduced the term the "definition of the situation," by which he meant that the situation in which the child finds

himself has already been defined for him and the rules according to which he must behave are determined by the group into which he is born. The child, therefore, has little or no chance of following his wishes, which are on the whole hedonistic (pleasure-seeking) and selfish and are opposed to those of the group, which call for restraint, order, and self-sacrifice. A state of conflict is then set up in which society usually, but not always, wins out. Thomas described this situation graphically in *The Unadjusted Girl* as follows:

"As soon as the child has free motion and begins to pull, tear, pry, meddle, and prowl, the parents begin to define the situation through speech and other signs and pressures: 'Be quiet,' 'Sit up straight,' 'Blow your nose,' 'Wash your face,' 'Mind your mother,' 'Be kind to sister,' etc. . . . His wishes and activities begin to be inhibited, and gradually, by definitions within the family, by playmates, in the school, in the Sunday School, through reading, by formal instruction, by informal signs of approval and disapproval, the growing member learns the code of his society."

Mead, Durkheim, and Freud on Socialization

George H. Mead, the distinguished American social psychologist, also held that society is the determining factor in the socialization of the individual. He stated that the individual, largely through social interaction, becomes cognizant of himself and obtains a picture of himself by assuming the role of others—those others being his parents, close associates, and, finally, society as a whole. The child, by putting himself, so to speak, in the position of others, by imagining himself to be the father or mother and, later, other persons and enacting their roles, thus takes an outside or "objective" view of himself. Similarly, Durkheim, in his theory of "collective representations," insisted that the individual becomes socialized by adopting the behavior of his group. This view was also implied in Sumner's theory of the folkways. Although Sigmund Freud, the Austrian psychiatrist and founder of psychoanalysis, was not concerned with the problem of the individual's socialization per se, he nevertheless contributed toward the clarification of the process. According to Freud, the human mind is divided into three compartments—the *id,* which is concerned only with satisfying the animal impulses of man; the *ego,* which serves as the mediator between desire and action, repressing the urges of the id when necessary; and the *superego,* which holds up the behavior norms of society, the idea of moral

and immoral, to the ego, which, in turn, intervenes with the id. Freud believed that the individual's superego is a reflection of his parents' standards of right and wrong which have been inculcated in him and which he has made his own through identification. Since the parents' standards are those of the society in which they live, or of one of its subgroups, the child through his superego adopts the norms of conduct of the society.

THE HUMAN PERSONALITY

In the course of maturation, the individual acquires a personality 'The term personality has been variously defined. According to the sociologist Kimball Young, it "consists of habits, attitudes, and ideas which are built up around both people and things." The social psychologist Gordon W. Allport defined it as a person's pattern of habits, attitudes, and traits which determine his adjustment to his environment. The sociologists Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess defined it as "the sum and organization of those traits which determine the role of the individual in the group." To the sociologist Herbert A. Bloch, personality is "the characteristic organization of the individual's habits, attitudes, values, emotional characteristics . . . which imparts consistency to the behavior of the individual."

Individuals, of course, differ at birth in their natural endowments, both physical and mental, and hence will tend to develop different personalities. But numerous studies show that the environment is a most significant factor in determining the kind of personality an individual develops.

Attempts, as yet unsuccessful, have been made to classify personalities into types. As early as the fifth century B.C., the Greek physician Hippocrates divided human beings into four types: the sanguine, the melancholic, the choleric, and the phlegmatic. A modern classification is that of the Swiss psychoanalyst Carl Gustav Jung, who distinguished between two main types, the introvert and the extrovert. The introvert tends to be preoccupied with his own inner world; the extrovert, with things outside himself. Individuals, he held, never belong exclusively to one type or the other, but merely tend to be to a greater or lesser degree one or the other, the majority falling into the class of ambiverts, i.e., those who vacillate between the two. The German psychiatrist Ernst Kretschmer, after painstaking research, concluded that the extroverted personality is associated with

the heavy-set, stout person, whom he called the "pyknic," and the introverted with the tall, slender, and athletic individual, whom he termed the "leptosome." Efforts have also been made to categorize individuals into social types. W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki, for example, distinguished among the Bohemian, the Philistine, and the Creative. But this classification, like the others, is open to a multitude of objections.

Culture and Personality

There is little doubt that society, by its demands on the individual members, by its approvals and disapprovals, largely determines the type of personality that will predominate in it. Naturally, in a complex society like our own, with an extreme heterogeneity of standards, there will be considerable variations. Even in a much less complex society, variations are likely because hereditary tendencies cannot be ruled out and because individuals everywhere will react to and be influenced by their culture in different ways and degrees. It would, therefore, be going too far to maintain that society produces a completely stereotyped personality. Rather, society provides the limits within which personality will develop. By and large, it may be said that each culture will produce its special type or types of personality.

Ruth Benedict, an American anthropologist, in her *Patterns of Culture,* analyzed the culture of three primitive tribes, the Zuñi of the southwestern United States, the Kwakiutl of the northwestern United States, and the Dobuans of Melanesia. She found that cultures may be divided into two major types—the Apollonian and the Dionysian. The Apollonian type is characterized by restraint, even-temperedness, moderation, and cooperativeness, while the Dionysian type is marked by emotionalism, excess, pursuit of prestige, individualism, and competitiveness. In Zuñi society, which follows the Apollonian pattern, the individuals display the characteristics peculiar to their culture, while in the Kwakiutl and Dobuan societies, which are Dionysian in character, the individuals display traits common to *their* cultures. Similar evidence that a culture shapes the character and behavior of individuals living in it was set forth by the anthropologist Margaret Mead, in her *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies,* a study of New Guinea tribal life.

A more recent attempt at classifying societies, primarily contem-

porary ones, and of showing the impact they have upon their members was made by David Riesman in his *The Lonely Crowd*. Riesman distinguished among three major types of societies: the tradition-directed, the inner-directed, and the other-directed. Although a great many variations and exceptions occur in each type, each has distinct patterns of behavior that are deep-rooted and pervasive.

According to Riesman, the first, the tradition-directed type of society, is one in which custom, handed down through the generations, is the predominant force; control over the members is achieved through the pressure of tradition. The second, the inner-directed society, is marked by great accumulation of capital, high productivity, and colonial expansion. Individuals are engaged in a ceaseless struggle to attain definite goals (chiefly independence, wealth, power, and prestige), and great appreciation is shown for the self-made man. The third, the other-directed society, is characterized by industrialism, urbanism, and bureaucracy, with emphasis on consumption rather than production. Adjusting to situations and circumstances, socializing, conforming to rules of the game, and manipulating each other are among the outstanding activities of members of this type of society.

While such classification and typing of societies have been found to suffer from many flaws, they illustrate graphically the determining influence culture has upon personality. The individual's thought and behavior are indeed largely the results of cultural conditioning.

INDIVIDUAL DISORGANIZATION

We have seen that society everywhere demands from its individual members conformity to its folkways and mores, to its values and standards. But often, the individual, for one reason or another, is unable to meet the requirements of the society in which he lives. As a result, he may develop personality problems and become disorganized. Personal disorganization, or maladjustment, means that the individual is out of adjustment with society as a whole, even though in many cases he may be adjusted to a smaller group within it, such as a delinquent or criminal gang. Personal disorganization, therefore, may often be looked upon as a special kind of adjustment.

Individual disorganization may stem from the fact that society itself is in a state of disorganization; its value system may be break-

ing down in many important areas, or, as some sociologists would describe it, may be undergoing changes in preparation for new patterns which are emerging. In other words, social disorganization confuses some individuals as to standards of propriety, and, hence, they become maladjusted.

An individual's disorganization, therefore, may be due to factors inherent either in the individual himself or in the society in which he lives. He may have been born with or have acquired a disability which prevents or obstructs his proper integration into society. But it is society which seems to be far more frequently responsible for personal disorganization, and, since we are concerned here primarily with the effect of society on the individual, we shall consider only the factors involved in personal disorganization which are induced by society.

Society and Personal Disorganization

Personal disorganization, due to social causes, is generally thought to be the result of mental conflict brought about by cultural situations conducive to it. The vast majority of individuals become adjusted more or less satisfactorily, but a considerable number fail to do so.

Civilized society, particularly our own, is very complex, competitive, and contradictory, as well as excessive, in its demands upon the individual. There is often a wide gap between what is taught and approved at home, in the church, and at school and what is actually expected in the world. Groups with different cultural backgrounds and different moral standards create different conceptions of right and wrong. Then, there is the stimulation of desires through such means as advertising—desires which often cannot be satisfied. Finally, rapid changes in the culture create new ideas and set up new standards, while the old ones still persist. All this leaves many individuals bewildered and frustrated in the realization of their desires and helpless in coping with the situation in which they find themselves. Such individuals may become victims of various kinds of neuroses and psychoses, commit suicide, or become criminals, extreme radicals, deviates, and malcontents of all sorts. Bloch, in his *Disorganization; Personal and Social,* distinguished five paths which individuals may pursue when they are caught in a situation of profound social change to which they have difficulty in adjusting. They may (1) return to the established norm of behavior, or

(2) create their own way of behaving and seek to have it adopted by society, or (3) attack the existing social order through various types of antisocial behavior, such as delinquency and crime, or (4) take refuge in a retreat from society (by withdrawing inwardly through various types of psychoses) or flee from situations and remain footloose, or (5) escape from life by committing suicide.

Personal Disorganization in Primitive and Folk Societies

In societies where the above-mentioned conditions are lacking or exist in a milder form, as in many primitive or simple societies, personal disorganization is comparatively infrequent, and certain types of disorganization are entirely absent.

Thus, the sociologist Ellsworth Faris stated in his *The Nature of Human Nature* that he found an almost complete absence of psychoses among the Congo Bantu, who do not even know what they are. Similarly, Ruth Benedict found it hard to explain the meaning of suicide to the peaceful, cooperative Zuñi Indians; the word was unfamiliar to them. On the other hand, among the competitive Kwakiutl suicide is said to be a frequent occurrence.

On the whole, studies show that primitive societies are comparatively free of disorganized individuals. This may be explained chiefly by their being relatively better-integrated groups. It seems that what is important in causing or preventing individual disorganization is not so much the number of regulatory agencies and institutions present in a society, but rather the degree of the society's integration. The American anthropologist Edward Sapir, in a notable essay, "Culture, Genuine and Spurious," summarized this point aptly in reference to the American Indian. He wrote that we "cannot but admire the well-rounded life of the average participant in the civilization of a typical American Indian tribe; the firmness with which every part of that life—economic, social, religious, and esthetic—is bound together into a significant whole in respect to which he is far from a passive pawn; above all, the molding role, oftentimes definitely creative, that he plays in the mechanism of his culture."

In tribes where individuals experience personality difficulties, these difficulties are traceable to certain traits inherent in the culture, such as competitiveness or excessive demands of one kind or another upon the individual. Thus, Thomas, in his *Primitive Society,* stated that among the Bantu many individuals who do not excel as orators

suffer from anxiety and frustration because the culture lays great stress on oratory. Individuals in primitive societies, many anthropological studies show, become seriously disorganized only when their society and culture come into close contact with Western civilization and their system of folkways and mores experiences a breakdown as a result. What happens to the individual is indicated by Sapir's comment that "he has slipped out of the warm embrace of a culture into the cold air of fragmentary existence."

Studies made of civilized societies and of various groups and sections within them reveal the close relationship between the lack of integration of a society, the inconsistencies in its system of values, and its complexity, on the one hand, and personal disorganization, on the other. Thomas and Znaniecki, in *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America,* showed that in the small peasant communities in Poland there are comparatively few problems of personality disorganization, whereas in the Polish community in the United States disorganization is frequent. They attributed this mainly to the transplantation of individuals from a simpler life (where control is strong) to a complex urban civilization. Robert E. Park and Herbert A. Miller, in their *Old World Traits Transplanted,* reported that this is also true, in varying degrees, of other immigrant groups. The sociologist E. Franklin Frazier showed that among the Negro migrants from the rural South to the industrial North a similar situation prevails. Research findings regarding white native Americans who migrate from isolated rural communities to industrial cities indicate that among these individuals, too, demoralization on a considerable scale tends to set in.

A revealing study of the effects of the social environment upon personality was made by two American psychologists Mandel Sherman and Thomas R. Henry. They studied five mountain communities in Virginia and discovered that the one furthest removed from the influence of "civilization" had the most stable personalities, while the one in closest contact with modern urban life showed the highest incidence of neurosis.

Recently a number of psychologists, psychiatrists, and psychoanalysts (including, among the latter, Harry Stack Sullivan, Karen Horney, and Erich Fromm) assigned to the cultural environment a most important role in conditioning the individual. They referred to society as the main source of personality problems, thus agreeing with the point of view of sociologists and anthropologists.

A penetrating analysis of the relationship of our culture to neurotic behavior was made by Karen Horney. In *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time,* she pointed out that the main causes of widespread neurosis in our society are its contradictory demands. In a society which requires the individual to be both humble and aggressive, unselfish and self-interested, cooperative and competitive, trusting and suspicious, many become confused and find themselves in a quandary out of which there is no escape.

Insanity and Suicide

The complexity of life and its accompanying problems are major causes of mental breakdown. Statistics show that insanity rates, as a rule, are higher in industrialized than in agrarian societies, and higher in cities than in rural areas. Moreover, as the sociologists Robert E. L. Faris and H. Warren Dunham showed, in *Mental Disorders in Urban Areas,* the rate of mental disorders varies greatly among the different sections of a city. They found the highest rates in blighted areas and slums, where poverty and social instability are greatest, and the lowest rates in the more prosperous, stable residential sections. Similar conclusions were arrived at in a number of other studies. Also, suicide has been found to be much more frequent in societies and communities with a complex social and economic system than in those where human relationships are simpler and less demanding.

A significant theory about the causes of suicide was developed in Durkheim's book, *Le suicide.* According to Durkheim, the causes of suicide are primarily social rather than psychological or economic. He distinguished three types of suicide: the egotistical, the anomique, and the altruistic. The first type, he maintained, is due to a decrease in group cohesion, a weakening in the bonds of solidarity, and an increase in social isolation. The reason for the lower rate of suicide among Catholics than among Protestants, according to him, is to be found in the stronger integrating force of the Catholic Church. Again, during periods of crises, such as war, when cohesiveness and solidarity within a group are high, the rate of suicide is low, but at the termination of such periods, when individualism returns, the rate rises. On the other hand, anomique suicide is caused by a disturbance in the social equilibrium, by a state of *anomie,* or normlessness, during which the conduct of the individual ceases to be controlled by the norms set by society. Finally, altruistic suicide

occurs as a consequence of an intensification in the tendency of a society to absorb the interests of the individual to such an extent that the latter is merely part of a group without personal demands. The individual is then psychologically ready, whenever necessary, to sacrifice himself for the group. Any act which is apt to bring disgrace or dishonor to the group will be atoned for by self-sacrifice. This phenomenon may occur in strongly disciplined armies or in other groups possessing a common purpose and a high spirit of solidarity.

Maurice Halbwachs agreed essentially with Durkheim, but in a later study of his own, *Les causes du suicide,* he showed that suicide is correlated more with a complex, rapidly changing life than with the type of faith to which one adheres. He claimed, for instance, that Durkheim found a lower suicide rate among Catholics because the Catholics he studied were concentrated in rural communities, and that the rate is sometimes higher among urban Catholics than it is among rural Protestants.

In the United States, the rate of suicide, like that of mental disorder, tends to be highest in disorganized areas and lowest in stable, residential sections This trend was confirmed by Ruth Shonle Cavan's book, *Suicide,* dealing with the phenomenon in Chicago, and by Calvin F. Schmid's studies of suicide in Seattle and in Minneapolis.

Personality Reorganization

With the problems of personality disorganization plaguing our society, social scientists have been prompted to analyze them and to search for effective remedies. Much has been done in ferreting out causes, but a great deal still remains to be learned before adequate measures of personality reorganization can be suggested. There is still a division of opinion as to the best way to proceed. Those who look upon human behavior as chiefly determined by heredity tend to regard the physical improvement of the human stock, through eugenic means of one kind or another, as the most effective way. There are still many psychologists, psychiatrists, and psychoanalysts who are intent upon finding the cause and remedy in the individual alone, as if he were living in a vacuum. On the other hand, there are the strict environmentalists who regard change in the environment as all-important. In recent years, however, an increasing number of scientists in all fields have come to the conclusion that the problem

is a complex and many-sided one and that effective analysis and treatment involve consideration of hereditary, biological, psychological and environmental factors. There is, moreover, a growing recognition of the predominant role that the social environment plays in the behavior of the individual.

SOCIAL CONTROL

Any society, in order to carry on, must have peace and order. There must prevail a certain *esprit de corps* among its members, a certain conformity to accepted standards, a certain subjugation of their self-seeking impulses to the welfare of the group as a whole. Since this cannot be achieved by the individual alone, society has to intercede and require its members to behave in a manner deemed necessary and desirable. In other words, society has to exercise control over its individual members. Sociologists refer to this procedure as *social control,* by which they mean the system of devices whereby society brings its members into conformity with the accepted standards of behavior.

E. A. Ross, in his book, *Social Control,* which appeared in 1901, was the first American sociologist to deal at length with this phenomenon. Since then it has become an important subject of inquiry. According to Ross, the individual possesses deep-rooted sentiments which make him susceptible to cooperation with his fellow men and to a consideration of their welfare. These sentiments are sympathy, sociability, and a sense of justice. They are not, however, sufficient to curb him in his self-seeking impulses. Society has to use a variety of means to accomplish that and thus to attain the necessary order and discipline.

Ross emphasized a number of devices that have been employed by social groups throughout the ages to keep individuals under control. Among them are public opinion, law, belief, social suggestion, social religion, personal ideals, ceremony, art, personality, enlightenment, illusion, and social valuation.

Public opinion, which is the judgment the group pronounces upon an act, has been, Ross stated, one of the most powerful means of dissuading an individual from pursuing a completely selfish course of action or, on the other hand, of making him follow a course deemed desirable from the point of view of the group. Group judgment expresses itself in admiration or abhorrence, respect or derision,

in calling an act good or bad, noble or ignoble. Law acts, on the one hand, as a repressive force and, on the other, as a compulsive force. In either form, it is an important device. Neither law nor public opinion, however, said Ross, insures control of an individual's actions when he is out of sight of his neighbors. This is accomplished by means of a belief in an all-seeing, omniscient judge who rewards and punishes.

Social suggestion is another device used by society since time immemorial. By this Ross meant the control exercised by such means as tradition, conventions, example, personal influence, etc. Ross distinguished between *legal* religion, which he attributed to awe of the supernatural, and *social* religion, which he identified mainly with ethical ideals. This latter type is also a significant force in controlling the individual. Ceremonies, by their insistence upon precision and detail and by their symbolism, have a unifying effect upon the participants and are thus a controlling force. Similarly, maintained Ross, art in its various expressions, by arousing common emotions, by causing a convergence of feeling, serves as a means of control. By the personality device Ross meant the influence exercised by compelling personalities, such as Garibaldi, Cortez, Mirabeau, and Napoleon, who aroused the masses to unbounded loyalty. Max Weber referred to such individuals as *charismatic* leaders, i.e., persons who are popularly believed to be divinely inspired and directed. The enlightenment device amounts to society's making the individual aware of the consequences of his actions and thus either encouraging or discouraging him in them. In control by illusion rather than by belief, society fosters misconceptions about ideas and things, and thus achieves the control of individuals. Finally, by assigning certain values to ideas and things, society also secures the desired reaction of individuals. While some of the devices are employed by society deliberately, others are unconscious manifestations.

E. C. Hayes, another American sociologist, distinguished between two major types of social control: control by sanctions, which involves a system of rewards and punishments, and control by suggestion and imitation. The latter he considered by far the more desirable as well as the more effective type. While repression of crime may be a right procedure, he said, prevention of it through proper training is certainly a superior means. The most effective means of control, according to Hayes, is education, and the most significant agency, the family.

Frederick E. Lumley, in his *Means of Social Control,* classified the existing devices of social control into two major categories: those based upon physical force and those founded on symbols. Although means based on physical force are indispensable in social control, stated Lumley, human societies could not function, i.e., social order would be impossible, if they had to resort solely to such force. The very idea that individuals could be managed by mere force is absurd, he said. Human societies, therefore, had to develop and come to rely upon the symbolic devices, which are quicker, easier, and more economical, as well as more effective, than force. The use of symbolic methods in controlling individuals is so old and universal that we take it for granted. It is a safe assumption that were man to lose the art of symbolic manipulation, society would soon disintegrate.

The symbolic methods of control, according to Lumley, fall into two classes. In the first are included those designed to evoke from individuals the same response and to direct their behavior along certain lines deemed desirable. Among the methods of this type are rewards, praise, flattery, persuasion, and education. In the second category are found those mechanisms aiming at restraint and repression. These consist of such techniques as gossip, satire, criticism, name-calling, ridicule, commands, threats, propaganda, and punishment. There are virtually thousands of devices which human societies have developed, consciously or unconsciously, for the purpose of controlling the thought and behavior of their members.

Luther L. Bernard, in *Social Control,* defined social control as "a process by which stimuli are brought to bear effectively upon some person or group of persons, thus producing responses that function in adjustment." Bernard distinguished between unconscious and conscious means of control. Among the former the most important are custom, tradition, and convention. Among the latter are found techniques consciously developed and employed by leaders of all types. It is the consciously applied devices, wrote Bernard, that are most effective, although the power of the unconscious mechanisms is also marked. Similarly, systematic and well-organized controls have, on the whole, a more powerful effect than sporadic and haphazard ones employed by mobs.

Bernard also distinguished between *exploitive* and *constructive* methods of social control. In the first type such techniques are used

as force in the sense of sanctions, pacification, punishment, reprisals, intimidation, fraud of all kinds, manipulation in its various forms, intolerance, censorship, and repression. Among the devices employed in the constructive method are revolution, nonviolent coercion, regimentation and standardization, belief in supernatural forces, ethical standards, custom and law, social reform, and education.

Like Lumley, Bernard divided control devices into two major classes, which he referred to as the *negative,* or inhibiting, and the *positive*. Such techniques as those employed by the police are within the first category and serve as a means to restrain individuals. On the other hand, devices utilizing promises and rewards fall within the second class. The positive type of control, stated Bernard, is more effective as well as more desirable, first, because in offering the individual a release for his energies it renders them more constructive, and, second, because persons by nature will respond more easily to promises than to threats, to peaceful means than to force. Even tyrannical regimes have found the latter methods preferable, employing them whenever possible. Good illustrations in recent years, were the Fascist and Communist regimes, which employed false promises extensively. By presenting hopeful programs to the populace, the dictators received enthusiastic support for their schemes, which involved a great deal of sacrifice on the part of the people. The positive method is especially important as a means of control in a democratic society where it can be utilized for constructive ends.

The mores, folkways, and institutions may be conceived of as serving chiefly as a means of social control. It follows that sociology deals largely with phases and aspects of social control. This is particularly so, if by social control we mean, as MacIver and Page, in *Society,* state, "the way in which the entire social order coheres and maintains itself."

Although the means used for social control are basically the same in all societies, the devices and techniques, and the emphasis given them, vary a good deal among different societies. Moreover, the number and variety of devices employed depend on the degree of complexity of life in a society. On the whole, primitive societies resort mainly to informal means of controlling individuals and groups —to the pressure of convention, usage, custom, and tradition. Advanced or civilized societies, on the other hand, tend to rely on sys-

tematically formulated regulations, rules, and laws which are enforced by agencies, such as courts and police systems, even though in certain phases of social life, where face-to-face contacts are maintained, control depends chiefly on customary rules, regulations, and codes.

7

The Meaning and Function of Institutions

Institutions are so vital a subject for the understanding of society that the chief concern of sociology is with an analysis of their nature and function. If, as Sumner and Keller pointed out, folkways are to society what cells are to the biological organism, institutions are its bones and tissues. Through its institutions the life of a society reveals itself to the observer in all its complexity and variability. Furthermore, institutions are, as Giddings observed, "the organs that conserve what is best in the past of the human race." Institutions are, therefore, essential elements in the study of society.

THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF INSTITUTIONS

The term *institution,* like many other sociological terms which are also found in popular usage, has been given different meanings. Even in sociology there is no unanimity as to the exact definition of this term, although the concrete forms of institutions are readily recognized.

According to Sumner and Keller, who contributed perhaps the clearest and most satisfactory explanation of the term, an institution is a vital interest or activity which is surrounded by a cluster of mores and folkways. For example, the facts that societal life is lived by two sexes and that their relationships to each other, to their offspring, and to society as a whole need to be regulated give rise to a set of practices which, when they become crystallized, are recognizable as an institution, namely, that of marriage and the family.

Sumner, in his *Folkways,* conceived of the "institution" as consisting not only of a concept, idea, or interest, but of a *structure* as well. By structure he meant an apparatus or a group of functionaries. Through this apparatus the idea takes on concrete form and is put to work to serve the needs of society. Thus, there are the concept of the deity and the need to form a relationship with it. This task is

accomplished through the priesthood, a special place of worship, a ceremonial, and dogma. Together they constitute the institution of the church. Many institutions require for their proper functioning a physical apparatus, such as buildings and equipment. The church, school, and court are examples of this type.

Lester F. Ward regarded an institution as the means "for the control and utilization of the social energy"; E. A. Ross considered it a "grouping or relation that is sanctioned by society"; and L. T. Hobhouse described it as "the whole or any part of the established and recognized apparatus of social life." To Joyce O. Hertzler, who made a comprehensive study of the subject in his book, *Social Institutions,* an institution is "a fabric of fairly definite and generally sanctioned relations . . . between individuals of a group in respect to one another." E. C. Hayes looked upon institutions as sets "of activities which a society adopts as its deliberately accepted method of attaining a deliberately approved end"; C. A. Ellwood defined them as "social habits which are systematized"; and Robert M. MacIver regarded them as "established forms or conditions of procedure characteristic of group activity."

ORIGIN AND CLASSIFICATION OF INSTITUTIONS

As in the case of the mores out of which they arise, institutions cannot be traced to their very beginnings because by the time they have become definitely established their origins are lost in the remote past. By means of careful inference, however, it is possible to determine the probable genesis of the basic social institutions.

Sociologists agree that institutions arise and persist because of a definite felt need of the members of a society. The need is not equally pressing in every case, but it must be present if an institution is to arise and develop. The family, for instance, is an institution which is tied up with the very survival of the human species, whereas an institution such as the theater does not approach it in importance. Nevertheless, the latter certainly arose in response to a definite need for recreation.

While, as we have seen, there is essential agreement on the general origin of institutions, sociologists have differed about the specific motivating forces. Thus, Sumner and Keller maintained that institutions come into existence to satisfy vital "interests" of man; Ward believed that they arise because of a "social demand," or "social

necessity"; and Bernard concluded that they originate to meet instinctive needs. Lewis H. Morgan, one of the American pioneer students of human society, ascribed the basis of every institution to what he called a "perpetual want." Other social scientists have propounded comparable views to explain the origin of institutions.

Attempts have been made to classify the interests or needs which are responsible for the rise of institutions. Here, again, Sumner and Keller have given us a succinct and inclusive classification. According to them the chief interests that have given rise to institutions are hunger, love, vanity, and fear, which correspond to the impulses of self-preservation, of sex, of self-gratification, and the dread of the supernatural. These socializing forces have operated in all human beings, and as a result institutions arose to satisfy as well as to regulate and control them.

The institutions that developed as an outgrowth of these interests are the *economic and governmental systems* (concerned with the food supply, property, class, and law systems); the *family* (concerned with courtship, marriage and divorce, training of the young, and treatment of the aged); *esthetic and intellectual expressions and recreational needs* (which find outlets in dancing, acting, poetry, art, science, philosophy, social activities, games, and entertainment); and *religion* and its accompanying beliefs and practices.

The four major interests enumerated above account for practically all the institutions found in even the most highly civilized societies. As a society develops, new interests arise, but they all fit into the major categories; with these in mind, one should experience no difficulty in assigning a place to such present-day institutions as a college, the stock market, Mother's Day, the game of baseball, cocktail-drinking, and the movies.

The more highly developed a society is, the greater will be the variety and, sometimes, the complexity of its institutions. The fundamental institutions resulting from universal human needs will be found in all societies, even the most primitive. Goldenweiser, in *Early Civilization,* showed that the psychological and physical needs of mankind are basically the same, as are the physical conditions under which man is forced to live. Hence, his activities and institutions are essentially alike in all societies. Sumner and Keller asserted that the means adopted for meeting universal needs "all reflect the inveterate conditions of life on earth."

THE GROWTH AND FUNCTIONS OF INSTITUTIONS

It is clear that institutions are subject to gradual growth. Every institution has its antecedents, even though some may give the impression of sudden appearance. According to Sumner, institutions may be divided into *crescive,* or those developing gradually through the process of accretion, and *enacted,* or those appearing as a result of conscious and rational effort. The state is an example of the former, and a college or bank of the latter. This distinction, however, does not imply that enacted institutions arise abruptly and without antecedents, but primarily that their formation is more rapid and involves rational purpose.

As previously shown, institutions serve chiefly as a means of meeting the needs of a society. Those needs range from the essential ones, without which social life could not go on, to those relatively unimportant, which are more or less dispensable. No institution arises unless a need is felt. This is not to say, however, that there are no institutions or institutional forms in existence in a society which fail to meet a present need. On the contrary, some are mere survivals of the past; although they had utility at one time, they have become useless or even harmful. (An example of a harmful institution is the caste system in the South.) Moreover, even many of the fundamental institutions may need modification in order to make them function more satisfactorily under changed conditions.

Besides satisfying the needs of human beings, institutions serve as a means of regulating and controlling man's activities. This is particularly true of governmental institutions, but in a broader sense all institutions exercise control over the members of a society by making it clear to them what is and what is not allowed, or what is and what is not desirable. Finally it must be remembered that the various institutions are not independent entities, but are interrelated as well as interdependent.

It is clear from what has been said that in an advanced and complex society the number and variety of institutions are very great. Every important phase of life is institutionalized. But there are, as we have seen, only a few major, or pivotal, institutions, an analysis of which yields a more or less adequate picture of society.

We have noted the classification made by Sumner and Keller. Hertzler, in *Social Institutions,* discussed what he considered the

nine major institutions. He referred to them as "pivotal institutional fields" and classified them as follows: the economic and industrial, matrimonial and domestic, political, religious, ethical, educational and scientific, communicative, esthetic and expressional, and health and recreational. No doubt the list could be extended to include many minor institutions. In the following chapters we shall concentrate on the ones most commonly considered. These are: economic institutions, government, religion, the family, education, and recreation.

8

Economic Institutions

In the process of satisfying his material needs, man gradually develops a body of practices connected with those needs. In time these practices become standardized and firmly established as clusters of folkways which have come to be known as economic institutions; the institutions are interrelated as parts of an economic system. Property tenure, the division of labor, and the system of exchange are among these institutions. Cultural and physical conditions determine the form that the economic structure of a particular society will assume. Food-gathering, hunting, fishing, herding, agriculture, trade, and industry are the principal economic activities of mankind. These activities give rise to systems such as feudalism and capitalism.

THE RELATION BETWEEN SOCIOLOGY AND ECONOMICS

The structure of economic institutions and the ideas upon which they are based are the primary concern of economics. Economic institutions, however, do not have a separate, independent existence. They are part and parcel of the culture of a society, being influenced by the other constituents of a culture and, in turn, influencing them. In other words, economic activities are inseparable from social life and cannot be understood apart from it. Many economic activities are themselves social in character. Economic organization is, as Walton H. Hamilton expressed it, "an implication of man's entire life in a society." The sociologist is interested primarily in these social aspects of economic activities, rather than in the mechanisms of production and distribution.

The sociologist's concern with economic institutions goes back to the very beginnings of sociology. The earliest sociologists, among whom Spencer was outstanding, included the economic activities

of man in their analysis of social relationships. Some of the most distinguished sociologists, such as Sumner, Durkheim, Pareto, and Weber, approached the study of society primarily through its economic institutions and made them the core of their analysis.

The Biblical saying that man does not live by bread alone is indicative of the importance attached ever since ancient times to man's economic activity. The earliest chronicles and sacred books of China and India abound in references to the basic significance of economic activities. Some of the great thinkers of Western civilization, particularly Plato, Aristotle, and Thucydides, in his *History of the Peloponnesian War,* went so far as to assert that the economic conditions have a determining influence over the social, thus anticipating economic determinism. Similar ideas were propounded by many Roman thinkers, especially toward the end of the Roman Empire, as well as by writers of later times down to the nineteenth century. It was not, however, until the appearance of the meticulously formulated theory of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels that economic determinism received its scientific form and gradually found a significant place in the theories of many social scientists seeking to explain societal phenomena.

Despite its seeming plausibility, Marx's theory that economic forces determine all other phases of life appears to be at best only a half-truth. Facts accumulated by sociologists and anthropologists as well as by other social scientists regarding the structure of primitive and civilized societies tend to negate, or at least to qualify greatly, the theory that economic activities determine all others in a society. That they play a dominant role is practically undeniable. That they influence, to a greater or lesser extent, almost every other phase of life is generally accepted. But economic activities themselves, as has been demonstrated, are also influenced, often very decidedly, by the noneconomic forces of a society, so that it is often impossible to decide which determines which. Marx and Engels were aware of the importance of the noneconomic elements in a culture, but they emphasized the determining nature of the economic forces.

Economic activities are unquestionably affected by the physical environment of a society. The Polar Eskimos, for instance, could not be expected to develop agriculture. Then, too, the stage of technological development limits the economic activities of a society. In a society subsisting by means of hunting and food-gathering, for example, trade and commerce cannot be developed, for this kind of

economy allows for little surplus. Finally, the type of economy prevalent in a society is deeply affected by religious and political institutions, as well as by the social organization as a whole.

FACTORS AFFECTING ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES

For a long time writers and thinkers concerned with analyzing the economic activities of man have felt that, far from forming a separable unit, these are an integral part of societal life, and can be understood only in terms of the total life of a society. Orthodox economic theory assumes the existence of an "economic man," but a number of outstanding economists have broken with this view and have postulated theories which hold that various noneconomic factors are the basis of economic institutions. Some of these economists came to be considered sociologists rather than economists, despite the fact that their primary concern was with economics. Outstanding representatives in this group were Vilfredo Pareto, Max Weber, and Werner Sombart. On the other hand, some sociologists, seeking to understand societal life, made the analysis of economic activities their point of departure. Sumner and Keller, for example, started their study of human society with an analysis of the basic economic factors, devoting to them the greater part of the first volume of their four-volume work.

The Theories of Durkheim, Pareto, and Sombart

Émile Durkheim, in his quest for an understanding of social institutions, was led to delve deeply into the economic aspects of life. The title of one of his major works, *De la division du travail social (Of the Division of Labor in Society),* is indicative of his approach. In this, and in other works, he approached the study of social institutions through an analysis of economic activities, which he considered fundamental to an understanding of social life. After a painstaking analysis of Western society, Durkheim concluded that the economic individualism which characterizes it is not based by any means entirely on purely individual interest but depends upon a set of rules and regulations, or commonly accepted standards, which are social, or "non-contractual," rather than economic in nature. The individual, in other words, is guided and constrained in his economic activities by the moral standards of his group, in the absence of which no orderly pursuit of economic gain would be possible. The com-

monly held standards, corresponding to Sumner's folkways and mores, must be considered in any attempt to understand our economic life. Economic activity thus becomes to a large extent social activity, and its institutions become subject to investigation and analysis by the sociologist.

Although differing radically in spirit and approach, Pareto arrived at a conclusion basically similar to that of Durkheim. Indeed, Pareto turned from the field of economics to that of sociology because he found himself unable to explain economic phenomena satisfactorily in purely economic terms. In his analysis of human motives for action, Pareto stated that the economic activities of individuals are controlled by the common interests of the group. These exert upon the individual a restraining influence so that he is prevented from engaging in purely selfish pursuits and is forced to consider the interests of the group.

In the monumental work *Der moderne Kapitalismus (Modern Capitalism),* which was published in 1902 and reissued in an enlarged six-volume edition in 1916, the German economist-sociologist Werner Sombart maintained that the economic system of a society is an outgrowth of the attitudes current in it, which, in their aggregate, form the spirit *(Geist)* of a people. It is this spirit, rather than other factors, which he considered secondary, that exerts a determining influence upon the economic system of a people.

Sombart distinguished between the precapitalistic and capitalistic eras. These two periods are characterized by radically different sets of attitudes or motives, and, hence, the economic systems vary fundamentally. In the precapitalistic society, need, which is largely determined by tradition and varies with the status of the individual, is the governing principle. Beyond that there is little or no acquisitiveness or competition. Tradition rather than rationality governs economic activity in such a society. Under capitalism, on the other hand, acquisitiveness and competition for power permeate the economic activities of individuals. Capitalistic society is dominated by what Sombart called the "spirit of enterprise" and the "spirit of the bourgeois." The first entails the quest for power which is achieved through acquisitiveness, and the second involves certain qualities which have come to be desired and respected, such as thrift hard work, and foresight. Sombart believed that a change in attitudes, which has occurred because of certain forces at work, brought about these new motivations, which, in turn, are responsible for

ushering in and maintaining the capitalist economy. Like Durkheim and Pareto, he saw in the noneconomic elements the basic forces shaping a society's economic structure.

Weber's Theory

Views similar to those of these three writers—stressing the idea that noneconomic factors exert a profound influence on economic activities—were developed by another outstanding German economist-sociologist, Max Weber. Weber's theories on the relationship between religion and economics were set forth in his *Religionssoziologie (Sociology of Religion),* parts of which were translated by Talcott Parsons and published as *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.* Weber concluded that Protestantism, particularly Calvinism, with its emphasis upon work as a Christian duty, gave a strong impetus to the development of capitalism. Protestantism demanded of the individual a devotion to his calling and application to his work, traits leading to worldly success, which, in turn, was looked upon as an indication of God's favor. The accumulation of wealth was not considered undesirable; yet one was not to use wealth for self-aggrandizement, but rather for Christian purposes. Thrift and frugality were highly esteemed. Protestantism, according to Weber, thus encouraged private enterprise, initiative, acquisitiveness, and individualism, which are the *sine qua non* of capitalism. Nevertheless, by its insistence upon asceticism, Protestantism also exerted a strong disciplinary influence upon economic activity. The individual was prevented from pursuing purely selfish inclinations; he was forced to consider interests other than his own. Religion, in this case Protestantism, thus had a far-reaching effect upon the economic order of Western society. Weber was impressed by his findings that the economic organizations of China and of India and of the ancient world as a whole were deeply influenced by the prevalent religious systems. He therefore concluded that the economy of a society is conditioned by its form of religion, even though he admitted that it is possible in many cases to show that the reverse is true.

This theory was criticized by social scientists, including the English economist R. H. Tawney. In his *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism,* Tawney pointed out that the capitalist spirit developed in fifteenth-century Venice and Florence, as well as in southern Germany, because these localities, though Catholic, were centers of

commerce and finance. Capitalism developed in England and Holland in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, not because of their Protestant faith but rather because of certain economic forces, especially the far-reaching effects of the great explorations and discoveries.

THE INFLUENCE OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES UPON OTHER INSTITUTIONS

As already noted, economic activities have an inevitable effect upon other phases of life. A number of careful studies, such as those by the anthropologists Clark Wissler and Robert H. Lowie and by the sociologists William F. Ogburn and F. Stuart Chapin, established the existence of a definite relationship, with the former usually having a decisive effect upon the latter. Some writers have even sought to prove the existence of a definite correlation between the economic system and the various social institutions of a society. The Italian sociologist Achille Loria, in *The Economic Foundations of Society,* maintained that the religion, moral code, art, and literature—in short the whole nonmaterial culture—of a people reflect to a large extent the economic system under which they exist. This view is supported by a number of other writers, some of whom consider economic factors primarily responsible for the rise of certain institutions, philosophies, or ideologies. The eminent American historian Charles A. Beard, in his *Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States,* maintained that the American Constitution was basically an economic document, which was inspired, framed, and carried through by the wealthy financiers, businessmen, and manufacturers who stood to derive economic advantage from it. Recently, Beard's theory has been severely criticized.

The Marxist writers regarded economic forces as the determiners of all social institutions. The chief exponents of this theory were, of course, Marx and his collaborator Engels. The noted German socialist Karl Kautsky, in his *Foundations of Christianity,* asserted that there is a close correlation between economic forces and the rise and development of Christianity, while the Communist leader Leon Trotsky, in his *Literature and Revolution,* concluded that literature is little more than a reflection of the prevailing economic system.

The existence of a relationship between economic and social insti-

tutions is undeniable. This relationship was set forth convincingly by the anthropologists Richard Thurnwald in *Economics in Primitive Communities,* Bronislaw Malinowski in *Argonauts of the Western Pacific,* and Melville J. Herskovits in *The Economic Life of Primitive Peoples.* These investigators found the economic life of the peoples they studied to be inseparably linked to their social life and incomprehensible apart from it. On the other hand, scientific studies show that the relationship between the economic and social phases of life is often uncertain and far from clear. It is difficult to establish a definite correlation between the two.

One of the most careful studies of this problem is summarized in *The Material Culture and Social Institutions of the Simpler Peoples* by Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg. In a statistical survey of over four hundred preliterate peoples, the authors noted that among peoples having a similar economy there may exist different forms of social institutions and different beliefs and practices, and that among societies having similar social organizations there may exist different economic systems. Sombart, who, as we have seen, tended to consider religion a factor of primary importance in shaping economic systems, insisted, in his *Technik und Kultur (Technics and Civilization),* that although some correlation may exist, the economic organization of a society does not determine its non-economic institutions. The same capitalistic system may be found in small states and in large ones, in republics and in monarchies, and in Protestant as well as Catholic countries. Furthermore, within the same capitalistic system there may be different expressions of art and literature, different codes of values, and different attitudes toward life.

THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

Economic institutions are as old as human group life itself. Under primitive conditions there is little division of labor, as each family produces nearly everything necessary for its existence. Concerted efforts to obtain food, clothing, and shelter, however, are found in societies on even the most primitive cultural levels. Such efforts call for the establishment of a machinery by means of which the various economic activities can be regulated and coordinated. Economic institutions thus come into existence. Everywhere, therefore, and at all

times, economic activities are regulated, and each individual is forced to curb his impulses and to subordinate his own interests to those of the group.

Since economic institutions are an integral part of the culture of a group, they take on, like the culture itself, a variety of forms. Moreover, a particular type of economy will bring into existence certain institutions which are especially adapted to it. Hunters and herders, for example, have little use for slaves, nor can they easily hold them, whereas farmers find them to be valuable assets. Hence, the institutions of slavery and serfdom are developed mainly in agricultural societies. Private property and trade are also more likely to exist and to be further developed in agricultural than in hunting societies. Likewise, the prevalent kinds of religion and other social institutions may account for the existence or nonexistence of certain economic institutions.

The number and variety of economic institutions found in different societies, primitive and civilized, and in different periods of history are, of course, very great. We shall limit ourselves here to a consideration of a few of the more basic ones.

Division of Labor

The division of labor to be performed by different individuals and groups appears almost at the beginning of human group life and is universal in all societies. Everywhere there are differences in the types of work done by men and women, by adults and children. The tasks usually allotted to children are determined by a consideration of the physical strength required, while in the case of men and women this factor is only one among many. Frequently, the distinction between men's work and women's work is a matter of custom and tradition.

Sumner and Keller stated that within any relatively small group, the occupations of men and women are seldom identical or interchangeable. The anthropologist George Peter Murdock in a study of the division of labor by sex in a large number of primitive societies showed that men usually perform tasks requiring greater physical strength, such as hunting and trapping in a hunting economy or the pursuit of sea mammals in maritime tribes. Such tasks as gathering and preserving food, cooking, and the like, are performed by women. The special disabilities of women handicap them in the performance of certain types of work. Thomas, in his *Sex and Society,* maintained

that women generally perform the household tasks because they are by nature more suited for occupations connected with the home. Owing to their greater physical strength and dominant position, men, as Sumner and Keller pointed out, take up occupations which require greater skill and which are more interesting or, at any rate, less monotonous than those of women. In most societies the men rather than the women have freedom to choose an occupation. Again, as the anthropologist O. T. Mason stated in his *Woman's Share in Primitive Culture,* some tasks may be performed by both men and women, their work often being supplementary or complementary. Finally, as brought out by Thomas, what is considered man's work may later come to be accepted as woman's and vice versa. For example, in our society, women now follow such professions, formerly reserved for men, as law, medicine, and engineering.

The division of labor assumes a simple form in preliterate societies. It is applied mainly to household tasks, though it is also seen in collective efforts involving the whole clan or tribe, when it takes the forms of dominance and subordination, division of function, allotment of tasks, and so forth. It is, however, only with an advance in the material culture and expansion in manufacture, trade, and commerce that the types of occupations increase in number and the division of labor increases. Another factor is population. A large population requires a complicated system of cooperation and a minute division of labor. Simmel suggested that a large group can maintain its unity only through an elaborate system of division of labor, without which it would break apart on every occasion.

In his *On the Division of Labor,* Durkheim distinguished between "mechanical" and "organic" societal solidarity. The first type prevails in the simpler, folk societies, where the division of labor is restricted to the family, village, or small region. These units are nearly self-sufficient and are bound together by ties of kinship and sympathy as well as by interdependence of their members; there are few ties between one group or locality and another. It is a "segmented" society. On the other hand, in an "organic" society, all parts are held together by an interdependence which is imposed by an elaborate division of labor and specialization. Here cooperation among all individuals and groups is of the very essence, for everyone is dependent upon everyone else. Sumner and Keller refer to this relationship as "antagonistic cooperation."

Property

Although land, the food supply, and other essentials are generally held in common in primitive societies, private ownership is recognized in almost all groups. This is particularly true of personal belongings, such as clothing, weapons, tools, utensils, and magic formulas. Often, so much a part of one's person are such articles considered to be that when the owner dies they are buried with him. Perhaps the most valuable property of the individual is his name, misappropriation or abuse of which is considered one of the gravest offenses. Primitive societies, on the whole, can hardly be called communistic, in the strict sense of the word, although most of them could be classed as communalistic.

The paucity of items that can be owned is one reason for the prevalence of communalism in primitive societies. An increase in material inventions and a consequent multiplication of goods are conducive to private ownership. Western capitalism, with its emphasis upon private property, is a result of a host of complex social forces, but it is unthinkable, of course, without a tremendous supply of material goods.

Our concepts about property may be traced back to Roman times; it was then an institution given legal sanction. During the Middle Ages, when the chief form of property was land, ownership was based mainly on custom and force, even though as time went on the legal right to ownership became more firmly established. In modern times the legal right is almost the sole basis for private property. Private ownership has become so much a part of the social and economic fabric of modern capitalistic society that property rights are often considered more important than other rights of the individual, and private property is regarded as something sacred and as a concomitant of "human nature."

Trade and Commerce

In primitive societies, trade takes the form of barter, and no exact standard of value exists. If money is used, it is in the form of cloth, cattle, sea shells, implements, and similar commodities. Profit-making is hardly a factor, and property is accumulated mainly for the purpose of gaining prestige. Not infrequently, goods, including foodstuffs, are stored with the object of destroying them or giving them away. Thus, the Kwakiutl Indians of British Columbia avidly gather

blankets only to dispose of them, and the Trobriand Islanders accumulate yarns for the same purpose. The system of trading in primitive societies often consists of gift-giving and mutual rendering of services. In this manner, a crude exchange of goods and services is effected. Although profit is not desired, exact reciprocities are insisted upon, so that no one gets "something for nothing." Economic factors such as wages, investment, interest, and profits, which are universal in our society, are practically unknown among preliterate groups. The exchange of goods over long distances requires means of transportation which are usually nonexistent in primitive societies.

Trade and commerce during the early Middle Ages were little more advanced than they had been among primitive peoples. These institutions represented in a number of respects a backward step in comparison with the stage they had reached in ancient Greece and Rome. With the development of manufacturing, the growth of towns, and the stabilization of feudalism, however, markets and fairs were established, or rather re-established, since they had existed in a number of countries in the ancient world. While at first conducted largely on a barter basis, trading gradually came more and more to involve money as a medium of exchange. Trade and commerce were thus given an impetus to their further development. In Europe the Crusades were a potent factor in advancing economic institutions. It was not, however, until the Industrial Revolution, which was accompanied by thoroughgoing changes in agriculture, transportation, and communication, that trade and commerce and the money economy in general became firmly established.

The change from a relatively simple barter economy to a modern money economy, from feudalism to capitalism, took place over a considerable period of time and involved complex factors, only a few of which can be considered here.

THE RISE OF CAPITALIST ECONOMY

The tribute in goods and services paid by the serf to the king and lord was gradually changed to money payments in the form of taxes, tolls, and duties. Money payments were being substituted for personal services. The system of wages came into existence. A series of events taking place in the fourteenth century in England, among which perhaps the most important were the famine of 1315, the Black Death, and the unsuccessful Peasants' Revolt, marked the

beginning of a decline in serfdom and the rise of a capitalistic economy. The merchant came to the fore, and the modern business system with its attendant institutions was ushered in. At this juncture, certain economic, political, and cultural forces combined to bring about the present economic system. These forces included inventions such as the compass, gunpowder, and the printing press. the rise and development of the national state, geographical discoveries, colonization, and the Protestant Reformation.

Simmel, in his *Philosophie des Geldes (Philosophy of Money),* asserted that the establishment of the institution of money in the economic system of modern Western society has had far-reaching effects upon almost every phase of life. It resulted in greater freedom for both employer and employee, and for both seller and buyer of goods and services, since the use of money makes for a depersonalized relationship between the two parties in a transaction and absolves them of all obligations not connected with the deal. While individuals depend for the satisfaction of their needs upon the services of a large number of people, they are at the same time independent of any particular one person. Simmel maintained that the institution of money has radically changed our whole philosophy of life and mode of living and has made us pecuniary in our attitudes, so that almost everything is evaluated in terms of money, and that, as social contacts have become depersonalized, human relations have tended to become superficial and cold.

Throughout the sixteenth, seventeenth, and part of the eighteenth centuries, economic activities were generally regulated by the governing powers, a practice supported by economic doctrine at the time. With the growing opposition by merchant princes and large mercantile interests, this practice of state interference began to break down and to be replaced by the doctrine and practice of *laissez faire.* While this doctrine is believed to have been propagated first in eighteenth-century France, it was in England, under the leadership of Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, that it received its full development. Among the prominent sociologists advocating *laissez faire* were Spencer in England and Sumner in the United States. According to this doctrine, if individuals (who are assumed to be acting at all times rationally) pursue their own interests, unhampered by restriction, they will achieve the greatest happiness for the greatest number. As the economist J. Kuczynski showed in his painstaking study, *Labor Conditions in Europe, 1820-1935,* the *laissez-faire*

system had particularly adverse effects on the workers. Wage slavery, excessive hours of work, child labor, abominable factory conditions, and general exploitation of workers were some of the resulting evils. Another far-reaching effect was the spread of the corporation and monopoly, which, in time, made a mockery of "free enterprise" and real competition.

The Modern Corporation

The corporation has its roots in the joint-stock company which originated towards the end of the Middle Ages. Among the advantages of the corporation are the limited liability of stockholders, a span of life beyond that of any individual stockholder, and an easy means of investment. However, the corporation as we find it today has become an organization in which a few individuals can, and often do, manipulate affairs to their own advantage and to the disadvantage of the vast majority of the stockholders. Perhaps the most dangerous development of the corporation has been the holding company, which may control a number of operating companies, and the super-holding company, which may control a number of holding companies. A comparatively few men, owning only a fraction of the stock, may exercise real control over immense capital wealth and over policies affecting the lives and happiness of millions of people. As a result of the pyramiding of holding companies, many fields of business and industry have been almost completely monopolized, leaving little or no room for "free competition" or "free enterprise."

A number of investigators of the problem have brought out some astounding facts regarding the tremendous concentration of economic power in the corporation. Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means in *The Modern Corporation and Private Property* showed that in 1930 in the United States 200 of the largest corporations other than banks, each with assets of 90 million dollars or more, controlled about one half of the total corporate wealth, about two fifths of the total business wealth outside of that of the banks, and about one fifth of the total national wealth. A publication of the Twentieth Century Fund, *Big Business: Its Growth and Its Place,* disclosed the fact that in 1933 the 594 largest corporations, making up about one tenth of 1 per cent of all corporations (338,564), owned 53.2 per cent of the total corporate assets of the nation. Another illustration of control by a comparatively few corporations is the fact that during

the Second World War so many government contracts were awarded to large corporations that by April, 1942, only 350 plants, out of 186,000, had received 85 per cent of the government contracts. In 1946 a United States Senate Committee found that 5 per cent of American corporations controlled 80 per cent of the assets of all industries, employed over 60 per cent of all workers in industry, and claimed 84 per cent of the net corporate profits of all manufacturing corporations. A similar tendency has been taking place in business and banking, as indicated by the increasing number of mergers.

The tendency toward monopoly and the consequent submerging of the individual is not, however, limited to business and industry. It is to be observed also in labor unions, in farmers' cooperative organizations, and in the professions. It has discouraged individual initiative and competition. However, this state of affairs does not arouse popular indignation, for the masses are interested primarily in security, which is being made available to more and more individuals earning wages and salaries. Recent decades have witnessed the development of a variety of schemes designed to offer the individual greater economic security by means of such devices as minimum wages, a guaranteed annual wage, unemployment insurance, sickness and accident insurance, old-age pensions, and so on.

At the same time, steps are being taken to provide better conditions of work. Researches by psychologists, such as Elton Mayo, and by industrial sociologists, such as Wilbert E. Moore, Delbert C. Miller, and Paul Meadows, have revealed that industrial plants and commercial establishments are not only economic enterprises but social organizations as well. These investigators have found that morale is very important to production and that good morale can be achieved only when the relationships among the workers and between them and management are kept on as much of a personal level as possible and when the workers are given an interest in, and an insight into, what they are doing.

Government Regulation

Regulation of economic activities is a very old practice—as old perhaps as concerted economic effort by man. It is found in primitive societies on all levels of culture. It existed in one form or another in ancient civilizations, and it persisted throughout the Middle Ages and down to the beginning of the *laissez-faire* system in the eight-

eenth century. Then there was a period of noninterference until the menace of growing monopolies and combines made government regulation imperative. In recent years governments have sought to regulate monopolies—and even to break them up—in the name of *laissez faire,* the main objective of which is noninterference on the part of the state.

The first antimonopoly law in the United States, designed to regulate the railroads, was enacted as early as 1887, and the Sherman Antitrust Act was put into force in 1890. Thereafter various other regulations were enacted, but since they did not prevent the spread of monopoly, the government was forced to take further steps in the direction of "interfering" with business. Economic planning by the government, so dreaded by believers in *laissez faire,* became inevitable.

The trend toward state economic planning began prior to the First World War, but, at least in the United States, state planning did not become a definitely established institution until the onset of the economic depression of the 1930's. Today, nearly every country has a good deal of government planning. The Soviet Union has gone to the extreme, but even England is often referred to as socialist because of its far-reaching national planning. In the United States the ever-increasing regulation of economic life has emphasized reform legislation. Recent years have seen a large variety of reforms, all designed to regulate big business and industry and to protect the "little man" from their abuses, as well as, in a positive sense, to give him the security made possible by the technological advances of our civilization. The problem no longer revolves around the question as to whether or not government control is desirable, but rather how much of it can be instituted without wrecking our manifestly efficient productive system or destroying our capitalist economy.

9

Governmental Institutions

We have seen that sociology is concerned with economic institutions, even though they are of primary interest to economics, because these institutions are inseparable from social life. Similarly, governmental institutions, which lie chiefly within the province of political science, are studied by sociology because they are an agency of social control. But the approach and treatment accorded the subject by the two sciences differ.

Political science assumes the existence of a more or less well-defined political community, the state; it deals with the state as a full-grown entity and with its subdivisions. Sociology, on the other hand, is concerned mainly with the processes whereby loosely organized human groups evolve into unified political communities or states and the modifications in the functions of these states which occur as a result of changing conditions. The state, moreover, is studied as only one of the agencies of control—albeit the most important—which exist in human societies. Sociology, therefore, may be said to be broader in its interests than political science. The two sciences are, nevertheless, supplementary, each supplying the other with data essential to an adequate understanding of the institutions of government.

GOVERNMENT IN PRIMITIVE SOCIETIES

According to Sumner and Keller, regulation is one of the vital necessities of society, for no association is possible without a regulating authority. All human societies possess some system of government, by means of which the relations of individuals are regulated and the interests of the group are safeguarded. Although this system varies greatly from a form which is weak and undeveloped and hardly discernible as such to one that is clearly defined and

all-pervasive, it nevertheless is universal and even when rudimentary it may be referred to as "government."

The chief functions of government are to secure coordination and peace and order in a society. Without such a coordinating agency, the necessary cooperation among its members cannot be achieved, for, although individuals can readily see their own interests, or what they imagine them to be, they have difficulty in appreciating those of others, particularly the interests of society as a whole.

Government as a form of social control is to be found on even the most primitive levels of culture. The apparent absence of governmental machinery in some preliterate societies has led some observers to conclude that there are societies without government. Various travelers, noticing the absence of functionaries or regulating agencies, held to be essential to control, reported that certain primitive peoples had no government. These travelers, however, went on to describe in great detail the powers of the medicine man in the control of the individual's conduct. They did not realize that such regulation constituted a kind of government.

Instead of societies without government, what we often encounter is societies with a government so rudimentary as to be devoid of almost all visible regulatory machinery or of any definite leadership. Thus, according to the German anthropologist Friedrich Ratzel, no name for "chieftain" is to be found in the native Australian languages. Another anthropologist, H. L. Roth, reported, in *The Aborigines of Tasmania,* that the Tasmanians, an extinct society, had no chiefs of any kind and no definite laws regulating the relationships among individuals. A similar situation is said to have prevailed among other peoples, such as the Andaman Islanders, the Papuan tribes, the Bushmen, the Shoshone Indians, and the Ona of Tierra del Fuego. Robert H. Lowie, in *An Introduction to Cultural Anthropology,* pointed out that the Ona have no established leadership; it is only when an occasion calls for group action that a temporary leader is chosen who promptly withdraws after his mission has been fulfilled.

Such societies are not without means of control. The controls are imposed by the folkways and mores. Small groups consisting of related families live in accordance with a simple, unorganized public opinion which has not yet been crystallized into definite agencies for its expression and enforcement. Yet, even in these societies, there is recognition of authority, which is usually vested in the

patriarch or in the old men of the group. The English ethnographer W. H. R. Rivers, in *The History of Melanesian Society,* analyzed this system of control by leaders which he found to be prevalent among the Melanesians and to which he referred as "gerontocracy." Another ethnographer, R. W. Williamson in *Social and Political Systems of Central Polynesia,* noted that the heads of families in Samoa exercise so much authority, with even the chief subordinate to them, that the system might almost be considered a family-state. Family heads and elders or wise men have been reported to possess high prestige in other tribes, including such diverse societies as the Eskimos of East Greenland, the Kirghiz of Central Asia, and some Gypsy peoples of Russia.

On the other hand, in many preliterate societies government reached a high level of development. Certain of the African peoples developed elaborate states comparable to modern civilized governments. The Zulus of South Africa built a powerful state, a miniature empire, with a comparatively large standing army. Other African peoples with advanced political development are the Uganda and the Bushongo. These peoples, it should be noted, did not develop a higher material culture (except perhaps in the art of iron work) than many others who lived under a very weak and embryonic form of government. The Indians of North America, with a few exceptions such as the Iroquois, had little political organization. On the other hand, those of Central and South America, notably the Incas, who had established an empire in the real sense of the word, went very far in their political development. Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg concluded that, although little or no correlation can be established between the material culture of a society and its form of government, the hunting societies (at least those in the higher stages of culture) have developed effective governments more frequently than the agricultural societies.

Preliterate societies show not only various degrees of political development but also the principal types of government—from absolute monarchies with elaborate dynastic and hierarchical systems to the most democratic regimes with councils, "senates," or "houses of representatives." Such institutions as slavery, feudalism, militarism, and caste and class systems, with their accompanying paraphernalia, are all encountered. (Even socialism is said to have existed among the Incas.) Thus, while some of the African peoples were being ruled by autocratic kings, the Zuñi and Hopi of America

and the Andaman Islanders lived under essentially democratic or equalitarian systems.

THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE STATE

It is extremely difficult to ascertain the origin of social institutions. Man, however, is loath to give up the search for origins, and, since he cannot find adequate proofs, he constructs well-contained theories, some of which seem more plausible or more acceptable than others but most of which are, at best, approximations of what might have actually taken place. This is certainly true of theories concerning the origin and evolution of the state.

Some of the early sociologists maintained that, as in the case of other institutions, the state evolved from a very simple organization and passed through certain definite stages until it reached a high level of development. One of the outstanding exponents of such a theory was the English sociologist and political scientist Walter Bagehot. In his *Physics and Politics,* Bagehot asserted that government passed through three distinct stages, corresponding to the three stages in societal evolution: (1) the age of custom-fixing, when government was practically nonexistent; (2) the age of conflict between groups with diverse folkways and mores and the resultant conquest and subjugation of certain groups by others, which marked the beginning of the state; and (3) the age of discussion, when government by discussion and compromise came into existence, this being the highest form of political development.

Spencer, in his *Principles of Sociology,* applied his principles of societal evolution to the state, postulating certain stages, similar to those propounded by Bagehot. These are (1) the tribal, when groups are unorganized bands and no government exists; (2) the military, when conquest and subjugation give rise to states organized around powerful war leaders and, eventually, hereditary kings; and (3) the industrial, when military activity tends to be displaced by economic influence. According to Bagehot and Spencer, the state, like society itself, passed through a process of evolution from simple and crude beginnings to the highest stage, which they believed to be still in the making and in which peace and harmonious development will prevail. Spencer believed that genuine democracy can develop only in a society in which industry tends to displace militarism,

a society undisturbed by war, whereas in a militant society the government tends to become centralized and dictatorial.

Somewhat similar attempts at classifying the developmental stages of the state, without implying that all societies necessarily pass through them, have been made by more recent sociologists. Giddings referred to the military-religious, liberal-legal, and economic-ethical stages. Hobhouse divided the history of government into periods of kinship, of authority, and of citizenship.

The theory of linear evolution of the state has been entirely discredited, particularly by Lowie in *The Origin of the State*. The state is now believed to have developed gradually from a simple to a complex type. Even today it exists in different stages of development among various peoples.

Thus, one theory holds that the state evolved gradually out of the family, particularly that of the patriarchal form. The chief exponent of this theory is Henry Sumner Maine, whose research studies of ancient societies convinced him that the chieftainship, and hence early government, evolved out of the prerogatives of the patriarch. This theory has been attacked as an oversimplified explanation based on sources too limited to justify generalization. At best it may apply to ancient classical societies. Nevertheless, this view found support among a number of scholars, among them Woodrow Wilson, who, in *The State,* postulated that the origin of government among civilized nations is to be found in the family organization and its disciplinary system. J. R. Commons, another eminent American social scientist, held that government has its roots in the struggle among classes for the control of private property, but he concluded that the patriarchal family, where children and women were considered private property, was the original nucleus of the state. On the other hand, the Swiss jurist Johann J. Bachofen and the American anthropologist Lewis H. Morgan contended that political origins are to be found in the matriarchal family. According to Lowie, the state is an outgrowth of the social code which was enforced by public opinion and which is present in even the most primitive societies.

There are many versions of a widely accepted theory that the state is a result of struggle. We may recall that Bagehot and Spencer considered the struggle among groups the primary factor in the rise of the state. This conception of the state's origin goes back

to ancient times, and it has reappeared periodically in the writings of philosophers, sociologists, and anthropologists.

The germ of this idea was stated by the ancient Greek philosopher of the sixth century B.C., Heraclitus, who believed that all things come into existence through strife. Similar beliefs were expressed by the Roman poets and philosophers, Lucretius and Horace. The idea received a much more definite expression in the *History of Rome* by Polybius, one of the greatest ancient historians. He contended that intergroup conflict is responsible for the creation and development of political organization. A still more specific form was given to this idea by the Arab historian and philosopher of the late Middle Ages, Ibn Khaldūn. On the basis of careful observation of historical events in the Mohammedan world, Ibn Khaldūn propounded a rather elaborately worked-out theory, claiming that the origin of states is to be found in the conquest of one group, usually sedentary, by another, usually nomadic.

The conflict theory of the origin of the state reappeared in the writings of outstanding social thinkers in early modern times. The Italian political philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli insisted that the state originates in warfare and must ever expand through conquest if it is to survive at all. Similarly, the French thinker Jean Bodin held that conflict accounts for the origin of the state. Among the outstanding English philosophers adhering to this theory were Thomas Hobbes and David Hume; the former made allowance for the theory of contractual origin, whereas the latter, like Spencer and Bagehot, contended that force was eventually replaced by peaceful means. A modified version of the conflict theory was developed by Marx. He asserted that the state is a creature of the dominant economic classes who use it as a means of exploiting the masses.

The most important exponents of the conflict theory of the origin of the state who have elaborated upon and made original contributions to it were Gumplowicz, Ratzenhofer, and Oppenheimer. All three, but particularly Oppenheimer, were influenced by the Marxian explanation of the origin of the state.

Although Ludwig Gumplowicz made other contributions to sociology of a quality which places him among the greatest sociologists, his theory of the origin and development of the state proved to be the most significant. He propounded his ideas regarding the state in *Der Rassenkampf (The Struggle Among Races)*, in *Rasse und Staat (Race and State)*, and in *Die soziologische Staatsidee (The*

Sociological Concept of the State). His general work on sociology, *Gundriss der Soziologie (Outlines of Sociology),* contains the main points of his theory. Gumplowicz, as we have seen, maintained that all culture is a product of group conflict. Briefly, he declared that at the dawn of human organization, groups were held together by kinship ties and lived in comparative peace. In time, however, a clash between the interests of diverse groups led to conflict. Groups struggled with each other until the powerful had subdued the weak. At first the aim of victory was to exterminate the defeated groups, but, as time went on, it became customary to enslave them. Thus appeared a ruling group and an exploited group. The conquerors enacted regulations to perpetuate their superior status. A small group of individuals established themselves as the actual rulers of the state, and these were ever bent upon further conquest. By granting the populace concessions, which eventually became rights, the ruling class obtained its support and was thereby enabled to carry on new wars of conquest. States thus came inevitably to include ethnically heterogeneous groups, which in time were amalgamated. No state, wrote Gumplowicz, has developed without original ethnic heterogeneity, and its unity is the result of social evolution.

This unity does not imply harmony, for within the state the struggle among groups and classes is carried on ceaselessly. Intergroup conflict is replaced by intragroup strife, which is mainly economic in nature, though other factors, such as the quest for power and influence, also play an important role. There is, then, an eternal struggle among groups of various interests—a struggle between and within states. This kind of struggle is largely responsible for evolution and progress. Gumplowicz did include fellow feeling, "syngenism," as a factor in social life, but he considered it of importance only in the original formation of groups.

Gumplowicz' theory of struggle found a foremost place among sociological theories and is held to be on the whole valid. However, he overemphasized the element of struggle, almost to the exclusion of other, peaceful, factors, which are always present and may be just as important in certain instances. Gumplowicz, it is believed, applied the Darwinian principle of the struggle for existence too literally to social and political evolution. Perhaps Gumplowicz was led to take his extreme view by the fact that he lived in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, a state in which there was constant conflict between the empire and the subject nationalities themselves, on the

one hand, and among the various nationalities, on the other hand.

Another Austrian, Gustav Ratzenhofer, agreed that the state is an outcome of struggle, but he considered the struggle one between individuals rather than groups. The interests of individuals, he believed, are always clashing. But individuals also tend to identify their interests with those of the group, which results in their sharing common interests that they are willing to defend against encroachments by outsiders. Moreover, such groups seek not only to preserve their interests but also to dominate their neighbors in order to increase their own wealth and prosperity. Group conflict ensues, and it is this conflict that gives rise to the state, within which group vies with group for advantages. Unlike Gumplowicz, Ratzenhofer held that this conflict within the state may subside or even cease with the reconciliation of the diverse interests, resulting in a peaceful society, the "culture state."

Both Gumplowicz and Ratzenhofer had a profound influence upon early sociologists, including the American Lester F. Ward. While holding that the "interaction of antagonistic forces" explains the origin and evolution of the state, Ward believed that these forces are eventually replaced by cooperation and amalgamation, thus giving rise to the nation. Moreover, he held that physical force is not a *sine qua non* of progress, that the human intellect can make it unnecessary and substitute for it peaceful means. Another American sociologist who was influenced by Ratzenhofer was Albion W. Small. He was particularly impressed by Ratzenhofer's analysis of "interests," which he made an important part of his theories.

The German sociologist Franz Oppenheimer maintained that conflict explains the origin of the state, but that the economic rather than the ethnic struggle is of prime importance. To him the ability of the conqueror to exploit the conquered economically marks the beginning of the state, and the machinery set up to assure continued exploitation of their subjects by the rulers makes possible its further development. In *The State,* he wrote: "Every state in history was or is a *state of classes,* a polity of superior and inferior social groups, based upon distinctions either of rank or of property. The phenomenon must then be called the 'state'. . . . The State in its genesis, essentially and almost completely during the first stages of its existence, is a social institution, forced by a victorious group of men on a defeated group, with the sole purpose

of regulating the dominion of the victorious group over the vanquished, and of securing itself against revolt from within and attacks from abroad." The state, according to Oppenheimer, evolves, going through a series of stages marked by struggles primarily of an economic nature. In the last stage an amalgamation of groups and their diverse cultural traits completes the formation of the state.

The theory of the conflict origin of the state, especially when it does not go to extremes, has been found to possess a good deal of validity and, as pointed out by Lowie, certainly explains the origins of many states which would otherwise be hard to trace. It does not suffice, however, to account for the origin and development of every state. In many cases, pacific factors such as sympathy, mutual aid, need for cooperation, leadership, trade, and commerce operated in conjunction with struggle and were decisive. This view was accepted by Comte, who believed that the natural sociability of individuals and other peaceful factors operate together with force in producing the state. The same view was accepted by Jacques Novicow, Franklin H. Giddings, Albion W. Small, and E. C. Hayes. Hayes, in his *Sociology,* expressed the opinion that even among some of the primitive pastoral peoples the regulation of economic, familial, ceremonial, and other internal societal matters could probably be demonstrated to have played as much of a part as war and slavery in the evolution of government. Perhaps the outstanding proponent of the theory that cooperation is a paramount factor in group life was the Russian social philosopher Peter Kropotkin. In his *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution,* Kropotkin showed that cooperation exists even among the lowest animals and that in human society it plays a most important role. More recently the American anthropologist M. F. Ashley Montagu, in his *On Being Human,* maintained that the history of the human race has been marked by cooperation among members of a society to a much greater extent than by competition and that cooperation is at the very basis of human development.

THE NATURE OF THE STATE

The state, essentially, is an agency of social control. It differs from other social institutions such as the family and church, which also exercise control, in that it has the power to regulate the relationships among all the members of a group. Moreover, the state cannot

be thought of apart from a definite territory. In short, it is a sovereign political organization designed primarily to protect its members, who constitute a nation, from the encroachments of other similar political organizations and to assure peace and order within its boundaries.

Sociologists and other empirical students of the institution conceive of the state as a man-made device, rather than a kind of mystical or supernatural power, as some thinkers believed—notably the German philosopher Hegel, who spoke of it as "a completely independent reality" and as "the march of God in the world." Of such conceptions of the state, Sumner wrote, in *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other:* "I have read a great many books and articles, especially by German writers, in which an attempt has been made to set up the 'State' as an entity having conscience, power, and will sublimated above human limitations, as constituting a tutelary genius over us all. I have never been able to find in history or experience anything to fit this concept. . . . As an abstraction, the State is to me only All-of-us. In practice—that is when it exercises will or adopts a line of action—it is only a little group of men chosen in a very haphazard way by the majority of us to perform certain services for all of us."

Since the state is a product of gradual development, it may be found in different stages of complexity. Again, since, like all other social institutions, it is a product of varying cultural and physical conditions, it will be encountered in different forms and serving different functions. These forms and functions represent little more than adaptations. They change—almost automatically—with changing conditions, and can hardly be proved, on a completely objective basis, to be either superior or inferior. Like all other folkways and mores, they can be judged only as good or bad adjustments to a particular situation.

One must beware of considering primitive society as characterized throughout by simplicity—some of its aspects, anthropological accounts show, are quite complex. Of course, primitive institutions are generally much less complex than our own. Government is comparatively simple in form, and the state is embryonic in development, even though some primitive societies, such as certain tribes in Africa and the Americas, have evolved advanced forms of political organization.

It is customary to classify states into three principal types: monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies, each of which may be subdivided. Attempts have been made by sociologists to use a different, more meaningful classification. Thus, Comte distinguished between theocracy and sociocracy (the latter term was used by Ward to describe a state which is designed mainly to promote the public welfare), while Spencer differentiated between the military and the industrial state.

THE STATE IN ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL TIMES

The roots of the diverse governmental forms may be found in preliterate societies. In their more developed stages, however, they are encountered only in the so-called historic or civilized societies of ancient times. One of the earliest forms of true political organization existed in the ancient city-states in the Nile Valley, in the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, and in Greece. Although these governments differed in many respects from modern political organizations, they nevertheless constituted a transition from a tribal relationship based on kinship and blood ties to one having a political and territorial basis. This early political form gave way to the autocratic or patriarchal type, as in the Egyptian, Babylonian, Persian, and Roman empires which flourished during what Bagehot called the "state-making age."

Although this "state-making" period was marked by the territorial expansion of states, it was not conducive to the development of popular nationalistic sentiments and the formation of the national state. It did, however, provide the basis for the rise of the latter. The decentralized political system prevalent during the Middle Ages was also not conducive to the rise of nationalism and the national state. The latter is generally considered to be the outgrowth of a number of complicated factors which made themselves felt beginning with the sixteenth century. Some of the main factors were the Protestant Reformation, which had a definitely economic basis; land discoveries and the subsequent colonization which, in turn, ushered in the Commercial Revolution; and the Industrial Revolution. Dynastic ambitions of rulers, the American and French Revolutions, and the Napoleonic wars were additional important factors promoting nationalism.

DEMOCRACY

An embryonic form of democracy existed in ancient societies and even in the most primitive groups. But democracy, as we now understand it, is a comparatively recent development growing out of modern conditions. What is referred to as the democracy of primitive peoples is hardly what we conceive as such, even though there may be certain similarities between the primitive organizations and the modern types. In primitive times the people had no power which could be used deliberately and systematically.

The democratic form of government in which elected legislatures are supreme is generally believed to have appeared first in England following the Revolution of 1688, to have developed in the American colonies, and to have achieved full expression in the United States during Andrew Jackson's administration. With its firm establishment in the United States and the so-called great Western democracies, such as England, France, and Scandinavia, and its gradual spread into other countries, democracy has come to be considered the ideal form of government, the type toward which the world is moving and which mankind as a whole will sooner or later adopt.

This belief is implied or expressed in the writings of Spencer, Novicow, and Ward. Among American sociologists, Cooley, in particular, took this position. On the other hand, there were those who, analyzing this question perhaps more scientifically and less emotionally, looked upon democracy as one of the possible governmental forms, which is the best only when judged subjectively or by comparison with other systems. Thus, Giddings considered democracy "only that state of politically organized mankind in which the rule of the few is least arbitrary and most responsible, least drastic and most considerate." Sumner and Keller, after considering the inherent shortcomings of democracy, stated that, despite its obvious flaws, one should judge democracy in the light of the conditions out of which it evolved. Moreover, these writers maintained that true democracy is an ideal practically impossible of realization and that, although the themes of democracy may flatter human nature, actual life demands inequalities. If man is to be guided by rational thought rather than by emotions, there is great need for thinking power, which is a rare quality. Hence, even in a democracy the real rulers are the few. However, despite the recog-

nized flaws, imperfections, and abuses found in the democratic form of government, social scientists, with the exception of a few (such as the Italians Vilfredo Pareto and Alfredo Rocco and the German Werner Sombart) who have shown leanings toward the totalitarian conception of the state, tend to agree with the statement attributed to Abraham Lincoln that the cure for the evils of democracy is more democracy. In other words, it is held that many of the defects could be remedied by perfecting its machinery, by making it dynamic, adapting it to changing conditions, and, what is even more important, by extending democratic practices beyond the political sphere to other, particularly the economic, phases.

Similarly, the concepts of "liberty" and "rights" have been found by sociologists not to possess the metaphysical qualities that philosophers and theologians have ascribed to them. Sociologists do not hold that there is such a thing as "natural" rights in the sense that they are derived from a source outside of human society. Far from being absolute, they are relative and exist only insofar as society grants them. To quote Sumner and Keller, rights arise "out of the facts of human life; they are necessary adjustments, being the rules of the game in the competition between men. They can never, therefore, be absolute; in history they are seen changing to meet newly arising situations."

THE FUNCTIONS OF THE STATE

Although the state is an agency designed primarily to regulate the relationships of its members and to protect its interests from outside encroachments, it performs many other services. The nature and extent of the services vary with the system of government and, under the same system, with the times and conditions. Even in democracies the services performed by the state in the past have been quite different from those provided at present.

There is no agreement among sociologists or other students in the field as to the importance of the state and still less as to what its functions should be. Some sociologists, among them Comte, Ward, Giddings, Pareto. and Hobhouse, held that the state is indispensable, that it is the agency best adapted to regulate relationships in a complex society as well as to safeguard the interests of its members. We have seen that some German philosophers asserted that the state is endowed with almost divine powers. This glorifica-

tion of the state prepared the ground for the Nazi conception of it as a supreme power. Other sociologists, such as MacIver, asserted that the state, while certainly an important regulating agency, is only one of a number of such agencies in a society and has definite limits. Finally, some sociologists have regarded the state as a "necessary evil" required for the maintenance of law and order. Among the latter were Spencer, Novicow, Sumner, and Durkheim.

Accepting the doctrine of *laissez faire,* Spencer and Sumner maintained that the interests of society, of individuals, are best served when their activities are least interfered with by government. The state, according to Sumner, should not be concerned at all with the promotion of the welfare of its members. In *What Social Classes Owe to Each Other,* he wrote that the state need not be concerned with promoting the happiness of man; this he must seek by himself in his own way and at his own risk.

Among writers who went to the extreme of denying any need for the state and even considering it as harmful to human progress were Marx and Engels and their followers. Holding that the state arose as a result of class cleavage in society, these chief exponents of modern socialism claimed that it will disappear, "wither away," with the disappearance of classes. "They [the classes]," wrote Engels in *The Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State,* "will disappear as inevitably as they arose at an earlier stage. Along with them, the state will disappear." Socialist society, he stated, will "put the whole state machine where it will then belong: in the museum of antiquities, side by side with the spinning wheel and the bronze ax."

Sociologists such as Schäffle and Ward went to the other extreme. They believed that the state should carry on economic and social activities to increase human welfare and happiness. Ward held that the major aim of the sociologist was to find a way of making the world an ideal place in which to live. He insisted that human progress can be achieved through *social telesis,* i.e., purposive, intelligent planning. The state he envisioned is a *sociocracy,* one wherein the power is vested in society as a whole and the government employs scientifically determined principles to promote the well-being of all its citizens. Such a state, he asserted, can be achieved, if the government will initiate and carry through measures to eradicate illiteracy and diffuse scientific knowledge, increase the skill of workers so

that they can receive higher wages, and eliminate economic injustices.

RECENT TRENDS IN GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS

At present few sociologists take the position of either the extreme "laissez-faireists" or the extreme "interventionists." Most sociologists realize that the extent of government intervention needed cannot be arbitrarily fixed, that it will depend entirely upon the economic and general cultural conditions in which a state finds itself, upon the demands of the times, and that there is no intrinsic merit in either system. While *laissez faire,* it is thought, may find considerable justification during one period in the history of a society—such as the frontier days of the United States—it hardly can be justified at another, such as the present stage of our economic and social development. Again, while at one time the degree of state intervention needed may be small, at another it may be considerable. Under intervention and nonintervention, of course, must be included not only the relative presence or absence of state control and regulation of the individual's activities but also the relative presence or absence of services rendered by the state for the benefit of its members.

These views have been expressed in the works of a number of sociologists. Giddings held that it is a great mistake unqualifiedly to approve or disapprove of the *laissez-faire* system. Cooley maintained that it is necessary to take a relative point of view regarding the question of what the functions of the state should be. Similarly, Ross contended that the proper functions of the state cannot be definitely determined, depending as they do upon a number of variables.

Many contemporary sociologists claim that society has reached a stage of development in which some intervention by the state in the economic and even the social life of its members, especially to effect an increase in public services, must take place. In fact, a definite trend in this direction has been evident for some time throughout the world and has become sharper in outline, particularly since the end of the First World War. This trend is not restricted to democratic states. Indeed, certain public services, which would seem to fit most naturally into a democratic governmental system, were "invented" and first put into operation by nondemo-

cratic states. An example of this is social insurance, which was initiated by Imperial Germany in the eighties of the past century. No doubt some contributions along this line, whether negative or positive in nature, have been made or will eventually be made by totalitarian states and will then be adopted by others, including the democracies. Still, there is an essential difference in the ways democracies and totalitarian states go about performing their increased functions. In the democracies, the services are demanded by the people from a government which is, as Sumner referred to it, All of-us, for the benefit of all individuals; but i. the totalitarian states, they are dispensed paternalistically by a small, more or less self-appointed, clique for the benefit of the "state," which is not always identical with the people.

William F. Ogburn and Meyer F. Nimkoff, in their *Sociology,* pointed out that the growth of governmental functions derives from existing agencies, which either expand old services or add new ones, or new agencies which are set up for the purpose of meeting new needs. The years of the economic depression of the 1930's were rich in the growth of governmental economic functions. Literally scores of new agencies were created in the ten years of the crisis, and many of them assumed the character of permanent institutions. The noteworthy fact that these functions were undertaken primarily by the national rather than the state and municipal governments indicates a tendency towards centralization. In the United States, the economic crisis resulted in an unprecedented extension of government functions, both in the provision of services and in control. Centralization occurred to such an extent that the government, with the strong approval of one section of the population and the equally rigorous opposition of another, albeit much smaller, section, became the most important social welfare agency. There was also a shift in the functions performed by various agencies of government. This came about on all levels of government—federal, state, and municipal—and was particularly notable on the federal level. There is now hardly an important phase of life in which the government does not participate either as a renderer of services, as an arbiter, or as a controller. It is noteworthy that this process has been going on under both Democratic and Republican administrations, despite the philosophy of rugged individualism that characterizes the latter party.

Wars, like economic crises, are conducive to, and in fact bring about, social changes, including both the kind that furthers the

welfare of society and that which hinders it. The First World War led to the broadening of the state's functions. The Second World War had a similar effect.

The trend toward governmental assumption of new functions is likely to continue. As shown by C. R. Fish in *The Rise of the Common Man,* by Roscoe Pound in *Social Control Through Law,* and by others, this trend, especially in the United States and England, is the result of the growth and diffusion of the idea that the state should be responsible for the economic and psychological, as well as the physical, security of its citizens. This idea, having gained an ever larger group of adherents, stimulated an active demand that could not be withstood by governments, which by their very nature are conservative. As Carroll H. Woody stated in *Recent Social Trends in the United States,* "Despite constitutional limitations, despite the existence of an influential tradition that 'the government is best which governs least,' it remains true that if active bodies of opinion demand with sufficient urgency and persistence that government render a particular service, or that it impose a particular control, the realization of these group objectives cannot be long postponed." It is worth noting that the study, *Recent Social Trends in the United States* (a comprehensive survey in which a number of experts in the different social science fields collaborated), was undertaken at the direction of former President Herbert Hoover, who was an outstanding exponent of "rugged individualism."

Of course, the assumption of social welfare functions by the government makes "interference" in private ownership and enterprise inevitable, and the more extensive these functions are, the more thoroughgoing is the "interference." The whole trend has been termed, and properly so, "socialization." This process of socialization continues unabated. In England, under the postwar governments, it proceeded at a much faster pace than in this country; but in the United States, too, the trend is unmistakable, and it is likely to go on, regardless of which party is in power, and, one might say, regardless of whether the trend is desirable or not. Sumner called this development an automatic adjustment to changing conditions, although, as an extreme "laissez-faireist," he probably would have condemned it.

Thus, although the capitalist state persists, outside the Soviet Union and its satellites, it does so in a greatly modified form. Many of the features that characterized it in the past either have been

irretrievably lost or have changed almost beyond recognition. As Richard T. LaPiere stated in his *Sociology,* " The term 'private property' has lost all its meaning. In one way or another and usually in a number of ways the owner of productive properties is held responsible by the state to society at large. . . . How far the process of socialization will run no sociologist and few businessmen would venture to predict. Certain, however, is the fact that the difference between allegedly capitalistic nations—such as the United States—and the allegedly socialistic states—such as Soviet Russia—is even now only a matter of degree."

While this tendency toward "socialism" is unmistakable in the Western democracies (some of them, notably Sweden, having become countries of "mixed economy"), various observers have detected definite "capitalistic" trends in the Soviet Union and other communistic countries, of which Yugoslavia is an outstanding example.

10

Religious Institutions

All societies have had some form of religion. Early ethnographers travelers, and missionaries reported tribes presumably without religion, but such reports were later shown to have no foundation in fact. They represented merely the subjective judgments of individuals who thought that a particular people had no religion merely because its beliefs and practices did not correspond to their notions of what religion must include. All that such pronouncements regarding religion indicate is that the religions of other peoples are not the same as ours and that ours is considered the only one worthy of the name. Careful students of primitive life have not found any people without the beliefs and practices which constitute a religion.

Religion is not only found everywhere but also goes back to earliest times. Indeed, authorities maintain that the predecessors of modern man, the Neanderthals, must have had some sort of religion, since there is evidence that they buried their dead in a definite position and placed their tools at their side, indicating a belief in an afterlife. Nevertheless, religion is probably not as old or elemental as the family, which exists among the higher apes and other animals.

Religion, as Ruth Benedict pointed out (in *General Anthropology,* edited by F. Boas), is a unique institution, for all other institutions can be traced back to the animal needs of man, to his physical characteristics. Thus, man's social organizations, no matter how much they differ, are based upon the physical facts of sex, infancy, and life in a group. Economic organizations, too, are rooted in man's quest for food and shelter. It is difficult to ascertain the basis of religion in animal life, however, and it is not clear upon which of the human traits it is built.

Sumner and Keller assumed that religion, like other institutions, is a means whereby man seeks to adjust himself to his environment. They distinguished between the natural, social, and supernatural

environments. The last-named, to be sure, is imaginary, illusory, but man finds adjustment to it just as compelling as he does to the other two. "It cannot but have appeared," they wrote, "that the grand illusion under which mankind has labored throughout the ages is that of the existence of a world of ghosts and spirits. That world has constituted a third environment, along with the natural and the social, adjustment to which has been believed to be fully as essential to well-being as adaptation to the more tangible surroundings of nature and fellow-men. . . . It is simply another life-condition along with the rest for man to meet in the struggle for existence."

DEFINITIONS OF RELIGION

There is no consensus about the nature of religion. Since religion constitutes an adjustment to a special set of conditions and circumstances under which a society lives and functions, and those conditions and circumstances vary, it appears in a multitude of forms. It should be clear, stated Sumner and Keller, that the religion of a people must fit in with the rest of its institutions, since they must be consistent with one another, representing as they do in their totality the adjustment of people to life conditions. The forms in which religion expresses itself vary so much that it has been found difficult to agree upon a definition that would fit all of them. Most authorities maintain that religion includes a belief in supernatural or mysterious powers, that this belief is associated with feelings of awe, fear, and reverence, and that it expresses itself in overt activities designed to deal with those powers.

This characterization of religion excludes certain elements which are often thought of as essential to it, such as belief in the immortality of the soul and belief in a god or gods. The ancient Hebrews did not have a definite concept of an immortal soul or of the continuation of life in the hereafter. "Primitive Semitic ideas regarding a future life," wrote Linton in *The Tree of Culture*, "were vague. . . . Like practically all peoples, the Semites believed in some sort of survival after death but the underworld to which ghosts were relegated was gray and uninteresting. They seem to have had no conception of post-mortem rewards and punishments." The Buddhists not only reject beliefs in the immortality of the soul and life in the hereafter but do not even admit the existence of a god. The belief in a soul, as the early American anthropologist D. G. Brinton stated

in *Religion of Primitive People,* does not necessarily imply a belief in a god. Belief in a divine government of the world was rare among preliterates.

On the other hand, religion is regarded by some anthropologists and sociologists as something very earthly and materialistic, designed to achieve practical ends. "Religion in history, from the earliest to very recent days," Sumner and Keller asserted, "has not been a matter of morality at all but of rites, ritual, observance, and ceremony. . . ." If religion, wrote Ruth Benedict, appears to be spiritual in character, to be the source of virtue, morality, and the good life, it is so because it appropriated these qualities from the concepts which were current in society and which were developed by it in the process of social life. "Religion is not to be identified with the pursuit of ideal ends. . . . Spirituality and the virtues are two social values which were discovered in the process of social life. They may well constitute the value of religion in man's history just as the pearl constitutes the value of the oyster. Nevertheless, the making of the pearl is a by-product in the life of the oyster, and it does not give a clue to the evolution of the oyster." A similar view was expressed by Harry Elmer Barnes in his *Social Institutions.* He stated that in identifying religion with social decency and justice, a highly attractive conception of religion is created. But, he continued, such a conception hardly coincides with the nature and concrete expression of organized religion as it existed in the past or as it exists at present.

Because of the different conceptions which have been held about it, religion has been defined in a multitude of ways, none of which seems to be all-inclusive.

Sumner and Keller conceived of religion as a "mode of self-maintenance belonging with industry, war, and regulation." To these sociologists it represents a practical insurance against the vicissitudes of life, which, insofar as they cannot be explained, are ascribed to supernatural, mysterious forces. From their doctrine of the evolution of the folkways and mores, it is also apparent that they believed that man arrived at his moral values and virtues in the course of living, and that religion eventually sanctions and incorporates them rather than creates them.

The eminent nineteenth-century German culture historian Julius Lippert, in his significant work *Kulturgeschichte der Menschheit* (published in English as *The Evolution of Culture*) viewed religion

as essentially a struggle for existence which has been projected beyond the grave. James G. Frazer, who, in his multiple-volume work *The Golden Bough,* gave us the largest collection of religious beliefs and practices of preliterate and folk societies, considered religion a belief in "powers superior to man which are believed to direct and control the course of nature and of human life." He added that religion is chiefly an attempt by man to propitiate and conciliate those powers. On the other hand, the great Semitic scholar W. Robertson Smith maintained that religion "is not a vague fear of unknown powers," not "the child of terror," but rather "a relation of all the members of a community to a power that has the good of the community at heart, and protects its law and moral order."

Durkheim, in his *Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse* (*The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*), defined religion as a "unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say things set apart and forbidden." He held that religion can hardly be thought of apart from an organization, a "church," and is, therefore, "an eminently collective thing." Religion, to Durkheim, is the creation of society, is made in its image, i.e., is society itself in idealized form, and, therefore, "reflects all its aspects, even the most vulgar and the most repulsive." It is, he maintained, a social necessity and will be present in one form or another, regardless of the changes that take place in the organization of a society. Lowie, in *Primitive Religion,* regarded religion as a "spontaneous" response to the "awe-inspiring extraordinary manifestations of reality." It is, he asserted, the distinction between the extraordinary and the ordinary, the natural and the supernatural, rather than that between the sacred and the profane, as Durkheim believed, that is at the basis of religious attitudes and behavior.

In *Primitive Religion: Its Nature and Origin,* Paul Radin conceived of religion as consisting of two parts: (1) feeling and (2) acts, customs, and beliefs associated with feeling. The beliefs inextricably connected with feeling have to do with supernatural beings or spirits regarded as more powerful than man and as exercising control over all elements in life which man deems significant. Although customs and beliefs play an important part in the life of all individuals, Radin said that the feeling is not shared by all persons to the same extent; it expresses itself in varying degrees of intensity among different individuals. On the whole, the less intense the feel-

ing in a group is, the larger do the customs and beliefs loom in its life and, furthermore, the greater is the punctiliousness in adhering to them.

Religious feeling is not a simple phenomenon. It has physiological and psychological phases. The former expresses itself in such acts as folding the hands, kneeling, and closing the eyes, the latter in a supernormal sensitivity to certain beliefs and traditions which reaches a stage of ecstasy, exaltation, and awe. Radin held that religious feeling originated in the struggle for existence under conditions of physical and social insecurity. The supernatural beings are always identified with a particular physical and socio-economic environment of a group. Radin found the source of religion in "the social precipitates of fear." These cluster around (1) the physiological facts of birth, puberty, disease, and death; (2) the contacts of man with the world around him and with the forces of nature; and (3) the individual's clash with his fellow men.

Religion, according to Radin, is not a mere process of meditation about life and man's destiny; it is a means of preserving the values of life. It must vary with the particular life-values of a group. It is not only part and parcel of man's mundane life, but it also preserves the values currently esteemed by most of the members of a group.

Another psychological interpretation was advanced by Goldenweiser. While maintaining that the belief in supernatural powers, present among all peoples, must be considered basic to all religion, Goldenweiser expressed the view that equally fundamental is the presence of a deeply emotional feeling which he called the "religious thrill."

THEORIES REGARDING THE ORIGIN OF RELIGION

The origin of religion is veiled in mystery. Among the numerous explanations by social scientists, some appear more plausible than others, but even the best of them are not susceptible of scientific proof, and all remain in the realm of logical assumption. Consequently, there is a great deal of disagreement among scientific students of the subject. They do agree that religion, like other social institutions, arose in response to certain felt needs of man, or because of conditions accompanying his life on earth.

The Fear Theory

The view of religion as a creation of man, as a socio-psychological phenomenon, is very old. It was accepted in ancient sophisticated societies, such as Greece and Rome. One of the oustanding exponents of this view was the Roman philosopher and poet Lucretius, who contended that belief in the gods was based on an illusion and that fear accounted for its origin. In modern times, the eighteenth-century British philosopher David Hume, in his *Natural History of Religion,* asserted that a fear of natural forces led man to believe in deities who manipulated nature and hence to conclude that the gods would intervene in his behalf if he tried to please them. This explanation was accepted by other theorists, including the German-English nineteenth-century scholar Friedrich Max Müller, who claimed that the basis of religion is to be found in man's awe in the presence of extraordinary and terrifying natural phenomena. Similarly, Giddings held that the awe of the "Great Dreadful," of the mysterious forces, accounts for the genesis of religious beliefs.

The Animistic Theory

The animistic theory of the origin of religion has had a wide influence. According to this doctrine, subscribed to by Comte and elaborated upon by the nineteenth-century English anthropologist Sir John Lubbock, primitive man tends to endow natural phenomena with life and to ascribe personalities to them. These become supernatural powers with which relationships similar to those existing between human beings are established. Lubbock also contended that primitive man ascribes great power to deceased ancestors and hence practices ghost-worship. In his *Origin of Civilization,* Lubbock presented evidence to support this contention.

In *Primitive Culture,* published in 1871 and still a classic in the field of anthropology, Edward B. Tylor traced the evolution of animism, or the belief in spirits, from primitive man's concept of another, invisible, self or soul. Tylor considered this concept an almost inevitable result of such universal phenomena as dreams. Primitive man, he asserted, could hardly explain a dream in which he had certain "actual" experiences. Suppose he dreamed of a hunting expedition which resulted in his bringing back game and enjoying a fine dinner. Upon awaking he found, of course, that he had never left his abode. How could he explain this except through the belief

in a spiritual self which is separable from his bodily self and which can lead an independent existence? Death, hallucinations, and epileptic fits, as well as such physical phenomena as reflections, shadows, and echoes, were other factors stimulating a belief in spirits. Once man had arrived at the idea of a spiritual being, it was a comparatively simple process to regard other animate beings, as well as inanimate objects, as possessing spirit. Primitive man was thus led to animism, which, according to Tylor, lies at the very basis of all religion.

Spencer, while also subscribing to the theory of animism, contended, in his *Principles of Sociology,* that religion originated primarily in ghost-fear. The ancestral ghosts, which were endowed by the primitive with superhuman powers, were believed to manipulate human affairs and natural forces, and hence had to be placated if they were to act in his behalf. Spencer held, furthermore, that deceased tribal heroes, who in life had distinguished themselves by extraordinary mental and physical powers, eventually came to be revered as gods, for their ghosts were believed to be very powerful. The belief in deities originated in this manner.

On the other hand, Frazer traced the genesis of religion to magic. Primitive man, cognizant of a cause-and-effect sequence in human affairs and natural phenomena, tried to control them by magical rites. The most fundamental kind of magic was the sympathetic or imitative, based upon the principle that like produces like. Thus, mutilating the image of an enemy would result, according to this principle, in actual injury to him. Failure to achieve results by magic, said Frazer, led primitive man to seek intervention by personalized supernatural powers. Magical practices, which Frazer carefully distinguished from religion, precipitated the religious belief in personal superhuman powers.

Although the animistic theories of Tylor and Spencer won wide acceptance among their contemporaries and still are believed by some scholars to possess merit, they have been subjected to severe criticism. Recent studies of religion among primitive peoples fail to confirm the assumption that animism and ghost-worship are the most elementary forms of religion. To be sure, these are encountered almost universally among primitives, but they seem to be comparatively advanced forms and to be derived from more rudimentary notions.

The Animatistic Theory

According to the noted British anthropologist Robert Ranulph Marett, the idea of impersonal power is by its very nature a simpler concept than that of spirit and hence should be regarded as more primitive and as antedating the latter. This impersonal power is designated as *mana,* a term first used by the anthropologist R. H. Codrington. Marett referred to the belief in *mana* as *animatism. Mana* is a word employed by the Melanesians to signify power which may adhere to a person, animal, or inanimate thing. The concept is well-nigh universal among primitive people. Although variously used by different tribes, it always signifies a wonderful power, or, as Lowie described it, a kind of "electrical fluid that could charge persons and things and be diverted from one to another."

The concepts of animism and animatism are generally accepted by anthropologists as fundamental to all religion. Marett's claim that animatism preceded animism, however, has found few adherents. Anthropologists tend to hold that neither is derived from the other and that both coexist and underlie all religion, although each varies in degree of significance. Nothing is gained, as Goldenweiser stated in his *Anthropology,* by juxtaposing *mana* and spirit and speculating as to which preceded which. The important point is that the nature of primitive religion or, for that matter, of any religion, cannot be explained by reference to the concept of spirit alone; this idea must be supplemented by that of *mana* or power.

Sociological Theories of Religion

One widely accepted theory derives religion from rites and ceremonies rather than from belief in the supernatural. The latter, according to this theory, is the effect, not the cause. Perhaps the earliest exponent of this theory was W. Robertson Smith. In his classic work, *The Religion of the Semites,* which was published in 1894, he concluded that ancient religions consisted primarily of "institutions and practices," i.e., of rites and ceremonies, and that myths, i.e., beliefs and creeds, were an outgrowth of these. Smith gathered a wealth of data, especially from the Old Testament, to prove his contention. He held that in the development of religious faiths, practice precedes belief in a cause-and-effect relationship; or, as Sumner maintained in his theory of the evolution of the folkways, the act precedes the thought. Smith's theory had a profound in-

fluence upon subsequent research in religion. It served as a basis for the formulation of the sociological theory of religion, of which Durkheim became an outstanding exponent.

Durkheim, in his search for the origin of religion, concentrated upon an analysis of the institution as found among the Australian aborigines, whom he assumed to be the most primitive of the preliterate peoples. He propounded his theory in *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life.*

Durkheim rejected the contention that religion must involve a belief in gods or in spiritual beings. He attributed its beginnings to ritualistic activities, or rites and ceremonies, which he held to be the most elementary forms of religion. But what gives rise to these ritualistic activities? To explain this, said Durkheim, is to explain the genesis as well as the nature and meaning of religion, and to do so one must go to the primitives, for among them one encounters behavior which most closely approaches the practices of rudimentary religion.

Primitives, like many people in civilized communities, have a compelling need to escape the daily routine, the dullness and humdrum character of everyday existence. Periodically, therefore, they gather for celebrations, during which their passions run high and, in fact, usually reach a state of ecstasy. The most important activities are dancing and singing, which are performed rhythmically, persistently, and with ever greater intensification until sentiment pervades all present and results in a high degree of exaltation. Each sentiment that is expressed registers in the minds of the participants without much resistance, since all are extremely responsive to outside impressions. Every participant re-echoes all those in the group. The emotion engendered spreads from one to the others, growing like an avalanche in its advance, so that the group feels that it possesses extraordinary power. From such experiences the primitive, said Durkheim, derives the idea of the mysterious power—*mana.*

Society, or rather its collective life, is usually symbolized or personified by the totem. The totem is, therefore, the source and dispenser of *mana* and hence is sacred. But, even though it is endowed with broad and important powers, it does not take the place of other agencies, each of which is equipped to perform certain functions. *Mana* attaches itself to individuals, things, places, acts, and even words, making them sacred. The primitive is thus led to distinguish between the sacred and the profane, and this distinction is the

sine qua non for the rise of religion. The mysterious power generated by the rites eventually may become personified, leading to the conception of spirits and deities. Thus, for Durkheim, the concepts of *mana* and totemism (and the ceremonies connected with the latter) are to be considered the elementary forms of religion. Totemism is the very core out of which religion develops. Since Durkheim believed the totem to be the objectified social life of the group, its "collective representations," or social mind, he concluded that society itself is the ultimate source of religion. He thus arrived at a completely sociological explanation of religion.

Durkheim's admittedly brilliant interpretation of religion shed new light on this significant social phenomenon. It brought about a revaluation of extant theories, and no subsequent studies of religion can disregard it. Indeed, some authorities feel that his was perhaps the most plausible interpretation. Others, however, while finding a great deal of merit in the theory, claim that by making the social mind or "collective representations" the sole source of religion, Durkheim resorted to something quite mysterious in itself and, hence, failed to give a satisfactory explanation. Goldenweiser criticized Durkheim's theory as one-sided and psychologically untenable. It is quite accurate, he wrote, to assume that religious dogma and the traditionalism of religious forms are always found in the sphere of the sacred, but society is only a precipitating agency and not an originating force. A society possessing the religious sentiment is capable of accomplishing unusual things, but it can hardly produce that sentiment out of itself.

Nevertheless, Durkheim's theory served as a basis for a number of important studies which further developed the concept of the social origin of religion. One of these is *Themis: A Study of the Social Origins of Greek Religion* by Jane Harrison. Influenced by Smith and Durkheim, Miss Harrison studied the origin and development of Greek religion and arrived at the conclusion that the belief in a god originated in the ritual, the dance, and the song, or hymn, induced by the major crises in life, such as birth, initiation, and death. Like Durkheim, she maintained that the emotions and feelings of power engendered by the collective ceremonial acts are externalized and eventually are personified in the form of gods.

The American anthropologists Eliot Dinsmore Chapple and Carleton Stevens Coon, in their *Principles of Anthropology,* expounded a theory of the origin of religion closely resembling the foregoing

theories. Taking their cue from *Les rites de passage* by Arnold van Gennep, they asserted that religious institutions arise as a result of crises during which the necessary equilibrium is lost and of the consequent attempt to regain equilibrium. The crises may be of two kinds, one involving the individual and the other the group. To restore equilibrium, two kinds of ritualistic ceremonies, each with its own techniques, are performed under the leadership of qualified personnel, or priests. These ceremonies are "rites of passage" and "rites of intensification." Out of such rituals the religious institutions evolve.

Another significant sociological theory, based exclusively on a study of the Old Testament, was advanced by the English sociologist Louis Wallis. In his *Sociological Study of the Bible,* he concluded that the Hebrews arrived at a monotheistic belief only after a series of struggles with other tribes and class conflicts between the poor agriculturists and the wealthy town-dwellers. The latter conflicts, he believed, were of a determining character. Wallis discerned in social conflict the most important factor in the evolution of religion. Finally, Max Weber's theory of the interplay of social and economic forces (discussed in the chapter on economic institutions) should also be included among the sociological interpretations of the development of religion.

The Theory of the Aleatory Element

A significant theory of the origin of religion was propounded by Sumner and Keller in *The Science of Society*. The most important fact in the rise of religion, according to Sumner and Keller, is the ever present element of chance, or, as they refer to it, *the aleatory element*. "The aleatory element, especially in its negative phase of ill fortune," they wrote, "fills the perspective of the race's childhood with an enduring and real menace." Primitive man is constantly puzzled and worried about the problem of bad luck. His mind is preoccupied with the question of how to avoid misfortune and assure himself of good luck. It is inevitable, these two authors asserted, that in his quest for an explanation of it, the primitive should picture this aleatory element as being controlled and manipulated by supernatural forces. "If primitive tribes over the earth," they stated, "agree on anything, it is that supernatural powers are in control of the luck-element." The problem, therefore, is to win the favorable attention of those powers in some manner and thus

to achieve the desired end—to avoid bad luck and to induce good luck. Human beings, concerned with this problem, have at all times attempted to devise means of insuring themselves against misfortune.

Sumner and Keller emphasized the fact that religion thus arose in response to a definite need—adjustment to the supernatural, or imaginary, environment, which, as already noted, appears just as real as the actual environment and adaptation to which is just as impelling. The supernatural environment, however, came into existence as a result of the presence of the aleatory factor. Although many inexplicable elements are being reduced "to rationality by science and art in respect to one point after another, they straightway recur a little farther on." Thus the inexplicable is retained, and with it the necessity for dealing with it, i.e., the need for religion. Had there been no aleatory element, religion might have been an entirely different sort of thing or it might not have come into existence. Since the aleatory element persisted as a major condition of life, men automatically adjusted themselves to it by developing religious institutions.

MAGIC AND WORSHIP

As has been pointed out, all religions involve belief in two elements radically different in nature—impersonal power (or *mana*) and personalized forces, or spirits. Belief in the latter is referred to as *animism*. One type of belief may often overshadow the other, but seldom, if ever, is either entirely absent. Generally speaking, civilized religions are predominantly animistic, though the belief in impersonal power is by no means lacking.

The two kinds of belief lead inevitably to different techniques of procedure. The belief in impersonal power calls for a procedure (commonly referred to as magic) which does not involve the establishment of rapport with anyone. The individual seeks to effect the desired end by following a mechanical course of action, such as touching certain objects, pronouncing formulas, or even merely possessing the object endowed with power. Judaeo-Christianity regards certain acts as "holy" in themselves; for example, the mere recital of a prayer, whether or not one understands the meaning of its words, is held to possess potency. Similarly, the mere turn of a Tibetan prayer wheel represents a prayer. The belief in personal power, however, requires a procedure identical with the one used

to establish rapport between two persons, or, rather, between a man and his superior. Hence the use of devices such as love, reverence, and humility, but also, under certain conditions, command, cajolery, or even bribery, and of techniques such as prayer, sacrifice, and abstention or taboo.

At least in primitive societies, any individual may have frequent dealings, personal or impersonal, with supernatural powers, but the techniques are usually involved and necessitate specialization. Besides, supernatural powers can be dealt with more effectively or less effectively, and one knowing all the intricacies is naturally thought to be better equipped to deal with them. Hence a religious leader, or priest, is encountered in religious institutions of all societies.

Chapple and Coon, as we have seen, distinguished between two kinds of religious leaders in primitive societies—those (e.g., healers) who perform the rites of passage and help individuals in their personal crises, and those (e.g., rain-makers) who conduct the rites of intensification and intervene on behalf of the whole group. Such specialization develops with an increase in the complexity of social organization in a society. As regular contacts between religious leaders and their clients become established, complex hierarchies are developed, which in turn give rise to elaborate administrative devices. Furthermore, the appearance of religious hierarchies is as a rule associated with the rise of elaborate governmental institutions, the head of one often being the head of the other.

FORMS OF RELIGION

In primitive communities, religion pervades practically all of the people's life and is virtually indistinguishable from the rest of the social organization, even though, to be sure, some aspects are recognizable as secular. The form which religion assumes in a society is determined by complex factors, among which economics plays a significant part. The degree of complexity of religious institutions does not seem to depend upon the level of civilization. Thus, the extremely primitive Australian aborigines and the highly cultured pre-Columbian Incas of Peru both had religions calling for elaborate rituals and ceremonies. It is not always the most primitive society that has the simplest religious institutions. Nor is it always the most highly advanced society which has the most complex religion. For instance, the "higher" concept of monotheism does not

automatically indicate an advanced civilization, just as polytheism is not necessarily an indication of a low level of culture. Radin noted in his *Primitive Religion* that a number of primitive tribes, including those with the simplest culture, such as the south-eastern Australians, the Andaman Islanders, and the Selknam of Tierra del Fuego, believed in a Supreme Deity. On the other hand, the most advanced peoples of ancient times (the Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans) had polytheistic religions.

The form in which religion expresses itself depends upon a host of complex variables, which often defy analysis. Different societies will emphasize different elements or aspects of religion. Some will assign greater importance, say, to ceremonialism than to communion with the spirit world or God, while others will do the opposite. One or the other aspect, therefore, will receive elaboration. The same is true of the religious hierarchy or priesthood. In some societies the connection between religion and other institutions is closer than in others. Thus, it is much closer among the Chinese than among the Americans, among the Confucianists than among present-day Christians. Moreover, there is a great deal of variation in the selection of those phases of life which will come under the jurisdiction of religion and those which will remain secular. Marriage, for instance, may be considered either a religious or a secular function, depending upon the society and times. Furthermore, religions have their own central themes, which are determined largely by the people's life interests, particularly their economic interests. Thus, farmers tend to build their religion around problems of fertility, whereas hunters emphasize hunting experiences. The central theme of Western religions has been altered because of the change from an agricultural economy to an industrial one and because of advances made in science and art and the consequent modifications in man's outlook upon life.

THE CHANGING FUNCTIONS OF RELIGION

Recent students of the subject have been impressed with the loss to Western religion of functions which were once considered integral parts of it. This change, which started with a trend toward separation of church and state, has occurred, formally or informally, almost throughout the Western world. One phase of life after another which had been controlled or even monopolized by the church was

brought under secular control, public or private. On the other hand, the church, aware of the new demands upon it, has been incorporating activities which in the past it would have considered alien to itself and of which it would have strongly disapproved. H. Paul Douglass, in his *1000 City Churches,* referred to thirty-three kinds of activities, exclusive of preaching, conducted by Protestant churches. Contemporary churches of all faiths find it difficult to define their proper functions, and a great deal of bewilderment exists in this respect among religious leaders.

Religion and Ethics

While there may be a close relationship between religion and ethics—this is especially true of the great religious systems—the two fields had independent origins. Ethics is believed to be the product of social evolution. Among the outstanding works in support of this view are *Evolution of Morals* by the nineteenth-century French anthropologist Charles Letourneau, *Principles of Ethics* by Herbert Spencer, *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas* by Edward Westermarck, *Folkways* by William G. Sumner, and *Die Sitte (Custom)* by Ferdinand Tönnies.

Ethical values, according to these and many other writers, are arrived at by man in the course of living, but they may be, and often are, appropriated by and incorporated into religion, giving the illusion of having been created by religion. Obviously religion plays an important part in promoting ethical values. In incorporating these values, religion strengthens and returns them, so to speak, to the people, often in a refined and crystallized form. Thus, according to this view, the moral rules which came to be known as the Ten Commandments were in the mores before becoming part of the Judaeo-Christian religious creed, but the belief that they came from God gave them greater binding power as well as clearer expression. Similarly, religious leaders, who preached in the name of God, helped to refine and reinforce existing values.

On the other hand, there are those who, like Herbert Spencer and the French sociologist Charles Bouglé, asserted not only that religion and ethics had independent origins but also that the ethical code can develop best and be most effective when separated from religion. Finally, some sociologists, among them Robert M. MacIver, held that the two arise simultaneously and that they have always reinforced each other. To quote MacIver's *Society:* "We cannot say

that either the religious or the moral code came first, just as we cannot say that custom preceded morality or law. . . . Moral codes, with such prescriptions as the duty of humility, of obedience and respect for elders, have prepared the way for the perpetuation of religious beliefs. Religious codes have strongly reinforced with their supernatural sanctions the prevailing morals of the group."

Many social scientists, recognizing the importance of the church as an agency of social control, suggest that religion should be primarily an institution for the promotion of ethical ideals and of human welfare. Moreover, they see in this role of the church its best chance of survival in a world which is growing indifferent and even antagonistic towards it. Some, nevertheless, in their wishful thinking and in their enthusiasm for the potentialities of religion, have ascribed to it qualities which it probably never possessed. Most sociologists may be said to share the view that religion ought to divest itself as much as possible of dogma and supernaturalism and concern itself mainly with the promotion of ethical values. Such a view has been incorporated into the doctrines of humanistic movements in religion.

Auguste Comte, a bitter opponent of dogmatic religion, advocated a religion consisting principally of the ethical teachings of Christ. He felt that science could and should support such a religion. Sharing Comte's attitude towards religion, a number of sociologists advocated a kind of scientific religion which would emphasize Christ's teachings. The arguments they advanced have no scientific validity, but are based on speculation. An outstanding advocate of this type of religion was L. T. Hobhouse.

According to Hobhouse, religion and ethics are inseparable. Indeed, he conceived of religion as being to an extent "emotionalized ethics." He rejected any sort of belief in an anthropomorphic God and even the sophisticated idea of pantheism. Considering supernatural religion to be ill-adapted to modern civilization and to be, in fact, a hindrance to social progress, he rejected historic Christianity. Conventional Christianity, he believed, has been unrealistic, impractical, and, in general, has shown little concern for humanity and social progress. He admired the ethical content of Christianity, however, and believed that it could be made the basis of an effective religion.

Such a religion would really be a system of ethics, depending upon reason, logic, and scientific knowledge, particularly psychology.

It would aim at the creation of a society in which altruism instead of egoism would predominate and in which the individual's personality would be fully realized. Hobhouse admitted that this ideal could be attained only by means of a great deal of effort over a long period of time.

Science and Religion

Sociologists and anthropologists are interested in religion primarily as an institution of human societies. The question of the existence of God is not involved here, for it is outside the scope of the social scientist and mainly concerns the theologian and metaphysician. Instead, the sociologist seeks to determine why people believe in supernatural beings and how this belief affects their behavior. There is more or less of a consensus among social scientists that belief in the supernatural has been brought about in a manner which can be explained on "natural" grounds, but they have not agreed in their explanations.

The differences among the various theories about the origin, nature, and purpose of religion arise inevitably from the nature of the investigation, which has to rely on inferences, as well as from the character of religion itself. Scientific investigators agree that religion, like other institutions, has its roots in certain needs, that it was necessary, and that, for the masses of people, it continues to be necessary. This is as far as the scientist, as such, can go. The kind of religion we should have, the sort of religion that is worth building and preserving, is a philosophical question, and if sociologists venture to discuss it, they do so as philosophers rather than as empirical scientists. All that the scientific sociologists can suggest in this matter is that religion should adjust itself to changes in life conditions. The more it is adapted to existing conditions and knowledge, the greater the chance of its being effective as an institution.

Sociological Evaluation of Religion

The question whether religion is compatible with science must be answered equivocally. The answer depends upon what kind of religion one has in mind. If it is a religion based on an anthropomorphic conception of God and all that this usually implies, then religion is incompatible with science. If, on the other hand, it is one of those ethical philosophies, or vague pantheistic conceptions, which individuals choose to call religion, then the two are compatible. As

Harry Elmer Barnes stated, while there is an irreconcilable conflict between fundamentalist religion and modern science, none exists between the latter and Humanism, because the Humanists frankly base their religion upon the findings of science.

The claim has been repeatedly made that religion has been all along antagonistic towards science and has hindered scientific research. The validity of this claim, again, will depend upon the kind of religion one is thinking about and also upon whether one is considering religion of the present or of the past. Fundamentalist religion is certainly in conflict with science, while the other types are, in varying degrees, tolerant towards it, or even, as in the case of Humanism, welcome it. It is a matter of record that dogmatic religion, on the whole, opposed science and interfered with its development by every means possible and at almost every step. Opposition of this kind has been advanced by most denominations. At present this is only true to some extent, and in the case of certain churches or denominations. The separation of church and state and the weakened position of the church as an agency of control account primarily for the change in attitude. Nevertheless, religion even at present could hardly be said to encourage free inquiry. "It is as difficult," wrote Sumner and Keller, "to find any type of religion which has welcomed free inquiry as it is easy to cite eminent inquirers who have been executed or persecuted by religious authorities."

The conflict between science and religion is held by some to be really a conflict between science and dogma, or theology, rather than between science and religion, or faith. Andrew D. White, in his definitive work on the subject, *A History of the Warfare of Science with Theology in Christendom,* took this position. But, according to Barnes, it is an untenable position. To maintain it, he stated in his *Social Institutions,* is like "saying that while there is no conflict between religion and medicine, there may be a conflict between religion and surgery. . . . Theology is the conceptual or intellectual side of religion, that which formulates the ideas underlying and rationalizing religious practices. It is obvious that science, as a body of intellectual concepts, is most likely to contact, and come into conflict with, religion through the field of theology. Any conflict between science and theology is necessarily a conflict between science and religion."

The American sociologist Clifford Kirkpatrick, in a brilliant book,

Religion in Human Affairs, held that, rather than science itself, it is the method and philosophy of science that are incompatible with religion, even though the facts brought out by science regarding the universe and its phenomena certainly contradict the Biblical accounts of creation and cosmology. He went on to enumerate and explain the differences in the approach and spirit of science and religion and found them irreconcilable.

In their examinations of the nature and functions of religion, sociologists inquired into the practical results of religious institutions. Sumner and Keller pointed out that far from guiding social behavior, as Benjamin Kidd and others maintained, religion has often trailed behind the mores, sanctioning whatever happened to be approved by them at the time and even what had begun to be disapproved by them. Moreover, religion, they believed, has been ambivalent and equivocal in its pronouncements. It has favored, for instance, both war and peace, wealth and poverty, hard work and idleness, virginity and prostitution, humility and ostentatious display. It has advocated such practices as cannibalism, the killing of the aged, suicide, incest, and slavery, and has sanctioned all forms of property-holding. There is hardly a vice which religion has not at one time or another actively supported. Religion, therefore, has not offered any absolute standard of morality. It could not because none exists. It has sanctioned merely what was in the mores of society at a particular time. Indeed, it frequently sanctioned the mores of the dead past, for morals often advanced faster than religion.

Among the "disservices" of religion enumerated by Sumner and Keller are: obtaining contributions in food, materials, labor, time, and thought, many of which constituted economic waste; tampering with social institutions, often to their detriment; instigating war and preventing peace by fostering animosities among peoples; and hindering the advance of knowledge and enlightenment. Blackmar and Gillin, in *Outlines of Sociology,* wrote that religion, ever conservative and dogmatic, has tried time and again to crush the spirit of earnest men seeking to discover the truth and to prevent them from revealing newly discovered facts. It forced Galileo to renounce his painstakingly established doctrines. It retarded the advance of science; it interfered with the free inquiry of scholars; it suppressed the democratic aspirations of the common people. In recent times, men clothed with the garments of ecclesiasticism attempted to suppress the doctrines of such scientists as Darwin and Huxley, thus

belittling "God's records written in the rocks and in the bodies of animals and men."

But religion has also performed undeniable services, among which Sumner and Keller included the provision of work, the accumulation of capital, and the creation of a leisure class, the priesthood, often dedicated to art and culture. The priests laid the foundations of medicine and even of science. It must not be forgotten that sorcery and magic supplied the roots of observation and experimentation from which science developed, and the rudiments of the learned professions can be traced back to the priesthood. According to these writers, perhaps the most important function of religion was disciplinary, for man had great need of discipline during the childhood of the race and never ceased to require it. Blackmar and Gillin defended religion in similar terms, emphasizing its great socializing value and its value as a means of control in society, primitive as well as civilized. Primitive religious notions exert a controlling influence through fear, while more refined ideas, such as the concept of immortality, offer man inspiration, hope, faith, and courage.

The persistence of religion throughout the ages impressed Sumner and Keller as proof of its "survival value." These authors summarized their verdict as follows: "If one looks dispassionately into the charges against religion and admits all of them, either wholly or in some degree, and then surveys and acknowledges the costs in capital, effort, and pain that religious systems have imposed coldbloodedly and offensively upon mankind, he is yet, in the end, constrained to believe that the article was worth the cost. Exceedingly expensive, it has also been incomparably effective."

Recent Trends in Religion

Recently religion in the Western world has tended to place less emphasis on dogma and more on social values. It has also tried to reconcile its doctrines with scientific knowledge. Many "progressive" churches have gone much further towards a reconciliation of this kind than the "orthodox" or fundamentalist churches.

Barnes's *Social Institutions* divides Christians in the Western world into the following major categories: the completely orthodox, the Devout Modernists, and the Advanced Modernists. The first adhere to a faith hardly varying from that held by Paul, Augustine, or Luther. The second group, the Devout Modernists, have made concessions to science and scholarship, retaining, however, a firm belief

in a personal God and a vague notion of the immortality of the soul. The third group, on the other hand, have made a thorough departure from orthodoxy (only the more conservative among them still retain some loyalty to Christianity and a formal belief in the existence of God), rejecting unequivocally the divinity of Christ and the whole Christian epic. The two latter groups, he stated, are drawn from among the Protestant denominations, since most of the believing Catholics remain within orthodoxy.

A still more radical group is represented by the Humanists. They have repudiated all connections with conventional Christianity and have attempted to construct a religion, if it can be called such, based entirely, to quote Barnes, "upon the service of man rather than the worship of God." They are agnostics, neither affirming nor denying the existence of God. The following excerpts from a sermon by one of its chief exponents, John H. Dietrich, indicate what Humanism stands for: "Humanism believes in the supreme worth of human life, and that man therefore must be treated as an end, not as a means to some other end. . . . Humanism is the effort to enrich human experience by means of human inquiry. . . . It has no blind faith in the perfectibility of man, but it believes that his present condition can be immeasurably improved. . . . Humanism accepts the responsibility for the conditions of human life and relies entirely upon human effort for their improvement. The Humanist makes no attempt to shove the responsibility for the present miserable conditions of human life onto some God or some cosmic order. He fully realizes that the situation is in our own hands, and that practically all the evils of the world have been brought upon men by themselves."

Humanism, then, represents an attempt to divorce religion from supernaturalism and from all dogma and ritual and to secularize and socialize it completely. Humanism actually is not at all different from other idealistic social reform movements, and many will doubt that it can even be called a religion—at least in the familiar meaning of the term. Being devoid of all dogma and ritual, holding out no promises of future rewards, except those won by human effort, it has little appeal, as a religion, for any but the most sophisticated individuals, and it is highly doubtful that it can ever become a mass movement. Even the Advanced Modernists, who according to Barnes, include the Unitarians and Universalists, constitute but a tiny fraction of all church-affiliated people in the United States. Of

approximately 97,000,000 Americans recently reported to be affiliated with churches, only about 160,000 were Unitarians or Universalists.

The trend toward the socialization and secularization of religion is undeniable. Even in the fundamentalist churches and denominations, increasing attention is being given to contemporary social problems and needs. Religious leaders are advocating greater participation by the church in meeting social problems and concentration upon the ethical rather than the dogmatic content of religion. We have seen the kind of religion which sociologists visualize as adapted to the needs of a changed world. MacIver expressed the views of many social scientists when he maintained that the way the conflict between our contemporary culture and religion can be resolved and the latter made into a constructive societal force is for religion to rise above tribal and national egoisms and, with the help of science, to rid itself of its misinterpretations of reality. In doing this, it will become consistent with a purely moral code and thus be brought into harmony with the needs of life.

Barnes, in a similar vein, asserted that the religion adapted to our changed conditions of life and the one that is worth preserving must seek to organize the masses of people and guide their activities for the benefit of society, rather than for the purpose of pleasing God, as taught by orthodox religions. But after mapping out the course which religion should take, he, like many others, doubted that an institution which has steadfastly been devoted to the supernatural can be changed into one dedicated to furthering the welfare and happiness of mankind here on earth. It is highly questionable, wrote Barnes, that a religion with a mass appeal can exist without elements of mystery and fear dominating it, and he might have added, without dogma and ritual.

11

The Family

Of all the institutions which the sociologist studies, the one with which we have the most intimate contact and perhaps the greatest concern is the institution of the family. The family has therefore been subjected to rather extensive analysis, particularly in recent years, when its forms and functions in Western society appear to have been undergoing considerable revision.

THE FAMILY AND MARRIAGE DEFINED

At the outset, a distinction should be drawn between "family" and "marriage." The family is a kind of grouping or organization; marriage is a relationship, which Bronislaw Malinowski referred to as "a contract for the production and maintenance of children." Meyer F. Nimkoff, in *Marriage and the Family,* defined the family as "a more or less durable association of husband and wife, with or without children." According to Sumner and Keller, the family is "a miniature social organization, including at least two generations, and is characteristically formed upon the blood bond." As such, the family may be considered to antedate marriage, for it is probable that man lived in families prior to their being regulated by marriage. Family is a word of Latin derivation. Originally it denoted a group consisting of parents, children, servants, and slaves. The corresponding Greek term is *oikonomia,* from which we get our word *economics;* this implies that the family is primarily an economic organization.

The size and composition of the family vary a great deal, depending upon the society as well as upon the period. In size it ranges from one person who lives by himself, which the United States Census recognizes as a "one-person family," to the "greater family," consisting of several generations and numbering as many as several scores of individuals, still found in some parts of the world, notably

in China. The size and composition of the family also vary with the developmental stage of a society. In some European societies (among the Southern Slavs, for instance) the "greater family" was once the rule, but at present this type has all but disappeared. In our own society, the family at one time was much larger, including, besides parents and children, relatives by blood and marriage, whereas now it may consist of a couple and their children, a childless pair, or even single persons.

Edward Westermarck, who devoted a lifetime to the investigation of the origin and nature of marriage—he himself, curiously enough, never married—defined it, in his *History of Human Marriage,* as the "more or less durable connection between male and female, lasting beyond the mere act of propagation till after the birth of offspring." The sociologist Ernest R. Groves, an authority on marriage and the family, defined marriage as "a public confession and legal registration of an adventure in fellowship." On the other hand, the anthropologist Robert H. Lowie defined it simply as a "relatively permanent bond between permissible mates."

THE BASIC FUNCTIONS OF THE FAMILY

On the purely biological side, the function of the family is to perpetuate the race. But, in the human family there are other functions which are little less important than the basic one of the propagation of the species. These are the economic, religious, protective, educational, and prestige-giving functions, which receive greater or less emphasis, depending upon the particular society and period. Among the major functions of the family are first, the socializing of the individual members so that they can become members of the society in which they live and, second, the perpetuating of the cultural achievements of the group. The family serves such a variety of functions in different societies and at different times that, aside from race perpetuation and, perhaps, the economic functions, it is difficult to find anything that applies universally. Depending upon the general cultural configuration of the group and a host of highly variable conditions and circumstances, one function or another will be emphasized. This is the impression we get when we go beyond our society and take a look at other societies, primitive as well as civilized, of the past or of the present. Even in our own society, the functions of the family have changed or are changing,

some having almost entirely disappeared or being in the process of disappearing. Indeed, the very institution of the family, while basic at all times, varies in its importance with conditions. Among hunting societies, ethnographers tell us, the importance of the family may increase with the scarcity of the food supply and decrease with its abundance. In our society the family played a more significant role, at least economically speaking, in the past than it does at present.

All this is well to remember when considering the present state of the family in our society, which has been described as one of disintegration. Looked at from this point of view, such disintegration may indicate only that the institution is undergoing a change and is seeking to adapt itself to new conditions; and that, if we understand those conditions and the processes by which the change takes place, we may be able to minimize the attendant pains by aiding its adjustment. Certainly nothing can be gained by seeking to preserve its past forms if new conditions call for changes in the objectives and functions of the institution.

THE ORIGIN OF THE FAMILY

The family has been found in every human society; indeed, this institution may be said to antedate man, for it exists among many species of animals, particularly the mammals. The eminent American biologist Herbert S. Jennings pointed out that among animals whose offspring depend upon a parent for their subsistence a more or less durable relationship between them exists. While most animal families consist of mother and offspring, it is not unusual for the father to become more or less attached to the mate and offspring, protecting and helping to feed them. Jennings noted that this is true even of some fishes and birds; the male protects the young and helps build the nest.

The duration of a family relationship depends upon the need of the offspring to become self-sufficient. As we reach the simians, the family assumes a form closely resembling that of human beings. Thus the noted zoologist Solly Zuckerman reported in *The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes* that the family group among the baboons consists of a male and one or more females and their offspring. Besides these, one or more "bachelors" (old males) may be included. They are usually weaker than the head of the "household" and in-

dulge in sexual relationships with the females only with his consent or when unnoticed by him. Similar observations have been made by investigators of social life among the gorillas, chimpanzees, and other primates. The gorillas live in hordes consisting of several pairs and their offspring. The most common family form among the apes, according to Zuckerman and others, is the polygynous one, but monogamy and even bachelorhood are also found, usually among the weaker males, who are forced into such a position. The males guard their females jealously, and quarreling about "women" is the order of the day. Indeed it is thought that jealousy and possessiveness are the chief reasons for the lasting relationship between male and female among the apes, although some desire to help care for the young is also discernible. Authorities maintain that complete promiscuity is rarely encountered among the higher apes, despite considerable instability in male-female relationships.

As in the case of other basic institutions, the origin of the family and the forms it assumed in the past can only be inferred rather than definitely established. The same holds true with regard to the reasons for its appearance. Hence, diverse theories developed as to what happened at the beginning. While some investigators believed that the small horde was the original form of human organization, others contended that it was the family. Sumner and Keller held that the small loosely knit band which was usually organized upon the basis of blood kinship, rather than age differences, was the primal societal group. Another authority, Robert Briffault, conceived of it as a maternal clan, or a group of mothers and their children. The family, according to this writer, was a later development. On the other hand, Westermarck put forth the view that the family was the original nucleus of society. Disagreeing with both views, Malinowski maintained that the family and the larger group, or clan, coexisted, that conditions within a society determined which was of greater importance, and, hence, that neither the family nor the larger group can be regarded, universally, as preceding or succeeding one another. Again, some students of the subject, among them Briffault, tended to look upon economic factors as of primary importance in causing the rise and perpetuation of the family, and some emphasized the sexual, psychological, and other factors.

A noteworthy theory concerning the motive for marriage was propounded by the German scholar, F. Müller-Lyer in *The Evolution of Modern Marriage*. He postulated that individuals have been

drawn into marriage because of three outstanding motives: economic need, desire for offspring, and love. While these, he maintained, have always been present in human societies, they have varied in their importance in different epochs. In primitive societies, the economic motive was the significant one; in ancient civilizations it was the production of offspring; and in modern civilizations it is love.

Views of Maine, Bachofen, and Morgan

A number of theories exist as to the original form of the family At the dawn of the development of anthropology, around the middle of the past century, there appeared a theory, evolved more or less independently and with variations by several scholars, that the patriarchal family, i.e., the family in which the father was the sole ruler of the household, was the earliest type. The chief exponent of this view was the learned English jurist Henry Sumner Maine, who expounded the theory in his *Ancient Law,* published in 1861. In the same year, however, a Swiss jurist with anthropological interests, Johann J. Bachofen, published *Das Mutterrecht (Mother-Right),* in which he took the opposite view. Relying upon data collected about scattered ancient civilizations, Bachofen maintained that in early times mankind lived in a state of promiscuity and that the earliest type of family was the matriarchal, in which the woman enjoyed religious and political supremacy. Among the adherents of Bachofen's theory was Lewis H. Morgan, sometimes referred to as the "father of American anthropology." His *Ancient Society,* published in 1877, in which he expounded his own views, was, unlike Bachofen's volume, based on actual, firsthand research among the Indians, particularly the Iroquois, among whom he lived for a considerable period of time. Morgan postulated that the family evolved through various stages, from the lowest—promiscuity—to the highest—monogamy—and that the more primitive matriarchy gave way, as society progressed, to the more advanced patriarchy. A similar view was set forth by another student of the institution, J. F. McLennan, in his *Primitive Marriage.*

The theories postulated by Maine, Bachofen, and Morgan have been regarded by anthropologists and sociologists as valuable contributions, constituting first attempts at a time of almost complete lack of information. However, with the accumulation of data and more scientifically gathered evidence, these theories, especially that

concerning the matriarchate, had to be almost completely discarded.

One of the first to question their validity was George Elliot Howard, whose major work, *A History of Matrimonial Institutions,* appeared in 1904. Later research, notably by Malinowski, completely disproved the theory of the matriarchate. At present, authorities agree that a real matriarchate probably never existed. It is true that the matrilineal family (one in which descent is reckoned and property is transmitted through the mother) existed (and still exists) in numerous primitive societies, but this does not by any means imply rule by the mother, for under such a system, women may actually be in a very subordinate position. On the other hand, in a patriarchy, where men are definitely in authority, the women may enjoy many rights and privileges. The claim that the patriarchal system signifies a superior culture is also rejected, because this system is found among some peoples on the lowest levels of primitive culture, while the matrilineal system prevails among some peoples on the highest level of development. Thus, among the Iroquois Indians, who were more advanced than the Algonquins, the matrilineal system prevailed, as contrasted with the patrilineal system of the latter group. Finally, the theory of linear evolution, according to which the family is assumed to have gone through certain definite stages from the "lowest" to the "highest," has become entirely unacceptable. The characterization of stages of family development as "low" or "high"' cannot be made with any degree of assurance.

Theories of Briffault and Westermarck

Some anthropologists and sociologists, while rejecting most of the implications of Bachofen and Morgan, accept their contention that the mother-family was the earlier to appear. Briffault maintained that man originally lived in a state of sexual promiscuity and that the earliest human family consisted of a mother and her children. It was only after the mother began realizing the economic advantages of having a man attached to her that she tried—successfully—to turn the casual attachment of the male into a more permanent relationship. Briffault wrote a three-volume work, *The Mothers,* which presented data gathered from all parts of the world to prove this contention. In this work, too, he asserted that women should be considered the real founders of the home as well as of many of the arts.

Westermarck strongly opposed the views of Briffault. Relying

upon a wealth of information, even as did Briffault, he concluded that, far from living in promiscuity, man originally lived under a monogamous form of marriage.

Few students subscribe unqualifiedly to the views of either of these scholars. Although both gathered abundant data in support of their contentions, the cases they used appear to have been selected to prove their theses. Perhaps they attempted to generalize where generalization is impossible.

THE PRIMITIVE FAMILY

It is always dangerous to draw indiscriminate conclusions about original human behavior on the basis of anthropological observations of primitive tribes, for the life of primitive peoples does not necessarily provide a clue to the life of civilized societies in the remote past; the notion of linear cultural evolution held by early anthropologists has been thoroughly invalidated. When, however, certain patterns are persistently encountered in widely separated parts of the world among many and varied societies, a cautious inference is justified. Una Bernard Sait stated this contention very aptly in her *New Horizons for the Family*. It is unreasonable to believe, she asserted, that the various primitive peoples who are at present on the lowest levels of civilization were at one time in possession of another, different type of culture. It is much more likely that the majority of them possess a culture which has remained relatively unchanged for many generations. Such peoples, therefore, afford the student an insight into the organization of the earliest types of human societies.

For this reason a consideration of the nature and characteristics of the family as found among primitive peoples is necessary for a thorough understanding of the institution as it exists in the contemporary civilized world. Of course it is even more important to take into account the institution as found among ancient historic and particularly earlier modern societies. Joseph Kirk Folsom, in *The Family and Democratic Society*, summarized the reasons for studying preliterate and alien family patterns as an aid in understanding our own pattern. An acquaintance with family types other than our own, he stated, gives us an insight into the manner in which changes in the institution take place; it also gives us an appreciation of the variety of human family types, which makes it possible for us to

take a realistic view of the institution; and, finally, it enables us to gain perspective with regard to the possibilities of human relationships. When we see our own culture undergoing change and note that some groups are attempting to modify it along certain lines, the belief forces itself upon us that it is possible for man to mold his culture according to a well-thought-out design instead of letting it take its course.

Primitive Family Types

Since conditions and circumstances determine the pattern that the family will assume, the variety of types encountered in the world is very great indeed. This is especially true of preliterate, or primitive, societies.

Among primitive peoples the family organization is most commonly of the *consanguine* type; that is, its core is the blood relationship between brothers and sisters, or parents and children. This is in contrast to the *conjugal* type of family, which exists in contemporary Western society, where the relationship between mates is the primary one. Either of two types of marriage arrangements prevails. In one, the wife goes to live with her husband's family; this is called *patrilocal* residence and is the more common. In the other, the husband joins his wife's family, in which case the arrangement is called *matrilocal* residence. In the first instance, descent and inheritance are usually, but not always, traced through the father, a system referred to as *patrilineal;* in the second, they are, as a rule, traced through the mother, a system called *matrilineal.* Under this latter arrangement, which is very widespread, involving probably nearly 50 per cent of the tribes, the biological father plays a minor role, while the real duties of the father are performed by the mother's brother. This practice is known as *avunculate*. The kinship system usually found in primitive society is, therefore, *unilateral;* i.e., descent is traced through either the mother's or the father's line but not through both.

An almost universal feature among primitive peoples is the rule that the individual must marry outside his own group of relatives. This practice is *exogamy*. The individual is also required to marry within a certain group, such as his own tribe or class. This practice is *endogamy*. The basis of exogamy is the taboo against incest; this taboo is universal with a few rare exceptions, as among the ancient Egyptians and the Samoans, where brothers and sisters in royal

families often intermarried. The practices of exogamy and endogamy, of one kind or another, are found in all advanced societies, including our own. For example, we insist on one's marrying outside his own close kinship group, but within his own racial, religious, or nationality group. However, the rules of endogamy and exogamy in our society are not as uniformly or as rigidly observed as in primitive societies or as in other advanced societies where the caste system strictly limits the choice of a mate.

Primitive Marriage Patterns

The two principal marriage patterns are *polygamy* and *monogamy*. Polygamy means plural mating and includes marriage of one man to two or more women, which is called *polygyny;* the union of one woman and two or more men, which is referred to as *polyandry;* and the marriage of several men to several women, in which all are husbands and wives to each other and which is designated as *group marriage*. The most prevalent form of polygamy is polygyny. Polyandry is relatively rare, and group marriage is even more so. Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg, in their survey of 434 primitive tribes, found that 66 practiced monogamy, 31 polyandry, and the rest polygyny. In spite of the fact that the vast majority of primitive tribes are polygynous, in actual practice most marriages in these tribes are monogamous. This is due to the fact that there is never a sufficient excess of women to make it possible for every man to marry more than one woman. Only the wealthy or otherwise outstanding individuals can do so.

In all societies the matrimonial event is one of interest and concern to the community. It generally involves some sort of contract and a payment to be made for the bride in the form either of goods or service. In some societies it is also customary for the bride to offer a dowry to her bridegroom. This implies payment to the man, but in the vast majority of instances he pays for the bride.

Premarital sexual relations are tolerated or even encouraged in many primitive societies; in some, as among the Trobrianders and Samoans, the practice assumes a form of trial marriage. There are, however, tribes such as the Veddahs of Ceylon, in which premarital chastity is an absolute requirement. Similarly, extramarital relations are not uncommon. In certain societies, particularly among the Eskimos and Siberian and Oceanic peoples, there is a custom of sexual hospitality, according to which the host offers his wife tem-

porarily to a visitor. These practices, however, are not to be construed as unlimited license or promiscuity. They must be in strict conformity with various rules and regulations applying to them, violations of which are considered illicit or adulterous.

Treatment of Children among Primitive Peoples

It is noteworthy that the treatment of children in so-called savage societies is on the whole marked by affection and tenderness, resort to physical punishment being the exception rather than the rule—this in spite of the fact that conditions may force the practice of infanticide and child exposure. Indeed, from reports by Margaret Mead about the Samoans and by Malinowski about the Trobriand Islanders, as well as from other reports, one receives the definite impression that in many primitive societies the training of children is more "progressive" and the children have a happier childhood than in our society with its countless restrictions, taboos, and repressions.

Divorce among Primitive Peoples

With very few exceptions, as the Veddahs of Ceylon, among whom marriage is considered indissoluble, all primitive societies provide for divorce and separation. In some, divorce is obtainable on definite grounds only, while in others it may be secured practically "at will" by either mate or by mutual consent. Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg estimated that the latter holds true for about 48 per cent of the tribes they surveyed. In those societies where one mate may initiate a divorce, it is usually the husband who has the privilege of doing so. Rarely is the opposite true. One society where the wife enjoys the privilege of divorcing her husband at will is the Zuñi Indian society. Here when a woman wishes to rid herself of her mate she simply puts his belongings outside the house, and the husband, upon seeing them, has no choice but to leave. Although divorce is comparatively easy to obtain in primitive society, actually it is not unrestricted and is certainly not encouraged. Primitive societies, like our own, are aware of the need for stable families and will often see to it that family life does not become too disturbed.

Position of Women among Primitive Peoples

In most societies the position of women is inferior to that of men. This is especially true in pastoral and hunting societies. Hobhouse, Wheeler, and Ginsberg estimated that woman's status is lower than

man's in 73 per cent of the agricultural and in over 87 per cent of the pastoral societies. It must be remembered, however, that estimates of Westerners are of necessity subjective since they tend to apply Western standards to primitive life. The whole question is very complicated. A woman, for instance, may serve as a kind of beast of burden and do the hard work, while in many other respects enjoy rights and privileges equal to those of a man. There is always, as Lowie pointed out in his *Primitive Society,* a discrepancy between the legal status and the actual treatment of women. In no society is man allowed to deal with his wife simply as he pleases. On the other hand, Malinowski found that in some groups, as among the Trobrianders, husband and wife are on equal terms. Moreover, there seems to be little correlation between the level of culture of a society and the treatment of women. In some of the most backward tribes, as among the Veddahs, women are treated with great consideration, while in societies of comparatively high development, the opposite may be true.

EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY IN WESTERN CIVILIZATION

The family in the Western world has been undergoing profound changes in the past five or six decades. Nevertheless, many of the essential features which characterized it earlier persist to the present day. Some of these characteristics, which have been transmitted to us from the past and which do not seem to fit into the changed scheme of things, constitute the core of the problems faced by the family today. At any rate, there is a direct connection between the institution as found in the past, as far back as very ancient times, and the institution as it is now. The influence of the past forms of the family has been deep and abiding.

The Family in Ancient Society

On the whole, our family still tends to be, if not patriarchal, at least dominated by the husband. This characteristic, which is more common in European and Latin American societies than in our own, goes back to the patriarchal system found in ancient Hebrew, Greek, and Roman civilizations. In these societies, the husband (the oldest male member of the family) was the sole authority. The wife occupied an inferior position, enjoying few, if any, rights.

In the Roman patriarchal family, as Maine pointed out, the woman was obedient, before her marriage, to her father; after his death, to her nearest male relative; and after her marriage, to her husband. A similar situation prevailed among the ancient Hebrews and Greeks. Aristotle, in his *Politics,* epitomized the general attitude of the ancients towards woman when he stated that the male is by nature more fit to command than the female, that the prerogative of the man is to command, and that the duty of the woman is to obey.

Influence of the Church on the Family

While the structure of the contemporary family can be traced back to ancient civilizations, our attitude towards sex (as something shameful, even sinful), which has had far-reaching consequences on marriage and the family, as well as on other phases of our life, goes back to the influence of Christianity.

The early Christian Fathers considered marriage at best a necessary evil. Paul had little use for marriage and condoned it only on the ground that "it is better to marry than to burn." This Apostle, one of the pillars of the Church, never married. His negative attitude towards marriage and sex had a determining influence upon the future position of the Church on these matters Willystine Goodsell, in her *Problems of the Family,* speculated that if Paul had been happily married instead of remaining a bachelor, the Christian leaders who followed him might have shown a friendlier disposition towards matrimony. The negative attitude of the Church Fathers became reinforced, as time went on, by the growing asceticism among Christians, so that celibacy came to be looked upon as *the* desirable state, while marriage came to be considered something to shy away from and to be tolerated only as better than fornication and as a means of avoiding it. This attitude was held by both Jerome and Augustine, who wielded tremendous influence upon the growing Church. Together with this, as well as a result of it, there developed a contempt for womanhood in general. Woman, who was regarded as responsible for the appearance of sin in the world, was looked upon as a temptress to evil. She was also considered inferior to man, born to serve and obey him. Said Paul, in *I Timothy:* "Let the woman learn in silence with all subjection. But I suffer not a woman to teach, nor to usurp authority over the man, but to be in silence."

During the long centuries of the Middle Ages, marriage and the family continued to be under the sway of the doctrines of the Church Fathers. Feudalism, which gained a firm foothold between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries, strengthened the existing patriarchal system in many ways. Also during the Middle Ages, between the tenth and twefth centuries, the Church established control over marriage and divorce, matters which had formerly been regarded as secular arrangements.

Although Protestantism brought about radical changes in many ideas about marriage, the patriarchal power persisted, as did some negative attitudes towards sex and marriage. The Puritans, though adopting the Old rather than the New Testament as their guide, continued to cling to the idea that sex is sinful, except as a means of procreation. Sexual repression became, indeed, one of the main concerns of the Puritans. The attitudes of these early Americans are still deeply embedded in our sex mores.

THE PRESENT-DAY FAMILY

The family has undergone radical changes in the past half century, and it is still in the process of being transformed. The old patriarchal family is gradually disappearing. The causes underlying the disintegration of the traditional patriarchal family are very complex. They involve radical changes in our economic and social life that have engendered forces which combined to challenge what Reuben Hill called the "familistic-patriarchal" type of family and to usher in what he referred to as the "person-centered-democratic" type, which is still in the making.

The Family under Rural Conditions

Up to comparatively recent times the vast majority of people, even in the Western world, were engaged in agriculture and lived in rural communities where the household economy prevailed. In the United States it was not until 1920 that the Census showed somewhat more than half the population living in urban communities. An agricultural society is conducive to a patriarchal family system. The agricultural family, being primarily an economic establishment, needs a head, and the man traditionally assumed authority. Moreover, in a rural society the home was the center not only of economic activities but also of almost all other activities

—educational, social, recreational, and, to a large extent, religious. This resulted in strong family cohesion, for the members were united by many bonds and were mutually dependent.

The Influence of Urbanization and Industrialization on the Family

Urbanization and industrialization have radically changed this situation. Within about one hundred years the United States has shifted from a predominantly rural to a predominantly urban community. Between 1890 and 1940, the proportion of Americans living in urban communities increased from 36 to 56.5 per cent; by 1960 the proportion had reached 69.9 per cent. The percentage of urbanites is constantly increasing. The same trend has been occurring in most regions of the world. Some of the Western nations, such as England and Denmark, have become even more urbanized than the United States.

Consequently, the home has been replaced by the factory as the unit of production. One after another the economic functions of the urban family have been taken over by outside establishments. The remaining functions, such as cooking and laundering, are performed on a greatly reduced scale. This is particularly true of middle-class and upper-class families. The husband's leadership has declined; in many families the husband, though continuing to function as the breadwinner, has actually ceased to exercise real authority. "The husband," stated Ernest R. Mowrer in *The Family,* "is no longer the head of the household in many families, in spite of the fact that he still provides the family name, as well as the Christian name which his wife uses upon more formal occasions. . . . In fact, he is lucky if his children look upon him other than as a meddlesome outsider." For one thing, in an urban economy there is less need for leadership in the family. Then, too, more women work for gain outside the home. In 1890, according to the Sixteenth Census of the United States, only 4.6 per cent of all married women were employed outside the home; in 1952, according to the Women's Bureau, 26.8 per cent were so employed. Finally, the emancipation of women from many of their past disabilities has put them on a more or less equal footing with men. All this has tended to make the family democratic or "equalitarian." On the other hand, since the father is often absent from home and is preoccupied with business affairs, the mother becomes the real head of the family, in

charge of practically all family functions. Such families have been referred to as "matricentric." According to Mowrer, there is also a trend towards the "filiocentric" family, i.e., one in which children play an increasingly important role, actually tending to dominate and to determine its policies.

As a consequence of changes in economic and social conditions, of new conceptions of personal freedom, and of modifications in the traditional religious view of birth control, the size of the family has been steadily declining. Folsom, in *The Family and Democratic Society,* gave the following reasons for this decline, which has occurred more or less throughout the Western world: elaboration of individual wants and demands, lack of opportunity to profit from child labor, and diffusion of contraceptive information. The size of the average family in the United States in 1960 was 3.6, as compared with 3.8 in 1940, 4.9 in 1890, and 5.7 in 1790. In urban communities, it is only 3.26; in rural areas, it is 4.02. Ray E. Baber, in *Marriage and the Family,* estimated that childless families have increased 700 per cent since Colonial times. Moreover, families now tend to include only parents and children. In only about 4 per cent of urban families are there other relatives living in the household.

The Changing Functions of the Family

Not only the economic functions but also other traditional activities of the family were transferred to outside agencies, thus further weakening the bonds that in the past kept the family together. There occurred a reduction in the educational, recreational, religious, and protective functions of the family, which have been more or less taken over by various institutions and agencies created for that purpose. The school, with its ever increasing services, the commercial and communal recreational facilities, the church, and various types of public agencies, such as the juvenile court, hospitals, and clinics, are performing many of the tasks formerly performed by the family.

As a result, the chief functions in the present-day family tend to revolve around personality. Ernest W. Burgess referred to the modern family as "a unity of interacting personalities." Affection between the mates and the personality development of the children are of primary concern. Where children are absent, affection between mates is all-important. Hence, if the affectional element

weakens or disappears, there sets in disintegration in the relationship, which Willard Waller called "the process of alienation," and which often leads to separation and divorce.

Clifford Kirkpatrick, in his *The Family as Process and Institution,* pointed out that the effect of technological inventions on the family has not been entirely negative. He mentioned devices such as the automatic washing machine and dishwasher, electric sewing machine, television, etc., as possible means of bringing back the traditional functions. "Technology," he wrote, "takes from the home, but it can likewise restore." It is doubtful, however, that these devices will prove of sufficient strength to check trends which are the results of a radically changed socio-economic situation.

Divorce in Present-Day Society

In the modern American family, divorce is relatively frequent. A large proportion of divorces occur among couples who have been married only a short time; approximately two-thirds of divorced couples have been married less than ten years. Again, more than half of the divorces in the United States are obtained by childless couples. According to a study by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, the divorce rate among childless couples is 15.3 per 1,000 families, 11.6 among families with a single child, 7.6 among families with two children, 6.5 among families with three children, and 4.6 among families with four or more children. About 85 per cent of all divorces are granted to couples with no children or with only one child. The divorce rate is lower in the rural community than in the city, and the rate is lower among Catholics than among Protestants and Jews. These comparatively low divorce rates have been attributed respectively, to the economic set-up of the rural family and to the prohibition of divorce by the Catholic Church.

According to the same study by the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, the United States has the highest divorce rate of twelve Western nations considered. The divorce rate in the United States has increased tremendously in the past half century. Whereas, according to an estimate by Kingsley Davis, in 1890 there were 0.5 divorces per 1,000 of population, or 57 divorces per 1,000 marriages, in 1949 there were 2.6 divorces per 1,000 of population or 267.9 divorces per 1,000 marriages, which represents a fivefold increase in the rate. The highest divorce rate was reached in 1946

when it was 4.3 per 1,000 population, or 400 divorces per 1,000 marriages. It is noteworthy that the rate, which varies considerably among the different sections of the United States, is lowest in the Middle Atlantic States and highest in the Mountain States. According to Mabel A. Elliott, these sectional variations must be attributed not merely to differences in laws but also to differences in the attitudes of the people.

The divorce rate does not, of course, yield a definite picture of the extent of disorganization in family life. Many, perhaps most, of the unhappily married couples do not resort to divorce. Then, there are the devices of separation and desertion, the rate of which is extremely difficult to estimate but which is suspected to be considerable, particularly among the lower income groups and among those whose church forbids divorce.

Success and Failure of Present-Day Marriage

In recent years a number of studies have been made by sociologists to determine the incidence of marital happiness as well as the personality factors conducive to happiness. Ernest W. Burgess and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., in *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage,* reported the results of their study of 526 couples in Illinois, married not less than one year and not more than six, who were native-born, urban-bred, middle-class, and high-school- or college-trained. Their method involved the use of certain indices, such as agreement between spouses on handling financial matters, demonstration of affection, and extent of common interests, from which they computed a marital adjustment score. The findings showed that 43 per cent were very happy, 21 per cent were happy, 14 per cent were unhappy, and 8 per cent were very unhappy. Using a similar, somewhat more elaborate, method in studying 792 California couples, the psychologist Lewis M. Terman and his collaborators, in *Psychological Factors in Marital Happiness,* arrived at approximately the same results.

These findings, however, hardly square with the facts regarding the rate of divorce and the suspected high rate of separation, desertion, and marital unhappiness. Critics of the studies pointed out that the cases were selected and that at best the findings would apply only to a certain group of the population. No doubt there is a great deal of validity in this criticism, and the authors themselves ad-

mitted some shortcomings in their procedures. Nevertheless, these and other attempts at analyzing an intricate problem scientifically are very promising.

Perhaps of greater significance were the findings of these studies regarding the relationship between the personality characteristics and environment of individuals and their success or failure in marriage. The studies disclosed that the individual likely to find marital happiness is one who had happily married parents; had a happy childhood in a home where discipline was firm but not harsh; had some early sex instruction, which resulted in a healthy attitude toward sex; did not marry too early (before twenty-two for men and twenty for women); had a number of friends of both sexes; and belonged to a number of organizations. It was also found helpful for him to have been born and raised in a small town or rural community and in a moderately religious and conventional family and to have had a higher education. Harvey J. Locke, in his *Pre-*

FACTORS INVOLVED IN DIVORCE




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dicting Adjustment in Marriage, which reported the results of a study carried on in Monroe County, Indiana, over a period of five years, stated that affiliation with a church, which he considered a mark of a sociable personality, is closely associated with marital adjustment, whereas not belonging to a church is significantly associated with unadjustment. These studies admittedly included only certain sections and types of the population, and much more extensive research will have to be done before one will be able to generalize safely.

Researches by students of the family, notably Lewis M. Terman and Harriet Mowrer, showed that persons with well-adjusted, well-balanced personalities are the ones most likely to be happily married. These investigators discovered that marital discord and unhappiness are due primarily to a lack of adjustment between two personalities. The grievances and complaints voiced by the spouses are symptoms rather than causes. The chief cause of marital rifts, they found, is incompatibility between two personalities. Moreover, sexual difficulties are almost always found to be present in marital discord, and these difficulties, as Burgess, Cottrell, Harriet Mowrer, and others pointed out, can be traced back to psychological and cultural, rather than to physiological, causes. It is interesting to note that the various studies dealing with the factors involved in successful marriage have shown that, contrary to popular belief, financial status in itself is inconsequential so far as marital happiness is concerned.

Trends in the Present-Day Family

It is apparent that the human family, while basically alike everywhere, has assumed many different forms and functions in different societies and in different periods. The form and function assumed by the institution are the results of conditions under which people live. Consequently, the contemporary family is different in many respects from the family of a hundred years ago. If the family appears to be "in trouble," the reason is that the transition from one form to another, from one set of functions to another, is still taking place. It is, therefore, contrary to the facts in our possession and altogether unrealistic to condemn the present tendencies of the institution as detrimental to society. The family is not "going to the dogs," as pessimistic moralists lament. It is merely seeking to adapt itself to changed conditions. Folsom summarized this very well.

Many students of the problem, he wrote, upon noting the increase in divorce rates and the apparently greater prevalence of family conflict conclude that disorganization is a marked characteristic of the modern family. The concept of social disorganization, he stated, has been overemphasized. Much of what is considered disorganization is in reality nothing more than "changing organization." To be sure, wrote Folsom, institutions may change and thus come to support new values, but if they fail to do so, different institutions will take their place to sustain the changed values. The family is one of those institutions whose structure, function, and values are changing.

There seems to be no danger of the family's disintegrating, much less disappearing. In fact, marriage rates, except during periods of economic depression, have increased in recent years. Sociologists who have studied the institution agree that people are becoming more dependent upon the family as a means of satisfying their cravings for affection and love. It is possible that a more genuine affection between parents and children is developing in the modern family.

The foregoing facts imply that our society has begun to adopt a new point of view regarding the family. It should, therefore, institute reforms designed to facilitate the transition from old to new values. Some countries have made considerable progress in this direction. The Scandinavian countries, particularly Sweden, are foremost examples. In Sweden, as noted by Alva Myrdal in her *Nation and Family,* the state has frankly recognized the changed value system of the people. Consequently, a series of reforms designed to meet the new demands has been put into effect. There is an awareness that many young people tend to postpone marriage too long, or do not marry at all; those who do marry have very few children or none. They are reluctant to undertake to raise a large family for fear that they will be unable to take proper care of the children. They fear that they may have to sacrifice comforts or even necessities and perhaps surrender some of their cherished freedoms.

Sweden has devised corrective measures without attempting to persuade or coerce people to change their ideas. Marriage loans are granted to couples desiring to marry early; free meals are provided for every school child; free prenatal and delivery care for women and free dental care for children are made available. Pregnant women, including the unmarried, can take a three months' leave of

absence from work; those in government service get fifty per cent of their salary as well; and all, except wealthy mothers, receive a bonus for each newborn child. The state supports children of divorced parents. Sex education is part of the educational program, and birth control information is available to all. Abortion is legalized within certain limits. Children are registered at birth in both the fathers' and mothers' names. Illegitimacy is not officially recognized; a child born out of wedlock is not stigmatized but is taken care of by society. Finally, divorce is obtainable without too much difficulty; grounds include legal separation for one year by mutual agreement or for three years otherwise.

The Soviet Union went much farther than Sweden in establishing new policies concerning marriage and the family, but had to retreat after having abolished all "capitalist" restrictions, proving that matters of vital concern to society cannot be left entirely to the whims of individuals. Soviet regulations regarding marriage, divorce, and abortions are much stricter now than heretofore. There is also greater recognition of the need for a close parent-child relationship. The Soviet experience indicates that care must be exercised not to go to extremes. Nevertheless, recent developments in the Soviet Union and Sweden are in conformity with the new values and concepts of contemporary society.

12

Educational Institutions

Education is one of the basic activities in all human societies, for the continued existence of a society depends upon the transmission of its heritage to the young. It is essential that the young be instructed in the ways of the group so that they will behave according to them. Every society, therefore, possesses means whereby these needs are met.

The means which are employed for the purpose of perpetuating the cultural heritage and of training the young in the ways of the group become more or less standardized, that is, institutionalized. As such they are within the scope of inquiry of the sociologist. Unlike the pedagogue, however, who is chiefly concerned with the techniques and immediate objectives of teaching, the sociologist seeks to analyze the nature and functions of educational institutions and to note their relationship to all other activities of society. It follows that for a broader understanding of education, the educator must turn to the sociologist, among other social scientists. An awareness of this is reflected in the fact that education, as a discipline, is increasingly turning to sociology and the other social sciences for assistance. On the other hand, sociologists, being aware of the social importance of educational institutions, have always been interested in the sociological analysis of these instiutions. In recent years education has become the major interest of some sociologists, with the result that "educational sociology" is now a generally recognized field within the science of sociology.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF EDUCATION

In its broadest sense, education is the process whereby a society seeks to transmit its traditions, customs, and skills, i.e., its culture, to its young members. Education may also be defined as the process whereby the social heritage of a group is passed on from one genera-

tion to another, as well as the process whereby the child becomes socialized, i.e., learns the rules of behavior of the group into which he is born. In primitive societies education usually takes place through the child's contact with his parents, relatives, and playmates. He learns by means of observation, imitation, and suggestion. Civilized societies utilize an educational system, a machinery, with well-defined functions. Referring to an advanced society, Franklin H. Giddings, in his *Readings in Descriptive and Historical Sociology,* described this system as including "so much of the social organization as is directly active in teaching, promoting learning, conducting research and furthering discovery," as well as "the policies adopted and the methods followed."

Education in Primitive Societies

Education may be informal or formal. In preliterate societies, education usually is informal. The source of education is hardly differentiated from the home, where, through observation and direct contact, the child acquires his training in practical techniques and skills as well as his knowledge of the folkways and mores of the group. Even in such societies, however, education is not altogether devoid of formality. The preparation for and the actual rites of initiation comprise a kind of formal training. The initiation ceremonies are frequently elaborate and include instruction, ordeal, and periods of testing. The complete education of a youth often takes years. In addition to other objectives, the initiation ceremonies serve as a means of transmitting the mythology and lore of the group. According to Margaret Mead, some primitive societies, such as the Maori, maintain a sacred college for the formal training of priests, and the Samoans have a training school for housebuilders. Nevertheless, among preliterates, education even of the formal type appears quite informal to us who are accustomed to great halls of learning, large teaching staffs, grading systems, degrees, etc.

Since education in preliterate societies is a natural process, a matter of direct observation and experience—the child learns by doing things—it is highly effective and poses practically no problems of learning or discipline. Indeed, it may be said that preliterates unwittingly observe the principles of "progressive" education—and with very good results. Observers of preliterate societies marvel at the almost complete absence of physical punishment and at the exemplary behavior of the children. The children, wrote Sumner

and Keller, enjoy utmost consideration and a great deal of freedom, yet they are obedient, or rather, they emulate the parents' actions, which usually are directed towards concrete, immediate objectives. Since the child is not overprotected but must suffer the consequences of inexpedient conduct, there is little need for external discipline.

Education in Ancient and Medieval Times

Education in definitely institutionalized forms is encountered only in civilized societies. Its extent of development, degree of formality, and contents and objectives vary with the type of civilization. Giddings divided education into three phases: the informal, direct phase of the simple societies; the ecclesiastical one of some ancient and of all medieval European societies; and the secular one of the present.

Up to comparatively very recent years all formal education was private and limited to individuals of the aristocratic and wealthy classes. Moreover, most of it was elementary in nature, even though some ancient peoples (such as the Egyptians, Hebrews, Greek, and Romans) had institutions of higher learning. The objectives of the schools in ancient times varied from a practical preparation for life in the community and the cultivation of the social graces, as among the Egyptians and Romans, to the semireligious training of the Chinese and Hindus and the almost purely religious training of the Hebrews. The differences in the objectives were due to the differences in the general cultural configuration of these peoples. Education was restricted to a small minority, although the Greeks and Hebrews, during certain periods, maintained a kind of compulsory school system. For the masses, informal training in the home was the rule.

During the Middle Ages, in Western society, the vast majority of the people had no opportunity for formal education. The schools were mainly those established by religious orders for the training of novices. Nevertheless, they were practically the only centers of learning at the time. Even the so-called Latin grammar schools, established during the late Middle Ages to prepare select groups of boys for the church or university, were little more than theological schools. Throughout the Middle Ages, the masses received their practical training in the home.

An impetus for secular education during that period came from the Arabs, whose influence, first felt in Spain, led to the rise of universities emphasizing secular subjects, such as mathematics,

natural science, and medicine. The most important factors in bringing about the spread of formal education were the growth of commerce and industry, the Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation, and the development of powerful national states. Thus, the school, which was originally a rather insignificant social agency affecting only a few people, has constantly become more important, until today it takes its place alongside the state, the church, and the family as one of the most influential institutions.

Popularization of Education

Although the secularization of education had begun, at least in some countries, during the Renaissance period, secular instruction did not become widely accepted until the nineteenth century. Popular education, i.e., education for the masses, particularly of the compulsory type, did not really start until the opening of the nineteenth century and did not become widespread until the beginning of the twentieth century.

The two major factors responsible for the secularization and popularization of education are the development of strong national states and the spread of democracy. Both of these factors combined to change the objectives and, hence, the subject matter, of education from preparation for a good religious life to good citizenship. Democracy was responsible for widening the objectives to include the preparation of the individual for a happy, useful life, as this was considered the *raison d'être* of the democratic state. Popular education, moreover, has been considered essential to the very existence of the democratic state; without an informed citizenry, a really democratic government is thought to be impossible. One of the chief effects of democracy on education was to make education a mass phenomenon. People became increasingly aware of the importance of mass education to democracy, a factor stressed by the great American educators, James Gordon Carter, Horace Mann, and Henry Barnard in their arguments for free public education. Finally, the democratic ideal of equality of opportunity was another powerful motive. The role played by democracy, therefore, in bringing about the transformation of the institution can hardly be exaggerated. Simultaneously, the development of science and technology, which brought about the industrialization of our civilization, necessitated many changes in the curriculum, among which was the inclusion of an ever greater number of theoretical and prac-

tical subjects. Education thus became a complicated set of institutions of far-reaching social significance.

THE OBJECTIVES OF EDUCATION

Education, by reason of its social significance, has been a subject of discussion since early times. Philosophers of all periods, beginning with the ancient sages, devoted to it a good deal of attention, propounding various theories regarding its nature and objectives. In modern times, outstanding teachers and educational philosophers included Comenius, Pestalozzi, Herbart, and Froebel, in Europe, and Carter, Mann, and Barnard in the United States. Many of the general philosophers, such as Locke, Rousseau, Hegel, Hume, James, and Dewey, accorded education a large place in their philosophical works.

From Comenius to Froebel

The seventeenth-century Czech educator Johann Amos Comenius is considered the first highly important educational philosopher of modern times. In *The Great Didactic* he criticized the prevalent emphasis upon logic and classics. He insisted that the method of instruction should be consistent with the mental development of the child and that the subject matter should be adapted to his interests. The training of the child, he maintained, should be free of harsh discipline and should be marked by kindness and gentleness. He also held that education should be universal and should include both sexes.

The English philosopher John Locke wrote that education should aim at mental discipline. But he also thought that practical training is even more important than book learning, particularly for poor children. He advocated the secular rather than the religious type of education. The French philosopher Voltaire, similarly a champion of secular education, opposed emphasis on the classics.

Perhaps the greatest influence upon modern education was exerted by Jean Jacques Rousseau's *Émile*. Believing as he did in the essential goodness of human nature, Rousseau taught that it is necessary only to direct the child's natural inclinations wisely in order to train him properly. He rejected all artificial restraints current in conventional types of education as interfering with the healthy growth and development of the child. He also advocated

popular education. Rousseau's doctrines had a profound effect upon subsequent educational philosophy and were incorporated in the theories of a number of outstanding educators, notably the Swiss educator Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi and the German educator Friedrich Froebel. The teachings of both of these men had a far-reaching influence upon the theory and practice of education. Pestalozzi believed that education should be fitted to the needs and interests of the child and should aim at the "harmonious development of all the faculties." The ultimate objective of education, he thought, should be the improvement of the lot of the masses. Froebel, who was the founder of the kindergarten, emphasized creative activity in the school and believed that the aim of education is "complete living." The experimental schools which he established served as models in all civilized countries, and his philosophy profoundly influenced the elementary school curricula.

Views of Some Pioneer Sociologists

The father of sociology, Auguste Comte, contended that human progress is largely dependent upon education. He therefore held that there is a great need for universal education. Education, he believed, should aim to cultivate sympathy for, and understanding of, our fellow men and not merely to develop the intellect. Herbert Spencer, on the other hand, asserted that the acquisition of scientific knowledge is of the greatest value in education and that the school should prepare the individual for a well-rounded life in society. He strongly criticized the methods and objectives of the prevailing educational system and insisted that it must be completely reorganized in order to fulfill its proper functions. True, however, to his individualistic philosophy, he did not believe that social progress requires mass education.

Lester F. Ward exerted great influence, perhaps more than any other sociologist, upon educational thought in America. We have seen that Ward had great faith in education as a means to social progress. He believed that the human mind, if properly trained, is capable of overcoming all obstacles that impede societal advance. Knowledge, he thought, is the key to the solution of human problems. If the masses of people were educated, they would be able to bring about a social order free of many of the prevailing evils. Ward had a great deal of confidence in the average individual's potentialities and, hence, believed that universal education would result

in a citizenry capable of acting intelligently. The American sociologist Charles A. Ellwood, who accepted Ward's ideas regarding education, similarly had great confidence in education as a means of promoting social progress. He regarded it as the most effective means of developing socialized individuals and as an indispensable factor in democratic living.

Sumner's *Folkways* defined education as the attempt to transmit to the child the mores of the group, so that he can learn "what conduct is approved and what disapproved . . . how he ought to behave in all kinds of cases; what he ought to believe and reject." In other words, he learns to behave in accordance with the mores of the group. Proper education, moreover, should produce in the individual a "well-developed critical faculty" which will prevent him from acting on mere suggestion or impulse, and from following uncritically traditional ways, but instead will enable him to act rationally —"by judgment." Individuals thus educated are not readily stampeded into action by agitators or stirred up by rabble-rousers. They are reluctant to believe. They think and, hence, will consider ideas as possible or probable in various degrees and without certainty. They will wait to obtain evidence and will then carefully weigh it. Sumner concluded that only education in the critical faculty may be said to train individuals for good citizenship. But he believed that even in democracies the system of education falls far short of achieving this goal.

Unlike Ward, Sumner held out no hope for education as a means of solving the world's problems. Indeed, he thought that our faith in education as a panacea for all ills is little more than a superstition. "We apply schooling," he wrote, "as a remedy for every social phenomenon which we do not like. . . . Our faith in the power of book learning is excessive and unfounded. It is a superstition of the age." Nor did Sumner share Ward's view regarding the potentialities of the average man. He did have great faith, however, in the abilities of the extraordinary man, the genius, to help society out of its difficulties and to direct it properly. Popular education, he stated, is justified by the tremendous service which persons of genius perform for society. We have not devised any sure way of discerning these men of genius in their early childhood. If we could do so, even the expenditure of large sums of money by society on their education would still be a great bargain. Popular education, he believed, should be upheld as a system of selecting potential leaders.

Giddings maintained that education should start during the earliest period of infancy. In *Civilization and Society,* he stated that if human beings are to be educated, the time to begin is about the time *they* begin. The period from their birth to the start of the educational process should not be prolonged. Education should aim to develop in individuals self-confidence and self-control, emancipate them from superstitious beliefs and ignorance, give them knowledge, make them think realistically, and help them become enlightened citizens. These objectives, he thought, are goals still to be realized. He emphasized especially the need to free ourselves from fears and superstitions, or "occulistic" beliefs, which are implanted in us, and to substitute for them objective knowledge, real enlightenment. In *Mighty Medicine* he condemned "traditional and sacrosanct" education and its "doctors of magic, heirs and assigns of the medicine man," which "crushes intellectual liberty when it can" and "hates the scientific knowledge with implacable hatred, for the knowledge exposes magic and discredits it." He criticized the tendency to neglect the "high-grade minds" at the expense of "defective, retarded, and other low-grade minds," and advocated greater attention to the selection of students.

It is interesting to note here Giddings' conception of the educated person. He wrote: "An educated man or woman is one who has found out most of the more important ways in which human beings have made fools of themselves, and thought about them long and seriously enough to have acquired an aversion for them. An educated person knows what ideas and practices have become almost universally discredited among civilized people, what ones are generally discredited although considerable groups here and there yet cling to them, what ones are becoming discredited, and what ones are discredited by experts who have made an exhaustive study of them."

A number of outstanding sociologists viewed education primarily in terms of psychological processes. Among these the French social psychologist Gabriel Tarde made a foremost contribution. Tarde's theory regarding human behavior, including the laws of imitation, found its way into the doctrines of sociologists and influenced particularly the sociologist E. A. Ross, who, in turn, had a far-reaching effect upon American social psychology and educational theories. Ross held that the individual's behavior is largely a matter of suggestion. The individual forms his ideas of right and wrong and

gets his motivations for action primarily through suggestion; the process is largely an unconscious one. Suggestion achieves its results by various means, the most important of which is example. These theories were elaborated in his *Social Control.*

Cooley believed that the individual's behavior is molded by his contacts with the "primary group," i.e., the family, the play group, and the neighborhood, and that his adjustment or maladjustment to the larger society depends upon the conditioning he receives in these groups. The primary groups are important conditioning agencies because of their personal nature, and as such are capable of fostering sentiments of love, sympathy, loyalty, and fair play. The public school, Cooley held, if properly organized, can stimulate these sentiments and can become the most useful agency for developing truly socialized personalities. Cooley's theories, even more than those of Ross, influenced the philosophy and practice of the American educational system. Similar views about the objectives of education were held by Albion W. Small, who believed that the aims of the school as an institution should be based upon the needs of society.

Durkheim conceived of education as "the socialization of the younger generation." "It is actually," he stated in his *Rules of Sociological Method,* "a continuous effort to impose on the child ways of seeing, feeling, and acting which he could not have arrived at spontaneously." To Durkheim, the school, like the home, is merely the representative and intermediary of society and seeks to inculcate in the child its customs and beliefs. It is therefore only with changes in the culture of a society that the educational system changes.

RECENT TRENDS IN EDUCATION

The early American educators fought untiringly for popular education and for more effective educational methods. But they fell short of understanding the objectives of education for democratic living. Barnes wrote of them (in his *Social Institutions):* "They failed to give due consideration to the content of the education needed to fit the masses to operate in a democracy. Instead of devising a curriculum suitable to democratic objectives and experiences, they permitted teachers to continue a type of instruction which had been worked out by educators of the fifteenth century for the purpose of instructing children of the decadent feudal nobility and the rising urban bourgeoisie. Hence we failed for a century to train American

children for life in a democracy, and by the time we realized the mistake, it was all but too late to correct the error. Fascism was just around the corner."

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, both educational theory and teaching practice were influenced profoundly by William James and John Dewey.

The Influence of William James and John Dewey

James developed the concept of the "social self" and concentrated on the analysis of consciousness, habit, memory, apperception, and will. He held that the individual's behavior is determined by inherited traits, or instincts—a theory which has since been thoroughly discredited—and that effective teaching methods must be based on a recognition of the existence of instincts. However, his experimental work in connection with problems of emotional, intellectual, and moral development exerted considerable influence on educational psychology. Similarly, his experiments on memory training led to important changes in the traditional school curriculum.

The theories of John Dewey had a much greater and more lasting effect upon educational philosophy than those of James. More than those of any other recent philosopher, they influenced educational methods and objectives and brought about a re-evaluation in educational theory. Dewey insisted that the chief aim of education is "to train children in cooperative and mutually helpful living." Education should not be regarded as a *preparation* for life but as *life* itself, and should be the process of living happily and fruitfully. The wants and needs of the child should be the primary concern of the school, and the methods and materials should be related to his interests and experiences, rather than to those activities which adults think the child should prefer. In applying such principles, education not only becomes more effective but also makes for a happy child and eventually a happy adult. These ideas, which were elaborated upon by William H. Kilpatrick and other educators, led to the movement which came to be known as "progressive education" and which had a widespread influence upon the educational system, even though recently some educators have questioned the soundness or validity of certain principles underlying it.

Closely identified with this movement is the educational philosopny advocating "social education," which calls for making the school an agency for the promotion of ethical values, proper attitudes, good

health habits, social participation, and other traits associated with the well-adjusted individual and the good citizen in a democracy. The school, according to this philosophy, while essentially an agency of control, should also serve as a means whereby new adjustments, demanded by a changing culture, are introduced to the children so that they will be better prepared to face the realities of life.

New Departures in Education

Since the beginning of the nineteenth century a definite trend toward public education provided by the state has been discernible. It is generally held that the movement for public education started during the revolutionary period in France and was in line with the principle of equality of opportunity propounded by the leaders of the French Revolution. Also underlying the demand for popular education were the views, expressed by Talleyrand and others, that enlightenment makes for better and happier individuals and that the state's welfare demands an enlightened citizenry. Still another concept held that the child belongs to the state, which has the right and duty to enforce education. One of the pioneers in this movement, the French philosopher and political leader Condorcet, also advocated education for women.

Nevertheless, the struggle for universal education was a prolonged one, and in many countries it took nearly a hundred years for compulsory education laws to be enacted. In Prussia enforced education for children from the age of five began as early as 1763. In England, because of the widespread philosophy of *laissez faire,* a universal compulsory law was not enacted until 1876, while in France a comparable law was not enacted until 1882. In the United States, too, the struggle for universal compulsory education was an extended one—a step-by-step procedure. Although Massachusetts enacted a law as early as 1642, requiring parents to educate their children, it was not until 1852 that the first compulsory attendance law was enacted in that commonwealth, not until 1889 that about half of the states had enacted similar laws, and not until 1914 that all but six Southern states had followed suit. Indeed, it was not until 1920 that the forty-eighth state, Mississippi, enacted a compulsory education law. Nevertheless, education has long been considered a fundamental necessity by Americans, the main argument put forth by the average person being that education is essential for success in life. Robert S. Lynd and Helen M. Lynd, in *Middletown in Transition,* epitomized this

idea as follows: "If adult Middletown sees its own hope for the immediate future as lying in hard work and making money, it has been wont to see in education the Open Sesame that will unlock the world for its children."

Today the trend towards universal education is practically worldwide. Public education is no longer limited to the elementary school, high school, and college, but includes such institutions as nursery schools, schools for the physically and mentally defective, vocational schools, and schools and courses for adults. These developments reflect recognition of the fact that education is a continuous process which commences at birth and continues throughout a person's life.

A significant development is part-time education, which the educator Jennie M. Turner defined as "those forms of schooling which are organized to fit the leisure time or are taken out of the working time of juveniles and adults." This type of education received its initial development in Europe, particularly in England, Germany, and Denmark, and spread throughout the civilized world, although in some countries, for various reasons, it is more fully developed than in others. England was responsible for introducing the evening tutorial system and university extension courses, Germany for the part-time continuation school, Denmark for the "people's high school," and the United States for cooperative and self-help colleges.

In the United States adult education has made great strides during recent years. New institutions providing instruction in a multitude of fields have been organized. Colleges and universities offer an increasing variety of extension courses, of both a theoretical and a practical nature, with instruction in the evenings, during the summer, and by correspondence. Extension courses for rural people are offered on an ever larger scale by land-grant colleges aided by the federal Department of Agriculture. All these extensions of our educational institutions indicate, as Turner observed, a realization that it is impossible to prepare a person adequately in his youth for full participation in a society as dynamic as ours.

The adult education movement was stimulated by the disproof of the long-standing popular notion that older persons find it difficult, if not impossible, to learn. The noted Columbia University educator and psychologist Edward L. Thorndike struck a decisive blow against this idea. In *Adult Learning,* Thorndike showed that the learning ability of the individual reaches its highest point when he is twenty-five, and then drops slowly until at forty-five it is about

what it was when he was eighteen. Furthermore, the difference between learning ability at the ages of twenty-five and forty-five is slight, and a person under fifty can learn almost anything he wishes. He does not lose his capacity for learning unless he becomes senile.

The functions of the school, moreover, have been increased tremendously in recent years. Many of them are attributable to the fact that schools were forced to take over functions previously left to the family but which the latter institution finds it increasingly difficult to perform; many other functions are attributable to new demands from the public or to new economic and social conditions. Among the new services are medical inspection and care, the provision of school lunches, vocational guidance, and supervised play. Some countries, notably the Soviet Union and Sweden, have gone very far in performing these new functions, which are, however, gradually becoming essential parts of the educational systems of all civilized countries. As the American educator I. J. Kandel has stated, the Soviet Union, perhaps more than any other country, has stressed the use of all the educative agencies, formal and informal, as means of preparing children for citizenship.

The fact that education is held in much higher esteem than ever before is shown by constantly rising expenditures for school facilities and steadily increasing enrollments on all levels of instruction. Expenditures for education (as computed by C. H. Judd in *Recent Social Trends)* rose about 1,000 per cent from 1900 to 1930. In 1950 Americans spent close to $60,000,000,000 on their schools. The enrollment in grade schools rose from 7,155,528 in 1870 to 23,149,000 in 1953; the estimated enrollment for 1960 is 28,787,000. The enrollment in high schools rose from a little over 200,000 in 1890 (less than 4 per cent of the number of children of high-school age) to approximately 7,000,000 in 1941 (over 60 per cent of the potential maximum). A total of 7,254,000 children attended high school in 1953; the estimated enrollment for 1964–65 is 12,600,000. With more than 93 per cent of all youth of high-school age enrolled (1964–1965), a high-school education is no longer merely a privilege of a minority. As for higher education, the enrollment in colleges and universities rose from about 285,000 in 1890 to about 1,400,000 in 1941 (an increase of approximately 500 per cent, as compared with a population increase of about 100 per cent during the same period). The total attendance in colleges rose from 49,827 in 1870, to 237,000 in 1900 and to 4,950,173 in 1964.

Besides the institutions considered above, a variety of other educational services, sponsored by the public or by private groups, are accessible to the masses as means of extending their educational opportunities. These, too, have experienced tremendous growth in recent decades. Among them are the public libraries and museums, forums and informal lecture courses, and the highly influential press, radio, movies, and television. The array of agencies created for mass communication is unprecedented. Oratory, religious revival meetings, and other traditional devices designed to arouse people to concerted action appear utterly insignificant when compared with these powerful forces. Moreover, whoever controls these forces may also largely determine the direction in which the masses will go.

13

Recreation

The ancient truism that man does not live by bread alone has been found by scientific research to correspond to reality in the sense that recreation or play has been shown to be a fundamental necessity of man. Indeed, the noted nineteenth-century German scholar and student of the recreational life of man, Karl Groos, in a careful study of the play life of animals, concluded that man's play interests have practically the same basis as those of animals. In the case of man, "play," as recreation, is found in human societies on all cultural levels.

Recreational activities, as Sumner and Keller pointed out, have not assumed the form of institutions, as economic, familial, governmental, educational, and religious activities have. Instead, these activities, they stated, have attached themselves to the various societal "self-maintenance" and "self-perpetuation" institutions, comprising, so to speak, the lighter, or brighter, side of the latter. Although recreational activities, on the whole, are encountered universally, they assume significance only when a society has reached a stage of development in which the struggle for existence is not incessant and leisure time is, therefore, available. Wherever the fundamental needs of man are adequately met, recreation occupies an important place in life. Accounts of primitive cultures disclose that the importance and amount of time accorded to recreation, as well as the degree of its refinement, correspond closely to the material prosperity of the people.

The striking thing about man's recreational activities is their relative or total lack of practical value in the economic sense. These activities, nevertheless, are utilitarian in the sense that they provide for what seem to be definite physical and psychological needs of human beings.

THE SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF PLAY

Although recreation is a social phenomenon perhaps as old as human culture itself, hardly any attempt was made to study it systematically or to explain its significance until comparatively recent times. The American sociologist Floyd N. House, in *The Range of Social Theory,* held that this may be accounted for primarily by two factors: (1) In ancient times recreation was merely one phase of religion, as it still is among primitive peoples; ancient scholars and philosophers, therefore, did not see the need for treating it as a subject of inquiry. (2) In later periods, as Christianity rose to dominance in the Western world, recreation came to be looked upon as mere indulgence of the flesh, deserving of contempt and unworthy of study. This attitude, House observed, became even more pronounced with the rise of Protestantism, particularly of the Puritan type, in Anglo-Saxon countries.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, however, with the development of anthropology, sociology, and psychology, recreation began to be studied systematically as an important phase of human behavior. In recent years interest in this subject was intensified with the growth of sports and other leisure-time activities, and numerous attempts were made by social scientists and psychologists to explain the origin, nature, and role of recreation in human life.

Some Early Theories of Recreation

One theory states that recreational life in primitive and in ancient societies is practically inseparable from religious ritual—indeed, that the latter may have its origin in the former. This view was implied in the theory of religion held by Durkheim and was made more definite in Jane Harrison's work on Greek religion.

The connection with religion was also brought out by the German writer Ernst Grosse in *The Beginnings of Art* and by the British classical scholar Gilbert Murray in *The Rise of the Greek Epic*. They noted that recreation, particularly such forms as the dance, song and dramatic play, is based on an elementary need of the individual and of the group. It is really a form of collective behavior which brings about solidarity among the members of the group and iden

tification of the individual with the group, both of which are essential to society as well as to the individual.

Another explanation, advanced by Herbert Spencer, among others, claims that the individual plays because of the surplus energy which he seeks to release. The theory that play provides for recuperation from work and recovery from fatigue and, hence, is a basic human need, was propounded by the nineteenth-century German psychologist Moritz Lazarus. Play has also been regarded as having a physical basis, i.e., as being related to somatic changes taking place during the individual's growth. This view was advanced by Lila E. Appleton in *A Comparative Study of the Play Activities of Adult Savages and Civilized Children*.

Sumner and Keller considered play a result of the quest for "self-gratification" which is primarily a product of the mores rather than an instinctive reaction. They saw in play a force conducive to discipline. In submitting to the rules of the game because of the urge for self-gratification which play satisfies, children as well as adults learn to be "good sports." The play life of man is one of the expedients molding the life of society. It can be used as an effective educational device and merits special attention on this account.

Karl Groos maintained in *The Play of Man* that man's play life, like that of animals, is rooted in an inborn need for activity. He held that the main function of play among children is to prepare them for adult life. He thus arrived at what has since been referred to as the "practice theory," defended by James Mark Baldwin and other American psychologists. Another function of play, Groos maintained, is to teach the child discipline. By discipline he meant subordination to superiors, obedience to the rules of society, and the development of sympathy and fellow feeling.

The Instinct Theory of Play

There have been several variations of the instinct theory of play. James emphasized that play has an instinctive basis. William McDougall held that the tendency to play is partly derived from the fighting instinct, since play frequently has a competitive character. E. A. Ross asserted that the intensity with which modern man seeks recreation is due primarily to his mode of life, which results in the starvation of his "instincts." The monotony and lack of stimulation of modern working conditions, he explained, have the effect

of stultifying the "instincts" and hence lead to a "passion for recreation." Man, he wrote, "needs experience that will feed his famishing instincts." Like Groos, Ross believed that play, of the proper kind, has a disciplinary, character-building value.

When the theory that man's behavior is based on instincts was discarded, the idea that play has an instinctive basis lost all validity. Similarly the theory, advanced by G. Stanley Hall, among others, that play is a recapitulation of the past experience of the human race is held to have little, if any, foundation in fact.

The Release or Relaxation Theory

Of the other theories regarding the origin and function of play, those attributing play to the individual's search for release from tensions are perhaps the most acceptable. This idea is part of Ross's explanation. Sumner's *Folkways* noted that the celebrations of primitives, which usually included moral holidays, served as a release from the restraint of the mores. W. I. Thomas set forth the above concept in his theory of the four elemental human wishes, of which one, as we have seen, is the wish for release from monotony, or for new experience.

A foremost exponent of the release or relaxation theory of play was the psychologist G. T. W. Patrick, according to whom the ceaseless activity and striving for efficiency of modern Western society result in a high degree of tension from which individuals seek release in sports and games, jokes, profanity, liquor, narcotics, etc., and in the extreme forms of diversion—conflict and war. Patrick asserted that one of the chief functions of religion, clubs, societies, and fraternities is to offer relief from tension.

The idea that play acts as an emotional catharsis can be traced to Aristotle, who believed that this accounted for the impact of tragedy on audiences. This theory has many adherents. Pastimes of all kinds are regarded as a means of release from pent-up emotions and of escape from the hard realities of life. They enable individuals, as Kimball Young pointed out in his *Sociology,* to escape their obligations as parents or citizens and to find release from anxieties in a socially approved world of wishful thinking. Hence, according to Young, they find fascination in the theater, games of chance, the humorous and comical, and the ritual of secret societies. In a somewhat similar vein, the followers of Sigmund Freud hold that the

element of make-believe is predominant in play activities. On the other hand, followers of Alfred Adler tend to see in play a means of compensating for physical and mental inadequacy.

FORMS OF RECREATION

Recreation in human societies takes on an almost infinite variety of forms. Some activities, as Sumner and Keller pointed out, aim at physical relaxation, and others provide for the release of pent-up energy, for relief from monotony and from the burden of everyday existence, for the gratification of the senses (taste, sight, hearing, touch, and smell), and for the satisfaction of the intellect. These authors also referred to recreational activities as a means of giving the individual distinction and prestige.

Many kinds of recreation are found in even the most primitive societies. Sleep, which is perhaps the simplest form of relaxation, takes up most of the time of primitive peoples, and among them it does not reflect laziness or inertia, but rather basic needs for rest from hard work, for pleasurable passing of time, or for escape from boredom. Contests, sports, and games are popular among primitives. They help to release accumulated physical energy. Similarly, forms of recreation ministering primarily to the mind are found in all types of societies. Among these are conversation, story-telling (the probable source of myth, legend, and folklore), oratory, riddles, and jokes.

Sumner and Keller referred to gluttony and indulgence in intoxicants and narcotics as means of gratifying the sense of taste. Peoples on higher levels of culture seek a special type of gratification of the senses of smell and touch; they find satisfaction in the appreciation of fine materials and in the use of perfumes. People on all cultural levels find a means of gratification in art experiences which appeal to the senses of sight and hearing. The anthropologist Franz Boas stated, in his *Primitive Art,* that no people has ever been found without some form of native art, and Lowie asserted in *An Introduction to Cultural Anthropology* that art may be traced back as far as the Old Stone Age. According to scholars, since art is rooted in the desire for self-gratification and in the need for the expression of deep emotions, its function is not very different from that of play and recreation.

RECREATION IN THE PAST

While recreation is a universal phenomenon, the amount of time devoted to it, the intensity with which it is pursued, the forms it assumes, and the degree of its refinement have varied with the cultural development and the living standards of a people. Recreational activities presuppose, of course, the availability of leisure. All societies so far discovered, even those with a most precarious livelihood, have had some time left for the enjoyment of life.

We have seen that in primitive societies recreation was closely associated with religion and was often an integral part of it. The same thing has been true of recreation in most of the civilized societies of the past, and, in fact, is still true in the case of contemporary folk and rural societies. Even in urbanized societies certain connections between recreation and religion are discernible.

Ever since ancient times, religious festivals have been accompanied by games, singing, dancing, dramatic performances, and feasting, thus affording recreational opportunities for the masses. The celebration of important events in the life of the individual family or community, such as birth, initiation, marriage, death, sowing, harvesting, and hunting, often took on a religious character and provided recreational opportunities for the common people. The regularly planned use of leisure time for recreation, however, was found only in societies with a well-developed class system, and in such societies only the privileged classes could participate.

In ancient Egypt, Greece, and Rome, leisure was enjoyed only by the upper classes. In their leisure time individuals in these classes took part in athletic games, dramatics, oratory, music, the pictorial and plastic arts, and other forms of pleasure and recreation. The Egyptians engaged actively or vicariously in a number of sports, notably bullfighting (the contest was between bulls, not between men and bulls), ball games, and other athletic games. The Greeks went further than any other ancient society in cultivating sports, making play and recreation an integral part of the people's life. The Romans, too, as Charles V. P. Young noted in his *How Men Have Lived,* were very fond of athletics, but engaged in them mainly for the purpose of developing military proficiency, rather than for the Greek aim of harmonious development of body and mind.

During the Middle Ages, too, play and sports were almost ex-

clusively the privilege of the nobility. Even though the common people did occasionally participate in sports, in imitation of the nobility, they found their chief recreation in religious festivals and in activities incidental to them. Leisure-time activities, in the modern sense, were restricted mainly to small privileged minorities.

LEISURE ACTIVITIES IN MODERN TIMES

It was not until the Industrial Revolution and the rise of modern democracy that recreation began to be part of the life of the common people. The Industrial Revolution ultimately resulted in increased leisure for the masses; furthermore, in the field of recreation, democracy, with its emphasis upon equality, had the effect of breaking down the barriers between the aristocracy and the common people. Recreational activities, particularly sports, assumed an ever greater importance in the life of the masses. Today they are included among the "inalienable" rights of all the people.

A tremendous expansion in athletics has been one of the most remarkable developments in the history of modern recreation. Although the popularization of sports began at the beginning of the past century, it was not until the early years of this century that this type of recreation became a mass movement. New social conditions were favorable to the popularization of sports, but there had to be a change in the attitude of people toward recreation, and such a change has indeed taken place. Physical recreation began to be looked upon as a desirable activity even by people who had regarded it, at best, as a waste of time, if not a sinful indulgence.

Despite more time for leisure and the growing popularity of sports, up to very recent times most people living in crowded cities still lacked facilities for active participation. This, as Barnes pointed out in *Social Institutions,* encouraged the development of commercialized mass spectacles as a means of vicarious enjoyment. During the past several decades, however, in response to insistent public demand, more and improved facilities have been provided, so that the masses of people could become active in a great variety of sports. Participation in sports is now as widespread as vicarious enjoyment. The English-speaking and Scandinavian countries have been in the forefront in the development of sports, but other countries have been adopting the same patterns. In England and particularly

America, competitive games played by organized teams are the main attractions. Barnes maintained that this emphasis on competition is due, at least partly, to the competitive nature of the economic life and institutions of these two countries.

The development and popularization of organized sports occurred at the same time that a variety of other outdoor activities were made possible by expanded facilities and new inventions. The low-priced automobile was a significant factor. Motoring and touring became highly important recreational activities of most Americans. The automobile multiplied the opportunities for enjoying outdoor activities, such as camping, hunting, and fishing, which were further encouraged by an increase in the number of national, state, county, and municipal parks.

Of equal importance to sports and other outdoor activities are the great variety of indoor pastimes, including attendance at moving pictures (perhaps the most popular activity) and the use of numerous recreational agencies, such as the amusement park, the zoo, the dance hall, the theater, and the museum. Social clubs, societies, and fraternities of all kinds also contribute to the recreational life of the nation. Millions of people find their main sources of recreation in radio and television programs or in newspapers, magazines, and books.

Americans have been accused of being disinterested in the fine arts, but, in recent years, they have demonstrated a keen interest in art and music. This broadening of cultural horizons has been attributed to progress in education, including art education, and to the influence of the radio, the moving pictures, and other recreational agencies. The art, theater, and writers' projects established by the federal government during the economic depression of the 1930's also stimulated public appreciation of art and culture.

Contemporary Trends in Recreation

The sociologist Jesse F. Steiner, in his *Americans at Play,* distinguished a number of definite trends in present-day recreation. The two main trends, he wrote, are the extensive development of commercialized facilities offering passive recreation and amusement and the growth in private and public facilities providing opportunities for participation in games and sports. Although passive commercialized entertainment, principally through the movies, radio,

and television, reaches perhaps the largest number of people, the bulk of our recreational expenditures goes for active rather than passive amusements.

Jerome Davis, in *An Introduction to Sociology,* distinguished three major categories of recreation, namely the "spontaneous," the "communally organized," and the "commercially motivated." In the first category he included the private recreational activities of the individual, such as reading and the pursuit of hobbies; in the second, amateur athletics and other activities sponsored by public agencies; and in the third (which he considered the most popular kind), entertainment offered by commercial enterprises. He asserted that commercialism tends to keep entertainment on a low artistic and moral level, that the noncommercial types of recreation need to be encouraged, and that this can be done by extending and improving recreational facilities.

Recreation as a Present-Day Social Problem


With the continuous decrease, during the past few decades, in the length of the working day, recreation, or leisure-time activity, has become a social problem of vital importance and one which has engaged the interest of many investigators. Studies indicate that unless we learn how to spend our increased time for leisure, deterioration both in culture and in personality is likely to result. Human beings have always wished for leisure. They are now confronted with the threat of getting more of it than nature perhaps meant for them to have as well as more than education has fitted them to enjoy and properly utilize. Consequently, what people are going to do with their leisure time is one of the most difficult questions faced by Western society.

George A. Lundberg, in *Leisure: A Suburban Study,* defined leisure time as "the time we are free from the more obvious and formal duties which a paid job or other obligatory occupation imposes upon us." The problem of leisure developed because of labor-saving devices which constantly reduced the time necessary for man's work. Whereas in 1840 the working week was about eighty-four hours, by 1930 it had been reduced to fifty hours or less. The forty-hour working week has since been adopted in most industries, and an even shorter one is predicted.

Leisure-time activities, which formerly were spontaneous and centered in the home and neighborhood, have undergone radical

changes, owing to rapid urbanization and to such inventions as the automobile, the movies, the radio, and television. But, said Lundberg, the problems emerging from man's increased leisure time have received scanty attention from social scientists because they are still influenced by the traditional economic theory which emphasizes production rather than consumption, work rather than leisure, despite the ever increasing importance of the latter. Some of them think of leisure as a sentimental matter outside the sphere of scientific inquiry. On the contrary, it should receive their most serious attention, for only scientific investigation will disclose how man can utilize his free time to best advantage. The way man uses his leisure time may even determine the quality of civilization.

WORK AND LEISURE IN THE PAST AND AT PRESENT



Similarly, the sociologist Henry Pratt Fairchild has expressed the view that we have reached a point in our civilization at which

the concept of leisure demands a radical revision, as do our attitudes towards work and our general philosophy of life. Hard and ceaseless work was inevitable in the past, if man were to meet his essential needs. Consequently, work was regarded with reverence and idleness with abhorrence. Now the situation has changed. With his ability to produce more than he can consume and at the expense of only a fraction of the effort and time necessary in the past, man must cease to regard work with the reverence of former days. "The god of work," Fairchild wrote, in *Harper's,* "must be cast down from his ancient throne, and the divinity of enjoyment put in his place. . . . We must come to realize that leisure time, that is, time spent in pleasurable enjoyment, is the only kind of time that makes life worth living. All other time is tolerable only as it contributes to the richness and developmental content of our leisure." The available leisure, however, must be properly utilized, if it is to be the blessing that it can be. In order that it be itself tolerable, leisure must be infinitely more than mere idleness. It should mean opportunities for individuals to pursue objectives which will contribute to the development and the enrichment of their personalities.

Opposed to this technological theory of leisure is Floyd H. Allport's biological theory. Work, wrote Allport, in an article in *Harper's,* is for man an organic need. In productive work man can find his greatest satisfaction. Leisure should be regarded as the lighter, more enjoyable, phases of work rather than as mere freedom from required tasks. We should aim, not at the increase of time free from all work, but at work which offers greater enjoyment, which involves a minimum of strain, of monotony, and of danger to our well-being. In Allport's view, unless we make this our goal and avoid striving for an increase in nonproductive activities, we shall run the risk of "becoming a race of morons well fitted to enjoy the age of the perfect labor-saving machine." In his opinion, to expect man's work to be done mainly by machine is to disregard fundamental human nature.

The time available for recreation and the intensity with which it is desired in any society depend upon many variables, including the technological state of the culture and the wealth of the community. Nevertheless, the recreational mood is fast becoming a universal phenomenon. More and more people look upon recreation as their right and insist upon it. In the United States the recreational movement is firmly established and the use of public funds to insure its

benefits is traditional. For many people, recreation has become a means of developing physical, mental, and moral efficiency, and of reducing delinquency and crime. Sports and amusements are not mere pastimes; they are factors conducive to physical and social health. The development of facilities for the leisure-time activities of all age groups is widely accepted as one of the imperative obligations of society.

14

The Community

Man has lived in communities since the dawn of human history. In fact, groupings very similar to human communities exist among animals and even among plants. The term "community" has been used very loosely, but sociologists have sought to give it a more exact connotation. They agree concerning some of the basic things which the term should denote.

Robert M. MacIver, in *Society; Its Structure and Changes,* conceived of a community as a group of people "who live together, who belong together, so that they share, not this or that particular interest, but a whole set of interests wide enough and complete enough to include their lives." He included in "community" small aggregations, such as villages, and large ones, such as cities, and tribes and nations. Similarly, Kingsley Davis, in *Human Society,* defined community as "the smallest territorial group that can embrace all aspects of social life." Other sociologists usually conceive of it as a local aggregation of people, i.e., a village, town, or city. Larger groupings, such as a tribe or a nation, are, according to them, more properly referred to as societies. This was the view of Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, in their *Introduction to the Science of Sociology,* and of Harvey W. Zorbaugh, whose *The Gold Coast and the Slum* defined the community as "a local area over which people are using the same language, conforming to the same mores, feeling more or less the same sentiments, and acting upon the same attitudes." However, sociologists agree that a community is a group of people who occupy a definite territory with which they identify themselves and in which a certain degree of solidarity exists.

Some sociologists would restrict a community to the village or certain small sections within a city, claiming that close relationships, which are essential characteristics of the community, prevail only in such smaller areas. Most students of the subject, however, refer

to such areas as "neighborhoods," another term to which sociologists have attempted to give a precise meaning. A neighborhood is similar to a community, but it is a smaller area (usually contained in a larger one—the community) in which relationships tend to be primary, or more or less intimate. The neighborhood, in other words, is a section (of a town or city) in which live a number of families among whom close relationships exist. It is a group in which no introductions are needed. Stuart A. Queen and David B. Carpenter, in *The American City,* referred to the neighborhood as an area in which the residents are personally well acquainted with each other, and are in the habit of visiting one another, of exchanging articles and services, and, in general, of doing things together.

A city may have any number of poor, middle-class, and wealthy neighborhoods. While some neighborhoods are well-integrated, rather self-sufficient units of the larger community, others are in various stages of disintegration. In recent years sociologists have referred to one type of neighborhood as a "natural area." This term, which was appropriated from the botanists, who employ it in connection with plant groupings, was introduced into sociology by the so-called Chicago School—Park and Burgess and their disciples at the University of Chicago. A natural area, as Zorbaugh defined the term in *The Urban Community,* is "a geographical area characterized by both a physical individuality and by cultural characteristics of the people who live in it." The people living in such an area possess a common set of institutions, similar customs, traditions, beliefs, attitudes, and ways of life—in short, they constitute a more or less distinct cultural unit within a wider culture. Families in such areas range from the poorest to the wealthiest. They may consist mainly or exclusively of native or foreign-born elements and contain one or several of the social and occupational groupings. Every American city of considerable size has natural areas; examples are the various Harlems, Ghettos, Little Italies, Polonias, Chinatowns, "Greenwich Villages," and "Gold Coasts."

THEORIES OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNITIES

Man, as we have seen, has always lived in groups. It was not, however, until human groups began living a more or less sedentary life that settlements, or communities, appeared. Villages made their

appearance with the rise of an agricultural economy. The eminent economic historian N. S. B. Gras propounded the theory that the village community was preceded by a nomadic economy and the latter by a collectional economy, which was the most primitive. Villages developed into towns when a class of traders settled permanently in the villages and began trading from their homes. Finally, when conditions were favorable, the towns developed into metropolises, or large cities, which, according to Gras, appeared with the rise of empires and of national states. Gras contended that the following conditions must be present in order for a metropolis to arise: considerable natural resources, good transportation conditions, i.e., land that lends itself to the construction of highways, with a location near navigable water but at a considerable distance from other large cities, and a temperate climate.

Cooley's Theory of Transportation

Charles Horton Cooley put forth the theory that the development of large cities is due primarily to a "break in transportation," that is, an interruption in the movement of goods for the purpose of transferring them from one type of conveyance, say a wagon or railroad, to another, such as a mule or a boat. He distinguished two types of "breaks," the physical and the commercial, both of which may be involved at the same time. By the first he meant mere physical transfer or storage of goods, and by the second a change in ownership. Transfer necessitates various activities which bring people together. People cooperate to unload and store the commodities and to complete the financial transactions involved in the transfer of ownership. This procedure requires warehouses and financial institutions, each with its personnel. The persons engaged in the various tasks, the primary workers, attract other, secondary, workers who cater to their needs. Consequently, houses have to be built and hotels, lodginghouses, and shops have to be established. Institutions and organizations of all types must be founded to satisfy the needs of the people. The more extensive the activities connected with the break in transportation, the greater is the number of people involved. The concentration of people and activities stimulates production. As a result, manufacturing also develops. Commercial development induces industrial activity. The modern metropolis thus comes into existence.

The Growth of the Modern Metropolis

The modern metropolitan city is a result of improved means of transportation and communication, which are an outgrowth of the technological advance commonly referred to as the Industrial Revolution. Metropolitanism manifests itself in the remarkable development of subordinate communities around a central city and their orientation towards it, so as to give the arrangement more or less of an integrated unity. It is inconceivable that the metropolitan community which covers a vast area, including outlying sections and subcenters and tens of villages, towns, and cities, could come into existence without advanced systems of transportation and communication. Although improved water transportation was important, the railroad and the automobile were the most influential factors in the development of the metropolis. The rise and development of the "metropolitan region" was truly a result of the automobile and hard-surfaced roads. The telephone was another significant factor, and still another was the daily newspaper with its mass circulation that was made possible by the improved means of transportation and communication. The eventual effects of air transportation are still a matter of conjecture.

R. D. McKenzie, in *The Metropolitan Community,* showed that the development of each of the three major types of transportation —water, rail, and motor—had a specific influence upon the course of city development in the United States. These three types of transportation played effective roles in certain periods, corresponding to phases of urban development. The water transportation period was important up to 1850 and marked the development of urban communities along the seacoasts, lakes, and navigable rivers. Rail transportation made possible the growth of towns and cities at junctions inland. Motor transportation, beginning early in the twentieth century, started the trend towards city regionalism.

TYPES OF COMMUNITIES

Communities are commonly divided into two generic types—rural and urban. The line distinguishing these two types is far from definite, and authorities do not agree in their use of criteria for defining them. The most common criterion is an arbitrary one,

according to which a locality is designated as rural or urban by reference to its population. In the United States, prior to 1910, any area with less than 8,000 population was designated officially by the Bureau of the Census as a rural community. In 1910 the figure was reduced from 8,000 to 2,500. A numerical criterion is now almost universally employed, although the minimum population for an urban community varies widely, ranging from 100 "non-indigenous" inhabitants in the Belgian Congo to 30,000 in Japan.

The numerical criterion, though convenient, has been regarded as too arbitrary and devoid of significance. Other criteria employed are: density of population, legal limits, and legal status, i.e., whether the locality has been accorded the status of rural or of urban community. Perhaps more significant are those referring to predominant occupations and social organization, i.e., the type of social and economic institutions, relationships, and folkways resulting therefrom. Each of these criteria has its advocates. Some are not satisfied with the exclusive use of one and insist that two or more must be employed for a satisfactory definition.

Mark Jefferson, a specialist in human geography, suggested in *The Anthropogeography of Some Great Cities* that density of population should serve as a criterion and that only a place with a density of 10,000 people or more per square mile should be considered a city. Such a locality must also have certain physical improvements (such as sidewalks and sewer and lighting systems), services (such as police and fire departments), and institutions (such as libraries and museums). Walter F. Willcox, in *The Urban Community,* also maintained that density should be used as a criterion, suggesting densities up to 100 people per square mile for rural communities, 100 to 1,000 per square mile for villages, and more than 1,000 per square mile for cities.

On the other hand, some sociologists hold that occupation should be used as the main criterion: if the great majority of people in any locality are employed in agricultural pursuits, it should be classed as rural, but if most people are engaged in nonagricultural pursuits it should be considered urban. Drawing upon data from many parts of the world, Pitirim A. Sorokin and Carle C. Zimmerman, in *Principles of Rural-Urban Sociology,* concluded that the factors distinguishing rural from urban communities include occupation, size, and density, as well as mobility, differentiation, and stratifica-

tion. All of these latter characteristics are more pronounced in urban than in rural communities.

The Rural Community

As the rural sociologist Dwight Sanderson stated in *The Rural Community,* a rural community consists of people living "on dispersed farmsteads and in a hamlet or village which forms the center of their common activities." It is, moreover, an association in which there is "social interaction of the people and their institutions in the local area." The relationships in the rural community tend to be what Cooley termed primary, i.e., of an intimate nature. The rural sociologists J. H. Kolb and Edmund deS. Brunner, in *A Study of Rural Society,* referred to rural localities as "country neighborhoods." Kolb and Brunner distinguished between the rural farm population, most of whom live in country neighborhoods, and the rural nonfarm population, the majority of whom live in villages and hamlets. They defined a village as a population center with 250 to 2,500 persons and a hamlet as a somewhat smaller aggregation. They classified rural communities as follows: (1) the single, simple service type, or open-country neighborhood; (2) the limited, simple service type, with 200 to 500 people; (3) the semicomplete, intermediate type, with 800 to 1,000 people; and (4) the complete, partially specialized type, with 2,500 to 5,000 persons. (A fifth, or "highly specialized," type they classified as urban.)

McKenzie, in *The City,* divided communities into (1) the "primary service" community, i.e., the agricultural town or the fishing, mining, or lumbering community; (2) the "secondary function" community, whose main function is to collect the basic materials produced in the surrounding area and to distribute them throughout the region; (3) the "industrial town," which serves as a manufacturing center, besides being a trading or commercial center; and (4) the community "lacking a specific economic base," i.e., the community which depends upon other communities for its economic existence. In the last type he included resorts, educational centers, political centers, and the like. A somewhat similar classification is given by Noel P. Gist and L. A. Halbert, in their *Urban Society.* They classified urban communities into (1) production centers, (2) centers of trade and commerce, (3) political capitals, (4) cultural centers, (5) health or recreation resorts, and (6) diversified cities.

The Urban Community

There is no single, all-inclusive definition of a city. William Bennett Munro, in *The Government of American Cities,* referred to it as "a large body of people, possessing striking characteristics, massed in a small area, chartered as a municipal corporation, having its own local government, carrying on various economic enterprises, and busily engaged in trying to solve the multifarious problems which its own crowded life puts upon it." The urban sociologist Howard Woolston, in his *Metropolis,* defined the city as a "limited geographical area, inhabited by a large and closely settled population, having many common interests and institutions, under a local government authorized by the state." On the other hand, Adna F. Weber's *The Growth of Cities* defined the city as any incorporated place with a minimum of 10,000 inhabitants. Some students of urban life tend to view the city in more purely sociological and psychological rather than statistical terms. Park expressed the view of many others when he stated in *The City* that the city, far from being a mere collection of individuals and of social conveniences, is rather a "state of mind, a body of customs and traditions, and the organized attitudes and sentiments that inhere in these customs." On the other hand James A. Quinn in his *Urban Sociology,* viewed the city as a "phenomenon of specialization," as a population aggregate whose occupations are nonagricultural.

Rural versus Urban Life

Aside from the differences in characteristics such as population size, spatial distribution, and occupations, rural and urban communities have a more or less distinct pattern of life, expressing itself in different attitudes and values—in brief, in different philosophies of life. The sociologist Louis Wirth referred to urbanism as a distinct "way of life," the chief characteristics differentiating the urban way of life from the rural being a high degree of interdependence of urbanities, segmental social life, sophistication, and greater adherence to rationally planned behavior. To be sure, with the continuing spread of urbanization and the intensification of contact between urban and rural people, thanks to improved transportation and communication, the differences are diminishing.

The next chapter notes Ferdinand Tönnies' distinction between the rural group, or *community,* and the urban group, or *society.*

Georg Simmel held that whereas the social structure of urban communities is based on interest groups, that of rural communities is based on kinship groups. The circles of social contacts are greater in the city than in the country. This makes city life more complex and varied. In the city social participation of the individual is also more superficial than it is in the country. The city-dweller's primary contacts, even within the family, tend to be of a less intimate nature. The urbanite tends to follow a more rational course of behavior and to be guided more by his own interests than the ruralite. The city person, Simmel believed, is also freer in his behavior, less restrained, more individualistic, more formal and less sympathetic, and less of a conformist than the country person. Sorokin and Zimmerman arrived at somewhat similar conclusions. They emphasized the larger range of contacts in the city, the fewer intimate relationships, on the one hand, and their greater impersonality, superficiality, and casualness, on the other.

Most of these characterizations are little more than suppositions which need empirical verification. While some are undoubtedly true, others are disputed. Thus, one of the most frequent characterizations of city people is their individualism. Yet, as Newell L. Sims, in *Elements of Rural Sociology,* asserted, one of the outstanding marks of the farmer is his extreme individualism.

The question as to whether the country or the city offers better chances for human development and happiness has been the subject of discussion since ancient times. Today, owing to the ever increasing number of problems created by urban concentration, the question seems to have added significance. There have always been those who felt that rural conditions of life bring out the best in man and are most conducive to human happiness and that the city has a deleterious effect on people. The pronouncement of the English poet Cowper that "God made the country and man made the town" epitomizes this attitude. The city and its mode of life are regarded as artificial creations which should be at best only tolerated.

The Greek historian Xenophon condemned city employments as having an enfeebling and enervating effect upon the mind and spirit. Cato, in his *De re rustica,* set forth his conviction that the noblest men are found among the farmers. Such views have been expressed in other writings of ancient and medieval times. To the physiocrats of the eighteenth century, life and people in rural areas

appeared to be far superior to those in towns and cities. Jean Jacques Rousseau contended passionately that the city is an artificial creation which can lead only to misery, whereas rural life is natural to man and one in which happiness can be found. Subsequently, writers and scholars in different fields expressed concern about the urban trend and urged the supremacy of country life. Francis Galton, the eminent nineteenth-century English scientist, held that cities "sterilize rural vigor." Thomas Jefferson considered city life essentially evil and stated that cities are like "ulcers on the body politic." In more recent times, social scientists and community leaders have exalted rural life, while more or less condemning the city. Charles W. Eliot, President of Harvard University, thought city life was endangering the physical, mental, and moral health of the nation. Franklin H. Giddings wrote: "Genius is rarely born in the city."

Others have taken the opposite view. Plato and Aristotle considered the city the ideal type of community, as did some of the famous utopian writers. In recent years a number of social scientists, equipped with data drawn from history and empirical research, have shown that the city, though certainly presenting new and aggravating problems, has not had the disastrous effects claimed by the rural apologists and other critics of city life. Instead, they have concluded that urban life, on the whole, has always been the mainstay of civilization and has been, generally speaking, instrumental in bringing about a freer and more satisfying existence.

Oswald Spengler, in *The Decline of the West,* asserted that all great civilizations originated in cities. States, governments, religions —all can be accounted for by the phenomenon of city life. Woodrow Wilson stated that through the free cities of the Middle Ages the civilizations of Greece and Rome were transmitted to us. "The city," he wrote, "the municipality . . . continued to breathe the only political life of which the world could boast." Others pointed to the great economic benefits made possible by the modern metropolis. Gras observed in *The Urban Community* that the concentration of economic resources in large urban communities resulted in the most effective utilization of human and material resources that the world has ever known. In no period of the past was so much achieved with so little. Never before did labor, capital, and management reach such a high level of efficiency. According to W. B. Munro, a good historical argument could be advanced that the earliest

mode of life was "urban" in nature, since primitive groups have often been found living together. The Iroquois Indians in their "long houses" were living in a kind of primitive apartment houses. "It is not unnatural for men to live close to their fellows," wrote Munro, "or, if it is, mankind has always lived unnaturally."

Similarly, assumptions about the detrimental effects of the city have been shown to lack a basis in fact. The German populationist Robert R. Kuczynski, in *Der Zug nach der Stadt (The Cityward Movement)*, definitely disproved assertions regarding the degenerating influences of the city. It is true that the city has a higher rate of delinquency and crime, divorce, desertion, prostitution, and other types of maladjustments, but some authorities claim that the picture suggested by such data is misleading because of many complications which the compilers of statistics do not take into consideration. Moreover, statistics can be variously interpreted. Paul H. Landis and other social scientists have expressed serious doubts whether one should regard the picture disclosed by statistics as unequivocally or absolutely bad. For example, the data concerning morality and family life do not necessarily mean that these aspects of society have reached low levels or have degenerated. Landis undoubtedly set forth views shared by many other sociologists when he stated, in *Social Policies in the Making*, that the morality of urban society can hardly be measured by such statistics. Urban society, he wrote, has developed moral standards of its own—standards based upon a greater consideration for others and a greater tolerance of individual deviation than have ever been found among rural people. Compared with rural families, the urban family has developed loftier ideals regarding individual welfare and happiness. To be sure, the failure of married couples to attain these ideals may result in the dissolution of their unions, and urban marriages have frequently been marked by failures. But, according to Landis, the new conception of morality offers perhaps a more satisfying life than the traditional one does.

THE STUDY OF THE COMMUNITY

The community has long been recognized as a proper unit for studying human society and its problems. Plato and Aristotle analyzed man's problems from the point of view of the community or the city. Again, Augustine and, a thousand years after him, Cam-

panella described the city as a place in which the good society and the ideal life can best be achieved. Although these opinions are utopian and at best reflect the aspirations of the times, they nevertheless indicate a recognition of the importance of the compactly settled area, the community, both as a unit of study and as a desirable arrangement for man to live under. With the disappearance of the city-state pattern, and the rise of the empire pattern, interest in the community waned and practically disappeared. It was not revived until late in the nineteenth century when the first efforts were made to study communities systematically. The first scientific studies, however, were undertaken during the period following the First World War.

Present-Day Study of the Community

Present-day scientific studies of the community were preceded by philosophical treatises and reformist "surveys." The latter, not the former, may be considered the predecessor and stimulus of the scientific community study. Towards the end of the past century there appeared in England and the United States a number of public-spirited, civic-minded persons who, appalled by the miserable conditions of the masses in an emergent industrial society, became enthusiastic reformers and sought to expose those evils with the aim of effecting changes. Many books were written to describe the prevailing evils of the large cities.

The most famous of the exposés included Charles Booth's *Life and Labour of the People of London,* published in 1892, Jacob Riis's *How the Other Half Lives,* Robert A. Woods's *The City Wilderness,* Lincoln Steffens' *The Shame of the Cities,* Josiah Strong's *The Challenge of the City,* and Jane Addams' *The Spirit of Youth in the City Streets.*

As a result largely of these and other works of reformers, public interest in community welfare was aroused. A demand for the gathering of facts to serve as a basis for civic reforms became widespread, particularly in the larger cities, and this demand ushered in an era of community surveys. The first and most notable, in America, was the Pittsburgh Survey (sponsored by the Russell Sage Foundation and directed by Paul U. Kellogg), the findings of which were published in six volumes during 1909-1914. This inquiry was followed by many other surveys of communities in various parts

of the United States. A most significant study of New York City was sponsored by the Russell Sage Foundation. The findings were published in eight volumes from 1927 to 1931 under the title, *Regional Survey of New York and Its Environs.*

These surveys stimulated reform movements and brought about improvements in social conditions. They also served to popularize community studies, helped in the development of methods and techniques for gathering facts about various aspects of community life, and called attention to the community as an entity. They contributed little, however, towards a real understanding of the forces producing the conditions investigated. The sociologist Warner E. Gettys justly referred to these surveys as "pre-sociological."

Also of limited value for an understanding of the factors involved in the problems of modern community life were the more or less philosophical studies published towards the end of the past century. The most outstanding of these were *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Community and Society)* by Ferdinand Tönnies and *Village Communities* by Henry Sumner Maine. Both of these works, though they show a keen insight and are highly stimulating and suggestive, consider the community a more or less abstract entity and are not based upon a concrete body of facts. Tönnies' distinction between community (or rural life) and society (or urban life) was primarily psychological. Maine was chiefly interested in tracing the evolution of law and of legal systems, and he found in the rural community the unit in which this subject can best be studied. Notwithstanding some fundamental contributions to the philosophical concept of the community, these authors did little to advance our knowledge of the forces shaping community life in modern times.

Antecedents to the Scientific Study of the Community

Community studies based on concrete, objective data did not get their start until the second decade of the present century. However, the scientific study of the community had its roots in the works of certain writers who dealt with man's relations to his environment, both social and physical. Among these were Georg Simmel, who called attention to the need of studying groups in relation to the space occupied by them, and Émile Durkheim, who emphasized the importance of the division of labor in society and thus stimulated the study of societies in terms of economic forces. A more direct

influence was exerted by the nineteenth-century French social economist, Frédéric Le Play, who insisted upon studying the community in relation to its physical environment; his monumental work *Les Ouvriers Européens (European Workers)* was published in 1855. Mention should be made of Patrick Geddes, an English biologist interested in social planning, who had a stimulating effect through his writings on community planning; his *Cities in Evolution* was published in 1915. He, too, emphasized the relation between the physical and biological, on the one hand, and the social, on the other.

A more decisive role in bringing a scientific attitude to the study of the community was played by the human geographers and ethnologists, as well as by biologists and botanists concerned with the relation of animals and plants to their environment. Among the human geographers, the most outstanding contributions were made by the German Friedrich Ratzel in his *Anthropogeographie,* appearing in 1899, and by the Frenchmen Jean Brunhes, in his *Human Geography* (1920), and Paul Vidal de la Blache in his *Principles of Human Geography* (1926). The geographers studied the effects of natural conditions upon the movement and spatial distribution of human populations and the means adopted by man to adjust himself to his environment as well as to overcome the obstacles put in his way by it. On the other hand, ethnologists, in developing the concept of "culture area," a term first used by Clark Wissler in *The American Indian,* also had a stimulating effect. Each culture area is a spatial area which is characterized by certain cultural traits and which is set off from areas of different cultural traits. These efforts at relating areas with human groups and their life and culture stimulated an approach to the study of the community in its larger ramifications, i.e., from the point of view of the extended area or "region."

At the same time the conclusions of zoologists and botanists regarding the relation of animals and plants to their environment suggested the possibility of the existence of similar adjustment processes among human groups. Some sociologists became convinced that an approach to the study of human communities similar to that employed by the zoologist and botanist might be very fruitful. Such an approach was indeed adopted, and for the past few decades it has been widely employed in the community studies which have shown the most useful results.

THE ECOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF THE COMMUNITY

The nineteenth-century German biologist Ernst Haeckel coined the term "ecology" to refer to the study of the influence of the environment upon animals. Zoologists and botanists began using this term in their researches into the relation of the environment to animals and plants; these fields of study came to be known as animal ecology and plant ecology. The sociologists who adopted the approach of these natural scientists in their study of the community refer to their field as "human ecology." The ecological studies of the botanists, rather than those of the zoologists, influenced the sociologists because the studies of the botanists seemed to be more applicable to the human community. The botanists also supplied the sociologists with fundamental principles, concepts, and terminology.

Plant Ecology

Plant ecologists noted that plants, when not interfered with by human beings, tend to group themselves into "communities." These communities are formed by plants of certain species which demand certain conditions and resources for their growth and reproduction. An area which is characterized by more or less the same conditions and resources is termed a "natural area." Natural areas, especially when extensive in size, may, however, show some variations; they may be divided into belts (called "gradients") with increasing or decreasing natural resources.

The botanists discovered an unceasing struggle for existence within the plant community. Plants of the same species compete with one another for moisture, light, heat, nutriment, and other necessities; one vies with the others for an advantageous position. On the other hand, the relationship between different species of plants, whose needs are not the same, is of a kind that might be called unconscious cooperation, resulting automatically in mutual benefit. The Danish botanist Eugenius Warming in his classical work *Plantesamfund (Ecology of Plants),* published in 1909, cited as an example of such a relationship the help that moss gives to the pine trees by preventing the soil from desiccation and the assistance that the pine trees, in return, give to moss by providing shade. This

kind of relationship is called "symbiosis," a term which the sociologist borrowed from botanists and found useful in explaining human relationships in the community.

Finally, plant ecologists learned that plant communities go through a certain life cycle, corresponding to childhood, maturity, and old age. They also discovered that such communities do not become permanently established in an area, but change their habitat. Species occupying one area are in time invaded by those of another. This process is called "invasion." The complete displacement of the original occupants of a certain area by invaders is known as "succession." This process is repeated. The invaders are themselves eventually displaced by others, and these by still others. Eventually the original occupants may return. Thus the cycle is started again.

Human Ecology

In approaching the study of human communities from the ecological point of view, sociologists appropriated a number of the concepts employed by the natural ecologist. The resulting development of human or social ecology made this field one of the major divisions of sociology.

The ecological approach to the study of communities has been employed so far primarily by American sociologists. Park and Burgess were pioneers in the study of human ecology; they and their disciple McKenzie formulated its basic principles and launched it as a field of study within sociology, leaving to their many students the task of demonstrating the fruitfulness of the ecological approach to the study of human communities. Subsequently this approach was usefully employed by sociologists other than those of the "Chicago School." Although Charles J. Galpin, of the University of Wisconsin, is credited with having been the first to use the ecological method (in his study of a rural community, *The Social Anatomy of an Agricultural Community*), his was a crude attempt and contributed little towards the formulation of basic concepts and of methodology. Galpin's work, nevertheless, had a highly stimulating effect upon subsequent community studies.

Human ecology, wrote Park in *The Urban Community,* is to be distinguished from human geography. The latter deals with man's relations to his environment, whereas the former is concerned with the influences of the environment upon man's relations to his fellow men. The unit of study in human ecology is the community, which

is not a mere population aggregate but a populational structure following a well-defined pattern, a "constellation" composed of interdependent individual units which are distributed spatially and stand in certain relationships to one another. These relationships are of a symbiotic nature; i.e., they involve people living together and benefiting one another without intending to do so. The areas thus formed come to display distinctive physical and social characteristics and to harbor specific groups of people. The arrangement, however, is not a permanent one. There are constant changes occurring, whereby these areas are transformed, gradually assuming different characteristics—a phenomenon very much like the one encountered in plant communities. The human ecologist seeks to understand the factors involved in the structural pattern of the community and the forces behind its constant changes.

The Ecological Conception of the Community

The ecologically oriented sociologist conceives of the community, city, town, or agricultural village as a sociological rather than as a legal or administrative unit. Its limits do not correspond to those set by law but usually extend beyond them. Galpin is said to have been the first to call attention to this fact in 1912, and to have demonstrated it in his study of a Wisconsin agricultural village. A community, from the ecological point of view, includes a focal area plus the surrounding territory. Its size is determined by the extent of its economic and social influence. In the case of a large city, the surrounding territory is quite extensive and includes smaller cities, towns, and villages which group themselves around the central city like planets around a sun. McKenzie referred to such a metropolitan area as an "ecological constellation." This ecological conception not only is being used by sociologists in their study of the community, but also is being more and more accepted by economists, social workers, businessmen, and social planning agencies.

McKenzie's Contribution to the Study of the Community

McKenzie was one of the first to outline the subject matter of human ecology, define its field, and formulate its underlying principles. He also contributed concepts which have become indispensable in the ecological study of the community.

McKenzie (in *The City*) pointed out that human communities, in the course of formation and change, show striking resemblances

to plant communities. The fundamental difference between plant and animal organisms, he stated, arises from the fact that the latter are capable of locomotion and, hence, of finding their nutriment in a wider environment. Human beings also have an ability to change the environment to fit their needs. They can select their area of settlement and control or modify their environment. This, however, does not mean that the particular pattern assumed by a human community and the changes and transformations taking place in it are designed or anticipated. They are determined more or less automatically by certain physical and social forces. Physical factors include climate, soil, topography, water and food supply, and location with reference to transportation and the surrounding territory. These factors determine whether a human settlement will be built and what the extent of its growth and development will be. The primary social factor is competition for an advantageous position, or a struggle for space. This struggle for what McKenzie called "a sustenance niche" determines the spatial distribution of individuals and institutions, both economic and cultural, and the characteristic form and organization a community will assume. The ecological organization of the community is in the process of constant disturbance and change, due primarily to technological advances which open up new opportunities and cause changes in the economic setup.

McKenzie set forth in *The Urban Community* the ecological processes involved in the spatial distribution of groups and institutions in a community. There are five such major processes.

The first process is *concentration,* or the tendency of individuals to settle in increasing numbers in a certain area because of its favorable location and other conditions. A community gets its start in this way.

The second process is *centralization,* or the tendency, once concentration has taken place, for individuals, business, industry, and services to become centralized in a certain area within the territory. This focal point becomes the shopping center, the "Main Street" of the little town, and the "loop" or "downtown" of the metropolitan community. But, at the same time, *decentralization* takes place, which McKenzie considered part of the same process. By decentralization he meant the tendency toward dispersion, or movement away from the center. In the past few decades the central areas, or "downtowns," of our metropolitan communities have been constantly losing

residents who are moving towards the periphery of the cities. This "flight" from the center of the cities frequently assumes the character of a virtual exodus. As new centers arise, they detract from the main center, even though specialized activities, both economic and social, are retained in the latter and many are even intensified.

The third process is *segregation,* or the tendency of groups of people and of types of business and industrial establishments to become concentrated in certain parts of the city. Thus, some areas are taken over by retail shops, others by wholesale business, and still others by industry. Different types of retail and wholesale business and industry tend to occupy specific sections of the commercial and industrial areas. Similarly, groups with different economic and social status and with different cultural backgrounds tend to concentrate or become segregated in particular parts of the city. Segregation, said McKenzie, is due primarily to competition for position. In the case of populational segregation, language, race, and culture are additional contributing factors.

The fourth process is *invasion,* or the tendency of a socio-economic group, usually of a lower status, to move into the territory occupied by another, usually of a higher status, and of business and industry to encroach upon a residential area. This phenomenon occurs because of constant changes in the economic and social structure of the community.

Finally, there is *succession,* which completes the process of invasion, as the original inhabitants of an area are completely displaced by another type or a residential section is entirely taken over by business or industry.

According to McKenzie, these changes occur in a cyclical fashion, as in the case of plant communities. When the cycle has been completed, it may begin again. Behind these processes is a change in the economic base, which affects the structure of the community and the relative position of its different components.

Burgess' Theory of Concentric Circles of Urban Growth


Taking Chicago as an example, E. W. Burgess (in *The City)* propounded a theory which he considered more or less applicable to other metropolitan cities in the United States, even though he admitted that the pattern of growth or expansion which he formulated was a simplified or ideal picture and that in reality no city, not even Chicago, followed it exactly.

Burgess pictured the city as circular in form and in its fully developed stage as consisting of five well-defined concentric circles or zones. His formulation, therefore, has since become known as the "concentric circle theory." According to Burgess, in the beginning stages of a city, all its activities, its residences, and businesses and industries are concentrated in a central area, taking on a circular form. Because of expansion, this area becomes surrounded by another, a second circular zone. The first zone becomes the "downtown" or the "loop," where the economic and social activities are centered, i.e., where the retail shopping and commercial and amusement establishments are concentrated, and where the office buildings, hotels, and transportation terminals are to be found. The second zone, to which the residents, in the process of expansion, have moved, becomes a "zone of transition," i.e., an area in which business and industry are gradually occupying the space and from which residents are moving out into the developing outer zones. The second zone also often becomes a "zone of deterioration," or, as Zorbaugh called it, an "interstitial" area. As business and industry gradually occupy more and more space, deterioration of buildings and general neglect come to mark the area, which thus becomes a blighted area, or slum, and comes to include deteriorated dwellings, factories, and warehouses.

As the city area expands, three other well-defined zones develop. Surrounding the zone of deterioration is a third zone, which Burgess called the "workingmen's zone," since it is occupied primarily by the homes of working people who want to live within easy reach of their places of work. Within this area lower-middle-class families also live, including immigrants who have achieved a higher economic status and their American-born children—the "second generation." The homes in this zone comprise mainly those left behind by residents who have moved to a more distant, more desirable area, but some may be rather cheap houses built by the newcomers themselves. Encircling this zone is a fourth one, occupied by exclusive apartment houses and residences of the wealthy. Surrounding this area is the suburban, or "commuters' zone," including suburban sections and towns in which live middle-class people, businessmen, and white-collar workers who commute to work in the downtown areas.

These various zones are constantly pressing and encroaching upon one another. Invasion of one zone by the people in another is con-

THE CONCENTRIC ZONES OF CHICAGO



Reproduced by permission of publisher from R. E. Park, E. W. Burgess, and R. D. McKenzie, *The City*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1925.

stantly taking place. Burgess identified this tendency as "succession" and considered it comparable to a similar process in plant communities. This whole process, he maintained, is cyclical in nature.

Burgess' theory has been criticized as failing to give a typical, or even an accurate, picture of urban growth. McKenzie, though accepting the hypothesis on the whole, asserted that it is useful only for the purpose of comparison, but that in reality urban growth is

never as orderly as Burgess contended. A similar view was taken by another urban sociologist, James A. Quinn, who regarded the theory as important only as a frame of reference for the student of city life. The theory was also criticized as "purely theoretical and not realistic" by the social worker Edith Abbott in *The Tenements of Chicago.* Homer Hoyt, in *The Structure and Growth of Residential Neighborhoods in American Cities,* accepted Burgess' theory on the whole, but with modifications. In studying the characteristics of several American cities, Hoyt found that residential, industrial, and commercial development occurs sector-wise and in a triangular rather than in a circular fashion, but within concentric zones. This theory came to be known as the "sector theory" of urban development.

A significant criticism of the Burgess theory was offered by Maurice R. Davie. According to Davie, although no one doubts that urban growth is the result of the operation of automatic forces and that the processes of competition give rise to well-defined natural areas, the hypothesis that the pattern it assumes is one of concentric circles hardly corresponds to the facts. On the basis of his own ecological study of New Haven and of land utilization surveys of a number of other cities, Davie showed that the distribution of population and institutions does not assume a concentric zone pattern. Instead of being circular in form, the central business district is irregular in size and tends to be square or rectangular. Commercial enterprises extend from the center radially and concentrate at strategic points. On the other hand, industrial concentration is always found near the means of transporation, which may be anywhere in the city. Again, low-grade housing is found in the proximity of industrial and transportation areas, whereas second-class and first-class housing may be found in any part of the city. Walter Firey, in his *Land Use in Central Boston,* similarly attacks both Burgess' concentric-zone theory and Hoyt's sector theory, maintaining that his study of Boston fails to confirm the contentions of either Burgess or Hoyt regarding the pattern of populational distribution.

Despite these and other criticisms of the theory of urban concentricity, it is agreed that Burgess was the first to give a systematic formulation of the structure of urban communities and to call attention to the city as a dynamic rather than a static structure. Although there is a good deal of oversimplification and even distortion in the pattern he presented, its basic ideas of radial expansion, of

a division into zones, or natural areas, each with its own characteristics, have been substantiated by a number of studies. Also proved to be essentially correct is Burgess' claim that certain social and economic characteristics (such as delinquency, some types of disease, poverty, and concentration of foreign-born residents) tend to decrease, while others (such as home ownership) tend to increase, as one moves from the center towards the periphery of the city; in other words, these characteristics take on the form of "gradients." Outstanding studies which have proved Burgess' theories to be fundamentally sound are *Delinquency Areas* by Clifford R. Shaw, *Vice in Chicago* by Walter C. Reckless, *Suicide* by Ruth S. Cavan, and *Mental Disorders in Urban Areas* by R. E. L. Faris and H. Warren Dunham.

The ecological study of communities, in which Park, Burgess, and McKenzie were pioneers, had a far-reaching effect on the subsequent study of the city. The research reports and monographs that appeared under its stimulation made possible a much better understanding of city life and its problems. The following studies are especially noteworthy: *The Hobo* by Nels Anderson, *The Gang* by Frederic M. Thrasher, *The Ghetto* by Louis Wirth, *The Gold Coast and the Slum* by Harvey W. Zorbaugh, *Hotel Life* by Norman S. Hayner, and *The Taxi-Dance Hall* by Paui G. Cressey. These and many other studies deal empirically with aspects or segments of city life, giving the reader new insights into modern urban problems.

THE CULTURAL APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF THE COMMUNITY

An equally significant approach to the study of the community is the cultural or anthropological approach. Here the investigator employs the techniques used by the cultural anthropologist in studying primitive tribes. An effort is made to describe and analyze what is observed by an outsider looking in, culturally speaking, and to grasp the meaning ascribed by the members of the community to their institutions and activities. Everything is described in minute detail so that as nearly complete a picture as possible of every aspect of life is obtained. The first such investigation was made by Robert S. Lynd and Helen M. Lynd in *Middletown: A Study of Contemporary Culture*. This was a study of a town in the Middle West (Muncie, Indiana) which was assumed to be typical of many other

towns of comparable size in the United States. Published in 1929, it was followed in 1937 by *Middletown in Transition,* which reported the changes in the town that occurred during an interval of about ten years, including the great economic depression. Together these two volumes, considered a classic in the field, provided a remarkably clear and incisive analysis of contemporary American culture. The Lynd studies were followed by others with a similar approach and aim.

THE PHENOMENON OF URBANIZATION

The city is not a phenomenon limited to civilized life, for it has existed in some preliterate cultures. Archeologists and ethnologists tell us that prior to the coming of the white man, the Mayans of Central America, the Incas of Peru, and the Aztecs of Mexico developed communities possessing definitely urban characteristics. Great cities, resembling in many respects those of the present, were found, of course, in the ancient world. One of the earliest cities was Memphis in Egypt of the Old Empire, which ended in 2,500 B.C. Thebes, established as the new capital after the fall of the Old Empire, is said to have attained a population of a half million. At about this time cities appeared in the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, among which Nineveh and Babylon were outstanding. Later, Carthage, a Phoenician colony, developed into a city of about 700,000 population. Greece had several great cities; Periclean Athens had a population of about 100,000. The largest of the ancient cities was Rome, which is estimated to have had a population of 1,000,000 at the time of its maximum growth. With the fall of the Roman Empire, cities ceased to develop, lost population, and all but disappeared. The disintegration of social and economic life after the decline of city life demonstrates how much a high type of civilization depends upon the city.

From about the fifth to the tenth century A.D., the cities of Europe were on the decline. By the eleventh century, however, they had begun showing signs of a revival that was due primarily to the commercial activities stimulated by the Crusades. Revived trade and commerce constituted the major factors in the growth of post-medieval cities. The establishment of markets and fairs, it appears, was chiefly responsible for the rise and growth of certain cities in

the post-medieval period. Lewis Mumford (in *The Culture of Cities*) took the position that after the sixteenth century the cities with a royal court developed most rapidly, since the court served as a source of economic power.

Urbanization did not become a world phenomenon until about the end of the past century. In 1800 there were only 21 cities in the world with a population of 100,000 or over, and all these were in Europe. By 1950 there were 858 such cities in the world (364 of them on the European continent) with a combined population of over 313,000,000. An unprecedented growth has occurred not only in the number of great cities but also in their size. In 1950 there were 49 cities in the world with populations of one million or over. The populations ranged from a little over one million to about twelve million (the population of metropolitan New York). Munro regarded this tremendous growth in urbanism as the most conspicuous phenomenon in the past hundred years.

The spread of urbanism and the increase in the number and size of cities are accounted for chiefly by the Industrial Revolution. It is generally held that the modern trend towards urban expansion became conspicuous first in Britain, where the effects of the Industrial Revolution were felt in full force earlier than elsewhere. Thus, as early as 1851, England and Wales had over 50 per cent of their population living in urban localities. By the beginning of this century over 75 per cent of Great Britain's population was urban, and by 1951, this figure had risen to over 80 per cent, making that country the most urbanized in the world. (Interestingly enough, one of the youngest states, Israel, with an urban population, in 1951, of 78 per cent is, next to England, the world's most urbanized country.) Rapid urbanization occurred in other European countries, too, as well as on other continents. In Germany the process was especially rapid. At the end of the past century only 27 per cent of the German population lived in cities, but twenty years later, in 1920, about 65 per cent were urban dwellers, and in 1950 (for the Federal Republic), 71 per cent.

Urbanization in the United States

The progress of urbanization in the United States was truly phenomenal. From an almost entirely rural country, it became, within a century and a half, a largely urban society. In 1790 only about

5 per cent of the population was urban. By 1890 over 35 per cent, by 1940 over 56 per cent, by 1950 about 64 per cent, and by 1960 almost 70 per cent were so classified. The growth of large cities was remarkable. This country, said Gras, "because of its size, wealth, and lack of medieval tradition, has been the most fertile spot, at least up to date, for metropolitan development." In 1790 there were only six cities in the United States with a population of 8,000 or over, but by 1880 there were 285 such cities. In 1920 the United States had 2,723 urban localities, i.e., places with a population of 2,500 or over; in 1930, 3,165; in 1940, 3,464; and in 1950, 4,284. Again, in 1790 there was not a single city in this country with a population over 50,000. In 1890 New York was the only city in the United States with a million inhabitants, but in 1950 there were 150 metropolitan cities with 100,000 or over, fourteen of which had populations ranging from 1,000,000 to nearly 12,000,000. The combined population of the metropolitan areas amounted to about half the total population of the country.

Although the movement of rural people into the cities reached its peak in the 1920's, mass migration from farm to city had started much earlier. Indeed, the movement from country to city was already under way in the 1870's; it had assumed considerable proportions first in New England and had become a national phenomenon by 1910. In the decade from 1920 to 1930 nearly six million people moved to urban areas. The economic depression of the early 1930's greatly impeded the movement, and for a time stimulated a counter-movement from the city to the country, but this reversal was of short duration. During the period just before the Second World War and during that war, several million people moved from the country to the city to find employment in war industries. The rate of migration was much higher than it had been during the First World War.

What caused this unprecedented growth of cities and the concentration of population within them? As we have noted, the Industrial Revolution ushered in the shift towards urbanization. The ceaseless and ever accelerating speed with which technological advance and its consequent industrialization progressed made the shift inevitable. Owing to labor-saving devices, fewer agricultural workers were needed on the land, despite the rapidly multiplying population. At the same time the rapid development of industry, trade, and commerce required more workers in the cities. While farming de-

clined in importance as a means of making a livelihood, the employment opportunities in the city became more and more alluring.

In the city itself, however, significant occupational shifts have taken place in the past few decades, with some occupations losing and others gaining in importance, as measured by the proportion of individuals employed in them. The professions have been gaining in the proportion of people engaged in them. The proportion of people in commerce, including clerks and kindred workers, has been increasing, while the proportion in manufacturing has been declining. Similarly, there have been a decrease in the proportion of skilled and unskilled labor and an increase in the proportion of semiskilled labor. All these occupational shifts can be explained by reference to the changes taking place in the economy of the country.

Aside from the major factors noted above, students of the phenomenon point out that there were also reasons of a psychological and cultural nature underlying the movement of population to the cities. Among these might be mentioned the lure of adventure and excitement, the attraction of freedom and urban stimulation, and boredom and loneliness.

The Problems of the Giant City

Cities with a population of several millions or more are subject to special, acute problems. Some of these cities have become so large that comparatively simple services and agencies have posed problems which even the most highly advanced technology is finding increasingly hard to solve satisfactorily. Some sociologists have concluded that unless a radical rearrangement occurs, life in the huge cities will become little short of unbearable, economically, physically, and socially, especially if the cities continue to grow.

In *Problems of City Life,* Davie asked: "Can cities be too big? Have they already grown so large that, like the dinosaur, they will break down of their own weight?" There is, he stated, sufficient evidence that they have become increasingly difficult to manage. Taking New York as an example, he pointed to the failure to solve problems of housing and transportation. Even the water supply and sewerage systems involve problems which have been solved only at a tremendous price in money and human energy. He asserted that it is doubtful whether the most elaborate schemes will solve these and many other problems satisfactorily. He concluded that a law of diminishing returns may be operating with regard to the cost of pro-

viding for the needs of the city, and that such a law may eventually limit the size of the great cities and force the overflow population to settle elsewhere.

The modern large city, the giant metropolis, has been viewed by a number of writers as an indication of the disintegration of our civilization. The most famous pronouncement to that effect was made by Spengler in *The Decline of the West*. A more moderate, more realistic, albeit alarming, view was expressed by Lewis Mumford in *The Culture of Cities,* which analyzes the problems besetting the modern metropolis. Mumford called attention to the exhausting expenditure of money and effort by each resident of the giant city in the attempt to make life somehow livable. He predicted that the overgrown metropolis will collapse unless large-scale decentralization takes place and effective plans are made for redistributing the population and institutions along radically different lines.

Taking his clue from his acknowledged master, Patrick Geddes, Mumford conceived of the city as having gone through certain stages in its course of development. The first stage, he wrote, is *Eopolis,* or the village community with its agricultural economy and primary relationships, dating back as far as the Neolithic age. The second stage is *Polis,* consisting of an association of villages clinging together for mutual protection, characterized by a more pronounced division of labor, industrial activity, and the beginnings of mechanization. The third stage is *Metropolis,* including a large area within which are located tributary towns and villages, and in which long-distance trading and administration and a more extreme division of labor are found. The metropolis shows internal weaknesses in failing to absorb and integrate the cultural complexes. The fourth stage is *Megalopolis,* which Mumford considered the beginning of a decline. There is extreme concentration of wealth and power under a merciless economic regime. Even spiritual and intellectual things are appraised in monetary terms. The fifth stage is *Tyrannopolis,* in which parasitism, exploitation, and extremes of wealth and poverty reach maximum heights. The sixth and final stage is *Nekropolis,* in which the final collapse occurs. The city then becomes "a tomb for the dying." Babylon, Nineveh, and Rome, he stated, are all examples of Nekropolises of the past.

Unlike Spengler, however, Mumford did not hold that urban civilizations inevitably move toward the Nekropolis stage, or that

they must go through progressively deteriorating stages in a definite order. Senescence may, because of historical accidents, occur in the middle of the process. On the other hand, during the final phases a rejuvenating process may take place because of the presence of vigorous elements or the rise of mutations. The possibilities of renewal are, therefore, always present, and, if man recognizes and heeds the handwriting on the wall and makes energetic efforts to change things, the direction of the movement may be altered and the process of disintegration may be halted.

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Social Groups and Classes

"Group" is one of those terms which in common usage lack exactness. Sociology has appropriated the term and has given it a technical or special meaning. Although even in sociology it is far from having a commonly agreed-upon definition, it nevertheless is employed in a more precise and meaningful sense than in ordinary usage. In sociology, a group in the sense of a mere collection of individuals is in itself devoid of significance. To the sociologist the term is meaningful only when there is some sort of definite relationship between those individuals and when that relationship results in some degree of fellow feeling.

CONCEPTS OF A GROUP

Albion W. Small, in *General Sociology,* defined a group as "any number of people, larger or smaller, between whom such relations are discovered that they must be thought of together," adding that those relations "are sufficiently impressive to demand attention." Park and Burgess maintained, in *Introduction to the Science of Sociology,* that a social group must be "capable of consistent action" and that that action must be "consciously or unconsciously directed to a common end." The anthropologist Edward Sapir stated in a significant article in the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* that a common interest is the basis of a group. This "community of interest," he wrote, "may range from a passing event which assembles people in a momentary aggregate to a relatively permanent functional interest which creates and maintains a cohesive unit." Similarly, the sociologist Robert Cooley Angell, in *The Integration of American Society,* defined a group "as constituted of a number of persons whose joint action express the policies of a directing will." This, he wrote, would exclude individuals who have nothing more

in common than that they have, say, an annual income of less than $1,000. In other words, to be a group, a collection of persons must "be organized, at least to the point of having some means of discipline."

Classification of Groups

Social groups have been classified in a variety of ways. The classes or divisions into which different sociologists have considered them to fall overlap and are not mutually exclusive. While some writers have used a simple, all-inclusive, division, others have employed more or less elaborate classificatory schemes.

A basic distinction was made by Sumner in his *Folkways*. According to Sumner, human society consists of "in-groups" and "out-groups," or "we-groups" and "other-groups." The in-group is the group to which one belongs, whereas that of which one is not a member is an out-group. This may be referred to as subjective classification, as the division is made from the point of view of a particular individual. What is an in-group to one may be an out-group to another, and vice versa.

A significant distinction between the primary, or face-to-face, group and the secondary, or derivative, group was made by Cooley in his *Social Organization*. In primary groups, such as the family, the relations between individuals are close and direct; in the secondary groups, such as a community, relations are less intimate and may be restricted to indirect contacts based upon certain common interests.

Sorokin divided social groups into two major types—the vertical and the horizontal. The former are large, inclusive groups, such as nations, religious organizations, and political parties. The latter are smaller divisions, such as economic classes, which give the individual his status and rank in society. Since the smaller, vertical group is part of larger, horizontal ones, the individual belongs to both. Thus an American citizen may be an Italian by birth, a Roman Catholic by religion, and a Republican by political affiliation. These are all horizontal groups, within which, however, each member occupies different statuses. The same citizen may be a senator and, of course, a citizen; an ordinary voter and a leader in his political party; or a cardinal and a parishioner in his church. These different statuses signify vertical groupings.

Charles A. Ellwood (in his *Psychology of Human Society)* distinguished among (1) involuntary and voluntary, (2) institutional and noninstitutional, and (3) temporary and permanent groups. In the first category he included, on the one hand, such groups as the family, city, and state (which he termed "natural" groupings), and, on the other hand, the political party, religious sect, and cultural association (which he called "specialized," "purposive," or "interest groups," and which he considered more or less artificial products of human culture). To the institutional and noninstitutional groups he assigned, in the first case, permanent groups, such as the church and the school (which have been "sanctioned, and established, or 'instituted' by the authority of communities") and, in the second case, temporary groupings, such as crowds and play groups (which are "constantly forming and dissolving"). The temporary groups ordinarily form part of the permanent groups and are less important for understanding man's collective behavior.

Several other classifications of groups are worthy of mention. Leopold von Wiese and Howard Becker classified human groups into three main divisions: (1) crowds, which they described as "loose-textured and transitory," (2) groups, i.e., aggregations of long duration, and (3) abstract collectivities, such as a state or a church. Sapir divided groups on the basis of physical proximity, common purposes, and symbolic functions. Park and Burgess distinguished between territorial groups (e.g. communities and states) and nonterritorial groups (e.g., classes, castes, and crowds, which are not tied down permanently to any particular location). These two American sociologists also proposed a more elaborate classification into: (1) the family, (2) language or racial groups, (3) territorial groups, (4) conflict groups (political parties, labor unions), and (5) accommodation groups (classes and castes).

Still another noteworthy classification was formulated by John Lewis Gillin and John Philip Gillin in their *Cultural Sociology.* They classified groups on the basis of (1) blood relationship (kinship groups); (2) bodily characteristics (age, sex, and racial groups); (3) physical proximity (temporary, including crowds, mobs, and audiences; permanent, i.e., local groups and communities; territorial, i.e., tribes, regional populations, and states); and (4) culturally derived interests (congeniality groups and economic, technological, religious, esthetic, intellectual, educational, political, recreational, and ameliorative groups, and publics).

Sumner's Concept of the In-Group and the Out-Group

Let us consider in some detail the implications of Sumner's distinction between in-groups and out-groups. The individual belongs to a number of groups which to him are in-groups; all other groups are to him out-groups. Thus, one is a member of a race, tribe, nation, or community; of any number of societies, organizations, and institutions of all kinds; of a family; or of a play or friendship group. All these are in-groups to the individuals belonging to them, displaying substantially the same qualities and calling forth similar attitudes and reactions in their members. The "in-group out-group" phenomenon, as conceived by Sumner, however, is most consequential, assumes the greatest significance, and is most applicable to the tribe, in primitive life, and to the nation, in civilized life.

Relationships in an in-group are characterized by peace and order. The members display cooperation, good will, mutual help, and respect for one another's rights. They possess a sense of solidarity, a feeling of brotherhood, loyalty to the group, and readiness to sacrifice for it. But their attitudes towards outsiders (members of an out-group) are those of hostility, contempt, or hatred. Things prohibited in the in-group are usually sanctioned and frequently even encouraged as far as the out-group is concerned. (In civilized societies, such inconsistency is less common and is expressed on a more sophisticated level.)

Sumner explained that an in-group needs internal peace, accord, and cohesion, without which it could hardly exist or face the ever present dangers of attack by outsiders. Moreover, wrote Sumner, the closer to one another two groups live and the stronger they become, the more likely they are to hate and fight each other; hence, there is need for greater unity and accord within them.

Ethnocentrism: A Characteristic of the In-Group

Ethnocentrism is another concept contributed by Sumner. To quote Sumner, it is that "view of things in which one's own group is the center of everything and all others are scaled and rated with reference to it." It is an assumption, often becoming a conviction, that the values, the ways of life, the whole culture, of one's own group are superior to those of others. The folkways and mores of one's own group are regarded as superior and as the only right ones, and are exalted, while those of others are looked upon with disap-

proval, scorn, and even contempt. Ethnocentrism also involves a double moral standard. "There are," wrote Sumner, "two codes of morals and two sets of mores, one for comrades inside and the other for strangers outside." When outsiders are involved, "it is meritorious to kill, plunder, practice blood revenge, and to steal women and slaves; but inside none of these things could be allowed because they would produce discord and weakness."

Ethnocentrism expresses itself in various ways, in diverse forms, and in different degrees of intensity among groups. Sumner asserted that every group, small or large, primitive or civilized, past or present, is ethnocentric. Every tribe or nation almost invariably is wont to refer to itself by some flattering name and to others by some degrading or derogatory one. At the same time each thinks of itself as the best and the greatest, as possessing the highest values, as having produced the wisest people, as having accomplished most—in short as a chosen people.

Thus, most primitive tribes, about nine-tenths of them, wrote Sumner, refer to themselves by a name meaning "men," "only men," or even "men of men," implying that others are something else. The Caribs call themselves "people" and the Lapps "men" or human beings. The literal meaning of Kiowa, an Indian tribe, is "I am the real man." Primitive tribes who refer to themselves in pretentious terms, call others by names implying that they are stupid, crude, unrefined, savage, when compared to themselves.

This attitude of superiority was nearly universal in ancient times. To the Greeks and Romans all outsiders were "barbarians," and to the Hebrews outsiders were "uncircumcised" and "unclean." In the modern civilized world the same ethnocentric tendencies are to be observed. In Sumner's view, the ethnocentrism of primitive peoples (often expressed in the murder and robbery of strangers) differs from that of civilized peoples in that the latter, though scarcely less crude, assumes a more peaceful form of expression. Sumner claimed that in modern nations, ethnocentrism "is really the sentiment of patriotism in all its philosophic fullness; that is, in its rationality and its extravagance and exaggeration."

Every modern nation, large or small, is pervaded by ethnocentrism. Every nation, said Sumner, imagines itself to have a civilizing mission in which its members firmly believe. Every country regards itself as the leader of civilization, the best, the freest, and the wisest, and all others as inferior to it. The ethnocentric attitude manifests

itself in many forms of thought, attitudes, and actions of a nation. Even some of the foremost modern writers are ethnocentric in their evaluations of ther own nations. J. Finot, who questioned French writers to ascertain their views of art and literature, reported (in his *Race Prejudice)* the following replies. François Coppée wrote: "It is only in France that one knows how to be strong without being heavy, and deep without being obscure." Anatole France stated that French literature shows "a certain spirit of order, of measure, of clarity, which is not to be found elsewhere, although all great writers in all languages have clarity, measure, and order. But it is another order, another measure, another clarity." Marcel Prévost wrote: "The French mind is clear, synthetic, loving, and respectful of rules." Francisque Sarcey asserted: "Every book which is logically arranged and clear is for that very reason French." Many intellectuals in all countries undoubtedly show this attitude of nationalistic superiority.

Ethnocentrism has its roots in a primordial feeling of an individual's identification with his own group, which Gumplowicz referred to as "syngenism" and Giddings as "consciousness of kind." Indeed, ethnocentrism appears to be basically an exaggerated form of this feeling. While it has a positive side to it, in that it is an important factor in the preservation of the group, particularly when the group's existence is threatened, it must, on the whole, be considered a menace to society. It is at the root of group antagonisms and prejudices. Because of it, peoples exaggerate their own importance and overrate their own qualities and achievements, while placing others on a low scale and underrating their accomplishments. Ethnocentrism thus has the effect of obscuring the outlook of a people and of obstructing their progress. A people held strongly in its grip tends to idolize their own mores and folkways while deriding those of all others, thus setting up barriers to mutual understanding and peaceful cooperation among nations.

Cooley's Concept of the Primary Group

Cooley's definition of the primary group is similar to Sumner's concept of the in-group. Both Cooley and Sumner referred to the respective groups as "we" groups. Cooley explained that a primary group "involves the sort of sympathy and mutual identification for which 'we' is the natural expression." Cooley's approach, however, differed in that he was chiefly concerned with the smaller groups

within the larger society and the role they play in the formation of the human personality and with the rise and development of "primary ideals."

According to Cooley, the most important primary, or face-to-face, groups are the family, the play group of children, and the neighborhood. These are universal groups functioning in all stages of cultural development. They are "the nursery of human nature." We have noted Cooley's contention that the primary group, particularly the family, is the chief molder of the human personality. The primary group is the source of "our notions of love, freedom, justice and the like." Fair play, equality, free expression, but submission to the will of the group and willingness to sacrifice for it, are characteristic of primary groups. From such experiences spring the desires for democracy and freedom. Modern democracy is traceable to the small village community, with its simple, face-to-face relationships, among the Teutonic tribes of northern Europe, whence it spread through the modern world. The primary groups are the mainsprings of all that is worth while in human relationships. But they are subject not only to improvement but also to degeneration and decay, and hence should be watched over with great care. Cooley also noted that in modern, urbanized societies, the intimacy of the neighborhood tends to disappear and to be supplanted by wider relationships, though it is not yet clear to what extent this change signifies a healthy development.

The Secondary Group

Compared with the primary group, the secondary group is much more important to an understanding of modern industrial society. The secondary group was analyzed by Robert M. MacIver and Charles H. Page in their *Society: An Introductory Analysis.*

MacIver and Page pointed out that primary-group relationships are characteristic of primitive societies or compact, small communities. Under such conditions face-to-face associations are found adequate. With the expansion in population and territory of a society, however, interests become diversified and other types of relationships become necessary—relationships which are indirect and impersonal in nature. The secondary group, or, as they termed it, the "great association," thus comes into existence. Its appearance is the result not only of expansion but also, perhaps primarily, of growing cultural complexity. Whereas under simpler conditions the members

of the group participate actively in its affairs, they now play a more or less passive role, delegating responsibilities to specialists. Whereas under primary-group control, relationships are informal, they are now more formal. Whereas in the primary group, direction of group affairs is diffused, in the "great association" it is concentrated and in the hands of the few, the specialists, or a hierarchy of officials who constitute a "bureaucracy." In the primary group, moreover, cooperation is direct and spontaneous, and everything is done together through personal association; in the secondary group it is largely indirect and formal. In the secondary group the objective rather than the process binds the members together.

Ferdinand Tönnies, in *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft (Community and Society),* pointed to essential differences between the rural, or localistic, society and the urban, or cosmopolitan, one. The local community *(Gemeinschaft),* he asserted, consists of a homogeneous population with a common value system. Life in it is intimate and is characterized by understanding and cooperation among individuals and families despite their economic self-sufficiency. The preservation of the group and its values, rather than the individual and his interests, is the chief concern. The urban, cosmopolitan, society *(Gesellschaft),* on the other hand, is composed of heterogeneous elements. There is a thoroughgoing division of labor. Individuals are bound together contractually rather than by sympathy; i.e., the basis for their cooperation is personal gain. Notwithstanding their close interdependence, individuals and families are antagonistic towards one another, for their actions and thoughts are motivated by selfish interests. The two types of society are imbued with entirely different philosophies of life.

In industrialized and urbanized societies the trend has been towards fewer primary-group relationships and more secondary-group relationships. As the population in an area grows, the opportunities for direct participation by the individual in the life of the group become more limited. He is forced to perform specialized tasks which narrow his horizon. This specialization, as MacIver and Page pointed out, is frequently considered an obstacle to the realization of the individual's fuller life and the development of his humane impulses. Despite such a danger, however, the changed order of things also includes elements counteracting the evils of specialization and producing opportunities for a broader culture and the greater enjoyment of life.

Minority Groups

The populations of all modern countries, particularly the larger ones, include minority groups. Although minorities are as ancient as tribal conquests, they are, at least in their contemporary form, essentially a modern phenomenon. Existing minority groups are mainly the results of conquests, which changed national boundaries, and of mass migrations. The minorities in the United States consist largely of the descendants of immigrants.

The term "minority" has various meanings. Here we are concerned only with the populational type of minority, of which there are two major types—the racial and the national, or ethnic. In the United States, Negroes, Chinese, Indians, and other "colored" groups are considered racial minorities; the white immigrant groups, such as the Italians, Jews, and Swedes, are considered ethnic minority groups.

Is a minority group to be understood merely as one with few members? While the number of members is obviously a factor, it cannot be accepted as the sole criterion. As Francis J. Brown wrote in *One America,* the "minority" is not infrequently an actual majority, as the Negroes are in parts of the South, or as certain immigrant groups are in some urban communities. Nor is a minority usually determined on a legalistic basis, i.e., by reference to a law recognizing the right to domination of one group by another. In most cases, certainly in the United States, the law recognizes no such right. The country of birth is not a major criterion. For example, the American Indians, the only real natives of America, are considered a minority. Brown maintained that a minority is mainly a matter of feeling and attitude. It is the attitude of dominance on the part of the "majority" towards the "minority" and the attitude of subservience on the part of the latter that are decisive. In other words, the majority "issues" the terms of the relationships and the minority acquiesces and "accepts" them.

The United States is truly a land of minorities. There is hardly a nation or race that is not represented in its population. From 1829, the year that pertinent data became available, to the beginning of the Second World War, about 39,000,000 immigrants came to this country. The foreign-born, together with their native-born children, or "second-generation," who settled here comprised about 35,000,000

people in the same period. The number of ethnic and racial groups, each with its peculiar cultural heritage, runs into the scores. As a result of this heterogeneity there exists among the diverse groups an aloofness, or "social distance," a concept developed by Emory S. Bogardus, which encourages prejudice, antagonism, and the retardation of assimilation and of adjustment to the dominant culture.

CLASS AND CASTE

The evidence is conclusive that in all human societies the members are divided into more or less distinct groups. Even the most primitive societies have some form of social stratification. According to Pitirim A. Sorokin, all permanently organized groups are stratified. "Unstratified society," he wrote, in *Social Mobility,* "with real equality of its members, is a myth which has never been realized in the history of mankind." Indeed, stratification can be found in the plant world, where it expresses itself in parasitism, exploitation, dominance and subjugation, as well as in the inequality of living conditions, including unequal accessibility of sunlight, air, and moisture. Among animals, stratification is still more evident, manifesting itself in definite classes among the insects and in leadership and subordination among the gregarious mammals.

Perhaps the most fundamental type of stratification in human societies is based on sex and age. But differentiation on such bases as ability, leadership, and occupation is also encountered on all levels of society. In some societies, to be sure, stratification is rudimentary or slight, but it exists and is recognizable in all.

What is meant by social stratification? John F. Cuber and William F. Kenkel, in their *Social Stratification,* view it as "a pattern of superimposed categories of differential privilege." Such stratification involves the distribution among the members of a society of unequal rights and privileges as well as duties and responsibilities. In other words, social stratification, as Kurt B. Mayer puts it, in his *Class and Society,* is a system of differentiation which includes a "hierarchy of social positions whose occupants are treated as superior, equal, or inferior relative to one another in socially important respects." Stratification expresses itself in two major forms—classes and castes.

How did stratification originate? Gumplowicz, Oppenheimer, and other sociologists contended that its origin is to be found in the

conquest of one group by another. The conquering group sets itself up as an upper class dominating the conquered, who become the lower classes. Contemporary sociologists tend to consider this an extreme view but concede that conquest has played an important role in the formation of classes. Cecil Clare North's book *Social Differentiation* analyzed the conditions leading to social differentiation; North considered the conquest of one group by another to be highly conducive to the appearance of privilege. He went so far as to assert that "no great and permanent divisions of class appeared so long as a peaceful mode of life was maintained."

Sorokin, however, rejected the view of conquest, or conflict, as the root of social stratification. Conflict, he maintained, may be regarded as facilitating stratification, but not as originating it. Stratification is present in peaceful as well as in warlike societies. Sorokin attributed social stratification mainly to inherited individual differences and differences in environmental conditions.

Human societies are thus found everywhere divided into a variety of groups rather than forming an undifferentiated mass. Some of the groups, such as sex and age groups, are the result of what North referred to as "natural" differences, while others arise from what he called "artificial arrangements that the social policy of the group has imposed arbitrarily on the individual."

The Nature of Classes

One set of theories about the nature of classes holds that class has primarily a psychological basis. Morris Ginsberg's *Sociology* defined a class as a collection of individuals "standing to each other in the relation of equality and marked off from other portions by accepted or sanctioned standards of superiority and inferiority." MacIver's *Society; Its Structures and Changes* similarly defined class as "any portion of a community which is marked off from the rest, not by limitations arising out of language, locality, function, or specialization, but primarily by a sense of social distance." According to MacIver, although such factors as income level and occupational distinction are usually involved, it is the general recognition of superiority and inferiority in status that sets one class apart from another and gives each cohesion. There is a class society whenever the population is divided into groups occupying statuses which are recognized as higher and lower and these groups are separated from one another by barriers based on status. Other sociologists who

investigated this phenomenon maintain that classes are based principally upon a community of interests. In his *Wirtschaft und Gemeinschaft (Economy and Society),* Max Weber maintained that classes are aggregates of individuals "who have the same opportunities of acquiring goods, the same exhibited standard of living." Alfred Vierkandt, in *Gesellschaftslehre (The Study of Society),* stated that in modern industrialized societies common economic interests have led groups to form classes. Aside from these common economic interests, classes do not necessarily share any other characteristics.

The chief exponent of the economic theory of class was Karl Marx, who contended that capitalist society is divided into two major classes, the capitalists and the proletariat, that is, the owners of the means of production and those who, deprived of means of production, are forced to sell their labor, or the exploiters and the exploited. The Russian philosopher and economist, N. I. Bukharin, in elaborating upon Marx's theory in his *Historical Materialism,* held that classes develop distinct characteristics extending to every phase of their life, including the social, psychological, and political.

Cuber and Kenkel, among other sociologists, view social classes as groups based on differential status, which may be assigned to a person (as in the case of age or sex) or achieved on the basis of ability and accomplishment. A hierarchical system is thus built up in which individuals or families are ordered according to (1) differential prestige, (2) privilege and disprivilege, and (3) power. By the first they mean the fact that a person's standing in the community is evaluated in terms of his occupation, property ownership or lack of it, his associates, etc.; by the second they mean the privileges, such as opportunities of acquiring a higher education, owning a home, and having servants, which an individual enjoys; and by the third—"the ability of an individual to control some part or parts of other persons' behavior in conformity to the former's will." In analyzing the class system in modern industrial societies, sociologists have considered as especially important the different "life chances" of different classes. These are determined primarily by the monetary rewards, or income, an individual, or family, receives. By "life chances" is meant not merely the chance of an individual to survive after birth, but also his opportunity to remain healthy and develop properly, and, in general, to enjoy the good things of life made available by our technological civilization.

The Meaning of Caste

A class which has a strictly hereditary basis is a caste. A member of a caste is never allowed to break through its rigid barriers, whereas one belonging to a class may, under certain conditions, change his status. The barriers marking off one group from another derive their rigidity from a strong religious sanction and the numerous taboos that go with it.

The classical land of caste is India. The term "caste," first used by the Portuguese to denote the divisions in the Indian class system, was derived from *casta,* meaning "lineage" or "breed." The Sanskrit word for caste is *varna,* which means "color." Race and color seem to be the bases of Indian castes. According to Henry Sumner Maine's *Village Communities in the East,* castes started as a natural division of occupational classes and eventually, upon receiving religious sanction, became solidified into the existing caste system. Some sociologists attribute the caste system to the conquest and subjugation of one group by another. At any rate, it is generally agreed that the system became deeply rooted and permanent only because it was an integral part of a religious dogma which required the separation of people into superior and inferior groups with different responsibilities, functions, and standards of living.

In Hindu society the caste system prevents intimate social intercourse, particularly intermarriage, among the various castes. The lowest, the "outcasts" or "untouchables," are forbidden to have any contacts with higher castes. Their very presence nearby is regarded by the Brahmins, the highest caste, as having a defiling effect. Occupations with maximum prestige are reserved for the Brahmins, those with lower prestige for the caste below them, and those considered debasing for the outcasts.

Not all sociologists condemn the Hindu caste system. Some maintain that it provides a much better method of division of labor than the European class system. Whereas the latter depends upon differentiation between rich and poor, and upon disparagement of labor, the former applies the criteria of nobility in spirit, piety, learning, and austere living; thus it lacks the envy and jealousy accompanying a class system. Sorokin maintained that the very fact that the Brahmins retained their supremacy for two thousand years proves that they were eminently fit to be in a position of domination.

It is necessary, he asserted, to admit this, regardless of how one feels about the caste system. Most Western scholars who have dealt with the phenomenon found the caste system irreconcilable with Western concepts of human relations, regarding it as more or less of an abomination. The ethnographer E. Schmidt, in his book *Ceylon,* pointed out that one of the most tragic consequences of the system is that it prevents the development within the population of a general national consciousness and thus denies the individual the feeling of belonging to a common people. With the social reforms and economic changes that have been taking place in India in recent years many of the rules regarding the intercourse between the castes have begun to break down, probably indicating a gradual disappearance of the caste system.

The caste system is not a monopoly of India. In different, more moderate, forms it existed and still exists throughout the world. It was used in many societies, including Egypt. The feudal system of medieval Europe was a species of caste system which left traces persisting to the present era. Certain ethnic and racial groups (e.g. the Jews and the Negroes) are still treated, in some respects, as castes in many civilized countries, including the United States.

Certain conditions give rise to or facilitate the growth of a caste system. Cooley listed several such conditions. The most important is the subjugation of one group by another, particularly when the two groups are racially distinct. The appearance of differentiation within a homogeneous society, or an increase in specialization and complexity of such a society, he stated, may also create a caste system. But if a caste system is to become crystallized and deeply rooted in a society, these factors must be accompanied by a slow rate of social change, a primitive state of communication, and poor facilities for education and for public enlightenment. Generally speaking, said Cooley, such conditions prevailed wherever and whenever castes appeared, although each area developed its system under circumstances peculiar to it.

The Main Characteristics of Classes

Sorokin distinguished among three major types of class stratification: economic, political, and occupational. These, he maintained, are generally intercorrelated; i.e., those occupying a superior position in one phase of life, say, in the economic, belong also, as a rule,

to the upper strata of the political and the occupational classes, and vice versa. To be sure, there are many exceptions, for it is not always true that superiority in one phase means superiority in others.

Class differentiation, according to Cooley, is based on two major principles: inheritance and competition. In hardly any society, however, does either operate exclusively. The two overlap and are intermingled. Inheritance results in a fixed and rigid system which in its extreme form becomes a caste system; competition allows for change and flexibility. In other words, the one results in a closed-class and the other in an open-class system. England, with its hereditary aristocracy, tends to be in the first category, the United States in the second. In each of these societies both principles are at work, but in England the emphasis is on the hereditary principle, and in the United States it is on the competitive principle.

MacIver and Page drew a distinction between "social class" and "economic class." Social class is based on status and is exemplified in the divisions between the wage-earning and professional classes, employers and employees, and skilled and unskilled laborers. Economic class depends upon economic functions, and it exists in the various subdivisions of these same groups. Thus, one group may be subdivided into capitalists, managers, and scientists, and another group may be subdivided into workers in transport service, metal trades, and building trades. The categories are class orders and are based on status; the subdivisions are functional orders in which status enters slightly or not at all.

The Marxian Concept of Classes: A Critique by MacIver

The oldest and most common social classification, wrote MacIver, is the dual or dichotomous one. The divisions into gentlemen and commoners, freemen and slaves, ruling and ruled classes, etc., illustrate this classification. Marx followed this method when he divided people into the proletarian and the bourgeoisie classes. Many sociologists, including MacIver, have criticized this distinction as basically erroneous and ill-founded.

Marx's contention, wrote MacIver, that the wage-earning class is a homogeneous group—that it has a common status, common interests, lives under common conditions, and has a common enemy in the upper classes—may apply to a feudal order, such as existed in Tsarist Russia, but does not correspond to reality in countries of Western civilization. In these countries the advanced facilities

of communication have furthered the cultural homogeneity of the different classes so that there is more of a common sharing of values and attitudes. By assigning such groups as officials, professional people, shopkeepers, farmers, white-collar workers, etc., to one great class—the "middle class"—and considering them the opponents of the proletariat, Marx unjustly oversimplified the facts. It is incorrect to identify these groups with the large capitalists. It is also erroneous to consider them a single class, since they vary a great deal in their status, attitudes, ambitions, and economic interests.

Marx, MacIver asserted, made a similar error in grouping all the workers in another single great class—the proletariat. In modern Western society, workers in different fields and of different skills are so divided in their interests, attitudes, and sentiments that one can hardly think of them as belonging to one class. There is a sharp distinction between skilled and unskilled workers in America. The attitudes of skilled workers come closer to those of the *petit bourgeoisie* than to those of the unskilled labor groups. On the other hand, one encounters the phenomenon of the small capitalists opposing the "big interests." In the light of these facts, stated MacIver, Marx's class division must be regarded as too simple and as mainly propagandist. "The Marxist class-philosophy," he concluded, "became an historical factor of vast significance, the full outcome of which we cannot foresee, but it became so because it gave a vision and a policy to property-less and often exploited industrial groups."

Veblen's Theory of the Leisure Class

Another dichotomous division that has won wide acceptance is that between the leisure class and the productive class. The origin, nature, and characteristics of the leisure class were analyzed by the American economist-sociologist Thorstein Veblen in his famous book, *The Theory of the Leisure Class,* published in 1899.

According to Veblen, class distinctions in human societies are based primarily on the division of labor, that is, on occupation or employment. Veblen divided human culture into three major stages: the savage, the barbarian, and the civilized. These three stages are each subdivided into lower and higher stages. In the lower savage societies, the differentiation depends mainly on the division of labor between men and women; the latter, as a rule, are assigned to tasks considered inferior. Among them there is no group that could be called a leisure class. Such societies are generally characterized by

a peaceful habit of life. With the transition from a primitive, peaceful society to a warlike, predatory one, a leisure class begins to emerge. The two sets of conditions causing the appearance of such a class are a predatory mode of life, which calls for a specialized warrior class and an adequate supply of the necessities of life, which makes it possible to release a group of people from productive labor. The rise of the leisure class, moreover, coincides with the beginning of private ownership. Together with the appearance of a leisure class there occurs also a distinction between worthy and honorific employment, which becomes associated with the upper classes, and unworthy and humilific, which becomes associated with the lower classes. Employment thus comes to be considered a major criterion for judging whether one belongs to the upper or the lower classes.

The leisure class, wrote Veblen, comprises a number of classes, or subdivisions, and assumes the form of a hierarchy. These have, however, a common economic characteristic, engaging in non-industrial occupations and being exempt from employment which "has to do directly with the everyday work of getting a livelihood." Such employment becomes the exclusive task of the inferior classes so that the superior classes are often debarred from it by custom. What are the types of employment that throughout the ages and in almost all societies have been considered on a higher plane than others? Veblen maintained that they have been consistently those occupations connected with "government, warfare, religious observances, and sports."

In the lower stages of barbarism, Veblen asserted, the leisure class is still in a rudimentary state. Here one finds customs and usages which mark the beginning and provide the basis of a leisure class. The nomadic hunting tribes all over the world illustrate such conditions. In the higher stages of barbarism, the distinction on the basis of employment is complete and the leisure class is fully established. Among societies in this stage of barbarism Veblen included those of feudal Europe and Japan. Hindu society, he stated, affords a good example of class distinction on the basis of occupation.

Exemption from industrial work or anything connected with it is characteristic of the leisure classes of all societies and constitutes the most important factor distinguishing them from the lower classes. This principle is often carried to extremes. Veblen cited as an example the absolute taboo on any type of work whatever among some of the Polynesian chiefs. They are forbidden even to feed

themselves and would rather starve than carry food to their mouths. But examples of a similar nature may be found in feudal Europe. The story is told of a French king who, in the absence of a servant, would not move the chair on which he sat near the fireplace, burning slowly to death.

Although, said Veblen, the old bases upon which the leisure class is distinguished from the working class have since been modified, they persist even in our present-day society and are shown, for instance, by our habitual aversion to menial work. In modern society, wrote Veblen, accumulated wealth has become one of the most important bases of distinction between the upper and the lower classes. Wealth has become "intrinsically honorable and confers honor on its possessor." Moreover, wealth which one acquires through inheritance is more honorific than that one acquires by one's own effort. Abstention from certain types of work and participation in others continues to serve as a mark of distinction, the old criteria remaining, although in modified form. What we witness now, said Veblen, is the transformation of modern culture into a "pecuniary" culture, the characteristics of which are pecuniary emulation, pecuniary standards of living, pecuniary canons of taste, with *conspicuous leisure* and *conspicuous consumption*. Veblen's detailed description and analysis of these characteristics of modérn capitalist society constituted one of the most penetrating and challenging portrayals of the life of the contemporary upper classes.

Mobile and Immobile Societies

We have seen that the class systems in different societies may be based primarily either on heredity or on competition and selection. Those in which the principle of heredity is adhered to or is emphasized are referred to as closed-class societies; those in which competition and selection predominate are known as open-class societies. In the first type there is little opportunity for individuals to change their class status, whereas in the latter type they are afforded such an opportunity. The two types of societies are, therefore, considered socially immobile and mobile, respectively.

The ideal society, as Sorokin pointed out in *Social Mobility,* has been regarded as the one in which each individual finds employment and status in accordance with his capacities. In theory, a mobile society can readily achieve this objective; in practice, however, the task is extremely difficult. In order to provide individuals

with work and prestige corresponding to their abilities, it is necessary to ascertain their abilities by means of definite criteria and adequate tests; but, in mobile societies, methods of testing have been inadequate and have often been based on false notions. This accounts for the failure of such societies to treat each individual on the basis of merit. There have been, stated Sorokin, on the one hand, some immobile societies (such as India) in which the distribution of work and status has not been "altogether bad," and, on the other hand, some mobile societies "with highly incapable grafters and irresponsible adventurers and demagogues at the top." Thus, it is not easy to decide which of these two types of societies can come closer to the ideal state of assigning every one to his proper place. At present, mobile societies seem to come closer to the ideal than immobile ones. Sorokin concluded that social mobility, despite serious drawbacks, facilitates social progress and well-being.

The Class System in the United States

The main basis of class distinction in the United States is wealth or income. This factor is also important in all other capitalist countries, but it is stressed more in the United States. The "levels" or "brackets" into which individuals and families fit determine their class. The population is divided traditionally, into three major classes—upper, middle, and lower. This classification is considered by sociologists to be inadequate, and efforts have been made to modify it.

In their attempt to characterize the social structure of a "typical" American town (Middletown), Robert S. Lynd and Helen M. Lynd distinguished between two major classes: the "business class" and the "working class." In addition to people employed in commerce and industrial management, the business class included professional people because they "sell" services (instead of goods), frequently receive incomes equalling—sometimes exceeding—those of businessmen, and, what is even more important, identify themselves with business interests. Social scientists do not agree as to what extent, if at all, such a division is justified.

Warner and Lunt, in *The Social Life of a Modern Community*, divided each of the traditional classes into two subclasses, namely, the upper-upper and lower-upper, upper-middle and lower-middle, and upper-lower and lower-lower. In this study of a New England town, Warner and Lunt found certain characteristics associated


with each of the six classes. The upper-upper class consisted of members of the "aristocratic" families, who usually are also distinguished by wealth and constituted about 1.5 per cent of the population. The lower-upper class comprised mainly the newly rich families in business and the professions, constituting a little over 1.5 per cent. The upper-middle class included financially successful people, the "pillars of society" who are instrumental in getting things done in the community. This class constituted a little over 10 per cent. The lower-middle class was made up of tradesmen and well-paid white-collar workers and skilled laborers who together represented about 28 per cent of the population. The upper-lower class encompassed white-collar workers and skilled laborers who receive low wages. These constituted about 32 per cent of the population. Finally the lower-lower class consisted of the unskilled workers, the unemployed, and destitute, who comprised about 25 per cent of the population.

It is interesting to note that Americans usually assign themselves to the wrong class, either through ignorance as to where they actually belong on the basis of income or, and this is more often the case, through wishful thinking. Thus, a poll taken by *Fortune* magazine in 1940 showed that over 70 per cent of Americans regarded themselves as belonging to the "middle class," despite the fact that about half of the families of the United States had an annual income at that time of less than $1,000. A Gallup poll taken a year previously showed that only approximately 6 per cent of the people thought of themselves as belonging to the "lower class."

Somewhat similar results were reported by Richard Centers in *The Psychology of Social Classes; A Study of Class Consciousness.* In his analysis, based on psychological, subjective factors, Centers arrived at interesting conclusions. He studied the responses of a sampling of adult individuals, representing a cross section of the white population in the United States, to ascertain the basis upon which people identify themselves with a class. Individuals were asked to identify themselves with the middle class, lower class, working class, or upper class. The results showed that 43 per cent identified themselves with the middle class, 1 per cent with the lower class, 51 per cent with the working class, and 3 per cent with the upper class. The chief criterion used by people in classifying themselves, Centers found, was an entirely subjective one. Nearly half of those questioned stated that class identification is mainly

a matter of how one feels and what one believes concerning "certain things." About 30 per cent thought "education" is an important criterion. Nearly 20 per cent felt that "family" is significant in determining the class to which one belongs, and only about 17 per cent considered financial status important ("how much money one has").

CLASS STRATIFICATION



(A) Class Stratification in an American Town. Based on data from W. Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Lunt, *Social Life of a Modern Community*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941.

(B) How Americans Rank Themselves in the Class System. Based on data from Richard Centers, *The Psychology of Social Classes*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949.

Old-established criteria for class distinction, particularly birth, play a relatively unimportant part in determining one's social place in American society. MacIver brought this home graphically when he wrote: "In America . . . the descendants of the *Mayflower* or of the Fathers of the Constitution, the established families of New England or of the South, the Colonial Dames or the Daughters of the American Revolution may assert counter-claims of class dis-

tinction, but a study of even the 'Social Register' shows with what little success, particularly outside a few strongholds of old tradition, such as Boston or Richmond."

Nevertheless, it is erroneous to think that other criteria do not exist. They are merely overshadowed by the overwhelming importance of wealth. Warner and Lunt found that, although economic position is the fundamental determinant of class status, there are other criteria which count: e.g., belonging to the "right family," doing the "right things," knowing how to "act right," associating with the "right people," and living in the "right" section of the town. Wealth *alone* is not always a sufficient qualification for being admitted to the uppermost class. But this merely indicates that other qualities are desirable. It must also be remembered that these authors were describing a New England town, a "Yankee City." John Dollard's *Caste and Class in a Southern Town* showed that in the South it is still possible for a person with little means to belong to the aristocracy.

The upper classes in the United States have developed a "way of life" of their own, with a ceremonialism and a ritualism which differ little from those found among their counterparts in other capitalist countries and in semifeudal countries. Conspicuous consumption and all that it implies are among the chief traits of these classes. Veblen's *The Theory of the Leisure Class* noted these traits. Zorbaugh's *The Gold Coast and the Slum* gave a good account of the life of the upper class in Chicago in the twenties, which may be taken as representative of the American upper class in general. In the United States, more than anywhere else, classes below the upper ones, particularly the middle classes, aspire to reach the standards of their "betters," and seek to emulate them in their ways. Mass production and inexpensive substitutes for costly possessions allow them to delude themselves that they are "almost there." As far as appearances go, it is, indeed, often difficult to distinguish between the upper and lower classes. The noted English political scientist James Bryce, in his classic study, *The American Commonwealth,* many years ago commented on the difficulty of distinguishing, on the basis of dress, between the wives and daughters of working men and those of persons "in easy circumstances." Ogburn and Nimkoff described this situation very graphically: "Thanks to Hart Schaffner and Marx, a call boy on Wall Street cannot by his clothes be distinguished from J. Pierpont Morgan. And if this call boy

should go, as he can, to college at public expense the cultural differences would be still further reduced."

Modern industrial societies have been more or less mobile. The United States is perhaps the most mobile of contemporary societies. Various studies, however, have concluded that social mobility has tended to diminish in all countries, including the United States, and that class rigidity has tended to increase. In their *Middletown in Transition,* the Lynds showed that the opportunities for a worker to move up to the position of a manager or an executive were considerably slimmer in 1935 than they were a decade earlier. A 1952 study of business leaders by W. Lloyd Warner and J. C. Abegglen showed that while only 4.5 per cent were sons of unskilled and semiskilled workers, 17 per cent were sons of major executives and important businessmen.

Conversely, some recent studies have pointed to increasing mobility in the United States. Lewis Corey, writing in the *Antioch Review,* stated that while the chances of a worker's climbing into the group of independent businessmen have been diminishing since 1910, new opportunities for people to "rise in the world" have been opened up by the remarkable expansion of technical-managerial and professional employment for the upper strata of white-collar workers. As a consequence, a new middle class has come into existence which has grown at a tremendous rate since 1870. From a very insignificant proportion in 1870, the new middle class increased to a point where it constitutes 25 per cent of all gainfully employed persons. From 1870 to 1950, its total membership increased sixteen fold, whereas that in the old middle class increased only eight fold, and that in the working class increased only six fold. Moreover, the industrial workers (the real "proletariat" of Marx) have, numerically speaking, barely held their own since 1920 when they reached their peak; their percentage of the total working class declined from 37 per cent in 1910 and 1920 to 34 per cent in 1930 and to 31 per cent in 1940. By 1960 white-collar workers outnumbered blue-collar workers 5 to 4.

The conclusion that vertical social mobility has diminished and that the American class system is becoming more rigid has been challenged in other recent studies. Centers reported that 30 per cent of manual workers went into nonmanual or white-collar occupations, and a study of Oakland, California, wage earners (*Social*

Origins and Occupational Career Patterns by Reinhard Bendix, Seymour M. Lipset, and F. Theodore Malm) noted that as many as 47 per cent shifted to nonmanual types of work. Individuals moved about to a much lesser extent during their occupational careers, and their movements did little to improve their social status, with only a few achieving a definite improvement. Nevertheless, various studies showed that social mobility in the United States is still high, and that more people move upward than downward.

In a challenging article, "Are Social Classes in America Becoming More Rigid?," in the *American Sociological Review,* Gideon Sjoberg analyzed the situation and rejected the widespread assumption that the social class system in American Society is becoming more rigid. Although certain social forces have been conducive to class rigidity, others that have appeared have been powerfully counteracting them, with the result that a class levelling has been going on since the beginning of this century.

While the lower classes have been "climbing up," in terms of income and, consequently, in their acquisition of advantages heretofore denied to them, the middle and upper classes have been proportionately going downhill. Although this change has permitted many workers to indulge in "conspicuous consumption" to a much greater extent than ever before, the reduced incomes of the upper classes forced their consumption to diminish. The effects of the changed situation have been far-reaching. If one considers such matters as home ownership, the acquisition of "durable" goods, education, and leisure, one finds that the worker has been able to share more and more in these good things of life which formerly were almost exclusively reserved for the middle and upper classes.

Sjoberg has warned us, however, not to assume that classes have ceased to exist in America; they have not. But the evidence seems to lend considerable support to the American belief in the achievement of equality for all. Although the future trend is difficult to predict, prevailing conditions in the United States and, in fact, throughout the world tend to diminish class differentiation and class rigidity.

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Group Behavior

It is a long-observed, undisputed fact that individuals behave differently in groups than they do when they are alone. Often, as members of a group, they do not hesitate to commit acts which they would never consider for a moment as individuals. How can the behavior of persons in such a group be explained? Is the individual a different person when thrown together with others than when he is by himself? Is individual behavior different in kind from group behavior? In short, is there a group or collective mind distinct from an individual mind?

THE THEORY OF THE GROUP MIND

According to Durkheim, the behavior of a group is essentially different from that of individuals. Group behavior, he maintained, is not merely the sum of the behavior of individuals in a group, but is an entirely different phenomenon. By studying individual behavior as such, we cannot arrive at an understanding of group behavior and vice versa. Durkheim asserted that there is a collective mind, the nature, characteristics, and workings of which must be considered in its own terms rather than in terms of the individual psyche. A similar position was taken by the psychologist William McDougall in *The Group Mind,* although he drew somewhat different conclusions. The group mind as conceived by McDougall is more than the sum total of individual minds; it has a life of its own and follows its own laws rather than those guiding the behavior of individuals.

Although this view at one time found considerable support among sociologists and social psychologists, it is largely rejected at present. Morris Ginsberg, in *The Psychology of Society,* expressed the opinion of most sociologists when he insisted that no direct evidence has

been found for the existence of a group mind apart from individual minds. Even more emphatically, Floyd H. Allport in his *Social Psychology* referred to the theory of the group mind as "the group fallacy," and maintained that it cannot but lead to "a state of mysterious confusion." There is no group psychology, he said, which is not fundamentally individual psychology. Nor is there any consciousness other than that of the individual. If we learn all there is to be learned about the behavior of the individual we are, therefore, learning all there is to be learned about the group.

Practically all sociologists now agree that a group mind in the sense that Durkheim or McDougall conceived it has no basis in reality. Most, however, would maintain that there is a socio-psychological force which is associated with the group, the society, rather than the individual. This force is culture, or the folkways and mores. The folkways and mores represent the adjustment of the group rather than that of the individual and provide the individual with his behavior patterns. They may, therefore, in a sense, be regarded as superpersonal.

L. T. Hobhouse, in his *Development and Purpose,* wrote of a "social mind." By this he meant "the order formed by the operation of mind on mind, incorporated in a social tradition handed on by language and by social institutions, and shaping the ideas and the practice of each generation that grows up under its shadow." This "mind" is sociological rather than psychological in nature, and an understanding of it necessitates an enquiry into social institutions, beliefs, and social relations, rather than into the minds of individuals.

THE CROWD

Although authorities dispute the existence of a group mind as such, most of them agree that a distinction must be drawn between individual behavior and collective behavior. It is a recognized fact that groups behave differently from individuals and that there are certain factors, certain forces at work, impelling groups to behave in a "strange" manner when compared with the way individuals ordinarily behave. Sociologists and social psychologists distinguish a variety of such groups and offer different explanations for their "peculiar" behavior. Of these groups, the most significant and most interesting is the crowd.

Le Bon's Theories of the Crowd

Gustave Le Bon is said to have been the first to recognize the significance of the crowd as a social phenomenon. His *Psychologie des foules* (published in its English translation as *The Crowd*) was one of the most influential books in social psychology. Despite quite a few conclusions based on erroneous conceptions, it is still regarded as generally sound and as offering a penetrating insight into the phenomena of group behavior. Practically all subsequent analyses of the crowd took their point of departure from Le Bon's study.

Le Bon conceived of a crowd as a group of people who, under the influence of certain psychological forces, think and behave as a unit, as a "single being." An accidental gathering of individuals which has no common purpose and is under no common influence does not constitute a crowd in the psychological sense; it is merely an aggregation of people. Should this aggregation be subjected to certain influences and become possessed by a common aim, it will become a crowd. A group of people gathered on a subway platform constitute merely an aggregation of individuals. But should an accident occur, they would then be dominated by a common interest and be transformed into a crowd.

Like Durkheim, by whom he was influenced, Le Bon held that in a unified group a collective mind is temporarily formed which differs essentially from the minds of the individuals composing it. Owing to the action of this collective mind, which possesses characteristics of its own and follows its own peculiar laws, the crowd behaves differently from the way separated individuals do.

According to Le Bon, in a group of people imbued with a common purpose, the individual, for the very reason that he is part of the group, acquires a feeling of power which he ordinarily lacks. Being part of such a group also means anonymity, and this, in turn, means irresponsibility. The member of a crowd, therefore, is released from ordinary restraints and controls and is ready to engage in almost any act without considering its consequences. Again, in a group possessed by a common aim suggestibility is high. This suggestibility results in what Le Bon called a contagion, a pervasive spread of every aroused sentiment and suggested act. So strong is this contagious power that every individual, no matter how determined and intelligent, regardless of his mode of life,

occupation, etc., will succumb to it to a greater or lesser extent. Consequently, an individual under the influence of a crowd is ready to sacrifice his personal interest to the interest of the group. Indeed, said Le Bon, reciprocity makes the power of suggestion even more irresistible under crowd influence than under hypnosis. In a crowd, individuals who are endowed with sufficiently strong personalities to resist suggestion are too few in number to struggle against the current. At most, they may succeed in bringing about a division by initiating different suggestions. In this manner crowds have occasionally been deterred from accomplishing cruel objectives.

Le Bon's theory is that the individual in a crowd loses his conscious personality, obeying all the suggestions of the crowd in very much the same way that a person in a state of hypnosis obeys the hypnotist. The individual who becomes part of a crowd "descends several rungs in the ladder of civilization." A man may be a cultured individual, given to thinking things over when alone, but in a crowd he may turn into a "barbarian," acting impulsively, "by instinct." He becomes little less than a savage, follows any suggestion blindly, and is easily induced to act contrary to his habits. In Le Bon's view, an individual in a crowd is but a grain of sand among other grains of sand, which are stirred by the wind at will.

The crowd, however, is not necessarily evil or cruel. Since it acts on suggestion, it may advocate or engage in activities of an altruistic nature. Its members may be swayed to commit acts of extreme generosity or of cruelty, depending upon the influences to which they are subjected. Nevertheless, crowd action is always on a low intellectual level when compared with that of individuals in ordinary circumstances. "In crowds," Le Bon wrote, "it is stupidity and not mother-wit that is accumulated." This is because individual aptitudes and creativeness are lost and all individuals are reduced to a common denominator which cannot be high. Acting on suggestions and impulse is behavior of a lower order than acting in accordance with deliberative thought, the use of the intellect. Le Bon contended that although the crowd is always intellectually inferior to the isolated individual, in the realm of feelings it may, at times, be superior. Acts of extreme heroism, of self-sacrifice, are usually performed under crowd influence, just as are those of extreme cruelty. History consists of heroic acts of masses of people throughout the ages. The great accomplishments of civilization, however, he claimed, have been achieved by means of deliberate

thought and by a small intellectual aristocracy, never by crowds. This led Le Bon to a certain mistrust of the masses, whom he associated with crowd behavior, and to a dislike of what he called the "philosophy of number."

According to Le Bon, crowd behavior is apt to become prevalent in times of social unrest, when the moral forces on which a civilization is based lose their strength; at such times, it is always the masses who bring about the destruction of their society. They act "like those microbes which hasten the dissolution of enfeebled or dead bodies." Crowd action, said Le Bon, is an inevitable accompaniment of the "birth of every new society" and therefore performs a useful function, even though the positive work in the creation of a new social order is done by the small class of intellectuals.

The crowd, as Le Bon used the term, refers to a variety of groups, including almost every aggregation, transitory or permanent, which is under a common influence, such as a street mob, a religious sect, and a parliamentary assembly. This lumping together of different kinds of groups into the single category of a crowd was later thought to be unwarranted. It became apparent that the characteristics ascribed by Le Bon to these various groups applied only to a mob, a spontaneous mass movement, a social epidemic, and similar group phenomena.

A Psychoanalytic Interpretation

Although he agreed with Le Bon on many points, Everett Dean Martin approached the phenomenon of crowd behavior from the psychoanalytic point of view. In *The Behavior of Crowds,* Martin likened crowd behavior to the behavior of a paranoiac, inasmuch as both involve elements of a compulsion neurosis. Martin associated crowd behavior with repressions in the unconscious and with mechanisms of escape and of compensation. Crowd behavior consists of "a release of repressed impulses," which occurs when the usual moral controls of behavior cease to function and actions ordinarily condemned are approved as morally justifiable. Martin held that crowd behavior is most frequent in political, religious, and moral spheres of social life because they involve the greatest degree of repression. The individuals in a crowd are possessed by feelings of egotism and hatred. The crowd makes it possible for them to give vent to these feelings. The outstanding characteristics of the crowd are self-adulation and dogmatic belief, or "absolutism."

Under the guise of self-righteousness and idealism the crowd is ready to annihilate anything in its way. It always tends to carry its ideas to a logical conclusion. There are, to be sure, some peaceful crowds, but even these are potentially homicidal. All crowds are against someone; all demand a victim. Martin viewed crowd behavior and crowd thinking as a great menace to social progress.

Although Martin's analysis of crowd behavior is suggestive and enlightening, it probably ascribed to the crowd characteristics which may apply only to the individual. As Kimball Young pointed out, this explanation of crowd behavior was based entirely on an individual psychology and did not take into account social factors and individual interaction. Martin's interpretation must, therefore, be supplemented by consideration of those factors.

The Social Projection Theory

Floyd H. Allport attributed crowd behavior to the individual's response to stimuli received from a large gathering of people. The individual imagines that everybody is reacting in the same way and he consequently follows suit. Allport called this the "sense of universality." Another influence in this situation is "social projection," whereby the individual attributes to the other members of the group the same reactions to a speaker's words that he himself is experiencing. Mob violence occurs because of the egoistic drive of individuals as they seek and find a means of release by acting in concert with others in the crowd. The individual derives a comforting sense of moral sanction from the fact that what he desires to do is approved by others who are themselves doing the same things. Allport referred to this rationalization as "the moral consciousness of the crowd man."

Ginsberg's Characterization of the Crowd

Morris Ginsberg, while agreeing with many of Le Bon's findings about crowd behavior, considered some of them erroneous or exaggerated. He also believed that Le Bon had included in the "crowd" certain groupings which, while sharing some characteristics of a crowd, are sufficiently distinct to be dealt with separately.

Ginsberg rejected Le Bon's postulate of a "group mind" as lacking in direct evidence. He agreed that the crowd is suggestible, uncritical, and irresponsible, but asserted that the degree of these qualities varied greatly among individual members, that the unanim-

ity of crowds is much exaggerated, and that a leader's suggestion inconsistent with the predispositions of the crowd will not be followed and may even be opposed. He criticized as an exaggeration Le Bon's comparison of the behavior of the crowd with that of a person under the influence of hypnosis, for the usual symptoms of the hypnotic state (e.g, changes in breathing) are absent. What happens in a crowd, he said, can be explained largely in terms of higher suggestibility (which tends to inhibit conflicting emotions and to lend force and energy to those that are in focus) and in terms of the consciousness of power, due to number, and the resultant loss of a sense of personal responsibility. These considerations, added to the fact that the intellectual level of a crowd is of necessity low because the appeal has to be made to the common qualities of the members, adequately explain the phenomenon of crowd behavior.

Ginsberg divided social aggregations into unorganized types, including crowds and mobs, and organized types, including publics and associations which have more or less well-defined means of collective action. The mob is merely a "sub-species" of the crowd, differing from the latter in that it is more unstable and disorderly.

According to Ginsberg, in order for an aggregate of people to become a crowd, it must have (1) a common direction, (2) a common interest, and (3) a common sharing in the feelings and emotions expressed. These qualities, however, can appear only if the group is homogeneous, i.e., if the members have a good many things in common. The crowd is invariably characterized by a kind of "nervous exaltation," by a "feeling of pleasurable excitement," which is due to the individual's awareness that his emotions are shared by a great many people. The crowd lacks a sense of responsibility, first, because it possesses anonymity and, second, because its responsibility is divided. Anonymity and consequent irresponsibility encourage the free expression of emotions through shouting, cheering, laughing, etc. Finally, the crowd is extremely gullible because of its low intellectual level, high suggestibility, and the prestige factor.

In Ginsberg's view, crowds, which may be good or bad, depending upon the occasion and the effective stimuli in operation, are always characterized by a low intellectual level; consequently, their decisions and behavior seldom produce constructive results. Collective deliberation can achieve good results only if it involves a real interchange of ideas among participants who can draw upon

their own experiences to shed light on the problems being discussed. The crowd is incapable of thinking collectively; it can only listen to its leader and follow him.

Crowd behavior assumes a multitude of forms and expressions. Although it is the result of a great variety of conditions, all crowd behavior betrays, to a greater or lesser extent, the characteristics described above. Outstanding examples of crowd behavior include race riots, lynchings, prison riots, and behavior of the masses during revolutions, critical periods of war, and widespread catastrophes, such as earthquakes, fire, and floods. But crowd behavior may be induced by lesser events or circumstances. Almost any gathering can be made to behave in crowdlike fashion, given certain conditions and effective leadership.

THE HERD

Akin to the crowd is the herd, so called because of the similarity of this kind of group to the animal herd. According to Park and Burgess, the herd, unlike the crowd, lacks organization and a common purpose. Its behavior is collective but not concerted. The crowd responds to "collective representation" and carries out the suggestions of the leaders, whereas the herd, like a flock of sheep, follows the leader.

The concept of the human herd and herd behavior was developed in great detail by the English sociologist Wilfred Trotter. Trotter assumed that herd behavior is the very basis of all social behavior. In his *Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War,* he maintained that herd behavior is due to the universal need of the individual to identify himself with the group. He propounded the further theory that man possesses a gregarious instinct which impels him to live in, and to remain always with, the group, the herd. This being so, it is inevitable that man should display a great sensitivity to the behavior of the herd and that he should be dominated by its opinions. The influence of the herd over the individual member, said Trotter, is irresistible. The individual accepts as the truth whatever comes from the herd. He approves what the herd sanctions and disapproves what it condemns. There is little opportunity for independent thinking and opinion. Behavior disapproved by the herd results in pangs of conscience and in a painful sense of guilt.

It is evident that Trotter was describing the behavior of the

"normal" social group. His explanation of group behavior had many elements of similarity to Sumner's. Although his view that gregariousness is as instinctive as the secretion of the gastric juice has been proved to be erroneous, his explanation of the processes and mechanisms of human behavior was a brilliant and plausible one.

THE PUBLIC

One of the most justifiable criticisms levelled against Le Bon was that he generalized too much, that he ascribed characteristics of the crowd and the mob to aggregations differing a great deal from these groups. Gabriel Tarde, another French pioneer in social psychology, is said to have been the first to call attention to the differences between the crowd and the public. Tarde, who postulated that the phenomena of imitation and suggestion are at the very basis of human behavior and the key to its understanding, maintained, in his *L'Opinion et la foule,* that the public, unlike the crowd, does not depend upon physical contact. The public is the product of the printed word, chiefly the press, through which the ideas of a person or a group are disseminated among masses of people. There thus occurs "contagion without contact."

The public is considered a mass phenomenon of an order higher than the crowd. According to Park and Burgess, the differences between the two are not merely a matter of numbers or even of means of communication. The chief distinction, as noted in their *Introduction to the Science of Sociology,* lies in the fact that in the public, discussion is possible and actually plays an important part, whereas in the crowd it is practically nonexistent. In the public individuals can take a critical attitude toward the issues raised. There can be disagreements and compromises. In the crowd there is no place for such reactions.

Ginsberg regarded the public as an unorganized aggregation of persons "who are bound together by common opinions and desires, but are too numerous for each to maintain personal relations with the others." He concluded that the public differs from the crowd in the following ways: (1) The public is not based on physical proximity; (2) whereas a person can belong to only one crowd at a time, he can, and usually does, belong simultaneously to a number of publics; (3) in a public, although ideas can be transmitted very rapidly over modern instruments of communication, the stimulus

is not simultaneous as in the crowd, and the suggestibility is consequently lessened; and (4) although the public is scattered, amorphous, it nevertheless forms organizations employing the technique of discussion and adhering to accepted rules of debate in their proceedings, and hence lacks the impulsiveness of the crowd.

Because of these differences, some writers maintain that, compared with the crowd, the members of a public are less suggestible and their behavior is more rational. On the other hand, the power of suggestion in the public may be far greater than it is in the crowd. This is largely due to the fact that in contemporary societies the public includes a vast population and hence acquires much greater prestige than the crowd. Very few individuals will reject views which are widely accepted and which are backed up by the authority of the overwhelming majority of people. We are reminded by Ginsberg that modern societies possess and make use of such formidable agencies for the dissemination of information that the effect on individuals is far stronger and more lasting than it is in the case of a crowd. By means of the speaker's platform, the pulpit, the movies, the radio, television, and the press, mass suggestion is practiced on a gigantic scale, particularly in times of crisis when powerful emotional forces are unloosed which tend to weaken the critical powers of individuals and to reduce them to a common level so that personal distinctions are submerged or lost. Although the public, at least in normal times, tends to be more rational and less explosive than the crowd, it shares many characteristics of the latter group.

SOCIAL EPIDEMICS

When crowd behavior goes to extremes, we have what is referred to as social epidemics or contagions. Such epidemics, of a more or less violent nature and involving large masses of people, are encountered in all societies and in all periods of history. They are, however, more characteristic of civilized societies than they are of primitive societies, and they are more prevalent in periods of change, upheaval, or crisis than in periods of stability. Although all social epidemics have much in common, each, as Kimball Young noted, is caused by peculiar conditions and circumstances and can be best understood when these are taken into consideration. Social epidemics are of various types. The types that have played the most conspicuous

roles in medieval and modern history are perhaps (1) those arising from religious fervor; (2) those arising from a kind of speculative mania; and (3) those arising primarily from political factors.

Among the outstanding epidemics of a religious nature in the Middle Ages were the Crusades, the Children's Crusade, the Flagellants, St. John's Dance, and St. Vitus's Dance. Later periods, including most recent times, have all had their religious contagions. The witchcraft mania, or demonphobia, starting at the beginning of the modern period and continuing into the eighteenth century, was essentially of a religious character. In more recent times, religious revival movements of all kinds have sometimes assumed contagious proportions.

Speculative manias seem to be characteristic of societies in which commerce is highly developed. The desire to amass wealth by means of speculation is the basic factor. One of the earliest manias, the famous Tulip Mania, occurred in Holland in the mid-seventeenth century. The craze to acquire tulip roots for purposes of speculation brought impoverishment to countless individuals and an almost total economic collapse of the country. This experience marked the beginning of a long series of manias of which (in the nineteenth century) the Mississippi Scheme, the South Sea Bubble, and the California and Alaska gold rushes were outstanding examples. Business bubbles, booms, and El Dorados of all kinds have since made their appearance and may be expected to recur in the future.

Contagious social behavior with a political background is found in violent revolutions and upheavals. In recent times, because of political agitation and propaganda, widespread persecution, or "baiting," movements have occurred, such as those resulting in massacres (pogroms) of the Jews in Tsarist Russia and of the Armenians in Turkey. The most notorious of anti-Semitic movements (which at one time were mainly of a religious nature but which in recent times have assumed a "racial," political, or economic significance) is, of course, the one that occurred in Nazi Germany and resulted in the extermination of millions of Jews. Examples of "milder" forms of contagious movements in the United States were the campaigns against Germans during the First World War, those against the Japanese during the Second World War, and the postwar "red-baiting" drives.

To these categories of social epidemics may be added others stem-

ming from a variety of causes, which can be traced to social crises, unsettled conditions, and resulting tensions. Among these epidemics may be mentioned such widely different phenomena as runs on banks, panics (e.g., the panic caused by Orson Welles's broadcast of a dramatized "invasion" from Mars), the "chain letter" craze, the "Pyramid Clubs," and the "zoot suit" craze.

Although there are diverse causes of social epidemics, all are related to social change and in all the economic factor is significant. The psychologist Boris Sidis asserted, in *The Psychology of Suggestion,* that social epidemics are due primarily to the heterogeneity and complexity of life. Under the tremendous pressures of economic, political, and religious regulations, the individual is unable to control his own relations to life around him. It is extremely difficult for him to think freely and to live unhindered. As the personal self recedes, the suggestible, impersonal, social self rises to assert itself and plays a decisive role in the tragic course of history.

THE SECT

The sect, at least in its initial form, displays characteristics typical of crowd behavior and is therefore akin to other groups behaving collectively. The Italian social psychologist Scipio Sighele concluded, in *Psychologie des sectes,* a comprehensive analysis of the sect and its behavior, that the sect is essentially a form of crowd which possesses, however, certain distinctive characteristics of its own. Whereas the crowd is heterogeneous and transient, the sect consists of selected individuals and is permanent. The crowd, to Sighele, is the more fundamental group. The sect is merely a "chronic" form of the crowd.

When an idea or sentiment of some substance finds its way into a crowd, wrote Sighele, it will serve as a starting point for the formation of a sect. The sect, in other words, starts out as a crowd of individuals guided by ill-defined notions and ideals. As time goes on, however, these become crystallized and the group becomes stabilized, turning into a denomination, church, political party, "school," etc. Sighele conceived of the sect as not limited to the religious group, but as including many other groupings which originate in idealistic movements, such as groups of patriots, socialists, and anarchists.

According to Park and Burgess the causes for the rise of a sect

are to be found in social unrest and in dissastisfaction with the existing order. In its initial stages it is a movement of "inchoate impulses and aspirations," but gradually its policies become defined and its doctrines and dogmas assume a definite form. With the appearance of an administrative machinery the sect reaches maturity. When this happens, it becomes institutionalized. Park and Burgess held that existing institutions are but social movements which have emerged successfully in the struggle for existence.

They distinguished between religious movements, or sects, and secular movements. Religious movements originate in the need felt by some group in a society for renewing the inner life of man. Christianity is one of the most conspicuous examples. On the other hand, secular movements, which assume the form of revolutions and agitations, are based on the desire of a group or groups to change "the outward fabric and formal structure of society." On the whole, Park and Burgess stated, the most radical as well as the most successful revolutions have been of a religious character.

Essential to any movement, according to Herbert Blumer, in *Principles of Sociology,* is morale, or *esprit de corps.* Morale gives a movement its persistency and strength. Morale, he stated, is based on convictions that the objectives of the movement are just, that their attainment will come close to solving all the social ills besetting mankind, and that the goal sought will ultimately be achieved. Morale in a movement is built up by the appearance of a leader who is thought to be endowed with extraordinary powers and who in time comes to be regarded with the awe and reverence accorded to a saint. Such leaders were Marx, Lenin, Hitler, and Sun Yat-sen. Leaders are supplemented by minor saints, heroes, and martyrs of the movement, by a creed and sacred books (e.g., *Das Kapital* and *Mein Kampf),* and by a mythology, making claims such as the claim that the adherents are a superior group who alone see the light and that only their movement can bring about the millenium. All this combines to lend a religious character even to a purely secular movement and to heighten the zeal and strengthen the convictions of its followers.

Equally important to a movement, wrote Blumer, is an ideology. An ideology consists of a set of doctrines, beliefs, and myths, the object of which is to provide a movement with its philosophy and psychology. It gives the movement a necessary direction, justification, weapons of attack and of defense, and inspiration and hope.

In addition to religious and secular movements considered above, which include a great variety of types, there are a number of others such as migrations, "rushes," "runs," and fads, all of which are phenomena of collective behavior.

PROPAGANDA

Attempts by persons or groups to influence people, which in modern times have come to be known as propaganda, are not by any means a recent phenomenon. Indeed, propaganda is undoubtedly as old as the human group and has been employed at all times and on all cultural levels. It may be "good" or "bad," "desirable" or "undesirable," depending upon what a group, or individual, approves or disapproves, or considers right or wrong, at a certain time. Moreover, propaganda may be true to fact or untrue, although some writers, such as the social psychologist Leonard W. Doob, viewed propaganda as an attempt to spread ideas that are "unscientific," that are untrue to facts. Doob admitted, however, that there is often no agreement among people competent to judge as to what is a scientific fact.

Propaganda, according to Clyde R. Miller, one of the authorities on the subject, is "the attempt to influence others to some predetermined end by appealing to their thought and feeling." Another authority, Harold D. Lasswell, conceived of propaganda as "the techniques of influencing human action by the manipulation of representations." These, he stated, may assume an oral, written, pictorial, or musical form.

It is common to think of propaganda as an attempt to win people over to an unpopular cause or to influence them to follow a generally disapproved course of action. Hence, an attempt to influence them in the direction of accepted patterns is hardly thought of as propaganda. While in the United States the term "propaganda" has a bad connotation, in some countries it is largely devoid of such a connotation, for it is considered merely a means of influencing others, often toward a desirable end. Thus, during the Second World War, the Germans called their propaganda agency the Ministry of Propaganda but Americans called their agency the Office of War Information. Americans prefer to use the terms "publicity," "advertising," and "public relations" instead of "propaganda."

Propaganda as a Science and an Art

Propaganda as a scientifically planned means of influencing people, as a formidable psychological weapon, may be said to have begun during and following the First World War. Thereafter it was constantly perfected, reaching a high point in Nazi Germany. During the Second World War the extraordinary power of propaganda was widely recognized. Both sides participated in what has come to be known as "psychological war," "war of nerves," or, more recently, "cold war." Everywhere, moreover, there was the realization that psychological warfare was at least as important as physical combat.

The value of propaganda is recognized by all groups and individuals in active political, economic, and social affairs. All kinds of organizations and prominent citizens find it necessary to employ public relations men who can and do transform their clients, in the eyes of the public, into almost anything that is desired. In the business world the advertising man can sell the public almost anything, no matter how superfluous, unnecessary, or even harmful the commodity or service may be. Propaganda has become a science as well as an art; individuals specialize in it as a profession, representing the organizations or persons employing them. It must not, however, be forgotten that propaganda has also been utilized for educational and public welfare purposes. This constructive kind of propaganda, however, can hardly be said to have been properly or adequately utilized.

The Techniques of Propaganda

Although propaganda can sometimes benefit the general public, it is usually carried on to serve the interests of groups. For this reason it has been condemned as a menace, and comprehensive scientific analyses have been made of its nature and techniques. As a result, at no time has there existed such a thorough understanding of the character, methods, and techniques employed by propagandists as at present.

One of the best analyses of common propaganda devices was made by Alfred M. Lee and Elizabeth B. Lee. In *The Fine Art of Propaganda* they classified them into the following seven major categories: (1) *Name-calling*—referring to an opponent as "communist," "fascist," "fifth columnist," or "reactionary," for the purpose of dis-

crediting him. (2) *Glittering Generalities*—using universally cherished sentiments, such as "social justice," "the right to work," "the American way," and the "Constitution." (3) *Transfer*—associating an idea with a revered person, image, or symbol, such as Washington, Christ, or the American flag. (4) *Testimonial*—citing the approval of an idea or policy by persons or organizations of great prestige, such as a president of the United States, a famous actor, a chamber of commerce, or a labor union. (5) *Plain Folks*—posing as democratic or everyday folks (a device exemplified when a president of the United States shakes hands with common people, or candidates for political office kiss babies). (6) *Card-stacking*—mentioning the virtues of a person, cause, or policy and exaggerating them, while omitting all the bad points. (7) *Bandwagon*—spreading the idea that "everybody's doing it," that the cause, program, or candidate is sure to win, and that, hence, one had better join the crowd and be on the winning side.

SYMBOLS OF TECHNIQUES USED BY THE PROPAGANDIST




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
GLITTERING GENERALITIES




TESTIMONIAL



PLAIN FOLKS



CARD-STACKING



BANDWAGON

Reproduced by permission of authors from Alfred McClung Lee and Elizabeth Briant Lee, *The Fine Art of Propaganda.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company and The Institute for Propaganda Analysis, 1939.

To these devices Alfred M. Lee, in his *How to Understand Propaganda,* later added: Guilt-by-Association and Guilt-by-Heredity and their opposites, Virtue-by-Association and Virtue-by-Heredity. In the former a person's statements or activities are shown to be similar to or identical with those of some discredited or "subversive" group,

or a person is identified as a relative of a member of such a group, the inference being that he, therefore, must be considered suspect. In the latter a person is shown to be identified with a prestige group through association or kinship, with the implication that he, therefore, should be trusted. Lee also analyzed the "techniques of basic procedure" used by the propagandist. These include: Selecting the Issue; Case-making; and Simplification. The first technique is illustrated in the common tendency of politicians to be as vague as possible in their claims, to avoid being specific about the issues selected to be aired in public. An example of the second technique is the use by politicians of every means to "prove" the high-mindedness, nobility, and humaneness of their cause and, at the same time, to "demonstrate" the low motives, ignoble goals, and self-seeking activities of the opposition. The third technique is exemplified in the well-nigh universal tendency of politicians to simplify matters, to reduce them to formulas or slogans, usually taken from some revered document, such as the Declaration of Independence, in order to arouse attention and obtain a following.

Students of propaganda have identified other "tricks" which are employed by the propagandist. The phenomenon of propaganda has been thoroughly analyzed and its methods have been exposed, with the aim of making the public aware of its menace. It is doubtful, however, whether critical analyses and counter-propaganda measures have accomplished much to make the average person wary of the various attempts to sway and mislead him. The chief reasons for this are to be found in the enormous growth, variety, and pervasiveness of mass media of communication and in the gigantic scale on which individuals and groups are attempting to influence public opinion.

MASS COMMUNICATION

The revolution that has occurred in the media of communication in the past half century is still too new and incomplete for one to be able to assess adequately its far-reaching social consequences.

The chief media of mass communication are the press, motion pictures, radio, and television. Even the press, the oldest of the four media (newspapers became a notable medium late in the eighteenth century) has changed radically during the past fifty years. The newspaper has changed from a medium devoted primarily to the dis-

semination of news and opinion to one with a major emphasis on advertising and entertainment. The circulation of newspapers and magazines has increased tremendously. At the beginning of this century the daily circulation of newspapers was insignificant; now it totals about 55,000,000, or more than one newspaper per family. (This record is excelled only in Great Britain.) There are about 8,000 periodicals in the United States, ranging in circulation from a few hundred to millions of readers (e.g. 10,000,000 for the *Reader's Digest* and 5,000,000 for *Life*). In a recent year, thirty-five periodicals had each a circulation of over 1,000,000 copies per issue.

The motion-picture industry was in its infancy at the beginning of this century, the radio industry did not come into its own until the twenties, and the television industry did not develop until after the Second World War. All these industries have experienced phenomenal expansion. Despite competition with radio and television, the movies still attract huge audiences—about 65,000,000 people weekly. On the average, Americans over six years of age spend an hour a week at moving-picture theaters; within the last two decades, annual box office receipts rose from $720,000,000 to $1,235,000,000.

In three decades, the radio industry, which had been little more than a toy at the beginning, became a giant business, with 2,600 AM and 600 FM stations, in addition to tens of thousands of special-purpose and amateur stations. At least 97 per cent of American homes have radios, with an average of almost two sets per family; about two-thirds of the millions of automobiles in use are equipped with radios. Americans listen to the radio an average of twenty-five hours per week. Although the advent of television brought some decline in radio listening and broadcasting time, the number of stations and sets has been increasing. Just as the radio supplemented newspapers and magazines, instead of replacing them, television has not replaced the radio but has merely introduced an additional medium of communication.

Progress in television has been amazing. Within a decade this industry became a huge business (with 415 stations and 197 under construction at the close of 1954), whose telecasts were received by 33,000,000 sets in American homes. The rate of expansion has been phenomenal. Charles A. Siepman, a close student of mass communication media, has stated: "Television grows and grows and gets 'curiouser and curiouser.' To point at it is like pointing at a jet plane —it has passed out of sight while you raise an astonished finger."

What are the effects of this tremendous development of mass communication media on society? On the individual? To what extent do they advance or retard the progress of a democratic society and of mankind as a whole? What problems have arisen and what can be done about them? To answer such questions it is necessary to measure the results of mass communication. Some social scientists have, therefore, turned their attention, in the past two or three decades, to developing techniques and methods of evaluating what is happening; information which might be needed to regulate or control these giant industries has consequently been made available.

Social scientists have, first of all, verified the fact that these media mold the views of large numbers of people. They have also discovered certain tendencies which are potentially dangerous, and they have, therefore, studied intensively the manner in which these media operate, the contents of what is being disseminated, the characteristics of the audiences, and the effects of the various means of mass communication upon the people.

Most writers on the subject agree that the two greatest dangers inherent in all the modern media of mass communication are monopoly and commercialism. In assessing the evil of monopoly in general, MacIver, in *The Web of Government,* stated: "Of all such monopolies, the most immediately fatal to democracy is the monopoly of the media of opinion, or any approximation of it." In spite of the antitrust laws, the media of communication in the United States are concentrated in a relatively few hands and, hence, are largely noncompetitive. In a society in which the molding of public opinion depends almost entirely upon the mass media of communication, the opportunity to read and listen to different points of view is vital, if free speech is to be more than theoretical. Moreover, the concentration of the mass media of communication has assumed an interlocking character. Thus, most of the AM radio stations belong either to one of the four national networks or to the several regional networks, and about 90 per cent of the FM stations belong to the owners of AM stations; further, most of the television stations are operated by owners of radio stations, and about one third of both the radio and television stations are owned or controlled by newspapers.

Over 97 per cent of the radio stations are privately owned, and their programs are sponsored mainly by a few large advertisers. A similar situation prevails in the press and in the television industry.

It is therefore not an exaggeration to say that the advertisers exercise substantial control over the various communication media. Among the results of this situation have been one-sided or distorted presentation of information, avoidance of controversial issues in order not to antagonize anyone, suppression or curtailment of minority viewpoints, conformity to the status quo, and efforts to sway the public in the direction of a predetermined end—the end sought by special interests. The content of the mass media of communication is determined by the profit-making interests of the producers and advertisers. "Since our commercially sponsored mass media," wrote Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Robert K. Merton, in *Communication of Ideas,* "promote a largely unthinking allegiance to our social structure, they cannot be relied upon to work for changes, even minor changes, in that structure. It is possible to list some developments to the contrary, but upon close inspection they prove illusory." They added: "Social objectives are consistently surrendered by commercialized media when they clash with economic gains. Minor tokens of 'progressive' views are of slight importance since they are included only by the grace of the sponsors and only on the condition that they be sufficiently acceptable as not to alienate any appreciable part of the audience. Economic pressure makes for conformism by omission of sensitive issues."

The revolutionary changes in the mass media of communication have also brought with them a need for devising means of finding out how public opinion is formed, how it is being influenced, and what it is at a given time. A number of social scientists have therefore made the measurement of public opinion their special field of inquiry. We are now in the possession of facts which, though they may be used by special interests to their own advantage, can be applied to solve problems arising out of the manner in which the mass media of communication are operating.

Within this whole area of inquiry, the public opinion poll has made tremendous strides in developing methods and techniques of measuring and predicting, with ever greater precision, what the people think and want. The possibilities of control, but also of manipulation, thus created are great. "Public opinion polls," wrote George Gallup, in *A Guide to Public Opinion Polls,* "cannot only deflate the claims of pressure groups and of minorities seeking special privilege, but, more important, they can reveal the will of the inarticulate and unorganized majority of citizens." Systematic re-

search may enable the community to counteract or at least to minimize the evils inherent in the present techniques of mass communication.

17

Social Processes

Human society has two aspects—the structural, or morphological, and the functional, or dynamic. The structural aspects of society are the institutions. The functional aspects are the multifarious human relationships growing out of the fact that man lives in groups; these are called *social processes*. These two aspects are not easily distinguishable. Indeed, they are inseparably interwoven, so that one can hardly speak of the one without bringing in the other.

THE MEANING OF SOCIAL PROCESSES

What, precisely, are social processes? They are the ways in which groups and individuals interact and establish relationships. A social process, observed MacIver in *Society,* is "the manner in which the relations of the members of a group, once brought together, acquire a certain distinctive character." It also implies, as he further explained, changes from one state of relationships to another, directed up or down and forward or backward, and, hence, leading toward integration or disintegration.

Social processes are so fundamental to the life of a community that a study of them is necessary for any understanding of human society. Indeed, some sociologists conceive of society as the expression of different social processes or forms of interaction, and therefore hold that sociology should concern itself almost exclusively with a study of these forms. Thus Georg Simmel stated, in his *Soziologie,* that "society exists wherever several individuals are in reciprocal relationships," and "that which constitutes 'society' is evidently types of reciprocal influencing." Simmel devoted most of his researches to an analysis of those relationships. Other outstanding German sociologists holding views similar to Simmel's include Ratzenhofer, Tönnies, Vierkandt, and von Wiese. In the United States, Albion W. Small expressed the opinion that sociology should deal "especially with phenomena of *contact.*" Among the various American sociolo-

gists who analyzed society mainly in terms of social processes are Hayes, Park, Burgess, and Ross.

Ratzenhofer, one of the first to conceive of sociology as primarily the study of social processes, arrived at this conception through his theory of interests. In his *Soziologische Erkenntnis (Sociological Understanding),* he maintained that human society should be viewed as "social process," by which he meant the totality of social relationships. These, he believed, are founded on certain elemental needs of man, which, as we have seen, express themselves in the procreative, physiological, individual, social, and transcendental interests. Society, as viewed by Ratzenhofer, exists in the form of reciprocal human relationships within a group; it is, in other words, social process or social behavior, a mobile, dynamic force rather than a static entity.

Small, who was influenced by Ratzenhofer, similarly viewed society as essentially social process, and sociology as the discipline concerned with the study of that process. Society, to Small, is a process of "becoming," a dynamic force. The student of society must, therefore, deal primarily with the nature of the different forms which that process assumes. Only in this way, he held, can we hope to understand the phenomena of group life.

Following this line of reasoning closely, E. C. Hayes concluded that the primary task of sociology is to investigate the factors which have an influence on the social process and on the social activities of man. Hayes was one of the first American sociologists to clarify the concept of society as social process and to call attention to the fruitfulness of this approach to the study of societal phenomena.

This preoccupation of sociologists with social processes, especially when it goes to extremes, as in the case of Simmel and von Wiese, was criticized by many (particularly Sorokin, in *Contemporary Sociological Theories)* on the ground that it cuts out of sociology "its other more vital parts." The varieties of human relations, said Sorokin, constitute only part of the subject matter of sociology; they must be studied along with what he called the "content phenomena." This view is shared by most sociologists in America.

ISOLATION

The social processes derive from interaction which, as Park and Burgess pointed out, is fundamental to all social life. Before dis-

cussing the nature of interaction, however, it is well to consider its opposite, isolation, which, in a sense, is a kind of negative interaction.

Absolute isolation (in the sociological as well as the biological sense) is a contradiction in terms. Among the higher animals two individuals are essential for the birth of a new individual, and parental care of the newborn, for varying periods of time, is necessary to insure his survival. In the case of man, care for an extended period is essential. As we have seen, if the human individual is completely isolated, he deteriorates mentally and physically, and his human nature gradually decays.

E. A. Ross, in *Principles of Sociology,* cited the effects of isolation upon prisoners. In 1821, eighty convicts in the Auburn prison were put into solitary confinement. At the end of a single year, five had died, one had committed suicide, one had become insane, and the rest suffered from melancholia. This forced the abandonment of the experiment the following year. A similar experiment in English prisons showed comparable results. Ross also cited the deleterious effects of isolation upon hermits. Prolonged isolation usually causes them to suffer from melancholia, delusions, and hallucinations, and often brings on various forms of mental distintegration. Among isolated prisoners, said Ross, "the struggles of the social self against death are pathetic. In lieu of anything better, a flower or a struggling plant may furnish support to the starving social self."

Isolation, even partial, of social groups, whether they be tribes or nations, has an adverse effect upon the isolated groups, particularly if they are small. Cultural growth depends largely upon contacts between groups; without contacts, a group may stagnate or remain backward. History is replete with such instances. The Tasmanians, a now extinct people who had no contact with other peoples, have been considered the most primitive of aboriginal peoples. Similarly, the mountain folk in the Southern United States have remained backward as a result of isolation. Although the complete isolation found in primitive societies is rare today, a good deal of isolation persists in spite of the marvelous development of communication and transportation. Recent instances can be recalled, such as the isolation of the German nation under the Nazi regime and the prolonged isolation of the people of the Soviet Union. Peoples are separated from the rest of the world in varying degrees by obstructions ranging from "iron curtains" to "silken curtains," and with injurious effects

upon these peoples as well as upon mankind as a whole. The chief difference between isolation in the past and in the present lies in the fact that, whereas in the past isolation was almost always the result of natural obstacles, at present it usually is decreed and artificially fostered and enforced by governments.

SOCIALIZATION

Another social phenomenon that needs consideration in the study of social processes is *socialization,* a phenomenon which itself is considered by some sociologists to be one of the social processes. The term socialization is used in two senses. On the one hand, it refers to the process whereby the individual acquires the standards, values, and attitudes of the group into which he is born, thus becoming a functioning member of it. On the other hand, it refers to the process whereby individuals are formed into unified groups by developing a "sense of belonging." It is socialization in this sense that concerns us here.

Ross defined socialization as "the development of the *we*-feeling in associates and their growth in capacity and will to act together." This process is influenced in a great number of ways and by a variety of conditions and circumstances. Moreover, it differs with the type of contact taking place, never being the same for individuals standing in direct face-to-face relationship (i.e., for members of primary groups) as it is for those whose relationship is indirect (i.e., for members of secondary groups).

Ross mentioned a number of conditions, agencies, and media which bring about or facilitate socialization. One of the conditions is *shared experiences,* including happy ones, as in celebrations and merrymaking, as well as tragic ones, as in wars and epidemics. Experiences in common—hardships, deliverance, successes, and triumphs—have a socializing effect upon individuals. Participation in common assemblages, as in festivals, games, exhibits, and public worship, is a major socializing force. The socializing value lies in the fact that individuals are deeply moved in one another's presence simultaneously and in the same way and are aware of their shared emotions.

Membership in enduring and exclusive organizations is worthy of special mention as an additional factor in socialization. Examples of such organizations are the nation, church, college, political party,

fraternal order, club, and gang. These organizations, aided especially by the use of symbols, generate identification and community of sentiment. Group ownership of property is still another factor in socialization. The most important type of ownership, said Ross, is that of national territory, undoubtedly a most powerful factor in bringing about solidarity among the members of a group. He noted examples of other types of group possessions which have had a unifying effect, such as the guild halls of the Middle Ages, the church building used by a religious group, and the chapter house of a college fraternity. Similarly, the feeling of being alike in some essential—in race, nationality, ancestry, or religion, for example—acts as a unifying factor, as do common civil, social, cultural, and economic interests.

Just as community of experiences, feelings, and interests acts as a socializing agency, so dissimilarity and clash in these areas act as alienating factors. Among the important obstacles to socialization, according to Ross, are (1) the perception of differences in appearance, ways, beliefs, and sentiments; (2) arbitrary discrimination; (3) a resented imputation of inferiority; and (4) traditionalism. These create barriers, engender antagonisms, and result in a lack of sympathy and understanding. Socialization is thus made difficult or impossible.

INTERACTION

Interaction, as we have seen, is the essence of social life. A group of any kind is inconceivable without reciprocal relationship and reciprocal influence. These assume varying degrees of intimacy and permanence, and thus determine the type and nature of the group. An aggregation of individuals becomes a group, a society, not because each individual possesses "life-content" which actuates him, but rather because there is a reciprocal influence, direct or indirect. People are influenced not only by their contemporaries but also by past generations, whose transmitted traditions act as a unifying force and contribute to the persistence of the group as a unit.

According to Park and Burgess, social interaction is of a dual nature: of persons with persons and of groups with groups. Contact, the simplest as well as the most fundamental phase of interaction, is the first stage of interaction and the preparatory one for the subsequent stages. The two kinds of contact are contact in time and

contact in space. The former refers to contact of a group with preceding generations all the way back to the remote past, which expresses itself in the folkways and mores and in the survival of memories and sentiments. This kind of contact exerts a powerful influence upon the thoughts and behavior of the group. The latter refers to association between contemporary individuals and groups within a certain area. In both types of contact the important factors are the rate, number, and intensity of the relationships. Contact may also be primary or secondary. Primary contact involves the intimate, face-to-face relationships of such groups as the family, the play group, and the small fellowship. Secondary contact involves the indirect relationships of larger groups, such as the nation, city, church, and labor organization.

Park and Burgess stated further that the medium of social interaction is communication, which takes place in three distinct ways or on three levels—through the senses, through the emotions, and through sentiments and ideas. The first two, the sensory and emotional media, may be called "the natural forms of communication," because they are the more elementary and are common to man and to lower animals. Communication via the senses and emotions is capable of bringing forth only attitudes and feelings. On the sensory level, vision, hearing, smell, and touch all, in varying degrees, play a role in evoking responses. On the emotional level, such things as facial expression, blushing, and laughing arouse reactions. Despite the ever increasing importance of ideas, wrote Park and Burgess, the sensory and emotional media play a most powerful role in human conduct. Communication on the third level, taking place through the intellect, is, strictly speaking, limited to man. Its tools are speech and language. Language enables man to transmit abstract ideas to his fellows and makes it possible for one generation to transmit its social heritage to another. The invention of the alphabet, followed by constant progress in means of communication, facilitated the transmission of the cultural heritage. New media and improved techniques and instruments for conveying ideas and sentiments, particularly in books, periodicals, and newspapers, and by radio, have made communication on the intellectual level a most significant factor in human interaction.

Interaction has been classified by sociologists into four major types: competition, conflict, accommodation, and assimilation. These, in turn, have each been subdivided into a number of different forms.

Von Wiese classified them into 650 subforms of social relationships. He distinguished between *Beziehung* (relationship) and *Gebilde* (structures or forms). By the former he meant the more dynamic aspects, namely, the various kinds of interaction; by the later he meant the more crystallized, stable, and enduring complexes of interaction, such as groups of all kinds. He also differentiated between individual and group relationships, dividing each type into several major categories and these into various subclasses. Thus, relationships between individuals may be toward each other, away from each other, and mixed (i.e., partly toward and partly away from each other). Von Wiese divided intergroup relationships into four types of processes: differentiating, integrating, destructive, and modifying-constructive. Ross included thirty-eight major types in his discussion of social processes; among them domination, exploitation, opposition, competition, antagonism, cooperation, stratification, equalization, ossification, decadence, and transformation. Nowadays, however, preoccupation with an elaborate classification of the social processes is considered unwarranted and of questionable value. Most American sociologists tend to follow Park and Burgess in their emphasis upon fundamental types and the more important derivative forms.

COMPETITION

Competition was described by Park and Burgess as the most elementary type of the four major forms of interaction. It is an aspect of struggle which is universal not only in human society but also in the plant and animal worlds. It is a natural result of the universal struggle for existence. Individuals in both plant and animal communities struggle with each other for a place in the sun, for the necessities of life. J. Arthur Thomson noted, in *Darwinism and Human Life,* that this universal struggle among living things takes on three distinct forms: struggle between fellows, i.e., members of the same species; struggle between foes, i.e., members of different species; and struggle against fate, i.e., the adverse physical conditions of life, such as excessive cold and heat, floods, and drought. There is an essential difference between struggle in communities of plants and struggle in communities of animals. In the plant world, competition is, so to speak, unmitigated and entirely uncontrolled; no subordination of the interests of individuals to those of the community as a whole takes place. In the animal world, competition

often gives way to cooperation. Among animals such factors as maternal instinct, gregariousness, and the division of labor restrict competition and even make mutual aid necessary—at least insofar as a single family, herd, or species is concerned. Thus, within the ant community, competition is almost nonexistent, and cooperation is the rule. In human societies the subordination of the interests of individuals to those of the group (a family or a larger community) occurs not only because of the inherent biological and psychological traits of the individual but also because of conditions inherent in group life. In other words, in human societies the process of living together is accompanied by conditions necessitating cooperation, and the group imposes it upon its members.

The Meaning of Competition in Human Society

More specifically, what is competition as it is found in human society? Competition, wrote Park and Burgess, is "interaction without social contact." It is, in other words, an interindividual struggle that is impersonal. Competition, furthermore, is universal, continuous, and devoid of actual violence and usually goes on when the individuals involved are not aware of it.

The human community is based upon competition and functions through competition. Competition in human society arises from the fact that individuals are capable of independent locomotion and have the capacity for, and the opportunity of, gaining an individual experience as a result of independent action. On the other hand, the human community is fundamentally an arrangement under which individuals must perform functions which, while enabling them to exist, also make it possible for the community as a whole to conduct its affairs. Competition determines who is to perform what function. Since there is always a limited supply of desirable things (land, goods, jobs, etc.), competition determines how things shall be distributed. Thus, competition determines, on the one hand, the ecological organization of the community, and, on the other hand, the economic and social class hierarchies. The division of labor and the entire complex economic organization in modern life are thus the products of competition.

Competition takes place on an unconscious level. Individuals must compete to gain their objectives, but they are unaware of the competitive character of their activities. And what are the ends towards which human beings strive? They are chiefly concerned with finding

a favorable place in the economic and social order of the community, or with attaining a favorable economic and social status. In human society, except on the most primitive levels, competition is rarely a brute struggle for the very necessities of life. It is only in extreme crises, such as those produced by devastating droughts, floods, famine, and pestilence, that such a struggle may occur. But in the modern world even such catastrophes do not have to result in this type of struggle because of the advanced means of communication and transportation, which make it possible to transfer needed supplies easily and within a short period of time from an area of abundance to one of scarcity. If a brute struggle for existence, nevertheless, occasionally occurs, it is because of defects in the economic organization, rather than because of unavoidable conditions and circumstances.

Forms of Competition

The most conspicuous form of competition is the economic one. In modern times the struggle is usually one for a standard of living rather than for the bare means of existence. Economic competition expresses itself in many ways, which are as varied as the activities carried on under a complex eccnomic system. There is competition for jobs, positions, customers, clients, etc. This competition goes on between individuals as well as between groups such as commercial and industrial establishments.

As previously noted, competition is usually not directed against any individual or group in particular; the competitors are not in contact and do not know one another. Not all competition, however, as Gillin and Gillin pointed out in their *Cultural Sociology,* is unconscious. When workers making dolls in Japan compete with those engaged in the same work in Germany, their competition is certainly unconscious, but the manufacturers and exporters in the two countries are usually well aware of each other and their competition can hardly be said to be unconscious. According to the Gillins, competition does not involve mutual awareness or direct opposition among two individuals; it usually involves a third party for whose interest or favor the competitors are bidding. These sociologists distinguished between personal competition (or rivalry) and impersonal competition. When individuals compete with each other for work, for social prestige, for leadership, or for business, their competition is personal. On the other hand, when they compete with

each other as members of groups, such as business, social, or cultural organizations, tribes, nations, churches, schools, or political parties, their competition is impersonal.

In addition to economic competition the Gillins distinguished three other types: cultural competition, competition for role and status, and racial competition. Cultural competition occurs when two peoples with different cultures or two groups with different religious or ideological systems come into contact. Competition of this kind developed between East and West, between paganism and Christianity, between Catholicism and Protestantism, between various Protestant sects, and between the cultural patterns of native Americans and those of immigrants. Another phase of this competition is found among social institutions, particularly the major ones, such as the economic system, church, state, family, and school. Competition for role or status arises from the quest of individuals and groups for recognition by others as well as for self-esteem. This kind of competition may express itself in the economic sphere, for economic success often bestows prestige in the social and cultural field as well. On the group level, such competition expresses itself in the claims made by organizations and whole peoples that they are superior to others, claims which are referred to as ethnocentrism. Racial competition consists of a nonviolent contest between nations, nationalities, and racial groups (such as a contest between Asian and Western nations) for economic or territorial advantages.

Competitive and Cooperative Societies

Competition in the social and economic spheres is generally strong in democratic societies but is weak in authoritarian societies. This fact is due to the greater freedom of initiative in the former than in the latter. Furthermore, competition, as Ross pointed out, is most intense in an open-class, rapidly changing society and least intense in a closed-class, slowly changing society. In a country like the United States, the individual is relatively free to compete for any place in the economic and social structure of society, but in a country like India, he is assigned a place at birth, depending upon the caste, status, and occupation of his family. In the United States the individual expends a large amount of energy to find his place in the social system; in India, he expends a minimum of energy for this purpose.

In general, the intensity of competition, according to Ross, varies not only with the degree of personal liberty but also with the rate of social change and the efficiency of the selective agents. The significance of personal liberty is quite clear. Social change creates new opportunities for all individuals. Even those who imagined themselves settled in life are challenged. New occupations and changes in the old ones require constant readjustments. All this intensifies competition. Ross referred to the efficiency of the selective agents as the methods whereby individuals are selected for the positions they are to occupy. If these methods are accurate so that the individual's capacities and abilities can be more or less definitely gauged, as by tests and measurements, competition will be relatively slight, since competitors can be easily sifted. But if these methods lack accuracy and definiteness (this is still largely the case in most societies, particularly in the Western world) competition will be intense, for the trial-and-error method will be used to determine the individual's place in the social system.

Societies vary a great deal in the degree to which they are competitive. This is true of primitive as well as of civilized societies. As noted in a previous chapter, certain preliterate peoples, such as the Zuñi Indians of the Southwest, are fundamentally cooperative societies, while other, such as the Kwakiutl Indians of the Northwest, are basically competitive. Similarly, some civilized societies are essentially more cooperative and less competitive than others, although no society is ever exclusively cooperative or competitive; nor is it equally cooperative or competitive in every phase of life. Thus, England is said to be less competitive than France, at least politically, as indicated by the frequency of cabinet changes in the latter country. The United States and Canada may also be said to be politically less competitive than the Latin-American countries. On the other hand, economically and socially the former are much more competitive than the latter. Again, the Soviet Union may be said to be more cooperative than the capitalist countries, particularly in the economic sphere.

Competition, especially in economic and social affairs, is perhaps greater in the United States than in any other Western country. In America, as the psychoanalyst Karen Horney pointed out in *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time,* the competitive spirit radiates from its economic base into practically every activity, permeating

love, play, social relationships, etc. The belief is widespread among the masses of people, stated the Lynds in *Middletown in Transition,* that "competition is what makes progress and has made the United States great." In a study of the relative role of cooperation and competition among school children, J. B. Maller, in his *Cooperation and Competition,* found that individualized competition (in which each individual was allowed to achieve personal rather than group distinction) resulted in the most efficient performance. Mark A. May and Leonard W. Doob reported, in *Competition and Cooperation,* that individuals compete on both the social and psychological levels. On the social level, they compete when (a) they seek to achieve a single goal which is limited to a few, (b) they are prevented from reaching this goal in equal amounts by existing rules, (c) they perform better under competition than cooperation, and (d) they have few "psychologically affiliative contacts with one another." On the psychological level individuals compete when (a) discrepancies exist between achievement and aspiration, (b) it is obvious that the goals cannot be shared to the same extent with others, (c) the attitudes of the individuals tend to be more competitive than cooperative, and (d) according to the existing rules of society, persons with certain skills have a reasonable chance of succeeding in competition.

What are the factors determining whether a society will tend to be largely competitive or cooperative? The conditions influencing a society in the one direction or the other are of a great variety and complexity. However, according to the Gillins, it is possible to reduce them to two major factors: (1) the system of values in a society and (2) the social structure. These two factors, as a rule, depend upon and influence one another. Competition will be marked when the system of values is such that success is measured in terms of achievement through individual effort, and when the basic needs or desires of individuals (such as the need for new experience, security, and recognition) are striven for individually and are believed to be best attainable through individual exertion. In such a society competition will be held up as an ideal which permeates every phase of the thought life of a people, including its religion. The saying "God helps him who helps himself" epitomizes this attitude. On the other hand, in a society where the individual can realize his basic desires by cooperating with others, by working for the good of the group as a whole, competition will be weak.

Desirability of Competition

The question has often been raised as to which type of society, the competitive or the cooperative, is the more desirable and offers greater possibilities of happiness to the individual. Viewed objectively, there can hardly be any doubt that competition performs many useful functions in society, especially that of assigning individuals to their place in the social system. The alternative is hereditary status. Competition, as Cooley stated in *Sociological Theory and Social Research,* involves social contact and, if it operates fairly, results in better mutual understanding and even sympathy, for competitors seek to comprehend each other's thoughts and behavior. Moreover, fair competition is conducive to economic as well as social progress and even to general welfare because it spurs individuals and groups on to exert their best efforts.

However, unfair competition has disintegrating effects upon individuals and groups. If uncontrolled, it becomes a conflict involving unethical, and sometimes violent, practices. Often, the unscrupulous, regardless of merit, are the ones who succeed, while the honest, even when deserving, may fail. In the economic sphere, such competition results in waste and lack of consideration for the real needs of the people. Unrestrained competition, as Park and Burgess stated, is neither desirable nor even possible. On the other hand, as far as the individual is concerned, competition implies mobility and freedom, and from the viewpoint of the group it means experimental change. The problem is not whether competition should be preserved, but rather how to control it so as to secure its greatest benefits, namely, personal freedom, initiative, and originality, and, at the same time, direct it so that it will work in the interest of the community as a whole.

Ogburn and Nimkoff analyzed the advantages offered by competitive and cooperative societies. They concluded that a competitive society provides the individual with better opportunities to satisfy his desires for new experience and recognition, whereas a cooperative society gives him a better chance to achieve security and social prestige. If these two last-named desires are considered more fundamental to the happiness and welfare of the individual—and many people would consider them such—a cooperative society, all things being equal, might be said to offer greater advantages to the individual. Moreover, the new experience and recognition which are

supposed to be more accessible to a person in a competitive society are acquired at a tremendous cost of energy and effort, and an appalling number of individuals succumb in the struggle. Ogburn and Nimkoff concluded that competition is undeniably an effective motivating force but that cooperation can be as effective. Individuals under the sway of a highly competitive culture, they asserted, tend to regard competition as the only natural way of inducing people to attain their goals. But observers of cooperative societies have shown that cooperation is just as natural, if it is the accepted way.

CONFLICT

Conflict is another form of struggle between individuals or groups. It differs from competition in that it involves contact, it takes place on a conscious level, it is personal, it involves violence or at least the threat of violence, and it is intermittent rather than continuous Whereas competition determines the position that an individual (or group) occupies in the community. i.e., his ecological relationship to others, conflict determines his place in society, i.e., his status in the social system. While conflict usually involves violence and is personal, in its higher forms it becomes an impersonal struggle to establish and preserve rules of justice and moral precepts. On the higher levels the controversy is decided not by the strength of the contending parties but more or less by the weight of public opinion.

Like competition, conflict is a fundamental human and societal trait. We have seen that Gumplowicz (and to a lesser extent Novicow, Ratzenhofer, and others) regarded conflict as underlying societal evolution and progress. Simmel maintained that a completely conflict-free, harmonious group is practically an impossibility. Such a group, he asserted, were it to exist, would be devoid of the essential life processes and would have no stable structure. Indeed, society requires for its formation and growth both harmony and disharmony, association and dissociation. Conflict, far from being entirely destructive and negative, also serves constructive and positive ends. In fact, opposition of one individual to another in a group often serves as the only means whereby persons can coexist with those who are intolerable to them. If we could not oppose tyranny and cruelty, we would be unable to endure association with persons who possess those characteristics.

Contravention

Some sociologists hold that there is a social process intermediate between competition and conflict. This process is *contravention,* a state in which relationships are characterized by hidden animosity or hostility towards, and uncertainty regarding, the person, group, or issue involved. This state may eventually, but not necessarily, develop into conflict. Thus in international disputes, a nation which is not neutral and yet not actually belligerent may be said to be in a state of contravention.

Von Wiese and Becker, in their *Systematic Sociology,* distinguished three major types of contravention: that of generations, that of sexes, and parliamentary contravention. The first is illustrated by the disagreement usually existing between parents and children and between the old and the young in general, because of differences in interests and in the philosophy of life. This disagreement, as a rule, remains passive and seldom breaks out into overt conflict. A similar relationship exists between the sexes, as exemplified in quarrels between husband and wife or between men and women in general. Derogatory remarks by one sex regarding the other and an attitude of superiority or inferiority displayed by the two sexes towards each other are expressions of this relationship. Legislative bodies and meetings and conferences of organizations illustrate parliamentary contravention. These are marked by latent hostility and opposition in the relationships of a minority to a majority and among the different factions within a group. Von Wiese and Becker further classified contravention into: general contravention, which includes such behavior as protesting, working against, blocking, hindering, and interfering; simple contravention, which involves denying, libeling, ignoring, blaming, etc.; intensified contravention, which includes inciting to riots, spurning, exposing, etc.; secret contravention, which consists of such actions as betraying, spying, and circumventing; and tactical contravention, which comprises provocation, trickery, harassing, etc.

Types of Conflict

Simmel distinguished four types of conflict: (1) war; (2) feud or factional strife; (3) litigation; and (4) conflict of impersonal ideals.

War is practically universal in primitive life. Relationships between tribes are almost always marked by hostility. Indeed, under

primitive conditions of life, prior to the development of interterritorial trade, war provides almost the only means of contact between alien groups; so long as peace exists, the groups remain indifferent to each other. War, in this case, although dissociative in character, has a definitely associative effect. Although war may be attributed to a deep-seated antagonistic impulse in man, as Simmel stated, it needs some definite objective to bring this attitude to the surface. In other words, the antagonistic impulse seems to reinforce a conflict engendered by material interests, but also serves as a foundation for conflict.

The second type of conflict, the feud or factional strife, is an intragroup form of war. It is based on an alleged injustice done to one member, or family, by another which is regarded by the group as a threat to its unity. The feud thus engendered may be carried on for a considerable time and may become extremely bitter.

The third type of conflict, litigation, is a conflict which assumes a judicial form. It is a struggle waged by an individual, or group, to protect rights to possessions. The judicial type of conflict is of an absolute kind; claims are asserted with great objectivity, while all extraneous matters are eliminated. Even the most ferocious contest involves some subjective factors, but in a legal controversy every attempt is made to exclude them.

Finally, in the conflict of impersonal ideals, the struggle is differentiated from the personalities waging it. Because this type of conflict is carried on by individuals not for themselves but for an ideal, the struggle often assumes an extremely fierce and merciless character. Since the contestants give no consideration to themselves, they show none to others and tend to justify every means to attain their ends. Moreover, as Simmel pointed out, since victory benefits only the cause and not the individual fighting for it, the struggle carries with it great respectability. Illustrations of this kind of conflict are the campaigns of socialists or communists for a better world order, the efforts of a minority group to gain or regain freedom and the work of missionaries inspired by religious zeal to spread their belief in a "true" god.

As in the case of competition, conflict has not only dissociative but also associative effects, negative as well as positive results. The results of intragroup conflict are largely negative in that such a struggle lowers the morale and weakens the solidarity of the group. In intergroup conflicts, on the other hand, solidarity and fellow feel-

ing are increased. Conflict which involves hostile actions and war may destroy irreplaceable lives and property, but the greatest damage may be psychological and moral.

ACCOMMODATION

The term *accommodation* was first suggested by the psychologist James Mark Baldwin to denote acquired changes in the behavior of individuals which enable them to adjust to their environment. He differentiated accommodation from the kindred concept of adaptation. Adaptation, he stated, means adjustment through organic or structural modification transmitted by heredity. Accommodation, on the other hand, is adjustment which the individual achieves through the acquisition of behavior patterns transmitted to him socially and through adopting new ways of behaving. Animals lower than man adjust themselves most frequently through adaptation; man does so chiefly through accommodation. This, of course, is due to the fact that man lives in a truly social environment or culture which demands adjustment to it. Indeed, after the early years of life, an individual's principal task is to make this adjustment to his social environment. In other words, the major problem of man, a problem with which he is always preoccupied, is how to get along with his fellow men.

As viewed by Park and Burgess, human social organization (excepting that part of it which is determined by organic adaptation) is fundamentally a result of an accommodation of conflicting elements. Every society consists of elements more or less in conflict with each other but unified, at least temporarily, by an arrangement which defines their roles and mutual relationships. The social environment of man may, therefore, be said to be characterized by the recurrence of conflict of different kinds. As soon as the individual is born, he is, in a sense, in conflict with his environment, for his impulses and drives, his biological nature, are being curbed on all sides. He could not become a functioning member of his group if he did not accommodate himself to its environment. In fact, the conflict extends to the individual's very personality and the demands are the same: he must adjust if he is to live a psychically normal life. Here, however, we are primarily concerned with the adjustment issuing from the conflict between individuals and groups.

Conflict cannot continue indefinitely. Contending individuals or

groups sooner or later are forced to find a way to reconcile their differences. It is especially to this state of compromise or agreement reached by conflicting parties that sociologists have applied the term accommodation, which, in this sense, is not a complete dissolution of differences, but rather a *modus vivendi,* an arrangement that, for the time being, makes possible cooperation between antagonistic elements and the restoration of equilibrium. In other words, in accommodation, as Park and Burgess stated, the antagonism between conflicting elements is temporarily regulated and disappears as an overt action, even though it remains latent and may become active again, with a change in the situation. Accommodation may be relatively permanent, as in the case of castes in a caste-constituted society, or transitory, as among classes in an open-class society. Accommodation arising out of conflict invariably results in a changed status of the contestants and in a new order of things.

Types of Accommodation

Park and Burgess distinguished two major types of accommodation: adjustment to new natural conditions and adjustment to new social conditions. The first involves coming to terms with a new climate, type of soil, etc., and is often referred to as acclimatization. The second includes adjustment to a new social milieu, i.e., new folkways, mores, and institutions and is usually called naturalization. Naturalization in its original sense means the process whereby an individual becomes "natural," and it is in this sense, rather than in the legal sense, that Park and Burgess employed the term. Again, in acclimatization the person has to change, more or less, physiologically, a process which is for the most part adaptation; in naturalization he has to undergo changes in attitude and behavior, which, fundamentally, involve psychological modification. Although naturalization appears, on the surface, to be a relatively simple process, it is actually beset by a great many difficulties. The hardships encountered by the rural migrant to the city, especially by the person migrating from one country to another, demonstrate the complexity of naturalization.

Accommodation, in the sphere of personal relations, according to Simmel, tends to take on the form of *subordination-superordination.* The superiority and inferiority of persons and groups, he wrote, is never absolute and one-sided. It is only on the surface that the superior person or group seems to dictate and exert all the influence,

while the inferior merely obeys and is influenced by the superior. In reality, the superior is also acted upon and is influenced by the inferior. Even the absolute despot has to take into consideration the reactions of his subjects; he is "forced" to behave and act in a manner expected of him. The orator confronting his audience or the teacher facing his class appears to be the sole leader, but he is conscious of the controlling reaction of his listeners, who give the outsider the impression of being passive and entirely submissive to his leadership. Similarly, every journalist is influenced by his public. All leaders, said Simmel, are also led. In a very real sense the master is the slave of his slaves. Even the hypnotist is said to depend for his success upon some sort of influence exerted upon him by the person he is hypnotizing.

The subordination of one person to another is hardly ever complete and all-inclusive. The subordinate individual is usually inferior only in some respects; in others he may be equal or even superior to the one dominating him. Thus, the father may be superior to his son in business experience but inferior to him in tennis or baseball. The physician is subordinate to the lawyer in matters pertaining to law, and the latter is subordinate to the former in matters relating to medicine. Similarly, the serf or the slave may be superior to his master in physique and in certain skills.

The organization of any society is essentially the result of accommodation. States, confederations, empires, and other social and economic groupings are examples of accommodation groups. In primitive society, social organization was based on the accommodation of kinship groups. The social organization of ancient society rested primarily on master groups and slave groups. Medieval society was founded chiefly on the basis of classes approximating a caste system. On the other hand, in modern democratic society, social organization rests on a more or less open-class system.

According to Park and Burgess, society is always partly in a state of stable equilibrium and partly in one of unstable equilibrium. All societies contain within them, on the one hand, elements in conflict with one another and, on the other hand, those in adjustment with each other. In other words, they consist of conflict groups and accommodation groups. Examples of conflict groups are gangs, labor organizations and employers' associations, races, sects, and nationalities. After making an adjustment, these evolve into the following corresponding accommodation groups: clubs, social classes, voca-

tional groups, castes, denominations, and nations. The extent to which a society is stable or unstable will, of course, depend upon the extent to which conflict groups prevail in it. Generally speaking, primitive and folk societies are relatively free of conflict groups, and civilized societies, particularly in modern times, are characterized by relatively large numbers of such groups. The former are, therefore, relatively stable; the latter are ordinarily more or less unstable.

In any normally functioning society the various differentiated groups are largely accommodated. They are arranged in a kind of hierarchy in which the status of each group and individual is defined, accepted, and generally recognized. In a slave, feudal, or caste-constituted society, the status of groups and individuals is definite and understood by all. In a democratic society, although this status is much less rigidly defined and universally approved, everyone more or less "knows his place," and, on the whole, accepts his position and role. To be sure, a latent antagonism between these diverse elements exists, but open conflict occurs only when accommodation breaks down.

Universality of Accommodation

What makes individuals and groups that are naturally in conflict with each other get together and cooperate? Cooperation is essential to any kind of social life; it is the *sine qua non* of society. All societies are so constituted that their members behave and act in conformity with established norms, which are accepted in practice and are fixed by habit and custom. Thus, in the family the relationships among parents and children, siblings, and other members are always quite definite. In large groupings, whether social or economic, whether or not they are based on sex, age, occupation, etc., the relationships are fixed in a definite pattern. These relationships virtually always require that there be superordinates and subordinates, or superiors and inferiors. Even under a democratic or "equalitarian" order, there is no complete equality. There are always leaders and followers, those who give orders and those who obey. Both the leaders and the led, however, are subordinate to impersonal guiding principles, which, in reality, are nothing but the customary rules. Individual members ordinarily accept the prevailing rules and are guided by them because they have been habituated to them almost from the moment they were born.

In a rigidly stratified society, the status and role of all groups are fixed so that the appropriate behavior of their individual members is entirely natural and requires no conscious effort. In this case accommodation may be said to have practically reached a state of perfection. The slave and caste systems are examples of this kind of accommodation. Usually these came into existence because of the subjugation of one group by another. (In caste systems, instances may be found where voluntary segregation was the initial cause.) The development of such systems begins with conflict between the two groups, i.e., between the conquerors and the conquered, the rulers and the subjects. If the conquest or subjugation is successful, however, the two groups become accommodated so that the subjugated persons accept their inferior status. In time, the latter not only acquiesce in their condition of servitude but also accept it as natural and just because of the support it receives from tradition, sentiments, and beliefs. These serve to rationalize and to defend the existing order. People are "convinced" that the poor are poor because they are ignorant, lazy, or wicked, and do not deserve any better lot. On the other hand, the rich, it is believed, are rich because they are intelligent, thrifty, good, and hence deserve their wealth and power. The prevailing order is looked upon as natural and, with the support of religion, which is usually forthcoming, as God-ordained. Hence, attempts to change the order are vehemently opposed. So deeply rooted do these convictions become that the existing scheme of things is regarded as the only proper one. Hence, the lower and exploited classes show the same loyalty to the system which exploits them that the prosperous classes show who derive benefits from that system.

When accommodation has reached this stage, the perpetuation of the condition no longer depends upon external force but rather upon the feelings and attitudes of the inferiors themselves. Their status becomes a matter of pride to them. They are proud of the superior status of their masters, as children are proud of the superiority of their parents; anything injuring the prestige of their masters is deeply resented by them. In short, such individuals regard themselves as inferior and as destined to serve others. As long as they continue to think in this manner, they are fully adjusted to their status of servility.

Such accommodation results in harmony and relations of friendship and sympathy between the superior and the inferior. In

America, prior to the Civil War, the Negroes were so well adjusted to their slave status that most of them remained loyal to their masters throughout the war which was presumably fought to liberate them. Even after the proclamation emancipating them, many continued to be loyal to their former owners for the remainder of their lives, for they could not become accommodated to a free status. On the other hand, the Southern whites were so accommodated to the old order that they also could not accept the change.

Methods of Accommodation

Accommodation may be brought about in many different ways and may assume various forms. Gillin and Gillin classified the diverse forms into the following: (1) yielding to coercion, (2) compromise, (3) arbitration and conciliation, (4) toleration, (5) conversion, (6) sublimation, and (7) rationalization. These, they stated, are not mutually exclusive and often are found in combination.

Coercion requires the use of force or the threat of force, and usually involves parties of unequal strength. An armistice following a war is an example. The weaker party yields because it has been overpowered or because of fear of being overpowered.

In the case of compromise, the contending parties are ordinarily equal in power, and they attain accommodation when each yields to some demands of the other. The settlement of parliamentary disputes involves accommodation of this kind.

Accommodation is also achieved by means of arbitration and conciliation; in this instance a third party acts as an arbiter or mediator. In recent years an increasing number of labor-management conflicts have been settled in this manner.

Accommodation through toleration does not necessarily mean a settlement of differences, but perhaps may involve only the avoidance of overt conflict. This sort of accommodation is exemplified by the cooperation between different sects within a state or between nations with radically different economic and social systems (such as communist and capitalist systems) in the world community. These differences cannot be resolved because they involve irreconcilable ideologies.

Accommodation through conversion involves a rather sudden repudiation of one's beliefs, convictions, or allegiance, and the adoption of others. Although this type of accommodation is usually thought of only in connection with religion, it may also be en-

countered in politics, economics, art, and other fields. Adjustment by means of sublimation involves the substitution of nonaggressive attitudes and activities for aggressive ones, and it takes place on an individual as well as on a group level. Examples of such adjustment, cited by the Gillins, include the inner struggle between the "flesh" and the "spirit" experienced by Paul and the case of the Quakers, who sublimate their patriotic feelings by offering aid even to the enemies of their country.

Finally, accommodation through rationalization involves plausible excuses or explanations for one's behavior. Acknowledgment of the real reasons might indicate guilt or the need for change. Thus, an individual who makes a mistake may blame others instead of himself. By ascribing his failures to discrimination against him, instead of admitting lack of ability, he can retain self-esteem. Groups, too, try to justify aggressive attitudes or actions on purely imaginary grounds. For example, the reason given by Nazi Germany for starting the Second World War was that the Allies sought to destroy Germany and hence were the aggressors. Americans were rationalizing in the same way when they asserted that the United States entered the First World War to "save the world for democracy" and participated in the Second World War to free the world from fascism.

Without accommodation social life could hardly go on. Since society is composed of antagonistic elements, conflict and warfare would be universal and incessant. Accommodation checks conflicts and enables persons and groups to establish and maintain cooperation, which is vital to group life. Moreover, it enables individuals and groups to adjust themselves to changed functions and statuses which are brought about by changed conditions. In brief, accommodation serves not only to control and to reduce conflict, but also, in a positive sense, to maintain the necessary security of a social order, so that individuals and groups with conflicting interests can carry on their life activities together.

ASSIMILATION

Assimilation is another process of interaction. It signifies both the process of transformation and the incorporation of an element into an assimilating body, as of a nutrient material into the organic tissue of a plant or animal body, or the state of being so transformed

and incorporated. In the sociological sense, the element dealt with is culture, and the process is concerned with the absorption and incorporation of one culture by another. It is the process whereby persons and groups acquire the culture of another group, in which they come to live, by adopting its attitudes and values, its patterns of thinking and behaving—in short, its way of life. Assimilation, as Park and Burgess stated, is a process by which "persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups, and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life." In the process of becoming assimilated, individuals or groups give up their own culture to adopt that of others. In other words, as Henry Pratt Fairchild observed, in his *Immigrant Backgrounds,* the process involves both denationalization and renationalization.

Acculturation

Assimilation may be said to be preceded by another process kindred to it—acculturation. Acculturation is a preliminary step to assimilation. It takes place when one cultural group which is in contact with another appropriates or borrows from it certain cultural elements and incorporates them into its own culture, thus modifying it. Contact between two groups inevitably affects both. Although there is usually one group, the culturally "weaker," which does most of the borowing from the culturally "stronger," the latter is far from passive, taking over elements from the former as well. Thus, civilized whites in contact with primitive natives play a dual role, as givers and as receivers. The American Indians adopted cultural elements of the whites with whom they came into contact, but the whites also appropriated certain cultural traits from the Indians. Many material items, particularly foods, and not a few nonmaterial ones, as Clark Wissler and other anthropologists have shown, were acquired by the whites from the Indians and incorporated into their culture. Similarly, immigrants to America adopted American customs and ways, but the native Americans also appropriated many of the cultural traits which the immigrants brought with them. Present-day American culture would be very different were it not for the influences of immigrant cultures. The cultures of the Indians and of the immigrants were, however, modified much more than the culture of the native white Americans.

The adoption of some traits of the dominant culture by another

cultural group paves the way for the absorption of the new cultural group into the dominant culture. Such traits are readily adopted even if the two groups are only slightly in contact. From the whites the American Indians quickly learned to use intoxicants and firearms. On the other hand, the early American settlers did not hesitate long before adopting the Indian uses of potatoes, maize, and other foods. Similarly, immigrants in America usually begin to wear American-style clothes almost as soon as they land. Even some of the nonmaterial culture traits are adopted, at least partially, and by some individuals, within a relatively short period. One of these is language. The adoption of such traits indicates acculturation, not assimilation. Nevertheless, it is a preliminary and necessary step towards assimilation.

Assimilation as a Result of Contact

Assimilation is the final product of social contacts. But the rapidity with which it is achieved—in fact, whether it is achieved at all—depends upon the nature of the contacts. The process occurs naturally and most rapidly in the case of primary contacts, as in the family or in close friendship groups. For primary contacts a common language is indispensable. Assimilation depends upon communication, which requires a common language. Through communication the attitudes, values, and sentiments of one group become identical with those of the other group. This cultural unification does not necessarily lead to like-mindedness. It does result in a sharing of experience, a common universe of discourse, which makes common aspirations and goals possible. On the other hand, where contacts are secondary, i.e., indirect and superficial, the result is accommodation rather than assimilation.

In any continuous contact between two cultural groups, acculturation is a natural and inevitable result. If such contact is between two numerically unequal groups and if the culture of one, particularly of the smaller group, is the "weaker," assimilation of the "weaker" to the larger and stronger group is inevitable, provided that the contact is close and the conditions are favorable. An example of this sort of assimilation is provided by the various immigrant groups in the United States. Although most of these groups—especially those in the "new immigration," who began to arrive in the 1880's—have, to a greater or lesser extent, preserved their ethnic identity, their cultural heritage is becoming progressively

weaker. Even the first-generation immigrants (those who themselves migrated to America and retained many of their native folkways) eventually become to some extent assimilated—notwithstanding the stubborn resistance they offer to assimilation.

The degree to which an immigrant group becomes assimilated depends upon a number of factors, such as the nature of the cultural heritage, its numerical strength, its contact with the dominant culture, its economic adjustment, and the extent of its segregation. Referring to the American situation, Robert E. Park and Herbert A. Miller, in *Old World Traits Transplanted,* considered assimilation in the United States inevitable, for the immigrants cannot maintain permanently their own culture. As they come into contact with situations and ideas prevailing in America and as these become intelligible to them in contrast to their previous experience, they identify themselves with American culture. This process of identification can be delayed or accelerated, but it cannot be stopped.

Differences between Accommodation and Assimilation

Assimilation is a natural and unassisted process. It is slow and gradual. It is fundamentally an adjustment process, a type of accommodation. The group with a cultural heritage different from the one by which it is surrounded is, on the whole unconsciously, discarding this heritage and substituting the new one for it, thus resolving the conflict between the two heritages. The dominant group, on the other hand, insofar as it admits the newcomers into it and adopts some of their traits, is also assisting in the adjustment process.

Assimilation differs from the afore-mentioned types of accommodation chiefly in being a more thoroughgoing permanent method of adjusting intergroup differences. Furthermore, accommodation may be quite rapid, whereas assimilation, involving as it does more intimate and subtle changes, is gradual. Accommodation may be not only sudden but also quite radical, as in the case of conversion. In assimilation, the modifications are moderate in degree, although, cumulatively, they may seem to be considerable. Furthermore, whereas accommodation involves mutation, assimilation depends upon growth. Finally, in accommodation the person or group is usually conscious of the process, as, for instance, in negotiating a peace treaty or in settling a management-labor dispute. In assimilation, the individual or group is, as a rule, unconscious of what is

occurring, and is incorporated into another culture before becoming aware of it and with little conception of the events leading to this denouement.

The Marginal Personality

Generally speaking, assimilation is, as we have seen, an accommodative process which resolves the cultural conflict between two divergent groups. Assimilation, however, is a slow and gradual process. The minority cultural group subjected to it resists the inroads made by the dominant culture and, while adopting some of the new elements, retains many of its own ways as long as possible. Consequently, over a protracted period, there is a clash between the old and the new ways. Individuals in the process of becoming assimilated experience, in varying degrees, internal conflicts because of their having adopted new values and attitudes without having completely given up the old. This is especially true of second-generation individuals. Moreover, since such individuals are not fully accepted by either their ancestral group or the dominant culture, they often become "marginal"—a term first used by Park.

The marginal man is a "cultural hybrid," a person who lives and shares in the cultural life of two groups while feeling entirely at home in neither. The self of the marginal man, wrote Louis Wirth, in *The Ghetto,* "is divided between the world that he has deserted and the world that will have none of him." Everett V. Stonequist, who made a detailed analysis of this type of person in his book *The Marginal Man,* described him as "one who is poised in psychological uncertainty between two (or more) social worlds; reflecting in his soul the discords and harmonies, repulsions and attractions of these worlds, one of which is often 'dominant' over the other." The inner life of the marginal man is disturbed and characterized by conflict because the situation in which he finds himself demands that his behavior conform to two divergent sets of attitudes and values.

A revealing description of this psychological problem is given in *Children of Loneliness* by Anzia Yezierska, a first-generation Russian immigrant who experienced the same inner conflict. "My greatest tragedy," she wrote, "is that I always see the two opposite sides at the same time. What seems to me right one day seems all wrong the next. Not only that, but many things seem right and wrong at the same time." In many marginal persons this conflict

expresses itself in social maladjustment. They become problems to society, often as delinquents or criminals. Although other forces are also at work, the conflict due to marginality is undoubtedly the greatest contributing factor in such maladjustment.

Factors Facilitating and Retarding Assimilation

While certain factors facilitate, others retard, assimilation. The rate of assimilation of a cultural minority depends upon whether the facilitating or the retarding factors predominate. Among the factors listed by Gillin and Gillin as favoring assimilation are: toleration, equal economic opportunity, sympathetic attitude on the part of the dominant group towards the minority group, exposure to the dominant culture, similarity between the cultures of the minority and dominant groups, and amalgamation or intermarriage. On the other hand, listed among the factors hindering assimilation are: isolating conditions of life, attitudes of superiority on the part of the dominant group, excessive cultural and racial differences between the two groups, and persecution of the minority group by the majority group.

Maurice R. Davie pointed out in his *World Immigration* that in the United States the public school is the outstanding factor promoting assimilation. Its role in the process of Americanizing the children of foreign-born parents and also, indirectly, the parents themselves can hardly be exaggerated. Another force making for assimilation, Davie maintained, is what the American philosopher Horace M. Kallen once called "standardization of externals." The reference is to a uniformity in such things as household furniture, utensils and the like, especially to the uniform fashions in dress attributed to mass production. Externally an immigrant begins almost at once to resemble the people among whom he comes to live. The favorable economic circumstances of an immigrant constitute another factor promoting assimilation. If the immigrant prospers, he automatically seeks to imitate the higher standards of living of the general population, thus diverging further from his native customs and traditions.

According to Davie, their large numbers have been one of the principal obstacles to the assimilation of American immigrants. Those who come here in multitudes settle in compact colonies where they continue to practice their native folkways instead of

participating in the life around them. Lack of education (most of them come from peasant families) is an additional hindrance to assimilation because it excludes such persons from contacts with American life. Finally, prejudice and discrimination against immigrants are the most significant barriers; they keep the immigrant from taking part in American life, and they force him to take refuge in his own group, to take an exaggerated pride in it, and to resist the suggestion that he give up his own ways and adopt those of the dominant culture.

Desirability of Assimilation

Is the assimilation of ethnic minority groups in America desirable? Most students of the problem agree that it is desirable if it takes place naturally and is unforced. It is essential that a democratic people share the same ideals, and this can be done only if they understand one another, if they live and think in the same world, have a common universe of discourse. It is necessary for every individual to participate as much as possible in the sentiments, ideals, and aspirations common to the whole nation. But this community of interests and outlook does not mean uniformity or like-mindedness, as conceived of by enthusiastic, naïve Americanizers. Park and Burgess stress the fact that such uniformity is neither possible nor desirable.

On the other hand, some students of the problem maintain that unity can be achieved and preserved amidst cultural diversity, with the various cultural minority groups retaining their heritages, and that this would, moreover, produce a richer American culture. This theory is referred to as "cultural pluralism" or "ethnic federation." The advocates of cultural pluralism say that it can be equated with *cultural democracy*—a goal as desirable as political and economic democracy. Moreover, they assert that cultural pluralism is realizable and workable and that it can solve many problems of prejudice. Thus, Oscar I. Janowsky, in his *Nationalities and National Minorities,* stated that the ethnic problems in East-Central Europe can be solved satisfactorily only by making possible the coexistence of cultural differences within a "framework of political and economic unity," or through the creation of a multinational state, by which is meant a national federalism which "furnishes the means of integrating minorities, along with their institutions and customs, in

the life of the larger community." Switzerland affords one example of a thoroughgoing, workable cultural pluralism whereby cultural groups retain their ethnic characteristics and at the same time form a strong, unified nation.

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Social Change

Social change refers to the modifications which occur in the life patterns of a people. These modifications are caused by a multitude of factors either internal or external in character, i.e., by forces arising from conditions within the group or outside it.

Change is characteristic of all cultures. The rate of change differs, however, between simple and advanced societies, changes in the former occurring at a much slower pace. Moreover, within both the primitive and the advanced societies, the rate and extent of social change vary widely depending upon the change-producing forces at work at a particular time.

Early sociologists viewed the cultures of primitive peoples as completely static. Such a view was abandoned with the appearance of scientific studies of preliterate cultures. Anthropologists agree that primitive cultures have undergone and are undergoing modifications, although often at such a slow pace as to give the impression of being stationary. Those engaged in the study of contemporary primitive peoples have noted the changes that have taken place in their tools, techniques, and modes of life. Similarly, archeologists have been able to trace modifications in prehistoric civilizations, while historians have recorded alterations in historic civilizations.

ANCIENT THEORIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE

A very ancient theory of social change identified it with deterioration. This, as Wilson D. Wallis pointed out, in his *Culture and Progress,* was the prevailing notion in the ancient Orient. It was expressed in the writings of the Chinese sage Lao-tse, who lived about 600 B.C., and in the epic poems of India, Persia, and Sumeria. In these and in similar creative works in other regions of the world, it was accepted that man originally lived in a perfect state of happiness, in a golden age. Subsequently, however, deterioration began

to take place, and through a series of successive stages man reached an age of comparative degeneration. That such should be the concept of world history in early times is understandable, since deterioration is an easily observable fact in all forms of life. The concept depends upon reasoning from analogy.

Another ancient notion of social change, perhaps somewhat less common, but found side by side with the afore-mentioned one, states that human history goes through certain cycles. According to this theory, history repeats itself; after passing through a number of stages, it returns to the original stage, whence the cycle begins again. This doctrine was held by some early Hindu writers and is still found in Buddhist doctrines. J. B. Bury, in his *The Idea of Progress,* pointed out that this concept is also found in the teachings of the Stoic philosophers of Greece as well as in those of some of the Roman philosophers, particularly Marcus Aurelius.

A third ancient interpretation of the course of history is the one which Newell Le Roy Sims, in his *The Problems of Social Change,* called the *idea of ascent.* According to this theory, which had comparatively little currency, social change took place in an upward direction. Man continued to advance from a very primitive condition until he reached an advanced state in the then-existing period. His progress, however, was regarded as ending with the present, and presumably the highest, stage of development, beyond which no advance should be expected. This doctrine was expressed in the writings of the Greek poet Hesiod, in the philosophy of the Epicureans, and in the works of the Roman poet and philosopher Lucretius, particularly in his *De rerum natura.* In general, the attitude of the ancients toward change was negative. They held the pessimistic view that change can have only deleterious results.

CONCEPTS OF CHANGE IN MEDIEVAL TIMES

In the Western world during the Middle Ages, man ceased to be interested in the problem of social change. Interest turned from mundane to otherworldly matters, since the universe was conceived of as directed by supernatural powers and man was regarded as impotent to change his destiny. Man was preoccupied with the future world and regarded life as preparation for it. Society was thought of as static, with values established for all time. The world, it was believed, was created by God for a specific purpose. That purpose might

at any moment be fulfilled and the universe brought to an end. This was a doctrine of extreme pessimism and resignation; the only bright spot was man's hope for a happy future existence.

The escape from this attitude of helplessness was a remarkable accomplishment attributed largely to environmental forces, among which the enlightened Arabic civilization of the time was perhaps the most important. Instead of bringing calamity—a widely feared consequence—it freed the Western world from universal ignorance and made it possible for the human spirit to soar again unhindered by the shackles imposed upon it by scholasticism.

Intellectual leaders played a great part in the development of a new attitude towards social change. Perhaps no other scholar in the Moslem world was as influential as the brilliant fourteenth-century social philosopher, Ibn Khaldūn. He conceived of human history as a natural, evolutionary process (anticipating similar theories in modern times) and paved the way for a new conception of the phenomenon of social change.

CHANGE AS PROGRESS

In early modern times one of the most widely accepted notions of social change was that of continuous progress. Man was deemed capable of achieving a perfect social order. This new point of view reflected his growing confidence in himself and his conviction that he is master of his own destiny. The change in man's outlook was based upon a more correct view of his environment, particularly of the physical world. An optimistic view of social change was adopted by an increasing number of intellectuals.

In the seventeenth century, Francis Bacon defended the concept of change as continuous progress. The concept was stated more definitely and clearly by French thinkers, especially by Turgot and Condorcet in the eighteenth century. Turgot maintained that human society was gradually but constantly and inevitably advancing towards ever greater heights, even though progress was at times interrupted. This advance, he believed, was taking place in every phase of social life as well as in man's nature. Human society, therefore, was destined to reach an ever higher state of perfection. Condorcet went even further than Turgot. He believed profoundly that human perfectibility is infinite and that the process of development will go on indefinitely.

The pioneer sociologists conceived of social change in terms of definite stages which proceed from lower to higher levels. As already noted, Auguste Comte, postulated three such stages: the *Theological,* the *Metaphysical,* and the *Positive.* Mankind has passed through the first two stages, even though in some aspects of life and thought they still prevail, and is gradually reaching the Positive stage. In the first stage, man believed the world to have been designed by supernatural powers, and he advanced gradually from a belief in fetishes and deities to monotheism. This era lasted until the beginnings of modern times, when it gave way to the Metaphysical stage, during which man tended to explain phenomena by resorting to abstractions. In the Positive, or scientific, stage man considers the search for ultimate causes hopeless and unnecessary, and he seeks explanatory facts that can be observed empirically. This concept implies progress, which, Comte believed, will be assured if man adopts the "positive" attitude in his search for an understanding of natural and social phenomena.

Another theory of social change in terms of stages was advanced by Spencer, who, as we have seen, likened society to an organism and necessarily concluded that social development is comparable to organic evolution. Since he identified evolution in general with progress, he regarded social evolution as progressive. Human society, he maintained, has been gradually progressing towards a better state. In its primitive stage, society was characterized by warring groups, by a merciless struggle for existence. Spencer referred to this as the state of *militarism*. Gradually, however, society moved towards a period of peace and industry—a state of *industrialism*. During this process society was slowly transformed from a state of lesser differentiation and integration to one of greater differentiation and integration of its parts. Although greatly differentiated, society in the stage of industrialism is also highly coordinated for its various parts form an integrated system. The establishment of an equilibrium makes it possible for the different social, economic, and racial groups to live in peace so that individuals can enjoy maximum freedom and self-determination. To Spencer social evolution, which he identified with progress, is largely an automatic process.

Other nineteenth-century sociologists propounded theories of social evolution similar to those just described. Among them were the noted Russian sociologists Nikolai K. Mikhailovsky and Vladimir S. Soloviev. Mikhailovsky was in general agreement with Comte's

theory of the three stages of human evolution, but he did not find it completely satisfactory. He propounded a theory of his own, which is in many respects identical with Comte's. According to Mikhailovsky, human society passes through three stages: (1) the objective anthropocentric, (2) the eccentric, and (3) the subjective anthropocentric. In the first stage, man considers himself the center of the universe and is preoccupied with mystic beliefs in the supernatural. In the second stage, man is given over to abstractions; the abstract is more "real" to him than the actual. It is an age of metaphysical speculation. Finally, in the third stage, man comes to rely upon empirical knowledge by means of which he exercises more and more control over nature for his own benefit. This period is also characterized by humaneness and the quest for general social welfare. Soloviev conceived of the three stages as the tribal; the national-governmental; and the period of universal brotherhood, which is the ideal stage, and which man must aspire to attain.

The stage theory of social change, which holds that society gradually moves to an ever higher state of civilization, that it advances in a linear fashion and in the direction of improvement, has been found to be based more on speculation and wishful thinking than on facts. No sociologist or anthropologist now subscribes to it. Today, social change is considered inevitable and continuous. It is not held to be identical with progress. Indeed, many contemporary sociologists and anthropologists doubt whether one can speak of progress, in the sense of absolute improvement, particularly in the realm of the nonmaterial. They assert that belief in progress depends upon a subjective evaluation, that change is the only certainty.

TELIC THEORIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE

A number of eminent sociologists, however, have not only regarded progress as something which is clear and definite, but have also insisted that it can be achieved by means of conscious, systematic effort. Thus, Lester F. Ward defined progress as an increase in human happiness. Since happiness is the goal of all individuals, society should seek the attainment of happiness for all its members. Ward asserted that progress can be achieved by means of purposive effort, or conscious planning. Inasmuch as the efficiency of the intellect in planning depends upon an increase in scientific knowledge, education is essential. It is only through education that the intellect can

assert itself over the emotions so that effective planning is made possible. Natural, or genetic, evolution, according to Ward, is a slow, wasteful, and uncertain process, whereas *social telesis,* or intelligent planning, accelerates the processes of nature.

A similar but less extreme point of view was adopted by Charles A. Ellwood and certain other sociologists. Ellwood held that social development, while due, to an extent, to unconscious, automatic adaptation (particularly in its early, and lower, stages), is being superseded by rational, purposive forces. He agreed with Ward that progress is promoted by education and knowledge.

The German sociologist and philosopher Ludwig Stein and the English sociologist L. T. Hobhouse expounded theories closely resembling Ward's. Stein was convinced that progress depends upon the development of the human intellect and of knowledge, particularly of a science of society. Planning and legislation, if they are to be effective, must be based upon sound sociological principles. He visualized the eventual federation of states and the disappearance of nationalism, greater cooperation among individuals and groups, and the substitution of intellectual competition for physical conflict. Hobhouse, too, expressed the view that progress can be achieved through the control of material factors by the mind. Human affairs are amenable to control by reason. Indeed, the only way to attain real progress is to exercise rational control. Hence, the rational element in our nature must be developed so that it can be utilized more and more as a factor in the evolutionary process.

The view of Ward, Ellwood, and others of similar mind may be called rationalistic or purposive. It is the most commonly held view of laymen at present because it conforms closely to the thinking of the average person.

DETERMINISTIC THEORIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE

Among contemporary sociologists the deterministic theory of social change is probably the most widely accepted one. According to this view, social change takes place because of certain forces (social, or natural, or both), rather than because of human thought and purpose. Purposive endeavor has a place in human society, but it is effective only if those forces and circumstances are favorable. Sociologists disagree as to the decisive factors but few question the deterministic nature of the process.

The Theory of Automatic Change

The deterministic nature of social change was emphasized by Sumner and Keller, who insisted that social change is automatically determined by economic factors. Keller, taking his clue from Sumner, elaborated upon the concept of automatic change which he described, in his *Societal Evolution,* as an essentially irrational, unconscious process. Change is brought about by variation in the folkways which occurs in response to a need, but it is not planned. To be sure, individuals within a society are ultimately responsible for variations; it is their intention to effect changes, but only the adoption (and incorporation) or rejection of them are subject to choice by society, and this choice is made automatically. Keller maintained that conscious effort and rational planning have very little chance to effect change unless and until the folkways and mores are ready for it. Man can at most only assist or retard the change that is under way. Keller pointed out that agitation against slavery, for instance, could be successful only when slavery was on its way out because of changed conditions. Otherwise, such agitation would have been ineffective. Since they considered long-range planning futile, Sumner and Keller, like Spencer, took a *laissez-faire* position regarding social change.

The Theory of Economic Determinism

Under the influence of the Darwinian theory of evolution, social phenomena began to be interpreted in naturalistic terms. We have seen that Spencer and other early social scientists viewed societal life and organization as controlled by natural forces. This point of view was consistent with the concept that economic life is a primary factor in human society. The first to give this concept definite and precise form was Karl Marx, the father of modern socialism. Although deeply impressed by the German philosopher Hegel's metaphysical idealism, which held that ideas are the basic motivating forces in life, Marx later became convinced that the material phases of life, particularly the economic aspects, are the determining factors. He thus became the originator of what came to be known as *economic determinism,* even though the concept was not entirely new. Since he viewed the total social structure as determined by economic forces, his theory is known as the *materialistic interpretation of history.*

Briefly, Marx and his collaborator, Friedrich Engels, held that hu-

man society passes through various stages, each with its own well-defined organizational system. Each successive stage comes into existence as a result of conflict with the one preceding it. Change from one stage to another is due to modification in the primary economic factors, namely the methods of production and distribution. A change in these fundamental phases of the economy causes alterations in all social institutions, such as government, religion, and the family. The economic factor is thus a primary one in society, for all social phases of life are dependent upon it and are almost entirely determined by it.

The social order, according to Marx, has passed through four distinct phases, each corresponding to a specific type of production system. A fifth, the final and ideal phase, is in the making, and its appearance is inevitable. The five phases are called the oriental (or Asiatic), the ancient, the feudal, the capitalistic, and the communistic.

The Asiatic economic order, Marx wrote, is the most primitive order; it is found in preliterate societies as well as in some backward civilized groups. Production for consumption, a division of labor limited to members of the family, and communal ownership of property characterize this phase. The ancient social order became established with the rise of private ownership of herds and articles of luxury, which inaugurated trade and the production of goods for exchange instead of merely for consumption. The matriarchal family was succeeded by the patriarchal. A merchant class arose which accumulated great wealth and power. On the other hand, in this period came the private ownership of large tracts of land and the institution of slavery. The impoverishment of the peasants and the unprofitableness of slavery led to the next phase, feudalism. Under feudalism, although the land was owned by the lords, the peasants possessed the means of production, while the artisans owned their tools and materials. Production was carried on chiefly for consumption. With the development of a money economy and the consequent phenomena of wage labor, the discovery of new lands, the development of new markets, and the multiplication of technological inventions, the feudalistic economy began to disintegrate and to give way to a capitalist regime. This system depended upon a wealthy class owning the means of production and an exploited proletariat possessing nothing but their labor to sell. Society thus came to consist of two hostile classes—the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.

The modern capitalistic system, according to Marx, has been moving towards its doom because the conditions it produced, the forces it unloosed, make its disintegration inevitable. In their *Communist Manifesto,* Marx and Engels likened modern capitalist society to a "sorcerer who is no longer able to control the powers of the nether world whom he has called up by his spells." The very weapons by which the bourgeoisie overcame feudalism are being turned against it. The resulting social order will not, Marx and Engels asserted, reach its full development at once, but will go through two stages. In the first, there will be a dictatorship of the proletariat, during which the laboring class will rule and the vestiges of the capitalist regime will gradually disappear. In the second, there will be real communism, during which there will be no state, no classes, no conflict, no exploitation. In a communist society the prevailing principle will be "from each according to his capabilities to each according to his need." Marx visualized a society in which the social order will have reached a state of perfection. Despite his painstaking distinction between modern scientific socialism and historical utopian movements, he nevertheless pictured an ideal social system which, in the light of our present-day knowledge of the nature of man and society, must be considered definitely utopian.

Marx's conclusions regarding the course of human events have been criticized as lacking an adequate scientific basis. So far as his economic determinism is concerned, many social scientists accept it as borne out by facts. Few, of course, hold that economic factors are the only activating forces in human history. Nor did Marx hold this to be true, for he recognized the importance of noneconomic factors. Sociologists reject his assumptions that society of necessity has gone through certain definite successive stages and that it is irresistibly and inevitably moving towards an ideal stage. In this respect, Marx's claims are open to the same objections as other evolutionary stage theories advanced by writers before and after him. There is no scientific proof that human society goes through stages in any direction, progressive or retrogressive. Marx's claim that man is destined to attain an ideal stage of existence is considered little more than visionary, a dream of a golden age. Nevertheless, his theory has had a deeper influence on contemporary man than any other social doctrine in modern times.

The theory of economic determinism has been criticized chiefly on the ground that it does not define "economic" precisely; some-

times, as in Marx's interpretation, the term refers to technology or the mode of production, but, at other times, to class interest, which is essentially political and social in nature. Moreover, the causes of social changes and the manner in which they occur in the economy are usually unexplained, or the impression is given that the changes are self-generating. Keller, however, attributed them to the dissatisfaction of some individuals, usually the gifted ones, with existing techniques or artifacts; these individuals devise other, "better," ways of doing things, which, if proven successful, are eventually adopted as *the* ways of the group and become part of the mores and folkways. Since it is in the realm of the material (more specifically, the economic) aspects of life, rather than in the social aspects, that these needs usually arise, innovations, as a rule, are initiated there, changing the economic base which, in turn, forces alterations in the noneconomic areas of life.

The Hypothesis of Cultural Lag

William F. Ogburn, in his influential work *Social Change,* formulated the hypothesis of cultural lag. The existence of a cultural lag was implied in the writings of other sociologists, particularly Sumner, Müller-Lyer, Vierkandt, Wallas, and Spencer (who called it "the dead hand"), but Ogburn was perhaps the first to elaborate upon the idea and to formulate a definite theory. Ogburn asserted that, owing to the multiplicity of inventions, made possible by the accumulation of material culture, social change has been occurring with great rapidity. This rapid change has taken place more quickly in the material aspects of culture, such as dwellings, tools, utensils, machines, the manufacture of goods, and transportation. than in the nonmaterial aspects, such as religion, government, the family, and education. In material culture, discoveries and inventions are readily made.

Since the different parts of a culture do not change at the same rate, a lag occurs between one part and another, calling for adjustment. The extent and duration of the lag depend upon the elements involved. It may last for a considerable length of time, and while it exists there is maladjustment. Since the material parts change first, as a rule, the nonmaterial parts are the ones which have to adapt themselves—if society is to maintain equilibrium. To be sure, change may be initiated in the nonmaterial elements of cul-

ture, but this is comparatively infrequent. Ogburn therefore concluded that the problem of adjustment in modern life is chiefly one of enabling the nonmaterial aspects of culture to catch up, as it were, with the material aspects. In other words, the problem faced by modern man is one of adapting his ways of thinking and behaving to the state of his technology.

Ogburn cited examples to substantiate his thesis. Thus, the patriarchal type of family, adapted to agricultural conditions, is maintained in a largely industrial, urban society. The major problems faced by the modern family stem, therefore, from its persistence in an obsolete form. Another example is the survival of the old forms of international relations and the old concepts of sovereignty, despite the obvious changes that have brought nations closer together and have made them much more interdependent. Still another example of a lag that existed for a long time was the discrepancy between the changed conditions of factory work and the conditions prescribed by protective labor laws. Instances of this kind may be drawn from practically every phase of life.

Ogburn's hypothesis is generally accepted by sociologists. Some, however, deny that discoveries and inventions initiate changes in the nonmaterial phases of life or that they always have a profound effect upon a society. In *The Sociology of Invention,* S. C. Gilfillan maintained that social change is the result of many complex factors and that it is practically impossible to determine which is the primary one. Gilfillan's conclusion was, in turn, challenged by Sims, who stated that even though there are technological inventions so inextricably interwoven with social factors as to make it impossible to determine which is of primary importance, there are many cases in which the primacy of the technological factors is obvious and demonstrable.

Ideological Determinism

A number of social scientists and thinkers, directly opposing the views of the economic determinists or "materialists," consider nonmaterial elements of culture the basic sources of social change. Thus, the Russian sociologist Eugène de Roberty held that ideas are the prime movers in social life. In other words, social change depends upon ideas, thoughts, rather than actions and concrete elements. The economic or material phenomena are thus conceived to be subordi-

nate to the nonmaterial. (A similar view was held by the French social psychologist Gabriel Tarde.)

A noteworthy theory states that religion is the chief initiator of social change, with other institutions following its lead. Among those favoring this interpretation are Gustave Le Bon, Georges Sorel, James G. Frazer, and Charles A. Ellwood. Max Weber elaborated upon the theory that religion leads other institutions in effecting social change. As previously noted, Weber attempted to prove that various other religious systems such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Judaism, have had a determining influence upon the economies of their adherents. To be sure, Weber admitted that change may be initiated by nonreligious forces and that the insistence upon spiritual and religious values as the sole determiners of the social structure was unwarranted. He, nevertheless, believed that ethico-religious ideas are usually the causal factors in social change.

The theory of ideological and particularly of religious determinism has also been criticized by sociologists. Sorokin, in his *Contemporary Sociological Theories,* posed the pertinent question: "If all social institutions change under the influence of the changes in religion, how, when, and why does religion itself change?" If, he asserted, exponents of the theory had attempted to answer this query, the errors in their thesis would have become immediately apparent.

According to Sorokin, change is caused by the interaction of the various parts of a culture, none of which can be considered primary. This theory, subscribed to by a number of other sociologists, assumes that cultural change is pluralistic rather than monistic in origin; it contradicts the theories of economic and ideological determinists. As yet however, the claims of the pluralists are far from being substantiated As Sims stated, those who, by advancing the pluralistic theory of cultural change, think that they are more scientific must do more than resort to epithets to invalidate determinism. On the other hand, materialistic determinism rests upon the obvious facts that the material aspects of culture are much more frequently inventive and cumulative than the nonmaterial, that they are more easily accepted and transmitted, and, finally, that since they are concerned with the basic needs of man, they necessitate social changes. Sims concluded that change is initiated in the material culture and thence spreads to other spheres. Change is thus not only initiated in the economic mores, but is also largely automatic in nature, a view held by Sumner and Keller, Ogburn, and other determinists.

CYCLICAL THEORIES OF SOCIAL CHANGE

The assumption that change takes place in a cyclical fashion is, as we have seen, quite an old one. The common saying "history repeats itself" more or less expresses this idea. This ancient concept of social change has persisted in various versions to the present day.

Theory of the Biologic Cycle

A noteworthy attempt to prove the cyclical nature of social change scientifically was made by the French anthropologist and biologist Vacher de Lapouge. Like his countryman Arthur de Gobineau, Lapouge held that race is the most important determinant of culture and that the "Nordic" race, being superior to the others, is chiefly responsible for the high state of civilization. Civilization, he maintained, in *Les selections sociales,* develops and progresses when a society is composed of individuals of superior racial stock and declines when racially inferior elements are absorbed into it. Different societies with vigorous, high civilizations have thus undergone disintegration and decay because of such negative social selection. Western civilization, a product of the "Aryan" race, is, he held, doomed to extinction because of the constant infiltration of foreign, inferior elements and their increasing control over it. This view, which may be referred to as the theory of the biologic cycle, was shared by Lapouge's contemporary, the German anthropologist Otto Ammon. Among others holding a similar opinion were the Englishman Houston Stewart Chamberlain, who propounded his theories in *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century,* and the Americans Madison Grant and Lothrop Stoddard. Since the claims of these racialists were subsequently found to lack a scientific basis, their theories concerning social change have at present little more than historical significance.

Theories of Cultural Cycles

Another version of the cyclical theory of social change was developed by Spengler in *The Decline of the West.* Analyzing the history of the ancient Egyptian, Greek, Roman, and other civilizations, which presumably underwent a definite process of growth and decay, Spengler concluded that all civilizations pass through a similar cycle of birth, maturity, and death. Factors at work in all civiliza-

tions make such a process inevitable. Western civilization is now on the decline and its disintegration is unavoidable, for it must traverse the path of all extinct civilizations.

Vilfredo Pareto propounded the theory that societies go through periods of political vigor and decline which repeat themselves in cyclical fashion. All societies, said Pareto, include individuals who like to follow traditional ways, whom he called *rentiers,* and those who like to scheme, to take chances, and to use force for attaining their ends, whom he referred to as *speculators.* The era of political health is initiated by a sturdy aristocracy, the elite, or speculators, who seize power by force. In time, however, the leadership group loses its energy and becomes incapable of vigorous rule. Instead of force, the ruling class resorts increasingly to tricks, to clever manipulations. Eventually the leadership group consists of weak individuals characterized by a *rentier* mentality. Since the oligarchy forms a closed class, admitting no outsiders who possess qualities of leadership, it degenerates completely. At the same time, enterprising individuals, *speculators,* arise from among the subjugated to become the new elite who overthrow and replace the old group. Then the cycle begins again. Pareto maintained that the economic life and the ideological system of a society pass through cycles similar to and concomitant with, this political cycle. In the ideological cycle, a period of faith and credulity is supplanted by one of skepticism and critical attitudes, which, in turn, is succeeded by an era of belief. The cycle is thus endless.

Still another version of cyclical change was offered by the sociologist F. Stuart Chapin, who in his book *Cultural Change* postulated a hypothesis of *synchronous cyclical change.* According to this theory, the different parts of a culture, or its social institutions, each go through a cycle of growth, vigor, and decay. If the cycles of the major parts, such as government and the family, coincide or synchronize, the whole culture will be in a state of integration. If they do not synchronize, the culture will be in a disorganized state. If the various parts are passing through a period of vigor, the civilization as a whole will be in a flourishing state. On the other hand, if they are on the decline, the total culture will be on the downward path. Growth and decay in cultural forms, Chapin held, are as inescapable as they are in all living things.

Sorokin propounded a theory explaining social change primarily in terms of recurrent cycles which include linear movements. Ac-

cording to this theory, a civilization develops in a certain direction for a definite period, thus following a linear course, but in time, because of internal, immanent forces, it changes its direction and enters upon a new course. This new course is also halted at a certain point, and another sets in. After a number of such turns and shifts, a civilization reverses its course and returns to an earlier phase, thus completing a cycle. Although Sorokin preferred to call his doctrine one of "variable recurrence," rather than cyclical, most sociologists see in it only a cycle theory delineated on a truly grandiose scale.

Relying, like Spengler, upon data drawn from the history of various civilizations, particularly of the Occident, Sorokin, in his *Social and Cultural Dynamics,* concluded that civilizations fall into three major types, or "supersystems," namely, the *ideational,* the *idealistic,* and the *sensate,* each with its own outlook upon life, its set of values, and its behavior patterns. In each of these supersystems, the social institutions, economy, legal system, ethics, art, science, and even the personality of individuals conform to the predominant philosophy of life. Some civilizations he asserted, do not attain the state of such a well-defined supersystem, but constitute a kind of mixture of different systems which remain unrelated and unintegrated. These he classified as "eclectic." Truly great civilizations, he believed, reach a state of integration which results in a definite, unified supersystem.

What makes cultures conform to distinct types? Sorokin maintained that cultures are always built upon a concept of "the ultimate nature of the true reality and value." He asserted that different societies, or the same society at different periods in its history, adhered to the ideational, the idealistic, or the sensate concepts of reality and value. One of these concepts eventually dominates practically every part of a culture and determines its framework, or its supersystem. We therefore may speak of ideational, idealistic, and sensate types of culture. Again, since great cultures may go through periods which are dominated successively by these three concepts, we may speak of them as phases or stages of a culture .

Cultures based on the ideational philosophy of life are usually in their infancy. Reality and value are then conceived of in terms of a "supersensory and superrational God," while the sensory world appears as illusory. The thought and behavior of man, his institutions—in short, his whole way of life—rest on this principle and center on this concept and the resultant value system. This kind of

culture might be called "god-ridden." Examples of such a culture, said Sorokin, include Taoist China, Greece prior to the fifth century B.C., Brahmanic and Buddhist India, and Christian Europe in the Middle Ages. Instances of ideational systems among preliterate cultures are those of the Hopi and Zuñi Indians.

On the other hand, a culture in which reality and value are regarded as sensory as well as supersensory, or superrational, belongs to the idealistic type. This is an intermediate type, a compromise between, or synthesis of, the ideational and the sensate. The thought and behavior of man are partly anchored in the utilitarian and materialistic but are partly concerned with the other world. Cultures of this type, according to Sorokin, existed in ancient Egypt at certain periods, in Greece during the fifth century B.C., and in Europe during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries A.D.

Finally, the sensate type of culture is a culture which is centered in the concepts that reality and value are merely what the senses perceive and that beyond sense perception there is no reality. In such a culture, science, law, morality, religion, and art are all based on this premise. The whole way of life is characterized by a positivistic, materialistic outlook. The cultures of Greece and Rome during the period from the fourth century B.C. to the third century A.D., of China at certain periods in its history, and of Western Europe after the fifteenth century are examples of this type of culture.

Sorokin's belief that great civilizations go through ideational, idealistic, and sensate phases, each of which, in turn, passes through a period of growth and decline, implies that a culture in a declining sensate phase is getting ready, so to speak, for its ideational or idealistic phase. Civilizations, therefore, do not actually die, as Spengler maintained, but either renew themselves or pass into other cultures. Sorokin, however, is in essential agreement with Spengler's conclusions in regard to the growth and decline of cultures. His ideational, idealistic, and sensate phases correspond to the phases of growth, maturity, and disintegration. Western civilization, he maintained, is now in an "overripe" sensate phase, i.e., it is in its last stages of decline, and is probably entering upon an idealistic or even ideational era. Our Western culture, he wrote, has reached a point whence it must disintegrate unless its system of truth, ethics, and art becomes more adequate, or rather regains its former adequacy.

A cyclical theory of the history of world civilization was also propounded by the English historian Arnold J. Toynbee, who, similarly,

maintained that civilizations pass through three stages, corresponding to youth, maturity, and decline. The first is marked by a "response to challenge," the second is a "time of troubles," and the third, characterized by gradual degeneration, leads to the "final downfall." Like Spengler and Sorokin, Toynbee "proved" his contentions by marshalling voluminous data on the life histories of many civilizations. His predictions resembled those of Sorokin more than those of Spengler in that he foresaw a way of escaping doom. Our civilization, he asserted, although it is seriously ill, can be saved by means of proper guidance by the "creative minority." This "creative minority" is a select group of leaders who "withdraw and return," i.e., withdraw from the corrupting influences, commune with God, become spiritually regenerated, and then return to inspire and transmit their rediscovered truth to the masses, thus leading to a general regeneration.

These concepts of the cyclical nature of social change are essentially the result of reflective-philosophical rather than scientific-sociological studies. They are attempts, such as those made many times in the past, to work out a simple, all-embracing, grand theory of the way human cultures behave, to answer the age-old question: "Whither mankind?" The authors of such theories begin with theses which they try to substantiate (and which they claim to have substantiated) by marshalling a mass of data from history—materials which lend themselves to diverse interpretations. Evaluating Sorokin's attempt at a formula according to which world history proceeds, Don Martindale and Elio D. Monachesi in their *Elements of Sociology,* stated that he had simply brought together a tremendous amount of "bits of historical evidence which he kneaded together and manipulated so as to make them fit into his pre-conceived scheme." It is doubtful, wrote Sutherland and Woodward, whether anyone is capable of even plotting the fluctuations of culture, let alone of making predictions as to what will happen next in a culture.

In appraising Toynbee's work, Barnes wrote (in *An Introduction to the History of Sociology):* "It is not objective or even interpretative *history.* It is theology, employing selected facts of history to illustrate the will of God, as the medieval bestiaries utilized biological fantasies to achieve the same results. . . . Toynbee's vast materials throw far more light upon the processes of Toynbee's mind than upon the actual processes of history. . . . He writes history as he thinks it should be to further the cause of salvation, rather than

as it has really been." On the other hand, Martindale and Monachesi referred to Toynbee's theory as a "species of the 'devil theory' of history," stating: "Although it is well concealed, yet the notion is that evil, in the guise of challenges of the natural environment, constitutes the source of temptations which underlie man's development."

The cyclical theories in their various versions, are, to a considerable extent, a reaction to the discredited linear theories and are due, in no small measure, to the revival of the "philosophy of history." They owe their coming into prominence largely to scholars who were motivated by a desire to escape from the complexities of a troubled world. The cyclical theories of Pareto and Chapin, which deal only with limited phases of culture—phenomena such as birth- and death-rates, unemployme1 , race relations, and business, referred to as "small-scale" cycles, in contradistinction to "large-scale" cycles—have proved more fruitful, although the cyclical behavior of few of even these phenomena has found complete scientific substantiation.

THE RATE OF SOCIAL CHANGE

The rate of social change depends largely upon the technological progress of a society. In primitive communities, with a relatively small accumulation of material culture, there are very few significant inventions and the rate of social change is necessarily slow. In advanced commuities, with a large accumulation of material culture, basic inventions are frequent and social change is consequently rapid.

Will the present rapid rate of social change in industrialized societies continue to be high? Careful observers have concluded that it will. Gilfillan predicted that the development of technological inventions and discoveries will continue at an accelerated pace. The suggestion of some writers that society should forbid new mechanical inventions until social change has caught up with them hardly deserves serious consideration. The course of a civilization cannot be controlled by such dictates. In fact, as stated by Ogburn and Nimkoff if we declared a moratorium on technologocal invention, the inventions that have already been made would continue to bring about social changes for hundreds of years to come. Society needs new technological inventions because human wants are virtually unlimited. Man cannot solve social problems by prohibiting material

progress; he can solve them by introducing desirable changes in institutions and human relationships.

RESISTANCE TO CHANGE

People prefer their customary way of living and consequently resist new inventions which require social changes. On the whole, the more radical an invention is, i.e. the more it involves modification in conventions, institutions, and beliefs, the greater will the resistance be. There is usually greater opposition to a social invention than to a technological one because the latter is easily shown to be desirable and is less upsetting to emotional attachments. Harry Elmer Barnes commented that the average person in the United States would be quite embarrassed to drive an outmoded automobile, say, a model of twenty-five years ago, even if it were in good condition. Yet, this same person may defend with enthusiasm a constitution of a century and a half ago or an economic system that is even much older. In matters concerning transportation, an individual may express contempt for the old methods, whereas, in political or economic life, he will wholeheartedly approve of outdated procedures.

Not all changes, however, encounter widespread opposition; some are, in fact, readily adopted, especially those which involve an improvement in or a new use for, an accepted invention. Furthermore, compared with a less advanced society, a technologically conscious society is more receptive to change, particularly in the material sphere.

Opposition to Technological Inventions

Instances of resistance to technological inventions are legion. Gilfillan found, for example, that no improvement in ships, with the exception of the compensated compass, met with ready acceptance. Throughout history, according to Bernhard J. Stern, writing in *Technological Trends and National Policy,* inventions, many of which later proved highly beneficial to mankind, were opposed. Thus, the use of coal was strongly resisted. "Sea cole," as it was first called, was prohibited in England during the reign of Edward I; one citizen was executed for burning it. Strong opposition was shown to the use of steam power, to gas for lighting purposes, and to the use of the incandescent lamp. Innovations in transportation

were all vigorously opposed; some were outlawed. The first stage coaches, steamboats, steam and electric railroads, and automobiles were condemned, ridiculed, and resisted. The English Parliament in 1861 outlawed the "horseless carriage." In England, the locomotive, in the early days of the railroad, was called a "hell on wheels" and the "devil wagon." In the United States, the railroad was denounced as a danger to life and limb, a fire hazard, and a socially disruptive influence.

Even shrewd financiers opposed these innovations. Chauncey Depew advised his nephew against investing five hundred dollars in Ford stocks, maintaining that nothing invented in transportation could beat the horse, while J. P. Morgan opposed his company's investing in a firm which later became known as General Motors. Commodore Vanderbilt dismissed George Westinghouse's invention of the air brake with the statement that he had no time to waste on fools.

Often, scientists opposed new inventions. In 1826 an expert engineer expressed the view that a rate of speed exceeding six miles per hour would be likely to result in disaster. In 1906 the astronomer Simon Newcomb maintained that attempts at long-distance flying were destined to fail because the laws of physics and the state of the industrial arts made the idea impracticable. Similarly, resistance to innovations of all kinds has frequently been offered by organized labor, chiefly because such innovations reduce the need for workers and necessitate the learning of new techniques.

In *Social Factors in Medical Progress,* Stern pointed out that many leaders in medicine opposed discoveries which later proved not only valid but indeed a blessing to man. William Harvey's discovery of the circulation of the blood was ridiculed by some of the foremost contemporary medical scientists. One of them, Caspar Hoffman of Nuremberg, accused the discoverer of having "impeached and condemned nature of folly and error." Vehement opposition to Pasteur's discoveries in bacteriology is another case in point. Freud's contention that hysteria afflicts men as well as women, which has become accepted as a fact, was at first bitterly opposed by his colleagues. There is still blind opposition to Freud's ideas, even though many of them are now an indispensable part of modern psychology. Such opposition of scientists to the discoveries of their colleagues is usually based on an appeal to authority rather than on actual evidence.

Opposition to Social Inventions

Resistance to social inventions is often much more stubborn and long-lasting than resistance to technological inventions. One need only recall the opposition to woman suffrage in the United States, which lasted more than fifty years, and the opposition to the abolition of slavery, which was accomplished only after a prolonged and devastating war. Such innovations as the income tax and workmen's compensation were adopted only after decades of struggle. It took virtually centuries for such major reforms as Christianity and the democratic form of government to become established. Many innovations, ranging from simplified English spelling to socialized medicine, are still strongly resisted. "It is a curious phenomenon," Ogburn and Nimkoff wrote in *Sociology,* "that some of the greatest blessings of the human race should have been bitterly resisted, at times with the spilling of blood, before humanity was allowed to profit by them. . . . It is as though there were enemies within the gates; as though many of us did not want to increase our blessing."

Reasons for Opposition to Social Change

Ogburn and Nimkoff listed a number of reasons for the spirited opposition to innovations so universally encountered.

One reason is that at first inventions are generally subject to imperfections, such as inadequate performance, easy breakage, and difficulty of repair. Social inventions also have imperfections in the beginning. These inadequacies could frequently be remedied if people were tolerant and patient.

Ignorance is another reason. It usually takes a considerable period of time for a new discovery, technique, or tool to be understood. Thus, for a long time the germ theory of disease was rejected. It took many generations for the iron plow to be generally accepted. Opposition to technological inventions and discoveries gradually disappears, inasmuch as it cannot be maintained in the face of definite proof of workability. But in the social sphere, where concrete demonstration is extremely difficult, or impossible, resistance may continue indefinitely.

Habit is another obstacle to social change. Individuals do things mostly by habit and custom. They usually dislike or fear the unfamiliar. Adoption of a new practice requires the substitution of a

new habit for an old one—a difficult task, especially for large groups of older people whose habits are relatively fixed. Hence the new practice will be looked at askance or will be rejected.

Tradition, or reverence for the past, is still another motive for opposition to change. The old, the traditional, even where it has clearly become a maladjustment, is clung to tenaciously because of sentimental ties and because of the halo that surrounds things of the past.

Finally, the power of "vested interests" constitutes an obstacle to innovation. The term was first used by Thorstein Veblen, in his *Vested Interests and the State of Industrial Arts,* to denote individuals who feel that social change endangers their interests. They therefore fight every proposal in this direction, organizing as opposition groups when their "rights" are threatened. Vested interests constitute the most common and most powerful obstacle to social progress.

Vested interests are not always based on economic gain. Persons settled in their jobs wish to preserve the status quo. Their security is threatened by the initiation of changes. They are therefore interested in preserving the system to which they have become accustomed. The vested interests of such people are chiefly of a psychological nature, although the economic aspect is often also present, inasmuch as such considerations as seniority and occupational advancement may be involved.

Barnes pointed out, in *Social Institutions,* that in Western society of early modern times there was a greater inclination to accept institutional change than has been true since the beginning of the nineteenth century, but there was less readiness to adopt technical and scientific inventions. Barnes explained that, with the beginning of modern times, changes were effected by the efforts of the middle class. It was primarily the middle class that was instrumental in bringing medieval institutions and modes of thought to an end, that helped to transform the absolutistic type of government into a representative one, that ushered in capitalism and its folkways, and that gained the various civil liberties. These changes in political and economic life had been accomplished by the end of the eighteenth century. Thenceforth, the middle class began to identify its interests with the prevailing system and to defend the status quo. While, on the whole, technological innovations were then looked upon as desirable and as leading to progress, changes in social institutions

were viewed as undesirable and as dangerous to society. This attitude, wrote Barnes, accounts for the present situation, in which a highly developed technology coexists with an obsolete system of social institutions, mostly dating back to the early nineteenth century, or even prior to that time.

In some instances, opposition to social change is justifiable. There is considerable doubt about the merits of numerous changes advocated by reformers; sometimes it seems evident that a proposed innovation will prove harmful—judged, of course, from the point of view of a certain standard of values. The suggestion, for instance, that trial (companionate) marriage be substituted for our present form is an example of a doubtful type of social reform. The proposal that a totalitarian type of government be substituted for the democratic system is an instance of a reform that is considered definitely harmful. Opposition to technological inventions is justifiable, if they are unworkable or impractical, or if their advantages are offset by their disadvantages.

Resistance to change, conservatism, thus has a place in society because there is often uncertainty as to whether the results of proposed social innovations will be beneficial, while sometimes there is good reason to believe that they will be disastrous. In the absence of definite means of predicting possible results, cautious evaluation of consequences (with the past experience of mankind as a guide) seems to be the best recourse.

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Social Problems

Sociology is concerned primarily with the "normal" problems of societal life, that is, with questions of social relationships and their concrete expressions. These relationships, however, frequently show "abnormal" or "pathological" signs; they fail to function "as they should" and, hence, cause dissatisfaction, suffering, and misery.

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SOCIETAL AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Howard W. Odum, in his *Understanding Society,* distinguished between two types of problems: the "scientific" or "societal" and the "ameliorative" or "social." The first type involves an analysis of the various phenomena of societal life; the second requires a study of "abnormal" or "pathological" situations, or maladjustments, with the aim of ameliorating or of eliminating them. Sociology investigates the broad problems of society in order to discover and interpret facts about social life, whereas the problems of amelioration fall within the province of social work. In other words, sociology seeks to understand the forces basic to societal behavior; social work attempts to alleviate or get rid of pathological conditions—to solve urgent problems faced by society.

Although concerned chiefly with the investigation of societal phenomena, sociology also necessarily studies social problems, since they are aspects of societal behavior. Sociology, therefore, deals with such problems as crime and delinquency, race conflict, poverty, and divorce. Its main purpose is to discover underlying causes rather than to find solutions, although the latter are, of course, ultimate desiderata. Since efforts to solve social problems can succeed only if they are based upon indisputable facts and an adequate understanding of their background, sociology can contribute much to make effective solutions possible.

The process involved in correct analyses of societal forces is tedious and prolonged. Social problems, especially the urgent problems, must be dealt with as they come up; society cannot wait for all causes to become known and for scientific methods of dealing with them to be developed. Since sociology, like the other social sciences, has as yet been able to establish few scientific principles or laws, much of what is attempted in the way of solving social problems is still necessarily in the nature of groping—this in spite of the fact that sociologists now have a much better grasp of basic factors than heretofore.

Even in areas in which knowledge is sufficiently definite so that problems could be dealt with effectively, little attempt has been made to apply it to the appropriate situations. Knowledge of how to deal with a problem does not guarantee its application. It must first be accepted by the members of a society, and this acceptance, as we have seen, is always beset by obstacles such as the difficulty of proving the efficacy of proposed remedies and the almost invariable resistance to innovation. Another stumbling block is the reluctance of all societies to expose their ways of thinking, feeling, and acting to scientific scrutiny. Furthermore, many object to public expenditures required for the research or for instituting the reforms. A reform proposal may call for a long-range view which people ordinarily find difficult to accept. Finally, there is always the question of implementation. Knowledge of the causes of social problems does not necessarily imply a knowledge of how to go about removing or even mitigating them.

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

What, more precisely, are social problems? They are situations or conditions which society regards as threats to its established ways, or to its well-being and, therefore, as needing to be alleviated or eliminated. Lawrence K. Frank (in "Social Problems," an article in the *American Journal of Sociology)* defined a social problem as "any difficulty or misbehavior of a fairly large number of persons which we wish to remove or correct." Paul B. Horton and Gerald R. Leslie, in their *The Sociology of Social Problems,* defined it as "a condition affecting a significant number of people in ways considered undesirable, and about which it is felt something can be done through collective social action."

The designation of a situation as a social problem is a matter of subjective judgment. What is considered a problem by one society may not be so regarded by another. Because of changed conditions and attitudes, what is thought to be a problem today may not have been thought to be one in the past, or vice versa, even in the same society. On the other hand, there are social problems which, as shown by historical records and surveys of different societies, are universal and permanent. The persistence of major problems such as crime, poverty, and war probably reflects the fact that men have always possessed the same basic drives and have had to deal with the same kinds of environmental and social conditions. For this reason, many of the social problems of today are identical with those of ancient times.

CLASSIFICATION OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

According to Harold A. Phelps *(Contemporary Social Problems)*, social problems—those due to personal or group deficiencies—derive from economic, biological, bio-psychological, and cultural sources. Every society has norms of what constitutes material well-being, physical health, mental health, and group and personal adjustment. Deviations from these norms are regarded as abnormalities and as constituting social problems. Phelps, therefore, classified social problems under four main categories, corresponding to the four major sources. Among the problems stemming from economic sources, he included poverty, unemployment, dependency, etc. Among those arising from biological sources he included physical diseases and defects. Among the problems emanating from psychological sources he included neuroses, psychoses, feeble-mindedness, epilepsy, alcoholism, personality maladjustments, and suicide. Finally, among the problems deriving from cultural sources he included problems of the aged, the homeless, and the widowed; divorce, desertion, and illegitimacy; crime and juvenile delinquency; and racial and religious conflicts.

None of these problems belongs exclusively to any one category. Thus, poverty may be the result of tuberculosis, which has a biological source; of mental illness, which is psychological in origin; or of inadequate vocational preparation, which has a cultural basis. Multiple causes may be cited for almost any other social problem. For each of the four major categories, Phelps listed problems incident to

the growing complexity of modern urbanized and industrialized life. Under the "economic" category he included the quantity, quality, and mobility of population; under the "biological"—social hygiene and public health; under the "psychological"—mental hygiene; and under the "cultural"—administration of penal institutions, immigration, urbanization, public recreation, vocational guidance, and adult education.

A most comprehensive study of contemporary social problems in America—*Report of the President's Committee on Recent Social Trends*—attributed them chiefly to inadequacies in (1) physical heritage, (2) biological heritage, (3) social heritage, and (4) social policy. In the first category (physical heritage) are such problems as the depletion and conservation of natural resources. In the second category (biological) are problems of population quantity, quality, growth, decline, and mobility, as well as problems of eugenics, birth control, and immigration. In the third category (social heritage) are problems involving technological changes, economic conditions (such as business cycles and depressions, and unemployment), minority groups, education, religion, politics, leisure-time activities, public health, and law enforcement. In the fourth category (social policy) are problems of planning and reorganizing economic, social, and political life and institutions. This elaborate classification indicates at once the great range and complexity of problems facing the United States and the enormous task of solving them.

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIAL DISORGANIZATION

Social problems have been referred to by sociologists as maladjustments or unadjustments. The latter term, although less frequently used is perhaps the preferable one, since it does not involve the subjective evaluation implied in the former, but merely states the existence of a lack of adjustment. In the aggregate, social problems have been considered as constituting a pathological state, or a state of disorganization, in a society. The concept of social problems as symptoms of disorganization may be said to be generally accepted by sociologists. Social disorganization, therefore, has been an important field of study.

Social disorganization refers to serious maladjustments among institutions so that they fail to meet the needs of individuals satisfactorily. Since institutions are never completely in adjustment with

one another, and never function in a manner that satisfies all individuals, a degree of disorganization is always present in every society. This being so, no sharp line can be drawn between integration and disorganization. In other words, it is only when the lack of adjustment is marked that one can speak of disorganization. No objective criteria for measuring this condition are available; the designation of a situation as disorganization depends largely on subjective judgment.

Émile Durkheim, in his *De la division du travail social (Of the Division of Labor in Society),* defined social disorganization as a state of disequilibrium and a lack of social solidarity or consensus among the members of a society. Such a state, he maintained, is the result of an extreme division of labor, which, in turn, is due to technological changes that have been taking place since the Industrial Revolution. Division of labor is generally productive of social solidarity. It is only when the division of labor becomes excessive and complex that the solidarity necessary for the smooth functioning of the social organization diminishes or disappears and the equilibrium is thus disturbed. Extreme division of labor, with its attendant lack of solidarity which tends to pervade every sphere of life, gives rise to economic crises of all kinds, class struggles, and industrial strife, and leads to the demoralization of individuals, the family, and the community. In short, it produces an abnormal, anomalous situation in which the different parts do not integrate but are at cross-purposes with each other and a state of normlessness which Durkheim referred to as *anomie*. Moreover, since economic activities under a complex system of division of labor are conducted on a contractual rather than on an interest basis and call for specialization, the individual's work experience is forced, or constrained, and unsatisfying. This constrained division of labor ("la division du travail contrainte," as Durkheim referred to it) is conducive to personal demoralization and to social disorganization because it loosens the ties binding the individual to his group and weakens social solidarity.

W. I. Thomas and Florian Znaniecki (in *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America)* conceived of social disorganization as "a decrease of the influence of existing rules of behavior upon individual members of the group." In other words, when the rules and regulations of a society fail to keep individuals under control, personal demoralization sets in. When demoralization becomes widespread, the entire social structure becomes affected and the various institu-

tions begin to disintegrate. The consequent institutional breakdown, or social disorganization, expresses itself in a high rate of delinquency, vice, crime, and other problems.

Social disorganization, according to Thomas and Znaniecki, is not an isolated phenomenon but is encountered, to a greater or lesser extent, in all societies. There are always some individuals who violate social rules. This has a disorganizing effect upon social institutions, and unless the violations are counteracted, they may multiply and eventually lead to the decay of institutions. Disorganizing forces are present in every society. A society which is fundamentally stable counteracts such forces and commands respect for, and obedience to, its rules and regulations. An equilibrium between the disorganizing and stabilizing forces is thus maintained. When a society finds itself unable to enforce its rules, the equilibrium is upset. A conflict between the attitudes of the individual and the values of society develops. As a consequence, large-scale disorganization ensues which may bring about the disintegration of the society. What usually happens, though, under such circumstances is that new forces appear which prevent a complete breakdown and bring about a reorganization. Reorganization, then, is effected not by reinforcing the disintegrating institutions, but rather by introducing new behavior patterns and new institutions which constitute a better adjustment to the changed needs of the members of the society. This process is referred to by Thomas and Znaniecki as "social reconstruction."

In their book *Social Organization and Disorganization,* Stuart A. Queen, Walter B. Bodenhafer, and Ernest B. Harper described social disorganization as the counterpart of social organization. Just as social organization provides the means by which a society maintains its unity and cohesion through effective control of its members, and, hence, functions smoothly, social disorganization causes a weakening of group solidarity, loss of control over its members, and, therefore, conflict and disintegration. Social organization implies the existence of institutions which meet the needs of the members of a society. Social disorganization, on the other hand, means the malfunctioning of institutions, their failure to satisfy the needs of the people, and the consequent frustration of their desires.

Social disorganization is a relative state and, like social stability, exists in varying degrees. Two sets of forces, those making for stability and those producing instability, are always operating in any society. In a stable society there is a balance between the two. When,

however, the latter becomes more powerful than the former, social disorganization occurs. Social disorganization is thus a disturbance in the equilibrium of forces which brings about a disintegration of institutions and a weakening of their control. Society is then beset with all kinds of social problems.

Mabel A. Elliott and Francis E. Merrill, in their *Social Disorganization,* have pointed out that social disorganization may be divided into three types: disorganization of the individual, the family, and the community. But it is difficult to decide to which type a specific social problem belongs because the individual and the group represent merely different facets of society which cannot be definitely separated. Thus, the prevalence of venereal disease is indicative of personal demoralization. Since this disease is often contracted in extramarital sex relations, it also reflects demoralized family life. Finally, the spread of the disease also implies ineffective control of the individual by the community, and, hence, community disorganization.

In a well-integrated society the various parts of culture are in harmony with one another. When this harmonious relationship is disturbed, disorganization ensues. Disorganization is a lack of adjustment between the different components of the culture of a society. In *Social Change,* Ogburn maintained that disorganization is caused primarily by the unequal rates of change in the different parts of culture, resulting in a conflict between them. This uneven change, as we have seen, is due to the fact that inventions and discoveries, which are the initiators of change, are made more frequently in certain parts of culture, usually the material parts, than in others. Hence scientific and technological advance, while furthering the material welfare of society, is also a disturbing element and is the major cause of social disorganization. Ogburn asserted that this has been particularly true in modern society with its accelerated speed of technological inventions.

Technological inventions, however, must not be considered the only cause of social disorganization. Ecological disturbances, i.e., disturbances in the relationship of man to his environment, including such natural phenomena as epidemics, earthquakes, and floods, may have a disorganizing effect upon society. This was especially true in the past; at present such catastrophes are more easily controlled. Finally, still another cause of disorganization is to be found in the difficulty with which man's inherited nature adapts itself to a

changed social environment. Man's nature is modified very slowly, through changes in the germ plasm, whereas culture is altered with comparative rapidity. The social environment, culture, may thus impose requirements on man which he finds most difficult to fulfill. For example, the highly competitive life of modern urbanized society is very taxing, causing many individuals to become demoralized or to suffer breakdowns, while conditions of work are such that industry, the economic system in general, is prone to become disorganized, thus in turn causing the disorganization of individuals.

Odum, expressing a view similar to Ogburn's, stated that contemporary society suffers from the disorganizing effects of "bigness, speed, technology, change," and is in danger of disintegration because of the difficulty of adaptation of the natural capacities of man and his institutions to these "artificial demands." He referred to the situation in which modern society finds itself as "the tragedy of bigness" and asserted that there is a limit to society's capacities to adapt itself to those ever increasing artificial demands—a limit beyond which it is in danger of disorganization and even disintegration.

The designation of a situation as a state of social disorganization is, as we have seen, a matter of subjective judgment on the part of a particular society, or some members thereof, at a particular time. Moreover the term "social disorganization," as Ogburn and Nimkoff pointed out, has been frequently given a moral connotation. Thus, a city having many saloons and gambling houses is often described as suffering from a disorganized social life, while one well provided with churches and courts of justice is thought of as having a well-organized life. As a matter of fact, gambling houses may be conducted in quite an orderly fashion as part of a well-organized community life. Students of the problem have, nevertheless, sought criteria for determining what constitutes social disorganization, or what its indices or symptoms are, even though these may apply only to certain societies and to them only at certain times.

Elliott and Merrill listed among the indices of personal disorganization juvenile delinquency, various types of crime, insanity, prostitution, drunkenness, and suicide. Among the indices of family disorganization they included divorce, desertion, illegitimate births, and venereal disease. Among the indications of community disorganization they mentioned poverty, irregular school attendance, unemployment, political corruption, vice, and crime. As noted above,

they believed that no definite separation can be made among these three different types of disorganization, for they are interdependent and often overlapping. Again, according to Elliot and Merrill, these phenomena cannot be regarded as invariably indicative of disorganization. Thus, a high divorce rate is generally thought of as signifying family demoralization and lack of marital adjustment. Actually, however, a high divorce rate may be due to a better knowledge of the divorce laws and of ways to obtain a divorce, altered attitudes towards marriage, a lessening of marital hypocrisy, and other factors.

Herbert A. Bloch, in his *Disorganization; Personal and Social,* divided the indices of social disorganization into two broad categories; (1) the sociological and (2) the literary-ideological. These indices, he stated, are symptoms, rather than causes, and are analogous to an increased pulse rate or fevers in an organic disorder.

The sociological indices, wrote Bloch, may be measured statistically by noting the rate of occurrence of certain problems; a high rate indicates a serious disturbance in the equilibrium of a society, in much the same way that a fever chart discloses to the physician the progress made by his patient. Bloch subdivided the sociological indices into three classes: individual, family, and community. In the first he included rates of delinquency, crime, mental illnesses, alcoholism, suicide, etc.; in the second, frequency of occurrence of such problems as divorce, desertion, neglect of children, etc.; and in the third, rates of unemployment, relief, mobility, the extent of governmental corruption, etc. He referred to literary-ideological indices as certain tendencies appearing in literary and artistic works which indicate a disturbed state of mind, reflecting the general condition of disequilibrium. Among these tendencies he mentioned nostalgic themes, indicating the desire for escape, so-called "free-associational" themes, and themes dealing with personal frustration and rebellion or protest.

Calvin F. Schmid listed the following symptoms of disorganized communities: high rate of population mobility, a disproportionately high rate of males, a low rate of home ownership, and high rates of divorce, desertion, illegitimacy, dependency, delinquency, and criminality, and, in addition, high rates of suicides, commercialized vice, and deaths from alcoholism and certain other diseases. Queen, Bodenhafer, and Harper included in their list of symptoms of dis-

organization unemployment, poverty, homelessness, sickness, feeble-mindedness, and insanity.

THE CAUSES OF SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Sociologists are more or less agreed that social problems, and for that matter personal problems, have no single or simple cause. Each problem has a complex history and is usually due not to one but to many different causes, which are often difficult to determine and particularly difficult to rank in order of priority or significance. Regardless of the problem being considered—war, unemployment, suicide, crime, or divorce—no single, simple explanation for its occurrence or widespread incidence can be found. Often a problem is so closely interwoven with many other problems in a society that it cannot be explained or solved apart from them. In other words, social problems can be understood and dealt with effectively only when they are considered in their complex totality or configuration. The idea of the *Gestalt* school of psychology regarding the behavior of the individual, namely, that to be properly understood it must be considered in the light of the total situation, also applies to social problems.

In spite of the increasing acceptance of this view among sociologists and anthropologists, the notion that a problem is due to a single, albeit not simple, cause (and that it can be solved if the cause is removed) is still widespread among laymen. This insistence upon finding a single, unique explanation for a problem reflects childhood conditioning (children expect simple definite answers to their questions) and an impelling desire to solve each problem without delay.

Reformers and "armchair social scientists," like the alchemists, tend to seek a single solution to social problems. Thus, as Elliott and Merrill noted, the current belief is that political troubles are due to man's sinfulness. Problems of crime, poverty, unemployment, and the like are all ascribed to the weakening of religion. Some people believe that most, if not all, of our problems stem from a particular system, e.g., capitalism. Others hold that the root of most of our problems is to be found in the biological shortcomings of man—in other words, that they all narrow down to eugenics. All these assumed causes imply assumed solutions. Since the causes are supposed

to be quite definite, the means to be taken usually also appear to be rather clear.

As good an example as any of this concept of causation of social problems, which is known as the "particularistic fallacy," is the explanation of the causes of crime. Prior to scientific attempts at analysis of the phenomenon of crime, all sorts of fantastic reasons were given for its occurrence. Criminal behavior was assumed to be the result of wickedness, of possession by the devil, etc. But even with the appearance of systematic investigations of the etiology, or causation, of crime, the search for a single and unique cause of criminal behavior continued. Indeed, this quest has by no means been given up to this very day.

Cesare Lombroso, who is often referred to as the father of modern criminology, maintained (in his work, *Crime, Its Causes and Remedies)* that criminal behavior is primarily a biological phenomenon and is transmitted by heredity. Lombroso arrived at this conclusion from his observations, which are now considered spurious, that the criminal has definite physical stigmata, or anomalies, such as asymmetrical cranium, long lower jaw, flattened nose, etc., and that he represents an atavistic type, or a throwback to primitive man. This claim was disproved by the English statistician Charles Goring in *The English Convict.* By means of painstaking statistical measurements of several thousand criminals and noncriminals, Goring proved that the former do not differ from the latter in physical characteristics.

The notion that criminality is biologically determined was subsequently discarded. But almost simultaneously with this development, the American psychologist Henry H. Goddard asserted that crime and delinquency are due primarily to mental deficiency, especially feeble-mindedness. Goddard's contention, however, was soon afterwards negated by various researches. The claims of some recent investigators that emotional imbalance or glandular disturbance is to be considered the chief cause of criminal or delinquent behavior is also being seriously questioned, and it has been discarded by many criminologists. The thesis of the Dutch criminologist William A. Bonger that crime is a result mainly of the abuses or pressures of the capitalist system also finds few adherents.

The most generally accepted view at present is that criminal behavior is due to a number of interrelated factors involving per-

sonality and environment. It is held that no general cause or causes of crime can be given, for individuals become criminals for different reasons. In almost every instance the combination of factors, or total configuration, is unique, even though some common factors may be present in many cases. Moreover, a situation, circumstance, trait, or combination thereof that causes one person to turn to criminality may not affect another similarly. Criminology, as Walter C. Reckless stated in his *Criminal Behavior,* may be forced to abandon the hopeless search for general causes of crime and be satisfied with establishing the relative importance of certain conditions associated with criminal behavior. Although these factors will not explain the *causes* of criminal behavior, they will reveal the *risk* involved in them, which is, of course, of great importance in the search for remedies.

The origin and nature of the other major social problems are of a similar complexity. No single, clear-cut explanation can be offered for their occurrence. For this reason the theories attributing social problems to such general situations as social disorganization, cultural change, cultural lag, etc., must be assumed to be closer to scientific truth than those emphasizing specific causes of particular problems. To be sure, the "configurational" type of explanation of social problems is still in the nature of hypothesis and does not afford any ready solutions. But the "particularistic" kind of interpretation seems to be, on the whole, devoid of scientific validity; it offers no over-all solutions, but, at most, amelioration.

When considered generically, the origin of social problems, as we have seen, may be traced to physical, biological, mental, and cultural factors. Different authorities, while recognizing these factors as sources of social problems, emphasize one or the other as the primary source. Thus P. A. Parsons, in his *An Introduction to Modern Social Problems,* held that the incomplete adjustment of man to material resources is chiefly responsible for his problems. A. B. Wolfe in *Readings in Social Problems* maintained that the fundamental social problem is one of population. Ogburn contended that many social problems are the result of the failure of the original nature of man to adjust itself to constant changes in culture and its institutions. On the other hand, some psychologists and biologists claim that the chief source of social problems is to be found in mental and physical deficiencies and inferiorities.

SOME MAJOR CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS

Some of the major problems facing contemporary society have already been indicated in the preceding chapters dealing with the family, education, religion, and other institutions or aspects of social life. Several problems with far-reaching effects will be considered here; these are the problems of poverty, the blighted area or slum, crime, and war.

Poverty

John L. Gillin, in *Social Pathology,* asserted that poverty may be regarded as a condition in which a person cannot maintain himself in accordance with the living standards of his group and, hence, is unable to achieve the mental and physical efficiency to function usefully in it. The rich and the poor have been encountered wherever one man could acquire or control more of the desirable commodities than another. Historically, the existence of poverty and wealth side by side did not constitute an important social problem until an exchange system and a scale of values came into existence. With the expansion of trade on a world-wide scale, the great accumulation of wealth and its uneven distribution, and the establishment of definite living standards in the folkways, poverty began to loom large as a social problem. It was then, by comparing differences in economic status, that members of a society became aware of these differences, began to look upon themselves (and to be regarded by others) as either poor or rich in varying degrees.

Poverty is considered a problem, indeed becomes meaningful at all, only when obvious differences in economic status among members of a society are established and comparisons and evaluations of those differences are made. In the absence of these, poverty does not exist, even though life may be most precarious. The vast majority of primitive peoples, as Faris pointed out, in his book *Social Disorganization,* have been living in a state of greater or lesser privation. Lack of sufficient food and of other necessities is very common among them. Indeed, discomfort and suffering due to the inadequate supply of essentials, rather than comfort and well-being, were almost universal until recent times. Under such conditions people usually look upon their discomfort as a natural state, rather than as a problem calling for a solution. and hence accept it with-

out becoming particularly discontented. People do not feel the sting of poverty, unless it be extreme privation, as much from the consequences of physical suffering as from resentment at their lot as compared with that of others. Factors contributing to their bitter resentment of poverty are their awareness of failure to achieve more than what they have and their feeling of injustice against the whole scheme of things.

In the modern world, especially in Western societies, poverty moved to the forefront of social problems not because of an increase in misery (if anything, conditions had been constantly improving), but rather because of the attitude of resentment. People are not poor because they lack the necessities of life, such as food, clothing, and shelter, but only because their possessions are considered insufficient according to prevailing standards. In the United States, for example, the inability to live in a "comfortable" house, or to afford a radio, an automobile, and many another modern "convenience" may be, and often is, taken as an indication of poverty, and individuals forced to do without these things may feel resentful. Indignation increases as such "conveniences" begin to be regarded as "necessities." People commence to look upon themselves as "underprivileged," as deprived of what is their "right" to possess and enjoy. It is then that the problem of poverty becomes real and various schemes to reduce or eliminate it are sought.

In the United States, where the scale of living is higher than in most other countries, poverty is one of the foremost social problems. It is more pronounced because of the relatively high living standards. Although poverty in the sense of actual privation is far from having disappeared, it has been reduced to a minimum; hence the problem revolves primarily around the need of increasing the income of large masses of people so that they can enjoy the comforts which this country is believed to be able to afford to all its citizens and to which they are "entitled." It is with such questions that studies and discussions of the problem are usually concerned. The problem thus becomes one of economic malfunctioning, or maldistribution of wealth, rather than of poverty per se.

Although incomes in the United States have been steadily rising, there remain a relatively large number of people who live under conditions of poverty or near poverty, as measured by American standards. W. Wallace Weaver, in his *Social Problems,* estimated that 12 per cent to 15 per cent of the total population of the United

States live on a level of poverty. The 1953 *Statistical Abstract of the United States* showed that 14.4 per cent of American families received money incomes under $1,500 in 1951; of these, 4.4 per cent received incomes under $500; 4.7 per cent, $500-999; and 5.3 per cent, $1,000-1,499. Poverty is more pronounced among certain groups of people and certain sections of the population than among others. In 1951, only 12.3 per cent of the white families received incomes under $1,500, as compared with 36.8 per cent of the Negro families. Again, 9.2 per cent of urban families had incomes under $1,500, as compared with 35.5 per cent of the rural-farm families. These figures seem to indicate that even in the United States, the most prosperous nation in the world, and during a very prosperous period, poverty constitutes a significant social problem.

Additional statistics on poverty may be cited. In 1952, according to Harold G. Moulton *(Controlling Factors in Economic Development)*, 14.7 per cent of American families and individuals received incomes under $1,000, and 12.8 per cent received incomes of $1,000-$2,000. This is a radical shift upward compared with 1929, when 27.5 per cent of families and individuals had incomes under $1,000 and 37.8 per cent were in the $1,000–$2,000 class. But as late as 1964, while the median family income was $6,569, more than 5,000,000 families (over 10 per cent of all families) and 6,000,000 individuals without families earned less than $2,000.

What are the causes underlying this economic problem? They are many and very complex, and no attempt at analyzing them in detail can be undertaken here. The Gillins listed the following factors as primarily responsible for economic maladjustment in our society: (1) incapacity of the individual, which may be due to a faulty heredity or to the environment; (2) unfavorable physical conditions, such as poor natural resources, bad climate and weather, and epidemics; and (3) maldistribution of wealth and of income and the imperfect functioning of our economic institutions, resulting in business depressions with their accompanying widespread unemployment. Of the three factors, the last-named is considered by sociologists to be the crucial one. The failure of the economic system to distribute wealth justly is principally responsible for poverty today. Only a few individuals are unable to support themselves because of disabilities, and if they were the only poor people, the task of caring for them would be so trivial that poverty would not be an important social problem.

The Blighted Area

In their studies of social disorganization, sociologists discovered that it is usually in the blighted, or slum, areas located in the proximity of the center of a city, or in the "downtown" section, that the highest degree or social disorganization is encountered. Dividing the city into several concentric zones, following the scheme of Ernest W. Burgess, these investigators showed that as one proceeds from the inner two zones outward, one finds less disorganization until a point is reached at which there is a minimum of it.

One index of disorganization is usually associated with a number of others. In *Delinquency Areas,* Clifford R. Shaw emphasized the fact that crime and delinquency in Chicago are concentrated in certain sections, particularly those adjacent to the "Loop." For purposes of study he divided the city into nine concentric zones. He found the largest proportion of offenders of all kinds, including school truants, delinquents, and criminals, in the zones immediately surrounding the central business district. The highest crime and delinquency rates were obtained for zones 1 and 2, with the rates gradually declining with each successive zone. The rate tended to vary inversely with the distance from the center of the city. Shaw's study also found a close relationship of truancy, delinquency, and crime to blighted areas, i.e., sections characterized by physical deterioration, a decline in population, high mobility of population, lack of neighborhood pride, dependency, desertion, etc. A similar study (Shaw's and Henry D. McKay's *Social Factors in Juvenile Delinquency)* of other American cities showed approximately the same results. In this study, the cities investigated, which varied in size, population composition, and geographic locations, were Philadelphia, Cleveland, Richmond, Birmingham, Denver, and Seattle.

Sociological studies of crime, vice, suicide, and insanity indicate that these maladjustments are encountered most frequently in geographic areas which also suffer from other symptoms of disorganization such as those indicated above. Schmid's *Social Saga of Two Cities* reported that in Minneapolis nearly all types of crimes, including burglary, robbery, larceny, and homicide, are more prevalent in the central business district and in the zones immediately surrounding it than they are in the more distant zones; the lowest rate of incidence is in the sixth zone, which is farthest removed from the center of the city.

Similarly, Frederic M. Thrasher's *The Gang* showed that delinquent and criminal gangs in Chicago tend to concentrate in the disorganized areas, or slums, around the "Loop." These areas, which he called "interstitial" because they lie between the business district and the residential sections, are in the process of deterioration, as indicated by such symptoms of disorganization as "invasion" by business and industry, declining population, physical deterioration, and conflict between immigrant groups as well as between native groups with different cultural backgrounds.

Vice, too, as shown by Reckless, in his *Vice in Chicago,* flourishes in the deteriorated areas of the city around the business district, although in recent years, due to its suppression by the law, it has become decentralized, moving, under different guises, to other parts of the city, notably those sections with high mobility and anonymity, and to the "roadhouses" and "tourist camps" on the outskirts of cities or suburbs, which are beyond the jurisdiction of the city.

Crime

Crime may be defined as any act forbidden by law which society expects its authorized officials to enforce. The standards of conduct may be expressed either in written or unwritten form. Where there are no written laws, the forbidden acts are recognized and punished as transgressions against the traditions or mores of the community. All crime, then, may be regarded as behavior of individuals which is strongly disapproved by the group. Since societies differ in their standards of right and wrong and since each society changes them from time to time, criminal behavior is relative, not absolute.

Crime has had to be dealt with in all societies, past and present, but it became a major social problem only among civilized peoples. In primitive societies, the mores are strong enough to control individual behavior effectively, and the few who disobey the rules do not constitute a threat to the group. In civilized societies, especially those with large, heterogeneous populations, it is difficult to compel universal observance of the mores. Transgressions multiply, and it becomes necessary to enact laws to compensate for the ineffectiveness of the mores.

Reckless, in his *Criminal Behavior,* stated that societies in which crime is uncommon have these characteristics: they are relatively isolated from the outside world; they have little mobility of population; they have a culture which is comparatively static; they are

homogeneous in race and culture; they have little institutional disorganization, a minimum of class-differentiation, a single code of beliefs and customs, and strong control over their members. Societies with a high crime rate, on the other hand, possess characteristics which are almost the opposite of these. They have wide contacts with other societies and are highly mobile; their culture is undergoing constant change; they have a population which is heterogeneous in race and cultural background and is differentiated into various classes; they have several norms of conduct, which clash with one another; and they have limited control over the behavior of their members.

It is easy to see that the first set of characteristics describes primitive tribes and simple folk societies, such as backward, isolated peasant communities, and that the second delineates highly advanced societies. It appears, therefore, that crime as a social phenomenon is relatively unimportant in primitive, backward societies but is always a major problem in civilized, advanced societies. In a sense, crime, like many other social problems in our society, is the price men have to pay for the advantages of civilization.

Policies and methods for combatting crime are in a state of flux; authorities are far from unanimity regarding them. This is inevitable because of the complexity of the problem. Often the measures advocated are based upon a particular theory regarding the etiology of crime. Most sociologists believe that since there is no simple cause of this complex social problem, a many-sided approach should be used. They attribute crime mainly to the social environment and advocate social change as an essential method of crime prevention. Some criminologists, such as Bonger, believe that only a completely renovated society, one that has done away with private capitalism and its abuses, which he holds responsible for widespread criminality, will solve the problem. Those who do not go to this extreme, and most do not, see in various provisions and reforms and in constructive rehabilitative, rather than punitive, treatment of the criminal a way of effectively attacking the problem.

Donald R. Taft, in his *Criminology,* emphasized the fact that certain phases of our culture are criminogenic, i.e., conducive to criminal behavior. Among these are: constant change and flux, complexity of life, materialism, increasing impersonality in relationships, the lawless tradition of the frontier, and the universal custom of the "fix." Similarly, Milton L. Barron, in his book *The*

Juvenile in Delinquent Society, contends that delinquency inheres deeply in American culture. He sees in our culture forces which play "an incredibly greater role in making the individual juvenile delinquent than the individual freely determines for himself."

Crime is much more prevalent and constitutes a much more serious problem than is evident from crime statistics, which are notoriously unreliable, or from newspaper reports. From these sources one may obtain, at best, only a slight idea as to the prevalence of the relatively minor, conventional, crimes. As Barnes and Teeters pointed out in their *New Horizons in Criminology,* the real menace to society stems from "streamlined twentieth-century crime, born of the maturity of a competitive economic order—white-collar crime, racketeering, and corrupt political chicanery." They assert that the damage done by the conventional types of crime, alarming as it is, does not amount to a tenth of that inflicted by the various kinds of white-collar criminality. White-collar criminality was defined by Edwin H. Sutherland in his *Principles of Criminology* as crimes committed by persons in the upper and middle socio-economic levels of society in their business and professional practices. It is so prevalent, he stated, that there is practically no business or profession which does not have its racket and that, frequently, it is possible to obtain more crime news from the financial pages of newspapers than from their front pages.

There are no dependable figures on crime in the United States. Available statistics cover only those arrested and convicted, or the crimes known to the police, and even these figures are unreliable. Nevertheless, from data supplied by various agencies we can obtain a rough idea of the trend of conventional crimes.

In recent years crime has undoubtedly increased steadily. For example, in 1952 over two million major crimes were committed in this country—an increase of 8.2 per cent as compared with the total for the preceding year—and the situation has certainly not improved since then. In 1965, according to Uniform Crime Reports, the total number of crimes against property alone was 2,422,121. Furthermore, data from various penal and correctional institutions show that about half of the inmates are repeaters, or recidivists, reflecting the failure of our society to rehabilitate the criminal. No wonder that the nation, according to a recent report by J. Edgar Hoover, spends four or five times as much on the crime problem than on all kinds of public and private education put together.

The record is just as bad, or worse, for juvenile delinquency. In a recent four-year period, court cases increased 29 per cent, and a study by Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck *(One Thousand Juvenile Delinquents)* indicated that even a larger proportion of juvenile offenders than of the adult criminals are repeaters.

War

Today the problem of war constitutes the most serious threat to society. Future wars, if they come, will be fought with atomic and bacteriological weapons. Such wars may destroy civilization.

Wars have been fought since the beginning of human history. Ethnologists have been able to point to only a handful of nonliterate peoples, small in numbers, such as some of the Eskimo tribes, among whom organized warfare is practically nonexistent. War has been so universal and persistent and so much a part of the life of peoples that social scientists regard it as an established social institution. Moreover, with the advance of civilization, war has become more destructive and fraught with graver consequences. It may be said, ironically, that wars have become more cruel as man has become more "civilized." Warfare among "savage" tribes was relatively tame. "A savage," wrote Sumner and Keller, "would stand aghast before the wholesale slaughter of civilized warfare, and beside some of its methods his own are those of a gentleman."

The degree of aggressiveness among peoples, both in primitive and in civilized societies, varies considerably. Quincy Wright, in his *The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace,* noted that since the beginning of the seventeenth century European states fought about 2,300 battles. France was involved in 49 per cent of them, Austria-Hungary in 35 per cent, Prussia in 26 per cent, Great Britain and Russia each in 23 per cent, and other countries in lesser degrees. Wright concluded that the great powers are the most consistent fighters. Sorokin, in his *Social and Cultural Dynamics,* stated that in 950 years the French were at war 80 per cent of the time; in a period of 875 years, the English were at war 72 per cent of the time; and in 275 years, the Germans were at war 29 per cent of the time.

The causes of war are numerous and complex. They are not to be found in a pugnacious instinct, as once thought (no such instinct has been proved to exist), but rather in certain conditions that lead man into war. Sumner and Keller emphasized economic conditions and changes in population density which result in "earth-hunger";

they also listed other incentives to war (primarily affecting primitive societies) such as the opportunity to earn an easy living through plunder of property, the desire for glory, and the urge to find a relief from the monotony of life. Maurice R. Davie in his *Evolution of War* cited the love of excitement and the desire for glory and distinction, which are bestowed upon the warrior, as major causes of war among primitive peoples. To Sumner and Keller, war did not seem inevitable, even though it is deeply rooted in life conditions. They concluded that the threat of war can be diminished only by knowledge of the facts underlying the nature of war and by rational thinking.

Wright distinguished between the motives which induce leaders to make war and those which impel the masses to follow their leaders into war. The leaders strive for wealth, revenge, prestige, a means of subduing internal revolt; the masses desire adventure or plunder and respond to the appeals of loyalty and feminine approval, etc. Wright contended that the major causes of war are an obsolete legal system which fails to meet the social and economic needs of the people, who feel bitterly dissatisfied and demand remedies even at the cost of war; the division of states into "haves" and "have-nots"; and inadequate provision for settling international conflicts by peaceful means.

Despite the evil, waste, and destructiveness of war, mankind has derived a few benefits therefrom. In primitive societies it served as a means of creating solidarity and discipline within the group; it furthered more effective organization; it stimulated individual initiative; and by bringing isolated groups into contact with one another, it promoted the growth of culture. Barnes, in his *Social Institutions,* pointed out that war helped to create great states out of small primitive groups, thus introducing law and order into extensive territories; to pave the way, in some cases, for a more enduring peace; to abolish feudalism; and to promote scientific inventions of all kinds. But the benefits bestowed upon man by war have been completely overshadowed by the untold miseries that accompany it. This is especially true of modern wars, which are an almost unmitigated evil.

According to Barnes, the effects of modern war upon society are varied and profound. To begin with, the most important social institutions, such as the family, community, church, school, and property, become subordinated to the state and the army. The customary functions of these institutions are neglected. Most serious

are the effects upon the minds and hearts of the people, who become brutalized as a result of a relentless struggle in which no respect is shown for human dignity and life. War propaganda distorts the minds of individuals and stirs up feelings of hatred, turning whole nations into mobs. In short, instead of calling forth our noblest sentiments, war brings out in us the basest and most brutal traits.

The cost of modern wars in terms of human life is staggering. The Second World War resulted in close to ten million military deaths and about twelve million civilian deaths. The fact that modern wars involve civilians to an even greater extent than soldiers was demonstrated by saturation raids on Dresden, Germany, which killed a substantial part of the population in one night, and by the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, which killed 70,000 to 80,000 people.

The monetary cost of modern wars is fantastic. The First World War is estimated to have cost more than $400,000,000,000. The official estimate of the total cost of the Second World War is $1,116,991,463,034, to which should be added an estimated cost of property damage amounting to $230,900,000,000. The United States spent about $250,000,000 a day during most of the war; the total amounted to about $400,000,000,000. The monetary cost of war, like the cost in lives, has been constantly rising. James H. S. Bossard (in an article "War and the American Family") estimated that the cost of killing a soldier was 75 cents in the Roman wars, $3,000 in the Napoleonic War, $5,000 in the Civil War, $21,000 in the First World War and $50,000 in the Second World War.

The tremendous direct costs of war are frequently exceeded by subsequent expenditures such as pensions, insurance, and veterans' bonuses. The United States government disbursed in pensions to Civil War veterans and their dependents far more than the cost of the war itself. The financial burden after the First World War followed a similar pattern. Additional economic burdens arise from prolonged periods of industrial dislocation, which may result in social and economic upheavals. Thus, the United States government has spent billions to aid veterans of the First World War who were jobless and who failed in business.

In 1954 eight cents of every tax dollar went to pay interest on the national debt incurred chiefly in financing wars, and six cents went to pay veterans of past wars. Barnes calculated that with the money spent on the First World War the following peacetime benefits could have been achieved: a $2,500 house, stocked with $1,000 worth of

furniture, for every family in England, France, Belgium, Germany, Russia, the United States, Canada, and Australia; a $5,000,000 library and $10,000,000 university for every city of 200,000 inhabitants in these countries; a fund which, at 5 per cent interest would yield a sufficiently large sum to pay $1,000 annually indefinitely to 125,000 teachers and 125,000 nurses; and a remaining sum to buy all the property and wealth in France and Belgium. It is easy to calculate what could have been achieved with the approximately one and a quarter trillion dollars spent by all belligerents on the Second World War, plus the nearly four trillion dollars in economic losses, including property destruction.

War, as noted, is deeply rooted in man's traditions. The solution, if any, of this problem can be determined only through an exhaustive scientific study of the many factors involved in war as a social phenomenon. It certainly is not going to be solved merely by ardent desire and pious intentions. As Stuart Chase stated, in his *The Proper Study of Mankind,* if an end is to be put to war it will be done through scientific research into the problem. It is futile to continue to pursue the methods of the past. The diplomats, priests, poets, and sages, although they may have meant well, failed to show us the way. Hope for peace lies in the use of the scientific method of investigating all the ramifications of this intricate problem. Similarly, George A. Lundberg stated, in his *Can Science Save Us?,* that organizations such as the United Nations cannot solve the problem of war until more knowledge about human relations is made available. How can the United Nations insure world peace if the ablest representatives of the member nations do not know the precise causes of war and if they do not know exactly how to deal with the causes? Moreover, said Lundberg, proposed measures in behalf of permanent peace require popular support, but methods of securing popular support for them are still unknown. Obviously, then, extensive sociological research must be completed before the problem of war can be solved.

SOLUTIONS TO SOCIAL PROBLEMS

It is probable that no society free of problems ever existed, and it is doubtful that such a society will ever exist. Indeed, by its very nature, social life is productive of problems. Man, consequently, has

always been faced by problems of all kinds, to which he was impelled to find solutions.

How has man gone about finding solutions to his problems? Throughout the past he has employed the method of trial and error. Frequently he has also resorted to magic and supernatural forces. This was in line with his concept of causation. Upon achieving somewhat greater sophistication, man also tried to solve his problems by resorting to speculation, to armchair philosophizing. Instead of using scientific methods of investigation, he constructed utopian worlds in his imagination, worlds as they should be—with few problems or none at all.

Man has learned new, more effective methods of coping with his difficulties. A more realistic analysis of social problems has been made available by scientific research. But the old ineffective methods have by no means disappeared. There are several reasons for their persistence. One reason is that the social sciences have not yet been able to be specific as to what to do about urgent problems. A second reason, perhaps even more important, is that the remedial suggestions of science are too remote or long-range (they offer no "complete" solutions and guarantees, or panaceas) to be acceptable to most members of a society, who have to pass on them to make them workable. Still another reason is the resistance to, and mistrust of, a science, especially an "upstart" science like sociology, which prescribes remedies in matters traditionally dealt with by the people and their chosen leaders. (The natural sciences encountered a similar mistrust in the early stages of their development.) Finally, there is opposition to new methods because social problems involve values and sentiments, and an objective approach to them will naturally meet with great resistance. In spite of all this uncertainty and confusion, considerable progress has been made, if not in solving our problems, at least in dealing with them. Our approach at present is more realistic and promises to be more effective. Such progress must be credited to the advancing social sciences, including sociology, which has contributed a lion's share of the required scientific research. Current methods of dealing with social problems tend to be either remedial or preventive in nature. In other words, they aim at alleviating existing evils or at bringing about changes in the social order that will make their appearance unlikely. The remedial is now the more common method. Concern is usually shown only

after conditions have definitely become "pathological." The remedial approach treats the symptoms or consequences of a problem instead of the underlying causes. Preventive methods, on the other hand, require the recognition of conditions that may eventually create social problems—a most difficult thing to achieve. These methods require painstaking research so that the facts underlying each problem as it appears in its total complexity will be fully known before preventive action is taken; they are undoubtedly more desirable and are bound to be more effective than the remedial approach.

Reformers seeking solutions to social problems may be said to fall into two major categories, "remedists" and "preventists," depending upon which methods they tend to adopt. Within both of these categories there are reformers who pay little or no heed to the scientific facts regarding the problems to be solved. To be sure, such facts are still very scanty. But those already available are perhaps sufficient to indicate the nature of the problem and the kind of approach necessary. While some of these reformers are rather modest in their attempts and seek to eliminate the most serious problems, others aim at the eradication of all the troubles besetting mankind. Again, each type includes well-intentioned persons as well as opportunists, and individuals—laymen as well as scholars—who have become enamored with certain cure-all ideas.

Reformers, as Phelps has pointed out, have belonged to a variety of types throughout the ages. They have been drawn from the ranks of fanatics, sentimentalists, opportunists, radicals, professional busybodies, and practical leaders. From the standpoint of panaceas advocated by them, modern reformers may be classified into prohibitionists, diet-faddists, fundamentalists, eugenists, blue-law advocates, salvationists, spiritualists, etc. One type of reformers comprises individuals who are prompted to seek reform because of moral indignation. These individuals see things in terms of black and white, in absolutes. They accept no compromise. Phelps cited as an example the American suffragist Mary E. Walker, who arrived at the conclusion that the ills of the world would disappear if women adopted the custom of wearing men's clothes. Those who see in "education" or "better educational opportunities," in a return to "good old religion," in the abolition of all international tariffs, etc., the solution to most or all of our problems are in the same category of reformers. They advocate an immense variety of cure-all remedies for ushering in the millenium.

Such reformers, however, include serious scholars and thinkers in many fields, some of whom are extremely dogmatic. Others are moderate but vague as to their claims. Some of the numerous schemes advocated are sweeping, others limited; examples date back to ancient times. The utopian society so meticulously worked out by Plato in his *Republic* is the classical illustration of a solution to all of man's problems. In the modern world, cure-all reforms have taken the form either of some single, relatively simple, device, or of an elaborate scheme, calling for radical changes and the peaceful or violent reconstruction of society.

Advocates of extreme theories included Henry George, who advanced the single tax plan (a tax on land), and A. E. Wiggam, the eugenist, who regarded the biological improvement of the race and prevention of the propagation of the physically and mentally unfit as the solution to most social ills. Still another extremist was Karl Marx, who called for the abolition of the capitalistic system and its replacement by a communistic one as a way out of most of our problems. Among the advocates of more moderate schemes are some of the most famous social thinkers of the contemporary era. Ward regarded universal education and dissemination of knowledge as the chief means of bringing about the millennium. Ellwood held a similar opinion, also emphasizing a spiritual regeneration, a revived ethical Christianity. Sorokin, pointing to the critical situation in which contemporary society finds itself, concluded that salvation lies in a return to more spiritual values, to a stage of idealism. Similarly, Toynbee maintained that an active recognition of the true values of religion is the only way to avoid doom and to achieve a Kingdom of God on earth—or, as Barnes, in his critique of Toynbee's work, expressed it, "a sort of perpetual Christmas."

In contrast to these extremists, there are advocates of great caution, many of whom oppose all interference with evolutionary processes of societal life which are conceived by them as automatic. These are the upholders of the *laissez-faire* philosophy. Spencer was a staunch supporter of this view, holding, as we have seen, that man is automatically moving toward a better adjustment to life conditions, even though the road be strewn with all sorts of obstacles. Meddling in this evolutionary process, he held, is inadvisable and can lead only to curbing the freedom of the individual. Sumner and Keller, too, held that man's adjustment to conditions of life is automatic. Large-scale effective planning, they believed, is impossible

and may have disastrous results, particularly if it is contrary to the mores and folkways.

SOCIAL PLANNING

At present, few sociologists adhere to a strict philosophy of *laissez faire;* most of them believe that man must plan on the basis of facts discovered by means of research in order to deal effectively with his problems. The majority of sociologists would agree with Karl Mannheim's statement, in his *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction,* that there is no longer any choice between planning and *laissez faire,* but only between good and bad planning. They realize that social problems are largely man-made and are susceptible to treatment by man. Planning, as conceived by sociologists, should be preventive rather than remedial in nature even though it is usually undertaken to deal with problems already prevalent in the community.

Planning for a better society is not new. It dates back to ancient civilizations. In the past, however, projected plans were largely speculative and utopian schemes which can hardly be considered planning in the modern meaning of the term. Social planning, as we understand it today, is relatively recent in origin and is the result of the ever increasing number and complexity of problems. These in turn are the outgrowth of an ever more complex technological civilization. In the past social problems were solved "the hard way," by primitive trial-and-error methods. But, with the growing complexity of civilization, better and more satisfactory means had to be found to deal with social problems. The great need for scientific planning became obvious during the depression of the 1930's and even more so in the years following World War II.

According to Phelps, contemporary social planning is unprecedented because of (1) the importance and complexity of the problems for which solutions are sought, (2) the number of people that it involves, (3) the amount of the financial costs, (4) the thoroughgoing changes it requires, and (5) the methods of approach. The goals sought by contemporary planning correspond to the criteria used for measuring social problems namely: (1) eradication of waste and poverty, (2) prevention of physical and mental disease, (3) elimination of the social sources of all kinds of evils, and (4) extension of the freedoms of individuals.

Social planning, as conceived by the sociologist, must be based upon a thorough understanding of how culture evolved from the most primitive levels to the present complex, industrialized, urban civilization and of the forces at work in these transformations; of the relationship between man and his resources, between culture and the physical environment, and between diverse human groups; and of the effects of technological inventions upon the individual and his culture. Unlike planning in the past, which consisted mainly of metaphysical speculation or exhortation, present-day scientific planning is based upon empirical research, and its aim, as expressed by Odum, is to produce "the equivalent of a workable blueprint to serve as a program of action." Moreover it considers society from a long-range point of view and seeks to provide a long-range program of development.

According to Odum social planning, from the sociological point of view, is fundamentally a means to social progress, which he defined as "the mastery of physical and societal forces and the resulting social order through which the continuity of human evolution may be insured." On the other hand, he asserted, scientific social planning aims at the elimination or alleviation of problems created by the lag between technology and our nonmaterial aspects of culture. Finally, social planning seeks to provide the means by which a better and richer human existence may be achieved.

C. C. North held that the aim of social planning should be to adapt our culture to present needs. It is impossible, he stated in *Social Problems and Social Planning,* to discover permanent fixed goals if by these are meant a particular type of government, economic organization, educational system, religion, or other institution. These inevitably undergo change; no institutional form can perpetually meet the needs of society. Nevertheless, there are qualities inherent in social organization, certain principles and values, which are relatively permanent. These unchanging qualities, according to North, are reflected in the following five major goals: (1) an intelligently planned society, (2) a "more nearly rational" society, (3) a cooperative society, (4) a free society, and (5) a democratic society.

The roots of many contemporary social problems, as we have seen, are to be found in the lag existing between technology and social institutions. Barnes, in his *Social Institutions,* expressed the view of many sociologists when he maintained that practically all of our social problems are due chiefly to the gap between machines and institu-

tions. The misuse of natural resources, the starvation of millions in a world of plenty, the break-up of religion, the ineffectiveness of education, the demoralization of family life, and the high rate of crime and mental disease are all primarily the result of this cultural lag. We are trying he wrote, to control an "empire of laboratories and machines through basic institutions which were fully developed by the time of George Washington." Our attempt to control an "airplane era" by "oxcart institutions" cannot of course, succeed. Our major problem, said Barnes, is to close the immense gulf separating our social institutions from our material culture. This can be achieved only by adjusting the institutions to changed conditions of life. After this has been accomplished, we can begin to deal effectively with the numerous problems plaguing society.

A better adjustment to life depends upon a real understanding of the workings of human society. Such understanding can be achieved only through scientific study, and this requires patient, painstaking labor, the gradual accumulation of objective data pertaining to societal phenomena. To quote Sumner and Keller, the study of society must be "purely scientific; coldly scientific; so austerely unmindful of contemporary 'problems' as deliberately to seek distance and detachment from them." These sociologists insisted on the need for a body of data pertaining to societal life similar to the data found by Darwin concerning organic life. They expressed the hope that the labors of a sociologist of Darwinian stature who may appear in the future will provide an understanding of societal laws that will enable us to "make a farsighted and accurately planned campaign against problems instead of a series of desultory and disconnected engagements."

Lundberg attributed our inability to solve social problems to (1) lack of a sufficient understanding of the nature of society and the forces shaping human relationships, and (2) a persistent belief that social problems can be solved by merely willing them to be solved, that ways out of difficulties can be found without the same kind of laborious search (in the physical and biological sciences) which eventually resulted in the solution of many physical problems posed by nature.

According to Lundberg, the main difficulty is the widespread belief that human relationships are not amenable to scientific study. Also, most people believe that the solutions to social problems are known and need only be applied. Many people, said Lundberg, de-

clare that "the real problem is in the hearts of men." Through constant repetition in the course of centuries, this cliché became very comforting and reassuring, particularly to the confused and disillusioned. But there has been nothing wrong with the hearts of men, who have always possessed a strong desire for peace and for freedom from disease and hunger. The mere desire, however, did not produce results; men succeeded in solving problems not through a change of heart but only through the use of intelligence and scientific methods. It is only wishful thinking to depend exclusively upon panaceas or ideals such as the Ten Commandments and the Golden Rule, universal education, socialism, free enterprise, communism, and world union. Each social problem must be studied scientifically so that the real facts involved in it will become known and definite techniques for dealing with it will be developed.

Social planning is not merely a procedure to be undertaken by specialists or authorities. In the modern world it requires understanding and continuous participation among the masses for whom and by whom modifications in customs and institutions are to be evolved. Planning can be of little avail, therefore, unless the individual learns to view social phenomena objectively so that, with the aid of specialists or authorities, he will be enabled to cooperate in the formation and administration of social policy. For social planning to be meaningful, it must be applicable to everyday living; to become applicable and successful it must have as its base large numbers of educated persons who have been trained to observe social phenomena carefully and to arrive at valid interpretations and conclusions. Unfortunately, too many people make up their minds about social problems on the basis of "common sense," random observation, and "practical experience," all of which may lead them merely to repeat the same error so frequently that they soon accept it as "natural." The world is in urgent need of people who have been conditioned to be self-critical, to depend on fact rather than fancy, to reject catchwords, stereotypes, and prejudices, and to accept scientific knowledge as the cornerstone of an enlightened society.

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PROFESSOR SAMUEL KOENIG received his M.A. and Ph.D. degrees from Yale University. He is author, co-author, or editor of several books on sociology and has contributed numerous articles to professional journals. Currently he is Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at Brooklyn College of the City University of New York.

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